The paper examines the development of Wittgenstein's views regarding the status of the proposition "There are objects", from the Tractatus to On Certainty, and compares it with Carnap's metalinguistic account.
‘So one cannot say “There are objects” as one says “There are books”’: From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap, via On Certainty 35–37 / Coliva, A.. - (2025), pp. 303-318.
‘So one cannot say “There are objects” as one says “There are books”’: From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap, via On Certainty 35–37
Coliva, A.
2025
Abstract
The paper examines the development of Wittgenstein's views regarding the status of the proposition "There are objects", from the Tractatus to On Certainty, and compares it with Carnap's metalinguistic account.
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