This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case.
Brighi, Luigi e D'Amato, M.. "Three-Types Models of Multidimensional Screening" Working paper, MATERIALI DI DISCUSSIONE, Dipartimento di Economia Politica - Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2005. https://doi.org/10.25431/11380_634623
Three-Types Models of Multidimensional Screening
BRIGHI, Luigi;
2005
Abstract
This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case.
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