Using a unique dataset including all rights issues of new shares and other equity-like securities announced by Italian listed banks between 1989 and 2014, and exploiting the ideal setting provided by the Italian Banking Law, which allows for listed co-operative banks, we test if the ‘one head-one vote’ principle of co-operative banks and the ‘one share-one vote’ voting system of joint stock banks imply different costs of equity. Our empirical results, obtained using an event-study methodology, regressions and matching estimators, support our research hypothesis that the one head-one vote principle makes it more difficult raising new capital compared to one share-one vote principle, and contribute to the literature on demutualization and cooperative hybrids.

Security-voting structure and equity financing in the banking sector: ‘one head-one vote’ versus ‘one share-one vote’ / Ferretti, Riccardo; Pattitoni, Pierpaolo; Castelli, Alex. - In: THE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE. - ISSN 1572-963X. - (2019), pp. 1-35.

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