In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a riskdominant convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider a model where a population of agents play a coordination game over time, choosing both the action and the network of agents with whom to interact. The main novelty with respect to the existing literature is that: (i) agents come in two distinct types, (ii) the interaction with a different type is costly, and (iii) an agent’s type is unobservable prior to interaction. We show that when the cost of interacting with a different type is small with respect to the payoff of coordination, then the payoff-dominant convention is the only stochastically stable convention; instead, when the cost of interacting with a different type is large, the only stochastically stable conventions are those where all agents of one type play the payoff-dominant action and all agents of the other type play the risk-dominant action.

Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Social Coordination with Locally Observable Types" Working paper, DEMB WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi - Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2015. https://doi.org/10.25431/11380_1191716

Social Coordination with Locally Observable Types

Bilancini, E.;
2015

Abstract

In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a riskdominant convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider a model where a population of agents play a coordination game over time, choosing both the action and the network of agents with whom to interact. The main novelty with respect to the existing literature is that: (i) agents come in two distinct types, (ii) the interaction with a different type is costly, and (iii) an agent’s type is unobservable prior to interaction. We show that when the cost of interacting with a different type is small with respect to the payoff of coordination, then the payoff-dominant convention is the only stochastically stable convention; instead, when the cost of interacting with a different type is large, the only stochastically stable conventions are those where all agents of one type play the payoff-dominant action and all agents of the other type play the risk-dominant action.
2015
Febbraio
Bilancini, E.; Boncinelli, L.
Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Social Coordination with Locally Observable Types" Working paper, DEMB WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi - Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2015. https://doi.org/10.25431/11380_1191716
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1191716
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