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Abbreviations

EFTA	European Free Trade Area
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
TCN	Third country nationals
UN	United Nations

Country codes

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CH	Switzerland
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czechia
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
EL	Greece
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
FR	France
HR	Croatia
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland

IS	Iceland
IT	Italy
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
MT	Malta
NL	Netherlands
NO	Norway
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
UK	United Kingdom
EU15	Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK)
EU10	Cyprus (CY), Czechia (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI)
EU3	Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), and Romania (RO)
EU13	EU10 and EU3

Labour mobility and migration in Europe: allocative efficiency and attitudes towards foreigners

Contents

General introduction

Despite the large body of literature on labour mobility and attitudes towards foreigners, significant gaps remain. This thesis aims to contribute to the academic debate by offering some answers to the following research questions:

1) Can we measure the allocative efficiency of foreigners across countries and sectors? Do foreigners find jobs in high-growth sectors? Or do they rather end up in sectors with little to no labour demand?
2) What are the drivers of attitudes towards foreigners? How much macroeconomic conditions, personal characteristics and institutional settings affect these attitudes? Are there difference across different subgroups of foreigners?

The thesis comprises three parts with the first examining how efficient is the sectoral distribution of foreigners in the EU, and the second and third ones examining the attitudes towards foreigners and the factors most often associated with them.

The first chapter ("Efficiency allocation of EU movers and TCNs in the European Union") sketches the evolution of EU movers and Third Country Nationals in the EU, based on their gender, education level, and sectoral distribution. Afterwards, it proposes a new indicator that should help gauging the sectoral allocative efficiency of different subgroups of foreigners in the EU and in specific Member States (those with the higher number of foreigners). The indicator compares the sectoral over- and under- representation of different subgroups of foreigners with the recent changes in the labour volume in the different sectors, weighted for their employment share. The intuition is that if over- or underrepresentation mirrors changes in the sectoral labour volume one could consider this situation 'efficient': more (or less) foreign labour is needed because there is more (or less) demand for labour in the sector. The results show that the overall allocative efficiency of foreigners decreased in the crisis period, before improving during the subsequent modest recovery.

The second part ("Attitudes towards migration in the European Union: literature review and latest trends") takes stock of the growing literature of the factors associated with public views and perceptions about foreigners, laying the ground for a multidisciplinary approach analysis. The listed literature covers a wide array of sciences and domains, namely: sociology, geography, economy, labour and welfare studies, security, political sciences, and institutional studies. Moreover, it shows a collection of descriptive statistics from different databases that should help shedding light on the migration phenomenon and attitudes towards foreigners in Europe. These statistics take into account EU averages and compare them with those of five countries representatives of different types of welfare capitalism: Germany (conservative), United Kingdom (liberal), Sweden (social democratic), Spain (southern), and Czechia (eastern/central).

Finally, the third chapter ("Determinants of attitudes towards migration") expands the second one and proposes a new and comprehensive analysis of the different factors associated with attitudes towards different sub-groups of foreigners, based on their ethnical group, geographical origin, and skill level. The analysis will focus on the 19 EU Member States contained in the 2014 wave of the European Social Survey pooled together, and on the five countries representative of different types

of welfare capitalism presented in the second chapter. The results go beyond the available literature in three main ways. Firstly, they show that classic socio-demographic variables (such as age, gender, and being born in the country) tend to lose significance while other factors (such as political beliefs, qualifying factors for foreigners to move in the country, interaction with people of different nationality or ethnical group) are taken into account. Secondly, they reveal that macroeconomic factors and conditions (as GDP per capita, expenditure in Public Employment Services, recent increase of foreigners and employment levels) show the highest estimated coefficients. Finally, they provide evidence that decommodification and typology of welfare state seem to play a role in the formation of attitudes towards foreigners.

1 - Efficiency allocation of EU movers and TCNs in the European Union

Introduction

The freedom of movement of people is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the European Union, alongside that of goods, capital, and services[1]. It lies at the heart of the EU project and it is a major institutional driver of the integration of its labour markets. Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states: "Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union[2]. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment".[3]

With the accession of the New Member States (NMS) in 2004 and 2007, and the onset of the economic crisis, the EU citizens started to exercise this right more than ever before. This was reflected in significant movements of workers from the New to Old Member States. Afterwards, the double dip recession laid the basis for another wave of internal EU labour mobility. This originated mainly from the Southern EU Member States suffering the recessions the most, heading towards Western and Northern Member States. These two intra-EU channels of migration were accompanied by constant inflows from extra-EU countries. In 2018, intra EU-labour mobility reached an all-time high, with 17.5 million EU citizens living and working in another EU country. In terms of flows, around 1 million of EU citizens move abroad every year, while around 680 thousand go back to their country of citizenship. In parallel, third country nationals (henceforth TCNs) do not enjoy the same freedom of movement, being subject to specific arrangements based on their country of origin. Yet, their aggregate number is higher than EU-movers (22.3 million in 2018).[4] While small in absolute terms, the increase of migration flows reignited the public debates in some of the Member States on the wider gains from the labour mobility.

Against this background, it is puzzling the lack of a straightforward and simple measure allowing to quickly assessing the allocative efficiency of the inflows of foreigners. This would help the debate, both at academic and policy level, on how much a country is gaining, or losing, from migration, and how different countries fare against each other. In order to close this analytical gap, this work investigates the migration patterns within the EU and the performance of the EU movers and third country nationals in the labour market. In particular, this paper explores the sectoral aspects of labour mobility within the EU and at the national level.

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[1] The free movement of goods, services, capital and persons within the Union are "four freedoms" enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11957E/TXT

[2] Moreover, the article adds that the freedom of movement entails "the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission". Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT

[3] In this work, we will distinguish between four groups of migrants: EU movers from the EU10, EU3, EU10, and TCNs. This is because EU movers and TCNs enjoy different rights and exhibit different migration patterns.

[4] The figure does not take into account those who took the citizenship of the country they migrated to.

Firstly, we present some descriptive statistics of EU movers and TCNs, namely: the evolution of their share in the overall population, their different employment rates, their qualifications level, and their sectoral distribution (NACE 1 digit rev. 2). Afterwards, we construct an indicator to gauge the allocative efficiency of migration phenomena. This indicator is a novelty in migration studies, and would allow researchers and policy makers to have an index which is both easy to obtain and easy to understand. It would help to understand the capacity of a country, or the one of a specific sector in the country, to attract an efficient amount of foreign workforce.

In a certain sector, migrants may be over- or underrepresented, relative to native workers. If over- or underrepresentation mirrors changes in the sectoral labour volume one could consider this situation 'efficient': More (or less) foreign labour is needed because there is more (or less) demand for labour in the sector. The indicator thus relates migrants' representation in a sector to the change in the number of hours worked in that sector. As it is calculated for several years it allows for an analysis of how the sectoral allocation of migrants evolves over time. Overall, the results show that the double dip recession had a significant negative impact on allocative efficiency at the EU and country levels, with considerable variation across the countries. Strong push and pull factors at macro-level could explain the decreasing efficiency. Afterwards, the recovery led to an improvement in the allocation. A number of sensitivity checks confirm these results. Finally, we test a variant of the model on selected Member States.

Literature review

Migration is an individual decision that improves labour allocation and maximises global welfare. From a pure economic theory point of view, and in the absence of externalities, workers choose the better-paying jobs and therefore allocate themselves across location, indirectly maximising the value of global output (Dustmann and Preston, 2019). Moreover, immigrants should be more responsive than natives to changes in economic conditions. Borjas (1987), assuming differences in socio-economic characteristics between natives and foreigners, treats in his theoretical model the migration decision as a variable depending on the returns to skills that individuals can obtain abroad. In later work, he demonstrates that immigrants' cost of changing location in search of better work opportunities is lower, and hence they are more prone to relocate (Borjas, 2001). Migrants tend also to be more prone to move again, with marked differences depending on country of origins and skills level (Kahanec and Guzi, 2016), and therefore may represent a buffer for future shocks (European Commission 2015a, 2015b). In doing this, migrants could in principle act as a stabilizer and reduce imbalances in the labour market (such as wage disparities between different countries) and reduce labour shortages (Dustmann et al., 2010). They could find jobs better suiting their qualifications and previous experience, hence improving the efficiency of skills matching.

