In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result
Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2010.
Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions
Bilancini, E.;
2010
Abstract
In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and discuss the relevant consequences of our result
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