In this paper I present and develop the reading of so-called 'hinge propositions' in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* already advanced in my *Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense* (Palgrave, 2010). I also draw out its consequences for a number of issues, such as Wittgenstein's anti-skeptical strategies and whether our basic certainties are effable as such.
Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense / Coliva, Annalisa. - In: PHILOSOPHIA. - ISSN 1574-9274. - STAMPA. - 41:1(2013), pp. 1-12. [10.1007/s11406-012-9399-9]
Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense
COLIVA, Annalisa
2013
Abstract
In this paper I present and develop the reading of so-called 'hinge propositions' in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* already advanced in my *Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense* (Palgrave, 2010). I also draw out its consequences for a number of issues, such as Wittgenstein's anti-skeptical strategies and whether our basic certainties are effable as such.
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