Migration can act as an automatic stabilizing mechanism at a macro scale. While migration is the result of a decision taken at individual or household level, large migration flows may affect macroeconomic outcomes. In principle, migration has the potential to help countries to better respond to macroeconomic shocks through labour movement across borders (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2016) and act as an adjustment mechanism (Ritzen and Zimmermann, 2014). High level of labour mobility is seen as a potentially important adjustment mechanism to regional shocks in currency areas (Mundell, 1961). For instance, in the US, high rates of labour mobility across its states have allowed the country to recover more quickly from adverse economic shocks. This also led to smaller unemployment differences in comparison with European states that are characterised by lower levels of mobility (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). The adjustment mechanism works since countries with labour shortages tend to offer higher wages, and in these states migrants are overrepresented, while the opposite is true for countries offering lower wages (Borjas, 2001).

From the empirical point of view, income, wage, and employment differentials are main drivers of migration. Traditionally, migrants are expected to move from countries with lower income and productivity levels to high- income, high-productivity countries. Indeed, the differentials in per capita income and wage levels have long been found to play a role in migration decisions (as shown by, among others, Sjaastad, 1962; Gross and Schmitt 2012; Ortega and Peri 2009; Mayda, 2010). Favourable labour opportunities in the destination country tend to increase migration inflows (e.g. Van Hear et al., 2012; Gjergji, 2015), while high unemployment has an opposite effect (Landesmann et al. 2015; Islam, 2007; Hatton and Tani, 2005, European Commission 2015a). The same factors can be linked with different average effects depending on the economic development of the country of origin: there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between development and migration. While in the first phase emigration increases with GDP per capita, the opposite becomes true at the later stages of development (European Commission, 2018 b). Box 1 reports survey data on a reduced number of reasons for migrating.

Economic explanations alone fail to explain the magnitude of migration phenomenon. Given the large income differentials across the world, the migration flows observed empirically are modest. Other country- specific factors related to institutions and culture play an important role. Indeed, economic forces do not act in isolation, but affect migration along with other factors, such as immigration policies, welfare state size and organisation,[5] and functioning of institutions. Policies dealing with immigrant integration, labour market mobility, family reunion, responsiveness of the education systems to the needs of second-generation immigrants, long-term residence, access to citizenship, and anti-discrimation[6] exert influence on mobility and migration patterns by altering adjustment costs (Guzi et al., 2015). For instance, migration restrictions and institutional barriers in the destination countries reduce the flows by constraining the supply of migrants (Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2008). Moreover, geographical, linguistic and cultural distance between home and destination country curbs the flows of migrants. This is due to adjustment costs (material, information as well as psychological and social costs) that migrants bear when moving: adapting to labour market conditions in the country of destination and severing family ties (e.g. Mincer, 1978, Mayda 2010, Pedersen et al. 2008, Gjergji, 2015). In this context, network effects play a significant role. Indeed, existing social and information networks between lower the adjustment costs related to moving and therefore reinforce migration flows between certain locations (Pedersen et al. 2008, Landesmann et al., 2015; Castelli, 2018). Finally, non-economic literature found other factors affecting migration phenomena, such as climatic conditions (Deuveny, 2007) and the presence of amenities (Florida, 2002).

In the EU context, migration patterns of the last two decades were shaped by EU-enlargements and by the great recession that affected different countries in an asymmetric way. Empirical research shows that differentials in real wages increase migration flows between countries (Hatton and Williamson 2002, Clark, Hatton, Williamson 2007; Gross and Schmitt 2012; Ortega and Peri 2009; Mayda, 2010). Income and wage differences were among the main determinants of workers moving from New Member States following the 2004 accession (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009; Barslund et al., 2015). In more recent years, migration in the EU is more linked to negative rather than positive shocks (Dao, Furceri, Longani, 2014), suggesting that during the crisis push factors played a bigger role than the pull factors. Figures from the last ten years indicate that Germany and the United Kingdom are the top destination among EU movers, Southern and Eastern Member States being the main sending countries within the EU. The overall pattern shows that the majority of movers tend to migrate from the low-productivity to high-productivity areas and from high-unemployment to low-unemployment areas (European Commission, 2018). The direction of the flows suggests that the observed migration has improved the allocation of labour across the EU, thus supporting the macroeconomic adjustment within the Single Market. This adjustment has contributed to the reduction of unemployment in Central and Eastern Europe until at least 2007 (Pryymachenko et al., 2013). Indeed, in this period, outflows from Southern European countries have led to gains not only at individual level (through employment

[5] There is also some moderate albeit inconclusive evidence that generous welfare state and quality of public goods in the destination country may act as a magnet for the migrants (see Borjas 1999 and Pedersen et al. 2008).
[6] The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) has developed indicators for all these policy fields. http://www.mipex.eu/

opportunities EU movers found abroad) but also alleviated the burden on public finances (through savings on unemployment benefits and social assistance in the countries of origin).

This work aims at filling a gap in literature by investigating the allocative efficiency of migration at sectoral level. More specifically, it explores whether the stabilising effect observed at EU level is reproduced at sectoral level in each country. In other words, how sectoral labour demand in the receiving countries influences the migration flows. While interest in the research topic of migration spiked in recent years, the information on sectoral allocative efficiency of migrants remains relatively obscure. It has been argued that migration from declining to growing sectors could reduce labour market imbalances (Guzi et al., 2015). Yet growing sectors in the future seem characterised by skills requirements that are more difficult to fill,[7] hindering this possibility of smoothening imbalances across regions. Moreover, better skill matches did not seem to play a big role in the migration decision (de Grip et al., 2010). The purpose of this work is therefore to explore the trends in sectoral allocative efficiency in the EU. To do so, we will build on the indicator developed in the Employment and Social Developments in Europe report 2015 to assess the efficiency allocation of EU movers and third country nationals (European Commission, 2015), exploring different avenues to improve it and test its consistency across different specifications.

Box 1 - Reasons to migrate: evidence from the EU Labour Force Survey

Survey evidence confirms some of the drivers for migration, at least for the EU. At this level, the largest and most reliable information comes from the LFS ad hoc module 2014 on "The labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants", containing a question on the most significant drivers for moving in another country for EU28 citizens. The four highest ranked answers were:

- family reasons (37%);
- employment without having found a job before migrating (35%);
- employment having found a job before migrating (16%);
- and study (6%).

Therefore, employment (as a sum of the second and third most common replies) seems to be the single most powerful driver to migrate. Worth noticing is that wage is bundled within employment in the survey, the other options included in the question being: "international protection or asylum", "other", and "not applicable".



[7] See Skills Panorama: Skills Forecast: key EU trends to 2030, available at: https://skillspanorama.cedefop.europa.eu/en/analytical_highlights/skills-forecast-key-eu-trends-2030

Data

The study is conducted mostly based on the EU Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), a household survey with a sample size across the EU varying between 4 and 4.5 million individuals in the analysed period. The survey has been used extensively for cross-country migration research in the EU (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2012; D'Amuri and Peri, 2014). For the purposes of the sectoral analysis, the breakdown into 10 broad NACE rev 2 sectors is used (see box 2). As for data reliability reasons, only selected countries with sufficient migrants' sample size are examined.

The descriptive analysis covers years 2008-2018 (split into three periods), for which LFS data at sectoral breakdown is available. The evolution of the sectoral allocation in section 'Model results' extends the analysis to years 2004-2018.

Descriptive statistics

This section provides basic employment statistics on EU movers and third country nationals (TCN). The distinction between EU movers and TCNs pursues a double purpose: on the one hand, it allows for a more refined analysis exploiting the possibilities offered by LFS. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that membership in the EU and the Eurozone increases cross-country mobility, especially after asymmetric shocks (Beine et al., 2013). The EU-movers group is split, where possible, in three aggregates: EU10, EU3, and EU15.[8] There are three reasons for making this choice: it is the highest possible level of accuracy when using LFS micro-data; these groups exhibit different characteristics and migration patterns; the restrictions of freedom of movement for these groups were lifted in different points in time. In the remainder of the paper, only results for all countries pooled together will be presented. The results by country may be consulted in the annex A.

The following sub-sections present descriptive statistics to outline how EU movers and third country nationals fare to the nationals:

1. The employment rate of nationals, EU-movers and TCNs
2. Basic characteristics of EU movers and TCNs.
3. Sectoral employment dynamics.

[8] EU15 refers to the countries which were EU members before 2004. These are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
EU10 consists pf countries that joined the EU in 2004, i.e. Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. EU3 refers to the countries who joined the EU after 2004, namely: Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.

Box 2 - (abbreviations used for the 10 broad sectors according to NACE, rev 2, at one digit[1]:

A Agriculture, forestry and fishing
B-E Industry (except construction)
F Construction
G-I Wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities
J Information and communication
K Financial and insurance activities
L Real estate activities
M, N Professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities
O-Q Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities
R-U Arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of household and extra-territorial organizations and bodies.

