SixPack: Abusing ABS to avoid Misbehavior detection in VANETs

This paper presents SixPack, a cyber attack to VANET communications that is able to go undetected by the current state-of-the-art anomaly detectors. The SixPack attack is a dynamic attack conducted by an insider attacker who modifies the content of the Basic Safety Messages to pretend a sudden activation of the braking system with the consequent activation of the Anti-lock Braking System, and create a fake representation of the vehicle. The attacker then rejoins the fake representation of the vehicle with the real one, avoiding the current state-of-the-art anomaly detectors. We experimentally evaluated the evasion capabilities of the SixPack attack using the F2MD test framework on the LuST and LuSTMini city scenarios, demonstrating the ability of the attacker to generate a high percentage of false positives that prevent the attack from being detected consistently.