We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual process theory, the persuadee has to sustain a cognitive effort – the elaboration cost – in order to fully and precisely elaborate information. The persuader makes an offer to the persuadee and, aware that she is a dual process reasoner, also sends her a costly signal – the reference cue – which refers the offer to a category of offers whose average quality is known by the persuadee. Initially, the actual quality of the offer by the persuader is hidden to the persuadee, while the signal is visible. Then, the persuadee can either rely on cheap low elaboration and form expectations on the basis of the signal – thinking coarsely, i.e., by category – or engage in costly high elaboration to attain knowledge of the actual quality of the offer. This signaling setup allows us to keep the assumption that agents are both rational and Bayesian and, at the same time, to match many of the findings emphasized by well established psychological models of persuasion – such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the HeuristicSystematic Model. In addition, the model provides novel theoretical results such as the possibility of separating equilibria that do not rely on the single-crossing property and, in particular, the emergence of a new phenomenon that we name reverse-signaling, where high types send low signals and low types send high signals.

Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2014.

Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs

Bilancini, E.;
2014

Abstract

We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual process theory, the persuadee has to sustain a cognitive effort – the elaboration cost – in order to fully and precisely elaborate information. The persuader makes an offer to the persuadee and, aware that she is a dual process reasoner, also sends her a costly signal – the reference cue – which refers the offer to a category of offers whose average quality is known by the persuadee. Initially, the actual quality of the offer by the persuader is hidden to the persuadee, while the signal is visible. Then, the persuadee can either rely on cheap low elaboration and form expectations on the basis of the signal – thinking coarsely, i.e., by category – or engage in costly high elaboration to attain knowledge of the actual quality of the offer. This signaling setup allows us to keep the assumption that agents are both rational and Bayesian and, at the same time, to match many of the findings emphasized by well established psychological models of persuasion – such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the HeuristicSystematic Model. In addition, the model provides novel theoretical results such as the possibility of separating equilibria that do not rely on the single-crossing property and, in particular, the emergence of a new phenomenon that we name reverse-signaling, where high types send low signals and low types send high signals.
2014
Giugno
Bilancini, E.; Boncinelli, L.
Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2014.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1292876
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