More information on the classification available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nace-rev2

Employment rate of nationals, EU-movers and TCNs

Chart 1 plots the employment rate of nationals and four groups of foreigners, between 2008 and 2018. As for the remainder of the paper, the chart focuses on age bracket 15-64 as the focus should be on working-age population. The overall employment rate in this age group increased during this time span, from 65.7% to 68.6%. The employment rate of all three groups of intra-EU migrants is higher than for the respective native population. However, for TCNs there is a gap of more than 10 pp that had widened during the crisis and has not narrowed significantly during the recent labour market recovery.

The chart displays the EU average in the period 2008-2018. This hides substantial differences among Member States. For instance, in 2018 the employment rate of Sweden (the best performer, at 77.5%) is 22.5 pp. higher than the one of Greece (the country with the lowest employment rate).

Chart 1. Employment rate of nationals, EU15-movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs, 2008-2018, age 15-64. Source: author elaboration based on EU-LFS microdata.



Chart 2 shows the changes in the absolute number of employed by group of nationality in the EU. It divides the period in three shorter spans: 2008-2011 (corresponding to the first dip of crisis), 2011-2014 (the second dip), and 2014-2018 (the mild recovery). To complete the overview, chart 4 plots the share of EU movers, TCNs and nationals in the overall employed population along the period.

The numbers indicate that, despite unfavourable developments in the labour market during the crisis, the number of employed from EU10 and EU3 was increasing at a yearly pace of 4.9% and 3% respectively. This reflects significant inflows of the workers into Western European Member States during the post-accession years as labour market access restrictions were gradually lifted. At the same time, the employment level of the nationals and TCNs was falling every year by an annual average of 1.1% and 1.9%, respectively.

In the second dip of the recession and the recovery, the employment of the nationals was growing at a modest pace, whereas a strong surge in the migration among the EU movers was observed. The decline of job opportunities in the South of the EU is likely to have pushed more EU15 citizens to seek jobs abroad. Their employment level grew by 3.1% annually in 2011-2014 and 4.3% in 2014-2018. The inflow of workers from the EU3 gained pace, reaching an average annual change of 10% in 2014-2018. At the same time, migration flows from EU10 slowed down as workers saw the labour market situations in their home countries improve.

Chart 2. Average annual change in employment of foreigners and nationals by nationality group in the EU-28, 2008-2011, 2011-2014, 2014-2018. Source: DG EMPL calculations based on LFS.

Chart 3. Share of foreigners and nationals by nationality group in the EU-28, shares in total employed, 2008-2018. Nationals are plotted on the right axis. Source: LFS.



During the last 10 years, the EU saw a substantial change in the composition of its workforce. The share of the EU15 movers and TCNs was continuously on the rise (from 1.5% and 3.8% to 1.9% and 4.1% respectively), while the EU10 and EU3 movers' shares almost doubled.

Qualification levels of nationals, EU movers and TCNs

Chart 4 displays trends in over- and underrepresentation of foreigners relative to nationals based on three broad skill groups[9]. Data reveals significant variation in the distribution of qualifications between nationality groups. Within the TCNs' population, low-qualified workers were continuously increasing their share. In 2018, they constituted almost half of the group. At the same, the non-EU28 nationals were strongly underrepresented among the medium-skilled workers. Highly qualified workers accounted for almost 40% of EU15 movers in 2018, while EU15 mobile workers are markedly underrepresented among medium-qualified. EU10 movers consisted of medium- (50%) and highly qualified workers (30%). EU3 movers were clearly underrepresented among the highly qualified group.

Chart 4. Over/underrepresentation of low, medium and high qualified relative to nationals by nationality group and distribution of low, high and medium qualified among nationals on the right.



As for gender distribution of the foreign workers, males are the majority among most of the nationality groups (Chart 5). The groups with the lowest share of women are workers from outside the EU and EU15 movers (42% and below 44% respectively). This may be linked with cultural factors, unsafe routes towards Europe (especially in the case of TCNs) and lower support for migration from their families of origin. By contrast, women were the majority of the EU10 movers for most of the period. In the EU3 group, the share of females fluctuated between 46% and 50% and females' share remained higher than that of the females of the reporting country. Chart 6 shows that

[9] The under(over)representation is defined as a difference between the share of the skill group in the nationals' population minus the share of the respective skill group in the nationality group. Skill level is defined as highest educational attainment level aggregated to three broad groupings: Low: Primary; Medium: Secondary; High: Tertiary.

females tend to be underrespresented in the production sectors (industry, construction and notably in ICT). Women are more likely to work in the service sectors (sectors M-N, O-Q and R-U).

Chart 5. Share of females in the employment by nationality group.

Chart 6. Sectoral distribution of employed females and males, all nationalities, 2018.



Chart 7 reveals that sectoral migrant over- or under-representation has a strong gender component. The black markers represent the sectoral distribution of males of all nationalities and the columns show the over(under)representation of females, both nationals and foreigners, relative to the distribution of males. While women from all nationality are almost equally underrepresented in sectors such as agriculture, industry and construction, marked differences can be seen in the service sectors. The EU3 and TCN women are considerably more likely to work in the service sectors R-U consisting mainly of services to households and arts and entertainment services. Interestingly, all foreign females are overrepresented amongst the professional, scientific, technical activities, administrative and support services. Around 16% of the women from EU15 and EU10 work in this sector, compared to around 10% of the nationals, female and male alike. Females from all nationality groups but EU15 are underrepresented in the information and communication.

Chart 7. Over- and underrepresentation of females by nationality groups relative to total males by sector, 2018.



Evolution of employment by industry

Chart 8 shows the sectoral distribution of total employment in the EU28 that allows for identifying the relative importance of the sectors across time. To complete the picture, Chart 9 plots sectoral growth contributions and Chart 10 the annual average changes, which help analyse the dynamics across the economic cycle.

Chart 8. Sectoral distribution of employment in the EU-28 in 2011, 2014, 2018, all nationalities. Source: DG EMPL calculations based on LFS.



During the analysed period, some sectors seemed to be less dependent on aggregate cyclical dynamics. The share of agriculture in total employment fell continuously, by 1.2% between 2008 and 2018. To the contrary, employment in sectors such as information and communication (J), real estate activities (L), and professional, scientific, technical, and administrative and support service activities (M-N) saw uninterrupted growth in employment and a steady rise in their share in total employment. This was particularly marked in the skill-intensive sector M-N. It was one of the biggest contributors to the total employment growth.

Chart 9. Employment by NACE in the EU-28, all nationalities, Sectoral growth contributions. Source: LFS, data extracted 9 July 2019.



More sensitive to the economic cycle were the largest sectors. Industry was responsible for most of the job losses in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Its employment fell dramatically (by 3.4% annually), before starting its modest recovery in 2014. Employment destruction during the crisis was most significant in construction: 5% of jobs got lost every year during the first three years of the crisis. Labour intensive service sectors also lost jobs during the crisis but rebounded quite quickly and were the largest contributor to jobs created in 2014-2018.

Chart 10. Average annual change in employment by NACE in the EU-28 in 2008-2011, 2011-2014, 2014-2018, all nationalities. Source: LFS, data extracted 9 July 2019.



The model

This paper presents a straightforward indicator to explore the allocative efficiency of the EU movers and the TCNs across the EU and some selected Member States with the highest number of foreign nationals recorded in LFS during the timespan considered. The index is composed by two elements. The first is a simple sub-index to obtain the degree in which different foreign workers are over- or under-represented in the different sectors of the economy. The sub-index is constructed (following European Commission 2015), as follows:

$$(1)\ r_{cs} = \frac{E_{cns}}{E_{cn}} - \frac{E_{c0s}}{E_{c0}}$$

Where:

E_{c0}: the number of employed in country c, nationality of the reporting country

E_{c0s}: the number of employed in country c, nationality of the reporting country, in sector s

E_{cn}: the number of employed in country c, nationality n={EU15, EU10, EU3, TCN}

E_{cns}: the number of employed in country c, nationality n={EU15, EU10, EU3, TCN}, in sector s

The first term represents the share of workers of nationality n who work in sector s in a given country. The second term is the same share for nationals in the same country. r_{cs} is therefore the degree of over- or under-representation of a particular group of foreigner in country c and sector s. It is positive (or negative), if the specific foreigner sub-group is over- (or under-) represented in country c and sector s.

