We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median voter model of citizenship laws determination. Next we test the implications of the model on a new data set on citizenship laws across countries of the world. We show that they have responded endogenously to economic and institutional determinants. Migration pushes national legislation in the direction of jus sanguinis. Moreover, the impact of migration interacts with that of the legal tradition. In particular, countries with a jus soli origin tend to restrict when facing an increase in immigration, while in jus sanguinis countries migration has a negligible impact. The welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation, while demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, while the instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual impact.

Bertocchi, G. e C., Strozzi. "The evolution of citizenship: economic and institutional determinants" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2007.

The evolution of citizenship: economic and institutional determinants

Bertocchi, G.;Strozzi, C.
2007

Abstract

We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median voter model of citizenship laws determination. Next we test the implications of the model on a new data set on citizenship laws across countries of the world. We show that they have responded endogenously to economic and institutional determinants. Migration pushes national legislation in the direction of jus sanguinis. Moreover, the impact of migration interacts with that of the legal tradition. In particular, countries with a jus soli origin tend to restrict when facing an increase in immigration, while in jus sanguinis countries migration has a negligible impact. The welfare burden proves not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation, while demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, while the instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual impact.
2007
Novembre
Bertocchi, G.; Strozzi, C.
Bertocchi, G. e C., Strozzi. "The evolution of citizenship: economic and institutional determinants" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2007.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1292054
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