Operational Closure and Self-Referentiality. Hume's Theory of Causal Inference from the Standpoint of Second-Order Cybernetics

This article deals with the problem of how operationally closed systems can construct a reality and get therefore their bearings in the world, but rather than looking for new theoretical solutions it suggests to go back to the empirical philosophical tradition of the first modernity, in order to find some of the roots of a really modern solution to such a problem. Following a suggestion of both the leaders of first- and second-order cybernetics Alfred N. Wiener and Heinz von Foerster, this article re-frames David Hume’s theory of causal inference in order to verify the basic assumption that not only Hume anticipated second-order cybernetics in interesting ways, but we can also use Hume and second-order cybernetics to inform each other leading to a better understanding of both. Starting from the statement according which the problem of causality represents “one of the most sublime question in philosophy”, the article goes deeply inside the problem of causality in order to argue that the new epistemological deal has to be conceived of as a process of internalization of cognitive facts. This path of search leads to cast new light on the paramount concept of sign, conceived of as the possibility that certain environmental events or data again set off the self-reference of a cognitive system, which thus switches from memory to expectation. Aim of this article is finally to show that the main results of a interdisciplinary theory of cognition such as second-order cybernetics are particularly congruent with the speculations of the Scottish philosopher and that Hume’s reflections still have at the same time an extraordinary relevance regarding the most advanced elaboration of the main epistemological problems.