In order to gauge the allocative efficiency of the EU labour mobility and migration, the sector-specific indicator r is plotted against the average annual change of the labour volume in the same sector.[10] The plot shows the situation in each of the 10 sectors described earlier in the descriptive part.[11] The sectoral change in hours worked is a proxy for labour demand in the sector (d_{cs}). It is the change over a given reference period which ends in the year for which sectoral over- (under-) representations of foreigners are calculated.

[10] Labour volume is a proxy of labour demand and it is measured by the number of hours worked in the respective sector. There is not a clear and uncontroversial indicator for labour demand at sectoral level. Four indicators were considered: Gross Value Added (GVA), Job Vacancy Rate (JVR), employment (head count) and employment (hours worked). European Commission (2015) used GVA, but this indicator may react to productivity as much as to labour demand (see box 2). Eurostat produces a JVR indicator, which measures paid posts that are "newly created, unoccupied, or about to become vacant" (Regulation (EC) No 453/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on quarterly statistics on Community job vacancies). Yet, this indicator presents several missing values for sectors outside the business economy (B-N), does not have data before 2000 (and has mostly missing values in the first year), and does not show values for France, Italy, and Malta. The possibility to develop an indicator based on JVR was therefore abandoned. The choice was then between employment (headcount) and employment (hours worked). These indicators share a common weakness: the impossibility to take into account unfulfilled labour demand. Yet, the advantages seemed higher than for GVA and JVR. Among the two, the latter was preferred as it offers a better proxy of labour demand, since it allows adjusting for sectors where part time is more prominent. All these alternative indicators are anyway used for sensitivity checks.

[11] Sectors are defined according to NACE rev 2, one digit.

Afterwards, both sub-indices r_{cs} and d_{cs} are standardised, following the transformation:

(2) $r'_{c\,s} = \frac{r_{cs} - \mu(r)}{\sigma\,(r)}$, *and* (3) $d'_{c\,s} = \frac{d - \mu(d)}{\sigma\,(d)}$, for s = 1, …, 10 in country c.

The final step to obtain the indicator for the allocative efficiency A_c of foreigners for EU28 and the five countries analysed more closely is to weigh each sector for the employment shares of the different sectors, per country, i.e. $w_{c\,s}$.

$$(4) \qquad A_c = \sum_{s=0}^{10} |r'_{c\,s} - d'_{c\,s}| w_{c\,s}$$

The indicator would then be straightforward to interpret. An index equals to zero would mean that the over (or under) representation of each foreigner groups would overlap with increasing (or decreasing) labour demand in the country. The higher the value of A the less would migrants' sectoral representation fit a country's labour demand at sectoral level. Migrants would be over-represented in sectors with low labour demand and/or under-represented in sectors with high labour demand. Therefore, higher values of the index would hint at lower allocative efficiency of the foreigners.

Sensitivity checks are also carried out, substituting the employment per hours worked $d'_{c\,s}$ in equations (3) and (4) with changes in employment (headcount), and in gross value added (GVA).[12] These three specifications of indicator A would allow depicting sectoral labour market shortages from different angles, given the lack of an exhaustive and reliable data on vacancies for all sectors at EU level.

[12] The use of gross value added growth allows assessing the sectoral growth in the period, and may therefore act as a way to deduce the labour demand, as done in Employment and Social Developments 2015 (European Commission, 2015).

Model results

Charts 11-14 plot the standardised sectoral distribution of employed categorised as: EU15 movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs, by selected sectors (columns). Values above (below) the zero imply that a specific foreigner group is over-(under-)represented in comparison to nationals. The green line plots the standardised change in the hours of employment for the sectoral average of the periods 2004-2008; 2008-2011; 2011-2014; 2014-2018.[13] We thus consider four periods:

- pre-recession
- the first dip of the recession,
- the second dip,
- the modest recovery.

Chart. 11-14. Standardised sectoral distribution of employed, EU15-movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs, by NACE rev.2 1 digit sectors, in 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018, and standardised annual average growth rates of gross value added (chain linked volumes) for the periods 2004-2008; 2008-2011; 2011-2014; 2014-2018. Source: Eurostat EU-LFS extraction [9 July 2019], and [nama_10_a10_e].



[13] Importantly, the columns refer to stocks of people in the country in a given year, while the line refers to average annual changes over the 3- or 4-year span. The former is motivated by the data reliability reasons. Ideally, it would be better to operate on flows of foreigners rather than stocks, but even in a large database like LFS migrants' sample size at the NACE10 breakdown is insufficient. As for the latter, the multiyear span for the changes in hours of employment work is meant to capture sectoral trends in labour demand. It is therefore assumed in the model that the stocks of migrants adjust to medium-term economic trends with a time lag.



How to read the charts: Take chart 11 (for 2004-2008). The column for the manufacturing sector (B-E) shows that mobile EU10-workers are overrepresented relative to nationals (blue bar positive). The opposite is true for EU3, EU15 and TCNs (orange, grey, and yellow columns respectively). The green line shows that the change of the labour volume in manufacturing was lower than in the

overall economy in the same period[14] (the green line being below the bar). The difference between each of the columns and the line shows how far the sector is away from 'perfectly' allocating the respective group of foreigners.

Adding up the absolute differences for each foreigners group, weighted for the employment hours worked of each sector, yields the allocative efficiency indicator shown in graph 15. Charts 11-14 present the evolution of allocative efficiency in the four periods considered (2004-2008; 2008-2011; 2011-2014; 2014-2018). Note that lower levels of the index indicate higher allocative efficiency (an index equal to zero would signal that the over and under- representation of foreigners mirrors perfectly the sector's growth performance).[15]

Chart 15 shows that the allocative efficiency index in the period 2008-2018 had a reverse U-shaped trend. The chart shows that aggregate allocative efficiency of foreigners decreased significantly in the first phase of the crisis. The worsening continued between 2011 and 2014 at lower pace before starting to improve as the economy recovered from the crisis. In terms of relative performance, EU15 movers were characterised by the highest level of allocative efficiency. By contrast, EU10 movers sectoral allocation shows the lowest efficiency. This is due especially to suboptimal performance in the sectors "B-E" (i.e. industry, except construction), "G-I" (i.e. wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities), and "O-Q" (i.e. public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities). These sectors account for about two thirds of the EU labour force.

This trend is not surprising and can be explained in two ways. Firstly, workers adjust only gradually to shocks by crossing borders and/or moving away from sectors most affected by those shocks. Such rigidities leave many workers stranded in industries that face decreasing demand and thus falling value added. Similarly, reduced total hours worked in some industries do not result immediately in layoffs and labour reallocation. Besides, during the recession, push factors from the countries of origin (especially those linked to higher unemployment and lower wages relative to the destination country) may have outweighed factors related to sectoral labour demand in the receiving countries. This would mean that migrants were moving in search of jobs, but not the jobs in the sectors characterised by labour shortages and growing gross value added. In the recovery phase, with improving labour market conditions in the countries of origin, pull factors probably started gaining strength, leading to improvements in allocation.

This explanation is in line with Dao et al. (2014) study on the intra-EU migration, which finds that in the EU 30% of the negative employment shock at the regional level is absorbed by net out-migration. This effect was possibly a factor behind the migrations flows from the Europe's south that in the post-2008 period saw rising unemployment levels and increasing workforce emigration. In the case of EU10 mobile citizens, both high unemployment and large real wage differentials are likely to have been the main drivers of migration in the post-crisis period. Nonetheless, with convergence in wages and improvements in labour market opportunities in their countries of origin, migration flows started to reverse, improving thereby the migrant allocation index.

[14] From graph 17 it is possible to see that the total hours worked decreased slightly in sector B-E between 2004 and 2008.

[15] It is recommended to analyse the evolution of the index over time rather than the absolute value of the indicator.

Chart 15-17: Evolution of allocative efficiency index between 2008 and 2018, based on standardised sectoral distribution of employed EU15-movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs, by NACE rev.2 1 digit sectors, and standardised average annual growth of hours worked, employment (thousands of workers) and gross value added, by sector. Source: Eurostat EU-LFS extraction [9 July 2019], [nama_10_a10_e] and [nama_10_a10].



