Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4).

In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology / Coliva, A.. - (2020), pp. 107-121. [10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_8]

In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology

A. Coliva
2020

Abstract

Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4).
23-nov-2019
WITTGENSTEINIAN (adj.). Looking at things from the point of view of Wittgenstein's philosophy
Da Costa, N.; Wuppuluri, S.
978-3-030-27568-6
Springer
PAESI BASSI
In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology / Coliva, A.. - (2020), pp. 107-121. [10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_8]
Coliva, A.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1169679
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