This is an argument in defense of a constructivist account of practical knowledge, which revolves around the phenomenology of self-reflexivity.

It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999b: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space between realist and relativist accounts of ethics” (O’Neill 1988: 1). Furthermore, they argue that their practical conception of objectivity succeeds in making sense of certain features of morality, such as its categorical authority and its relation to rational agency, which escape rival theories (Korsgaard 1996b, 2003). To this extent, constructivism claims a privileged place in meta-ethics. The legitimacy of this claim is widely challenged. Precisely because of its practical conception of objectivity, many – including some constructivists – regard constructivism as a first-order normative theory, rather than as a meta-ethical position, hence not on a par with realism. Some critics object that constructivism fails to offer a distinct meta-ethics because it is structurally incomplete and thus must be combined with a fully-fledged meta-ethics (Hussain and Shah 2006); others argue that it tacitly relies on realism (Shafer-Landau 2003; Timmons 2003; Larmore 2008).

Constructivism about practical knowledge / Bagnoli, Carla. - STAMPA. - (2013), pp. 153-182. [10.1017/CBO9781139094221.009]

Constructivism about practical knowledge

BAGNOLI, Carla
2013

Abstract

It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999b: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space between realist and relativist accounts of ethics” (O’Neill 1988: 1). Furthermore, they argue that their practical conception of objectivity succeeds in making sense of certain features of morality, such as its categorical authority and its relation to rational agency, which escape rival theories (Korsgaard 1996b, 2003). To this extent, constructivism claims a privileged place in meta-ethics. The legitimacy of this claim is widely challenged. Precisely because of its practical conception of objectivity, many – including some constructivists – regard constructivism as a first-order normative theory, rather than as a meta-ethical position, hence not on a par with realism. Some critics object that constructivism fails to offer a distinct meta-ethics because it is structurally incomplete and thus must be combined with a fully-fledged meta-ethics (Hussain and Shah 2006); others argue that it tacitly relies on realism (Shafer-Landau 2003; Timmons 2003; Larmore 2008).
2013
Constructivism in ethics
9781107019218
-Cambridge University Press / New York:40 West 20th Street:New York, NY 10011:(800)872-7423, (212)924-3900, EMAIL: journals_subscriptions@cup.org, INTERNET: http://www.journals.cambridge.org, Fax: (212)691-3239 -Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.
REGNO UNITO DI GRAN BRETAGNA
Constructivism about practical knowledge / Bagnoli, Carla. - STAMPA. - (2013), pp. 153-182. [10.1017/CBO9781139094221.009]
Bagnoli, Carla
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Bagnoli 2013 Constructivism about PK CUP offprint.pdf

Accesso riservato

Tipologia: Versione dell'autore revisionata e accettata per la pubblicazione
Dimensione 129.61 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
129.61 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Licenza Creative Commons
I metadati presenti in IRIS UNIMORE sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono rilasciati con licenza Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale (CC BY 4.0), salvo diversa indicazione.
In caso di violazione di copyright, contattare Supporto Iris

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/976101
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 27
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 24
social impact