Charts 16 and 17 show a number of sensitivity checks with alternative indicators used as proxy for labour demand, namely: average annual changes in the number of employed by sector (chart 16) and average annual changes in sectoral gross value added (chart 17). These alternative proxies confirm the above findings: allocative efficiency decreased in the course of the crisis before slightly improving during recovery.[16]

[16] Some differences among the indicators persist, especially when considering the gross value added instead of the Hours of employment. The main one is the change in order between EU15 and EU3, with the latter becoming the subgroup of movers characterised by highest allocative efficiency. Moreover, with the Gross Value Added, EU10 workers become a group with the highest level of allocative efficiency in the last period considered.

Box 2. Sensitivity analysis of the labour demand proxies.



Charts 18-21. Average annual growth of labour productivity per hour worked in percentages (authors' own calculations), employment in hours worked [nama_10_a10_e] and gross value added (chain linked volumes) [nama_10_a10].

Three proxies for labour demand were used in the study. The employment in heads and hours worked capture the effective labour demand in the reference period and is therefore purely backward looking. It is characterised, however, by the endogeneity problem as for instance falling volume of labour in a sector may point to both lower demand for workers in the sector or a lack of suitable candidates to fill vacancies. Gross value added is used as an alternative labour demand proxy. Growing GVA in a sector may indicate that a given unit of labour allocated to that sector would add more economic value than in other sectors. The downside is that growing GVA may be driven by productivity increases and falling demand for labour (see sector A, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries).

Charts 18-21 illustrate the dynamics of labour productivity, gross value added and hours worked in the four reference periods. There is a clear correlation between GVA and hours worked, as almost in all sectors their growth rates tend to have the same sign. Using the GVA measure accentuates the weight of the sectors with strongly growing productivity that experience high rises in GVA not matched by a similar growth in hours worked (particularly sector J). On the contrary, employment-based proxy (hours worked) stresses the significance of sectors with strong changes in hours worked not matched by changes in GVA (sectors "B-E" and F).

Given the trade-off between the two ways of building the indicators, the authors decided to give more prominence to the use of employment per hours worked, but to include this box for the interested readers.

Testing the allocative efficiency index at national level

This section replicates the analysis of sectoral allocation efficiency at country level using the main model specification, i.e. the one based on changes of hours worked by sector. Data limitations linked to the Labour Force Survey preclude this exercise in countries where EU-movers and TCNs are represented only in relatively small numbers. Therefore, reliability reasons limit the analysis to those Member States for which sufficient numbers of workers are observed (per subgroup of migrants, per sectors, and for all the periods considered). These Member States are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Sweden, and the UK.

Moreover, in order to smooth one-year spikes in the data due to smaller samples, three-year moving averages are used. Besides, only two periods are considered: the years leading to the recession (2004-2009), and the time after the onset of the crisis 2010-2017.[17] The crisis year 2009 data point was removed from the standardised changes in hours worked by sector. The model uses a one-year lag between the standardised sectoral distributions (referring to the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2016) and the sub –index of over and under representation of different groups of foreigners in comparison to nationals (referring to 2009 and 2017).

Results for the allocative efficiency index are shown in charts 22 and 23 (the interested reader can find the charts displaying the standardised sectoral distribution of foreigners the changes in hours worked by sector in annex A). Limiting the analysis to two periods levels out the changes that took place between the second dip of the recession and the following mild recovery.

All countries analysed experienced a worsening of their allocative efficiency. This is due to the fact that the improvements that took place during the recovery did not compensate for the worsening of the allocative efficiency originated by the double dip recession (a trend visible also for the results at EU28 level).

Only three groups of foreigners registered improvement in the index namely: EU10 in Spain, EU15 in Italy, and EU15 in Sweden. All these groups are characterised by a small size in relative terms (EU10 in Spain and EU15 in Italy are the smallest groups of foreigners in these two countries) and have not experienced growth between the two periods.

While countries experienced similar trends in terms of allocative efficiency, cross-country heterogeneity in terms of level of indicators persist.

These findings corroborate the evidence presented in previous sections. While the direst crisis the EU ever faced was instrumental to a worsening of the allocative efficiency, the modest recovery was a sufficient condition for it to improve.

Chart 22-23. Evolution of allocative efficiency index between 2009 and 2017, based on standardised sectoral distribution of employed EU15-movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs, by NACE rev.2 1 digit sectors, and standardised changes in hours worked by sector (averages for the periods 2004-2008; 2010-2016), for selected Member States. Source: Eurostat EU-LFS extraction [9 July 2019], and [nama_10_a10_e].



Conclusions

Intra-EU labour mobility and migration from third countries continued to increase in the 28 MS in the last decades. Labour flows can act as a macroeconomic stabilizer and are associated with improving labour market conditions for the migrants and welfare gains for receiving countries. Yet, the analysis of sectoral distribution of migrants in the receiving countries is a largely unexplored field that can contribute to better understanding of the migration patterns over time.

Building on LFS data, this paper tries to close a gap in literature by proposing a simple indicator to estimate the sectoral allocative efficiency for selected groups of foreigners (EU15 movers, EU10 movers, EU3 movers, and TCN). It does so by providing an indicator which combines two important sectoral information to just one figure: the degree to which migrants are represented in each sector of the economy and the sector's labour demand. Are migrants well-represented in high-growth sectors? Or are they stuck in sectors where there is little labour demand?

The results shows that the double dip recession had a sizeable negative effect on allocative efficiency at EU, and that all main receiving countries (albeit to different degrees) experienced a decrease in allocative efficiency following the recession. Yet, the mild recovery was accompanied by an improvement in allocative efficiency, for all foreigners' groups considered. This probably shows that during crises, push factors play the main role in migration decision. They cross borders just to escape adverse personal or work-related circumstances. During recovery, high-growth sectors may attract more foreigners as their decision to migrate is more focussed and firms may make better offers to attract migrants ultimately helping receiving economies to better adjust to economic transitions.

The robustness of the indicator is tested with sensitivity checks. These replaced the changes in hours worked with changes in number of person employed and changes in the sectoral gross value added. Moreover, a similar version of the model is tested in the eight Member States with the highest presence of foreign workers. The findings obtained prove the robustness of the indicator proposed.

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Annex A. Results by country

Charts 1-24. Standardised sectoral distribution of employed, EU15-movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs, by NACE rev.2 1 digit sectors, in 2009 and 2017 (three-year moving averages), and standardised annual average growth rates of hours worked for the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2016 (charts on the left). Shares of 15-movers, EU10-movers, EU3-movers, and TCNs in the total employment (charts on the right). Source: Eurostat EU-LFS extraction [9 July 2019], and [nama_10_a10_e].




Germany 2004 - 2009
Germany 2010 - 2017
2,5
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
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
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
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
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
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2 - Attitudes towards migration in the European Union: literature review and latest trends

Introduction

Labour force mobility (internal migration among the Member States of the Union) in Europe is much lower than in the United States, even if the freedom of movement for workers is one of the four fundamentals freedom of the European Union, along with that of goods, capital, and service.

Labour mobility is enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The principle lies therefore at the heart of the EU and is a key element in the development of the European labour markets. It should provide EU citizens with the possibility to find jobs and to work in other areas where there are labour shortages or more employment opportunities, ultimately contributing to the reduction of skills and job mismatches.

Mobility in Europe is often intertwined with other migration flows, involving third countries. The paper investigates the determinants of attitudes towards migration and mobility through the perusal of the literature on the topic. This lists the following factors as those most linked with attitudes formation:

- the number and ethnicity of foreigners present in a given country or region and its recent change;
- the receiving country economic conditions;
- the composite effect on employment and wages (both average and for sub-group);
- the perceived effect of migration on labour market, welfare, and crime;
- factors at micro level (notably education); and
- the political landscape.

The main dimensions affecting attitudes towards migration are illustrated in the second part of the paper, through descriptive statistics. The data come from different data sources, mainly administrative data, the European Labour Force Survey and the European Social Survey relating to 2014. This round of the survey contains a module on immigration, which allows distinguishing among different groups of foreigners (most notably, Europeans versus non-Europeans).

The paper presents data for the EU aggregate and for five countries representatives of different worlds of welfare state capitalism: Germany for conservative welfare state, UK for liberal welfare state, Sweden for social democratic welfare state, Spain for southern welfare State, and Czechia for eastern/central European welfare state.

The first section of this work summarizes the main factors that the literature links with attitudes towards foreigners. The second one presents the five countries selected for the case study and the rationale behind the choice, linking it with institutional literature. The third section provides descriptive statistics for the main macro and microeconomic factors linked with attitudes towards foreigners. Finally, the last section draws the conclusions and suggests that econometric analysis based on ESS might prove an important area for future research.

