The paper argues that Martin Davies's recent distinction between two kinds of transmission failure as well as his distinction between two kinds of epistemic projects are spurious. I then offer a better characterisation of the various kinds of epistemic projects in which appeal to Moore's Proof can be made and accordingly assess the latter's chances of success.
Moore's Proof and Martin Davies's epistemic projects / Coliva, Annalisa. - In: AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. - ISSN 0004-8402. - STAMPA. - 88/1:(2010), pp. 101-116. [10.1080/00048400802587317]
Moore's Proof and Martin Davies's epistemic projects
COLIVA, Annalisa
2010
Abstract
The paper argues that Martin Davies's recent distinction between two kinds of transmission failure as well as his distinction between two kinds of epistemic projects are spurious. I then offer a better characterisation of the various kinds of epistemic projects in which appeal to Moore's Proof can be made and accordingly assess the latter's chances of success.
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