Even if the respect for human dignity is a first principle which is shared by all European democracies and constitutes one of the pillars of European constitutionalism, there is no common conception of it. Moreover, one of the most vexing issues facing the jurist is balancing the relationship between the right to human dignity and the exercise of self-determination. This article aims to demonstrate how the principle of respect for human dignity has a clear juridical definition, implying a general guarantee of moral freedom, intended as the right ‘to live one’s life in harmony with one’s moral convictions and commitments. The right to moral freedom is linked to the individual’s right to freely and autonomously choose his or her own destiny, which may only limited in order to preserve the ‘core content’ of nursing and medical ethics. This choice exemplifies a soft paternalism, resulting in precepts and prohibitions which do not in any way infringe the principle of personal responsibility, as they are based on plausible assumptions held by the vast majority of citizens and are, further, targeted at seeking to preserve society’s most fundamental and cherished values. These limits may shift over time, but the process of change must necessarily result from a consultative process involving all relevant stakeholders.
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Titolo:||THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND END OF LIFE DECISIONS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||Articolo su rivista|
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