Literature review on attitudes towards migrants

Labour mobility[18] and migration are at the centre of the ongoing policy and political debate. Given the higher visibility, the topic gained momentum in the last years. Indeed, studying attitudes towards immigration is important, since these affect immigration policies through voting (Mayda, 2006). Attitudes towards migrants gained momentum and became a topic investigated by academics from different angles and through analytic tools coming from different branches.

Without any claim of being exhaustive, literature has identified a number of factors that help explaining attitudes towards migration, namely:

- From a sociological perspective, the number of migrants in the areas in which respondents live affects the attitude towards them in two main ways. One is defined under the name of "power threat hypothesis". According to it, if the number of immigrants is high enough, the natives become afraid of losing their hegemonic status in terms of resources, jobs, and welfare policies recipients (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hopkins 2010); this fear fuels negative attitudes towards immigrants.[19] The other one is described with the name of "contact theory". This predicts that, if some conditions are respected, a higher number of interactions with people from foreign countries may contribute to the reduction of prejudices towards them (Allport, 1954; Hewstone and Swart, 2011). This effect is not necessarily in contrast with the power threat hypothesis since the prejudice reduction is conditioned to interactions.[20]
- Increases in the share of foreigners in the respondent area have ambiguous effect on the attitudes towards migrants in the literature. Initially, the literature on the topic found a negative relation between share of foreigners and attitudes towards them (e.g. Blalock, 1967), at least for the US. More recent evidence for the Netherlands indicates a more complex and reverse u-shaped relationship between increasing exposure to foreigners and attitudes towards them: while at the beginning an increase of foreigners seem to increase "favourable outgroup feelings", further grow in their presence diminishes it (Havekes et a., 2011). Other studies assume that the above-mentioned prejudice reduction is accompanied by status threat perception (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017), and that the equilibrium between the two effects is unstable and prone to sudden changes (Evans and Kelley, 2019). Finally, rapid increases in the numbers of foreigners have also found to elicit hostile reactions in England and Wales, although higher initial levels of foreigners seem to mitigate the hostile attitude (Kawalerowicz, 2017);
- Different race is found to have negative effect on the attitudes towards foreigners. The literature on the topic dates back to the beginning of previous century, where a survey conducted by Bogardus led to a paper where the ethnic origin of 36 groups were associated

[18] Labour mobility is used in this work as flows of people from different EU Member States. EU mobility research area saw a notable increase with the enlargement of 2004, which affected an all-time high ten new Member States. This is different from migration, which deals with foreigners from countries outside the EU.

[19] Through this channel, migration has been considered as a concurring cause of the rise of populism in the 2010s (Eichengreen, 2018; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2018).

[20] And in this case, not all interactions are equal. Random contacts are different from the ones leading to the creation of social bonds (Pettigraw, 1998).

with a sense of sympathy and antipathy from the respondent. In the case of the latter, origin from Africa, Middle East, and Asia were dominant among the replies (Bogardus, 1925). The existence of a negative judgement by individuals based on race was later corroborated by further research, initially in the US (e.g. Blumer, 1958; Kleg and Yamamoto, 1998, replicating Bogardus' experiment almost 70 years later and finding a similar ranking), before reaching Europe (e.g. Dustmann and Preston, 2000; Scheepers et al, 2002; Ford, 2011). Here, recent research found that the opposition towards foreigners based on race is stronger than the one linked with other factors such as skills, belief systems, or religion (Taras, 2013; Kawalerowicz, 2017);

- Improving economic conditions is found to have beneficial effects in attitudes towards migrants (Blalock, 1967; Semyonov et al., 2006; Semyonov et al., 2008), while increases in the unemployment rate have the opposite effect, although small in size (Schissel et al, 1989);
- Trade (Heckscher-Ohlin model)[21] and labour economics theories suggests that attitudes towards migration should be the result of its composite effect on employment levels and wages. Assuming that those react to an increased supply of labour, that high skilled and low skilled labour force is complementary, and that skills composition between sending and receiving countries is different then: high skilled individuals should favour migration inflows if immigrants are mainly low skilled, while low skilled should favour immigration if immigrants are mainly high skilled. Indeed, inflows of low skilled should raise income dispersion, since low skilled individuals are normally low earners, while inflows of highly skilled should reduce it. Evidence, at least from the US, supports this hypothesis (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Borjas, 2003). Results from the EU are mixed. While competing with migrants for jobs is associated with more negative attitudes towards foreigners (Gang et al. 2002), the Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe report shows immigration is not among the main determinants of wage growth and has mostly short-term effects (European Commission, 2018). Empirical studies on the impact of migration on the wages of native workers even suggested that migrants can have a positive effect on the wages of native workers in the long period due to their positive impact on firm growth and productivity. Such positive effects are stronger and more durable than those stemming from increased competition in the labour market (as suggested in, among others, Peri, 2014). This is reflected by research showing that people with higher educational attainment is more tolerant towards high-skilled foreigners (O'Connell, 2011). Educational attainment of parents seems also to play a similar role (Fertig and Brenner, 2006).
- From a welfare perspective, natives should oppose the inflows of migrants and mobile workers receiving more benefits than what they have contributed through taxes (therefore draining resources from the welfare states that would have otherwise used for them). Conversely, they should support the immigration of people contributing to the welfare state more than what they take from it through benefits (Card et al., 2005). This can be seen along the "Ethnic competition Theory" paradigm (Scheepers et al, 2002), which postulates that the cause of antagonistic attitudes among different ethnic groups is the competition over "scarce resources", which can be represented by unemployment benefits and social assistance

[21] Mundell in 1957 made a case that in international mobility of goods and factors (hence including people), an efficient allocation should create a surplus that can be redistributed among natives. Yet, redistribution policies tend to create winners and losers (Card et al., 2009) and in practice, natives may not reap the benefits from migration.

mechanisms (as seen in Ingvarsson 2014), or family and housing benefits. These hypotheses led to the welfare magnetism theory, suggesting that people move from one country to another based on the welfare benefits of the latter (Peterson and Rom, 1990). Interestingly, the literature has inconclusive evidence on the aggregate effect of immigrants on public finances, mostly based by different methodologies, countries, and period considered. Most of these studies agree that the overall effect is small in size (e.g. OECD, 2013). Among these, Nyman and Ahlskog found that, at least in the EU, the effect is positive on average, but negative for some Member States, especially among those in Central and Eastern Europe (Nyman and Ahlskog, 2018).[22] Others (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013) found that in the UK immigrants from the European Economic Area[23] had a positive effect, opposite to the one of extra-EEA. Moreover, empirical research does not find welfare state generosity as a significant determinant of migration decisions (e.g. Allard and Danziger, 2000). Yet, this belief can alter the attitudes towards foreigners (as shown in Markaki and Blinder, 2019 and, for the UK, in Ford and Lowles, 2016).[24] [25]

- From a safety perspective, natives should oppose migration inflows of migrants with a higher crime propensity than natives, and support immigration of people more prone to abide with the law. The literature in this regard is divided, with studies hinting at migrants having lower (e.g. Butcher and Piehl 1998; Ousey and Kubrin, 2018, both for the US) and higher (Entorf and Larsen 2004, for Germany and Denmark; Hällsten et al. 2013 for Sweden) crime propensity than natives. There is a certain amount of evidence that socio-economic opportunities affect crime propensity (Bell et al, 2013; Hällsten et al. 2013). Irrespective from the real relationship between immigrants on crime, the perception of a negative effect of foreigners on crimes has been found in the literature (Semyonov et al, 2008);
- The effect of education is generally positive in the literature. This holds for EU as a whole (Card et al, 2009), single Member States (e.g. Margaryan et al, 2018, for Germany), and other extra EU countries (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, for the US). Some researchers developed also more sophisticated model though, taking into account the effect of education in relation with other factors. Most notably, in her seminal work on attitudes towards migrants, Mayda analyses the role of what she calls "skills ratio" (where the word education proxies skills), which compares the share of skilled[26] natives with skilled foreigners. More specifically, she argues, based on data from the 90es, that skills are "positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences in low per capita GDP countries", irrespective of the model or the data source used (Mayda, 2004). Moreover, Mayda claims that in the case of natives with higher qualification than immigrants, the impact of more education is

[22] This is the case especially for Poland, where the negative effects though are linked with a relatively high presence of old foreigners, predating the accession to the EU.

[23] This international agreement covers the 28 EU Member States (although Croatia is under a provisional application starting from April 2014), and the three EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, while Switzerland has signed but never ratified the agreement).

[24] Recent research finds the opposite to be true, i.e. high levels of migrants in the region reduce support for large and redistribution prone welfare states (Eger and Breznau, 2017).

