This paper aims to highlight the importance of banks’ Internal Corporate Governance (ICG),viewed as an operational mitigation instrument, in a context where banks enjoy a high degree oforganisational flexibility due to principle-based regulatory and risk-based supervisory approaches.The recent crisis has shown, on the one hand, that financial mitigations (i.e. capital requirements) are,per se, not sufficient to ensure the stability of the banks (which underpins the soundness of the entirefinancial system) and, on the other hand, the failure of the light-touch supervisory approach. The mainresearch question is whether the improvement of ICG, involving proper protection for stakeholdersand the switch to a more intrusive supervisory model, will be able to offset the failures of marketdiscipline revealed by the crisis and, together with Basel 3’s reinforced capital adequacy regime,strengthen the resilience of the financial system, without the reintroduction of structural reforms. In theEuropean Union, the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and, above all, the three newEuropean Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) will play a crucial role in this process.

Gualandri, E., E., Mangone e A., Stanziale. "Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks, Regulators and Supervisors" Working paper, CEFIN WORKING PAPERS, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi - Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2011. https://doi.org/10.25431/11380_746900

Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks, Regulators and Supervisors

Gualandri, E.;
2011

Abstract

This paper aims to highlight the importance of banks’ Internal Corporate Governance (ICG),viewed as an operational mitigation instrument, in a context where banks enjoy a high degree oforganisational flexibility due to principle-based regulatory and risk-based supervisory approaches.The recent crisis has shown, on the one hand, that financial mitigations (i.e. capital requirements) are,per se, not sufficient to ensure the stability of the banks (which underpins the soundness of the entirefinancial system) and, on the other hand, the failure of the light-touch supervisory approach. The mainresearch question is whether the improvement of ICG, involving proper protection for stakeholdersand the switch to a more intrusive supervisory model, will be able to offset the failures of marketdiscipline revealed by the crisis and, together with Basel 3’s reinforced capital adequacy regime,strengthen the resilience of the financial system, without the reintroduction of structural reforms. In theEuropean Union, the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and, above all, the three newEuropean Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) will play a crucial role in this process.
Novembre
Gualandri, E.; Mangone, E.; Stanziale, A.
Gualandri, E., E., Mangone e A., Stanziale. "Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks, Regulators and Supervisors" Working paper, CEFIN WORKING PAPERS, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi - Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2011. https://doi.org/10.25431/11380_746900
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
CEFIN-WP29.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Versione dell'editore (versione pubblicata)
Dimensione 394.71 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
394.71 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

Licenza Creative Commons
I metadati presenti in IRIS UNIMORE sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono rilasciati con licenza Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale (CC BY 4.0), salvo diversa indicazione.
In caso di violazione di copyright, contattare Supporto Iris

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/746900
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact