In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result

Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2010.

Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions

Bilancini, E.;
2010-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result
Aprile
Bilancini, E.; Boncinelli, L.
Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2010.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1292467
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