Ethics of accounting information manipulation in local government: opportunism or selfishness?

This paper addresses the ethics of accounting information manipulation (AIM) within the political domain, with a particular focus on local government—an area that remains under-researched. We developed a theoretical framework distinguishing two key contingencies influencing AIM: (1) the tension between pursuing organizational or personal interests and providing neutral accounting information, and (2) the extent of information asymmetry. These dimensions define four AIM archetypes. In addition, we draw on Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) to assess the ethical aspects of each archetype. To investigate these aspects, the study employs real-life constructs (RLCs)—short cases designed to present AIM dilemmas and stimulate ethical reflection during interviews. Consistent with prior research, our findings indicate that AIM motivated by personal gain generally attracts stronger disapproval than AIM aimed at advancing organizational goals. Furthermore, manipulation that compromises the integrity of financial representation is considered less acceptable than manipulation that merely limits the amount of disclosed information.