Moral Objectivity: a Kantian Illusion?

This article offers a Kantian constructivist account of objectivity. Kant’s analysis of respect is a promising starting point for a phenomenological defense of objectivity. Kant takes the moral feeling of respect to show that we are responsive to the categorical demands of morality. Unlike the realist, Kant does not try to demonstrate an ontological relation between how things appear to us and how they stand independently of us. Rather, his argument establishes that our experience of morality is congruent with the objectivist aspirations of morality. This article argues that constructivism best accounts for this congruence by taking the feeling of respect as the subjective condition of the reality of practical reason. Surprisingly, this results in a far more ambitious claim than the realist can defend. While the realist argument is pro tanto, Kantian constructivism purports to provide a conclusive argument for the objectivity of practical reason. Kantian constructivism survives Williams’ critique and presents some important advantages over traditional accounts of the role of moral experience in foundational arguments.