We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.
Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation / Righi, Simone; Takács, Károly. - (2013), pp. 104-107. (Intervento presentato al convegno Proceedings Wivace 2013 - Italian Workshop on Artificial Life and Evolutionary Computation tenutosi a Milano nel 1-2 Luglio 2013) [10.4204/EPTCS.130.17].
Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation
RIGHI, SIMONE;
2013
Abstract
We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Wivace2013.pdf
Accesso riservato
Dimensione
382.12 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
382.12 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I metadati presenti in IRIS UNIMORE sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono rilasciati con licenza Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale (CC BY 4.0), salvo diversa indicazione.
In caso di violazione di copyright, contattare Supporto Iris
