In an economic perspective, punitive damages and class actions can be viewed as sharing a common economic function – creating optimal deterrence. Building on Parisi and Cenini (2010), we study the effect of alternative procedural regimes on the effectiveness of punitive damages and class actions. Specifically, we compare the workings of punitive damages and class actions in the American and English (“loser-pays”) regimes. Our findings help explain the limited use and late adoption of class actions and punitive damages in Europe.
Incentive Effects of Class Actions and Punitive Damages Under Alternative Procedural Regimes / Luppi, Barbara; F., Parisi; M., Cenini. - In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0929-1261. - STAMPA. - 32(2)(2011), pp. 229-240.
Data di pubblicazione: | 2011 |
Titolo: | Incentive Effects of Class Actions and Punitive Damages Under Alternative Procedural Regimes |
Autore/i: | Luppi, Barbara; F., Parisi; M., Cenini |
Autore/i UNIMORE: | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9241-z |
Rivista: | |
Volume: | 32(2) |
Pagina iniziale: | 229 |
Pagina finale: | 240 |
Codice identificativo ISI: | WOS:000294503500006 |
Codice identificativo Scopus: | 2-s2.0-80052272700 |
Citazione: | Incentive Effects of Class Actions and Punitive Damages Under Alternative Procedural Regimes / Luppi, Barbara; F., Parisi; M., Cenini. - In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0929-1261. - STAMPA. - 32(2)(2011), pp. 229-240. |
Tipologia | Articolo su rivista |
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