This article argues in defense of the concept of moral responsibility. It shows that the claim that we cannot dispense with the concept of moral responsibility does not force us outside the bounds of the naturalistic construal of reality. Responsibility is a normative dialogical concept. By clarifying the dialogical nature of responsibility and specifying its implications, the reductive pretenses of naturalism are questioned.
Responsibility for Action / Bagnoli, Carla. - In: PARADIGMI. - ISSN 1120-3404. - STAMPA. - 27:(2010), pp. 75-86.
Responsibility for Action
BAGNOLI, Carla
2010
Abstract
This article argues in defense of the concept of moral responsibility. It shows that the claim that we cannot dispense with the concept of moral responsibility does not force us outside the bounds of the naturalistic construal of reality. Responsibility is a normative dialogical concept. By clarifying the dialogical nature of responsibility and specifying its implications, the reductive pretenses of naturalism are questioned.
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