This article explores the structure of the Italian capitalistic system by focusing on the relationships between financial - banks, insurances and holdings - and industrial firms in Italy during the period 1952-72 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database - Imita.db - containing data on over 300,000 directors of Italian joint-stock companies for the years 1952, 1960 and 1972. After showing a descriptive statistics of the firms and directors included in the database, the article develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The article confirms that Italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues thatinterlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the mahor private firms and their connections with State owned firms. In 1952 and 1960, the system, centred on larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after the natioanlisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies.
The structure of Italian capitalism, 1952-1972: new evidence using the interlocking directorates technique / Rinaldi, Alberto; Vasta, M.. - In: FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW. - ISSN 0968-5650. - STAMPA. - 12:2(2005), pp. 173-198. [10.1017/S0968565005000090]
The structure of Italian capitalism, 1952-1972: new evidence using the interlocking directorates technique
RINALDI, Alberto;
2005
Abstract
This article explores the structure of the Italian capitalistic system by focusing on the relationships between financial - banks, insurances and holdings - and industrial firms in Italy during the period 1952-72 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database - Imita.db - containing data on over 300,000 directors of Italian joint-stock companies for the years 1952, 1960 and 1972. After showing a descriptive statistics of the firms and directors included in the database, the article develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The article confirms that Italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues thatinterlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the mahor private firms and their connections with State owned firms. In 1952 and 1960, the system, centred on larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after the natioanlisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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