Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis

Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The method of analysis in metaphysics”, this article argues that, in fact, Stebbing anticipated some of Moore’s ideas in “Proof of an external world”, and even ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. It further argues that Stebbing cast an original light on the method of analysis, while at the same time being much more aware of its limitations than Moore in “A defence of common sense”. In fact, her reservations anticipated some of Wittgenstein’s criticisms, in Philosophical Investigations, of his earlier logical atomism. It is concluded that Stebbing’s paper is a treasure trove of seminal ideas both in metaphysics and in epistemology, the full significance of which is better appreciated by reading it in connection with the work of these founding fathers of analytic philosophy.