Many tort cases are characterized by two interrelated elements: “role uncertainty”, which occurs when individuals take precautions ignorant of their roles in future accidents and availability of “dual-effect precautions”, which reduce both the probability of an individual becoming an injurer and the probability that the same individual will become a victim of someone else’s negligence. In this paper, we extend the traditional model to account for role-uncertainty and dual-effect precautions. We find that in these situations, the traditional formulation of Negligence fails to incentivize efficient precautions, inducing excessive role-specific precautions and insufficient dual-effect precautions. For such cases, we argue for a modification of the standard of due care that accounts for the full benefit of dual-effect precautions, in order to incentivize efficient precautionary efforts.

Double-Edged Torts: Incentives and Precautions Behind a Veil of Role-Uncertainty / Luppi, Barbara; Francesco, Parisi; Daniel, Pi. - In: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0144-8188. - ELETTRONICO. - 46:(2016), pp. 43-48. [10.1016/j.irle.2015.10.003]

Double-Edged Torts: Incentives and Precautions Behind a Veil of Role-Uncertainty

LUPPI, Barbara;
2016

Abstract

Many tort cases are characterized by two interrelated elements: “role uncertainty”, which occurs when individuals take precautions ignorant of their roles in future accidents and availability of “dual-effect precautions”, which reduce both the probability of an individual becoming an injurer and the probability that the same individual will become a victim of someone else’s negligence. In this paper, we extend the traditional model to account for role-uncertainty and dual-effect precautions. We find that in these situations, the traditional formulation of Negligence fails to incentivize efficient precautions, inducing excessive role-specific precautions and insufficient dual-effect precautions. For such cases, we argue for a modification of the standard of due care that accounts for the full benefit of dual-effect precautions, in order to incentivize efficient precautionary efforts.
2016
46
43
48
Double-Edged Torts: Incentives and Precautions Behind a Veil of Role-Uncertainty / Luppi, Barbara; Francesco, Parisi; Daniel, Pi. - In: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0144-8188. - ELETTRONICO. - 46:(2016), pp. 43-48. [10.1016/j.irle.2015.10.003]
Luppi, Barbara; Francesco, Parisi; Daniel, Pi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1119534
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