Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density.

Social closure and the evolution of cooperation via Indirect reciprocity / Righi, Simone; Takács, Károly. - In: SCIENTIFIC REPORTS. - ISSN 2045-2322. - 8:1(2018), pp. N/A-N/A. [10.1038/s41598-018-29290-0]

Social closure and the evolution of cooperation via Indirect reciprocity

Simone RIGHI;
2018

Abstract

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density.
2018
8
1
N/A
N/A
Social closure and the evolution of cooperation via Indirect reciprocity / Righi, Simone; Takács, Károly. - In: SCIENTIFIC REPORTS. - ISSN 2045-2322. - 8:1(2018), pp. N/A-N/A. [10.1038/s41598-018-29290-0]
Righi, Simone; Takács, Károly
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1326094
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