Problems of cooperation have often been simplified as the choice between defection and cooperation, although in many empirical situations it is also possible to walk away from the interaction. We present the results of two lab-in-the-field experiments with a diverse pool of subjects who play optional and compulsory public goods games both with and without punishment. We find that the most important institution to foster cooperation is punishment, which is more effective in a compulsory game. In contrast to Rand and Nowak (Nat Commun 2(1):1–7, 2011), we find that loners are not responsible for anti-social punishment, which is mostly imputable to low-contributors (free-riders). Loners neither totally free-ride nor they significantly punish cooperators (or other types of players): they simply avoid all forms of participation whenever possible.

Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment / Pancotto, F.; Righi, S.; Takacs, K.. - In: THEORY AND DECISION. - ISSN 1573-7187. - 95:3(2023), pp. 405-428. [10.1007/s11238-023-09929-9]

Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment

Pancotto F.
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Righi S.
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2023

Abstract

Problems of cooperation have often been simplified as the choice between defection and cooperation, although in many empirical situations it is also possible to walk away from the interaction. We present the results of two lab-in-the-field experiments with a diverse pool of subjects who play optional and compulsory public goods games both with and without punishment. We find that the most important institution to foster cooperation is punishment, which is more effective in a compulsory game. In contrast to Rand and Nowak (Nat Commun 2(1):1–7, 2011), we find that loners are not responsible for anti-social punishment, which is mostly imputable to low-contributors (free-riders). Loners neither totally free-ride nor they significantly punish cooperators (or other types of players): they simply avoid all forms of participation whenever possible.
2023
95
3
405
428
Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment / Pancotto, F.; Righi, S.; Takacs, K.. - In: THEORY AND DECISION. - ISSN 1573-7187. - 95:3(2023), pp. 405-428. [10.1007/s11238-023-09929-9]
Pancotto, F.; Righi, S.; Takacs, K.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
THEO2023PUBLISHED.pdf

Accesso riservato

Descrizione: Published version from the editor
Tipologia: Versione pubblicata dall'editore
Dimensione 622.41 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
622.41 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Licenza Creative Commons
I metadati presenti in IRIS UNIMORE sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono rilasciati con licenza Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale (CC BY 4.0), salvo diversa indicazione.
In caso di violazione di copyright, contattare Supporto Iris

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1305066
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact