Autonomous systems are often complex and prone to software failures and cyber-attacks. We introduce RVAFTs, an extension of Attack-Fault Trees (AFTs) with runtime events that can be used to construct runtime monitors. These monitors are able to detect when failures, that can be caused either by an attack or by a fault, occur. The safety and security properties monitored are, in turn, derived from the hierarchical decomposition of RVAFTs. Our approach not only provides further use of AFTs, but also improves the process of instrumentation often required in runtime verification. We explain the principles and provide a simple case study demonstrating how RVAFTs can be used in practice. Through this we are also able to evaluate the detection of faults and attacks as well as assessing the computational overhead of the monitors.

Extending Attack-Fault Trees with Runtime Verification / Cardoso, R. C.; Ferrando, A.; Fisher, M.. - In: ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE. - ISSN 2075-2180. - 371:371(2022), pp. 193-207. ( 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Autonomous Systems, FMAS 2022 and 4th International Workshop on Automated and Verifiable Software sYstem DEvelopment, ASYDE 2022 deu 2022) [10.4204/EPTCS.371.14].

Extending Attack-Fault Trees with Runtime Verification

Ferrando A.;
2022

Abstract

Autonomous systems are often complex and prone to software failures and cyber-attacks. We introduce RVAFTs, an extension of Attack-Fault Trees (AFTs) with runtime events that can be used to construct runtime monitors. These monitors are able to detect when failures, that can be caused either by an attack or by a fault, occur. The safety and security properties monitored are, in turn, derived from the hierarchical decomposition of RVAFTs. Our approach not only provides further use of AFTs, but also improves the process of instrumentation often required in runtime verification. We explain the principles and provide a simple case study demonstrating how RVAFTs can be used in practice. Through this we are also able to evaluate the detection of faults and attacks as well as assessing the computational overhead of the monitors.
2022
4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Autonomous Systems, FMAS 2022 and 4th International Workshop on Automated and Verifiable Software sYstem DEvelopment, ASYDE 2022
deu
2022
371
193
207
Cardoso, R. C.; Ferrando, A.; Fisher, M.
Extending Attack-Fault Trees with Runtime Verification / Cardoso, R. C.; Ferrando, A.; Fisher, M.. - In: ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE. - ISSN 2075-2180. - 371:371(2022), pp. 193-207. ( 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Autonomous Systems, FMAS 2022 and 4th International Workshop on Automated and Verifiable Software sYstem DEvelopment, ASYDE 2022 deu 2022) [10.4204/EPTCS.371.14].
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
2209.14044v1.pdf

Open access

Tipologia: VOR - Versione pubblicata dall'editore
Licenza: [IR] creative-commons
Dimensione 337.03 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
337.03 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Licenza Creative Commons
I metadati presenti in IRIS UNIMORE sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono rilasciati con licenza Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale (CC BY 4.0), salvo diversa indicazione.
In caso di violazione di copyright, contattare Supporto Iris

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1383133
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact