We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.
Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation / Righi, Simone; Takács, Károly. - In: ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE. - ISSN 2075-2180. - 130:(2013), pp. 104-107. ( 2013 Italian Workshop on Artificial Life and Evolutionary Computation, Wivace 2013 Milano 1-2 Luglio 2013) [10.4204/EPTCS.130.17].
Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation
RIGHI, SIMONE;
2013
Abstract
We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.
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Wivace2013.pdf
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1309.7698v1.pdf
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