According to the EC Directive on takeovers regulation, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a s.c. “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.
White knights and black knightsDoes the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies? / Mucciarelli, Federico Maria. - In: EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW. - ISSN 1613-2548. - STAMPA. - 4:(2006), pp. 408-425.
White knights and black knightsDoes the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies?
MUCCIARELLI, Federico Maria
2006
Abstract
According to the EC Directive on takeovers regulation, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a s.c. “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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