[25] and Tilley research showed that people in richer member states that could be attractive for natives are prone to "economic xenophobia" (i.e. limiting migration for economic migrants) (Garry and Tilley, 2009).

[26] Mayda defines skilled individuals as those with at least secondary education.

positive on attitudes towards foreigners, while if immigrants are more educated, then the opposite is true;

- From a political perspective, evidence suggested that there was a correlation between actual flows and their perceptions based on the political orientations of the respondent. More specifically, left-oriented individuals tend to perceive flows as less important (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008). Right-oriented respondents tend also to be against redistribution policies in the EU, if their region has a higher share of foreigners (Alesina et al, 2019).

Selection of case studies

European Member States are affected in different ways by migration phenomena, given their diverse and complex histories, socio-economic situations and types of welfare states. Since a thorough analysis of 28 Member State is beyond the scope of this work, this research will focus on a selected number of countries. The selection is done based on four main criteria (shown in table 1, along with a column reporting the share of people born in another country, to complement the information based on citizenship):

- presence in the ESS round 7 (containing replies to interviews carried out in 2014),
- cover the five main types of welfare state typologies (liberal, conservative, social democratic, southern, and eastern/central European),[27]
- size of the country,
- extent of the stocks and inflows of EU movers (i.e. foreigners from another EU Member State) and third country nationals (or TCNs, foreigners from a country outside the EU), based on the criterion of citizenship.

The decision of considering one country by main welfare state typology stems from the fact that institutions have been proven to shape the way in which foreigners adapt in the labour market. For instance: conservative Member States tend to have markedly higher level of labour market segmentation, southern and conservative have increased efforts to integrate foreigners (at least until the 2015 migration crises), while liberal and social democratic regimes have shown consistently higher level of integration (Guzi et al., 2017). Most importantly, the level of decommodification affects the way in which natives perceive foreigners. Indeed, while means tested benefit (typical of liberal welfare states but also present in Southern and Eastern/central Member States) can exacerbate divisions in the society and lead towards a denigration of welfare recipients (Titmuss, 1968), social democratic/universalistic welfare states have much lower possibility to identify welfare state support recipients, thus reducing discrimination among citizens (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). In their work "Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants", Crepaz and Damron indeed demonstrate that universal welfare states reduce welfare chauvinism, and that the level of decommodification matters in the attitudes towards foreigners (Crepaz and Damron, 2009).[28] Finally, different Member States grouping tend to have similar social protection attitudes which may help include foreigners (especially those with lower income levels), or raise the competition among poorer natives and poor foreigners. A context of stronger competition between the two groups seems particularly likely in Eastern and Southern Europe Member States. Eastern European Member States tend indeed to have lower shares of GDP dedicated to social protection. From their part, Southern European Member States, notwithstanding

[27] The taxonomy was first introduced in 1990 by Esping Andersen, based on the study of 18 OECD countries divided in three main welfare state regimes (liberal, conservative, and social democratic), based on three main criteria: decommodification, social stratification, and private-public-mix. The model sparkled intense and still ongoing debate, aimed at complementing the initial model with further aspects initially overlooked. Most notably, Ferrera in 1996 added the Southern European welfare states, while Eastern European Member State were added in a later stage following the need to cover these different state of welfare regimes (e.g. Lipsmeyer, 2000; Aidukaite, 2009). The European Commission also uses a version of this five world of welfare capitalism taxonomy (e.g. Turrini et al., 2014).

[28] Interestingly, continental welfare states are also affected by high level of welfare chauvinism, showing the highest preference among the world of welfare states controlling for favouring natives over foreigners in case jobs vacancies are scarce.

higher relative expenditure in social protections, perform quite poorly in the coverage of the bottom 20% of the population, being labelled “truncated Member States” (World Bank Group, 2015).

Through a point-awarding system weighing the last three criteria equally, the five selected countries are: UK (for the liberal welfare state), Germany (conservative welfare state), Sweden (social democratic/Scandinavian welfare state), Spain (southern welfare state), and Czechia (eastern/central welfare state). Annex B elaborates on the criteria.

Table 1: type of welfare state regime, country population, share of EU movers and Third Country Nationals, source: selected literature and Eurostat population and migration statistics [migr_pop1ctz], [migr_pop3ctb].

	Type of welfare state regime	Overall population (2014)	Share of EU Movers, by citizenships (2014)	Share of TCNs, by citizenships (2014)	Share of people born outside the country (2014)
European Union - 28 MS	-	507235091	2,84%	3,84%	10,16%
Belgium	Conservative	11180840	7,40%	3,67%	15,64%
Bulgaria	Eastern/central	7245677	0,17%	0,56%	1,51%
Czechia	Eastern/central	10512419	1,65%	2,49%	3,77%
Denmark	Social Dem	5627235	2,84%	4,14%	10,12%
Germany	Conservative	80767463	3,94%	4,74%	12,14%
Estonia	Eastern/central	1315819	0,60%	14,22%	14,94%
Ireland	Liberal	4637852	8,76%	2,61%	16,27%
Greece	Eastern/central	10926807	1,76%	6,06%	11,58%
Spain	Southern	46512199	4,28%	5,77%	12,81%
France	Conservative	66165980	2,22%	4,17%	11,71%
Croatia	Eastern/central	4246809	0,23%	0,50%	13,39%
Italy	Southern	60782668	2,37%	5,72%	9,44%
Cyprus	Liberal	858000	12,92%	5,65%	22,33%
Latvia	Eastern/central	2001468	0,30%	14,92%	13,55%
Lithuania	Eastern/central	2943472	0,13%	0,54%	4,67%
Luxembourg	Conservative	549680	39,00%	6,27%	43,27%
Hungary	Eastern/central	9877365	0,82%	0,60%	4,53%
Malta	Liberal	429424	3,54%	3,22%	10,28%
Netherlands	Social Dem	16829289	2,39%	1,96%	11,61%
Austria	Conservative	8507786	6,10%	6,34%	16,62%
Poland	Eastern/central	38017856	0,07%	0,19%	1,63%
Portugal	Southern	10427301	0,96%	2,88%	8,24%
Romania	Eastern/central	19947311	0,10%	0,26%	1,06%
Slovenia	Eastern/central	2061085	0,79%	3,90%	11,42%
Slovakia	Eastern/central	5415949	0,83%	0,23%	3,23%
Finland	Social Dem	5451270	1,54%	2,24%	5,46%
Sweden	Social Dem	9644864	3,00%	3,99%	15,89%
United Kingdom	Liberal	64351203	4,08%	3,77%	12,49%

Descriptive statistics and data sources

The evidence presented in the section "Literature review on attitudes towards migrants" raises a number of questions. The use of the European Social Survey (ESS henceforth), allows to respond to some of them through descriptive statistics. The ESS is a survey with around 35,000 respondents (aged 16 years old or above) living in EU Member States.[29] Given the relatively small sample size of the Survey and the focus of only one data entry (2014),[30] it is better to complement the data with other official surveys. The year of reference for all the data taken from other sources and presented in the following sections will be 2014, since this is the year of the ESS round used for the bulk of the statistics presented in this work.

Share of EU movers and migrants in the population

The "Literature review on attitudes towards migrants" lists the factors which may influence the attitudes towards foreigners (both Third Country Nationals and EU movers) in the different Member States. The most reliable data source at European level that allows to gauge the phenomenon, providing comparable data,[31] is the Eurostat population and migration statistics. Here below the selected data for 2014 for stocks of EU movers and TCNs in EU and in the five selected countries.[32]

Chart 1: share of EU movers and TCNs, source: Eurostat population and migration statistics [migr_pop1ctz]



The definition of EU movers and Third Country Nationals hinges on the nationality of the respondent. The alternative would have been to consider the country of birth of the respondent, but this was excluded since Germany does not provide information in this regard. Unfortunately,

[29] The survey covers also countries outside the EU, which are not covered in this paper.
[30] The survey has a module on migrations, with two data points: 2002 and 2014. Given the focus to recent developments it was decided to focus on the 2014 data only.
[31] The data quality improved following a 2007 regulation. Following it, a framework for the collection and publication of migration statistics was created improving data availability.
[32] In Eurostat jargon, these are called "EU28 countries except reporting" and "non-EU28 reporting countries nor reporting".

