This paper presents some aspects of the legal and philosophical thought of the American jurist Catharine MacKinnon, with a particular focus on her negative anthropology and on the reclaiming power of rights. Specific attention will also be given to her view of equality, which refuses the formal logic of the Aristotelian formula (“treating likes alike and unlikes unalike”) in order to emphasise the substantive elements rooted in the social background. Finally, some critical remarks and conclusive reflections will be presented.

Law as a Weapon. Substantive Equality in the Legal and Philosophical Thought of Catharine MacKinnon / Vantin, Serena. - 1:(2019), pp. 1-17.

Law as a Weapon. Substantive Equality in the Legal and Philosophical Thought of Catharine MacKinnon

Serena Vantin
2019

Abstract

This paper presents some aspects of the legal and philosophical thought of the American jurist Catharine MacKinnon, with a particular focus on her negative anthropology and on the reclaiming power of rights. Specific attention will also be given to her view of equality, which refuses the formal logic of the Aristotelian formula (“treating likes alike and unlikes unalike”) in order to emphasise the substantive elements rooted in the social background. Finally, some critical remarks and conclusive reflections will be presented.
2019
Materiales de Filosofía del Derecho
R. de Asís, F.J. Ansuátegui Roig
N/A
Seminario Gregorio Peces-Barba, Grupo de investigación “Derechos humanos, Estado de Derecho y Democracia”
SPAGNA
Law as a Weapon. Substantive Equality in the Legal and Philosophical Thought of Catharine MacKinnon / Vantin, Serena. - 1:(2019), pp. 1-17.
Vantin, Serena
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1175764
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