This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward dierent Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic ecient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education ecient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights.
Lancia, F. e R., Russo. "A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2010.
A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts
Lancia, F.;
2010
Abstract
This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward dierent Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic ecient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education ecient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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