According to the EC Directive on takeovers regulation, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a s.c. “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.

White knights and black knightsDoes the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies? / Mucciarelli, Federico Maria. - In: EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW. - ISSN 1613-2548. - STAMPA. - 4(2006), pp. 408-425.

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