This paper deals with the optimal regulatory policy of a monopolist producing two goods and with two-dimensional private information about costs. The case of perfectly and negatively correlated cost's parameters is analyzed and a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism by means of easily interpretable conditions is obtained.
Two-Dimensional Screening: A case of Monopoly Regulation / Brighi, Luigi; D'Amato, M.. - In: RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1090-9443. - STAMPA. - 56:3(2002), pp. 251-264. [10.1006/reec.2002.0280]
Two-Dimensional Screening: A case of Monopoly Regulation
BRIGHI, Luigi;
2002
Abstract
This paper deals with the optimal regulatory policy of a monopolist producing two goods and with two-dimensional private information about costs. The case of perfectly and negatively correlated cost's parameters is analyzed and a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism by means of easily interpretable conditions is obtained.
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