EnglishThis paper argues for a new approach to building Byzantine fault tolerant replication systems. We observe that although recently developed BFT state machine replication protocols are quite fast, they don't tolerate Byzantine faults very well: a single faulty client or server is capable of rendering PBFT, Q/U, HQ, and Zyzzyva virtually unusable. In this paper, we (1) demonstrate that existing protocols are dangerously fragile, (2) define a set of principles for constructing BFT services that remain useful even when Byzantine faults occur, and (3) apply these principles to construct a new protocol, Aardvark. Aardvark can achieve peak performance within 40% of that of the best existing protocol in our tests and provide a significant fraction of that performance when up to f servers and any number of clients are faulty. We observe useful throughputs between 11706 and 38667 requests per second for a broad range of injected faults.
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2009 |
| Titolo: | Making Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine Faults |
| Autore/i: | Clement, Allen; Wong, Edmund; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Dahlin, Mike; Marchetti, Mirco |
| Autore/i UNIMORE: | |
| Nome del convegno: | The 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation |
| Luogo del convegno: | Boston, MA, USA |
| Data del convegno: | April 22 - 24, 2009 |
| Citazione: | Making Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine Faults / Clement, Allen; Wong, Edmund; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Dahlin, Mike; Marchetti, Mirco. - (2009). ((Intervento presentato al convegno The 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation tenutosi a Boston, MA, USA nel April 22 - 24, 2009. |
| Tipologia | Relazione in Atti di Convegno |
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