In this paper we study how the presence of a small amount of noise in signaling games impacts on the likelihood of separation and, hence, the likelihood of information transmission. We consider a variant of a standard signaling model where a source of exogenous noise affects the signals that agents observe. Noise, even if tiny, poses tight constraints on beliefs by making all signals possible along the equilibrium path. We show that separation cannot be obtained in equilibrium if the noise is small enough – but not nil. In particular, for any separating profile, if noise is sufficiently small then the sender has a profitable deviation consisting of a signal reduction. Instead, the pooling equilibrium where all sender’s types pool on the minimum signal always exists, independently of the level of noise. These results provide a new source of interest in pooling equilibria.

Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Small Noise in Signaling Selects Pooling on Minimum Signal" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2014.

Small Noise in Signaling Selects Pooling on Minimum Signal

Bilancini, E.;
2014-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we study how the presence of a small amount of noise in signaling games impacts on the likelihood of separation and, hence, the likelihood of information transmission. We consider a variant of a standard signaling model where a source of exogenous noise affects the signals that agents observe. Noise, even if tiny, poses tight constraints on beliefs by making all signals possible along the equilibrium path. We show that separation cannot be obtained in equilibrium if the noise is small enough – but not nil. In particular, for any separating profile, if noise is sufficiently small then the sender has a profitable deviation consisting of a signal reduction. Instead, the pooling equilibrium where all sender’s types pool on the minimum signal always exists, independently of the level of noise. These results provide a new source of interest in pooling equilibria.
Giugno
Bilancini, E.; Boncinelli, L.
Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Small Noise in Signaling Selects Pooling on Minimum Signal" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2014.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1292875
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