Eurostat started the breakdown of EU movers/TCNs for the data series only from 2014. Before, these two groups are considered together. Moreover, this database does not allow detailed breakdowns, being these limited to age and gender. Its main advantage is the source of the data, i.e. administrative data. While not being as comprehensive as censuses (the best source of information, yet happening only once every ten years in most European countries) and having a potential issue of underestimation (foreigners may not register out of lack of obligation, poor enforcement of mandatory registration, poor motivation, or fear), it has the advantage of not being a survey, which relies on a sample of the overall population.

Since Eurostat population and migration statistics does not allow to have the breakdown between EU movers and Third Country Nationals before 2014, it is necessary to rely on another data source to shed light on the composition and evolution of the three different population groups this paper is interested in (EU-movers, TCNs, and citizens of the country. The choice fell on the most reliable EU wide database, providing comparable data, the Labour Force Survey (LFS).

Differently from Eurostat migration and population statistics, LFS is a survey. The table below shows the number of respondents for 2004 (the first year considered to assess the trends in the presence of foreigners in EU and the countries analyses), and 2014 (the year of the ESS module on migration).

Table 1: Number of LFS respondents in 2004-2014, EU and selected countries. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

	2004	2014
EU28	1637114	4525525
DE	326789	478356
CZ	62782	42002
ES	175156	111022
SE	51870	227126
UK	125573	86381

While switching to another data source, which will allow a greater level of granularity, it is important to take into account differences among the two. Although not fully comparable (LFS starts collecting data for people aged 15-74, and exclude people living in collective households),[33] data presents not negligible differences in the share of foreigners in the population. The table below shows the differences in the share of natives in the country.

Table 2 – Comparison of the share of natives in the represented population of the Labour Force Survey and the Eurostat Population Statistics, year 2014.

Share of natives among represented population in the two database, 2014	LFS	Eurostat Population Statistics
European Union - 28 MS	92,87%	93,28%
Czechia	98,00%	95,87%
Germany	90,63%	91,31%
Spain	89,34%	89,94%
Sweden	94,28%	92,80%
United Kingdom	90,24%	92,11%

[33] This does not hold for Germany, where collective household are covered, with the exception of the military ones.

Moreover, in comparison to administrative data sources, different reasons can lead to an underrepresentation of foreigners in these types of survey.[34] Table 3 below shows the main sources of measurement errors. Most notably for foreigners, Germany and the UK do not provide questionnaires in languages different from the official ones, which can lead to foreigners' underrepresentation, especially for those less integrated into the society. Yet, also for countries providing translations of the questionnaires, a lack of common language between interviewer and respondent may still be seen as a major hurdle for foreigners to be properly represented in the survey.

Table 3: Main measurement errors of LFS, by selected countries. Source: Eurostat, 2018.

Measurement errors				
Country	**Respondent**		**Questionnaire**	
	Letter introducing the survey	Phone call introducing the survey	Questionnaire in different languages	On-line checks
Czechia	N	Y	Y	Y
Germany	Y	UNA	N	UNA
Spain	Y	N	Y	Y
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom	Y	Y	N	Y

[34] In 2014, according to the LFS quality report, "almost all" were carried out following the Computer-assisted personal interviewing, CAPI (Eurostat, 2015).

Evolution of the share of EU movers and TCNs in the population

The following charts illustrate the trends in terms of share of EU movers, TCNs, and natives in the overall population. The charts show a growing trend in all the five countries analysed for what concerns the movers (+77,35% overall in Europe, with countries characterised by lower levels of movers in 2004 showing a higher increase) and TCNs (+69,58% in Europe, and a similar trend in comparison with movers) in the period 2004-2014. Conversely, the number of natives decreased overall, dropping from 95,87% in 2004 to 92,87% in 2014. To be noted the sharp changes in the Spanish database between 2005 and 2006, which may hint at lower level of reliability or break in the data series.

Chart 2: evolution of the share of EU movers in EU and selected countries, 2004-2014, source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.



Chart 2: evolution of the share of Third Country Nationals in EU and selected countries, 2004-2014, source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.



Chart 3: evolution of the share of natives in EU and selected countries, 2004-2014, source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.



Employment rate and income levels of natives, movers, and TCNs in the overall population

As seen in the literature review section, the share of EU movers and TCNs in the overall population is only one of the factors that could help explain the attitudes towards migrants. Their performance in the labour market concur in explaining the formation of attitudes towards them, as well as how foreigners fare relatively to natives. The charts below presents the data, coming from the LFS, for the EU and the five countries this work will focus on.

In order to further refine the analysis the movers were split in two main groups: the ones coming from EU15[35] and those coming from EU13,[36] a division that will be maintained going forward. The split is feasible following LFS microdata, and allows a greater level of granularity,[37] which is meaningful given the results showed in the table.

The most striking results are the following:

- At EU level, movers have constantly higher employment rate than natives. The opposite is true for Third Country Nationals;
- In Czechia, natives have been the sub-group of the population with the lowest employment rate for most of the considered years. EU15 performance has been somewhat erratic, but this is mostly due to the relatively small sample of EU15 movers in this country (often below the 100 individuals). Since 2011, Third Country Nationals have been the sub sample of the population faring better in terms of employment rate, an exception in the overall picture;
- In Germany and Sweden, on the contrary, natives have been the group with the highest employment rate for most of the period covered, with EU15 presenting a similar pattern;
- In Sweden, no individual coming from EU13 was ever recorded in LFS microdata in the 10 years analysed,[38] for anonymity reasons;
- In Spain, the effect of the crisis was particularly evident. All groups saw a decrease in their employment rate. This was much more pronounced for EU13 movers and Third Country Nationals, both registering drops of more than 20 pp. EU15 movers, from their side, lost just 1 pp, while natives 6. Overall, in 2014, no group recorded an employment rate above 59%. In all other countries, only Third Country Nationals have employment rates below 60% (Czechia being the excpetion);

[35] EU 15 refer to the first 15 Member of the EU, by chronological accession order. These are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom (UK).

[36] EU13 refers to the 13 countries reaching more recently the EU, namely: Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Czechia (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Poland (PL), Romania, Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI).

[37] Among the limitations of LFS microdata is that it does not allow to split EU movers and Third Country Nationals by country, both to comply with anonymization criteria reasons, and to avoid large year-on-year variations due more to sampling than to changes in the population.

[38] This does not mean that no EU13 mover lived in Sweden in those years. It rather hints at the fact this group can be underrepresented, at some survey design issue overlooking for more than a decade areas where EU13 movers are concentrated, and should remind the reader that even surveys with rich sample as LFS have limits when it comes to analyses on foreigners. Indeed, official statistics for Sweden have recorded around 180,000 people from Eastern Europe living in the country in 2016 (data available at https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/, in Swedish), thereof half coming from Poland.

- In the United Kingdom, both groups of EU movers fare better than natives in terms of employment rate. EU 13 movers are the best performers, almost 10 pp better than natives across the period analysed.

Chart 4-9: employment rate of natives, EU15 and EU13 movers (see country codes at the beginning), and TCNs in EU and selected countries, 2005-2014, source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.



In the literature review part, employment rate was coupled with wages in terms of labour market factors that could play a role in explaining attitudes towards migrants. The charts below show the

data for EU and the other countries from LFS, grouped by income deciles (used as proxy for wages). The samples are significantly smaller than in previous sections, since 48,8% of the respondents did not disclose any information about their income. Importantly, Sweden did not have any observation with information on income, and therefore no chart is shown. Finally, concerning Czechia, the results for EU15 were not reported since only 12 people were listed.[39]

Chart 10-14: income levels of natives, EU15 and EU13 movers, and TCNs in EU and selected countries, by deciles. 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.



Looking at charts 10-14, the following features are particularly striking:

[39] The other small samples were Third Country Nationals and EU13 movers in Czechia, 82 and 101 individuals respectively, which were kept.

- At EU level, on average and for the respondents disclosing information on income, EU15 movers tend to have an income distribution per decile very similar to natives;
- Conversely, EU13 movers and TCNs show an almost constant decreasing trend, being overrepresented in the poorest deciles while gradually decreasing while moving towards the upper echelons of income distribution;
- While Third Country Nationals have on average a similar income distribution to EU13 movers, they are even more overrepresented in the first decile (more than one-fifth of TCNs is there)
- EU 15 movers are overrepresented in the richest decile, even in comparison to natives (14,2 to 9,3%);
- In the EU, EU13 movers are overrepresented in the lowest five quintiles and underrepresented in the highest five: the trend is particularly evident in Spain;
- In Germany, natives and EU15 have an even similar distribution, while the curves of EU13 movers and TCNs are flatter;
- In UK EU 15 movers are overrepresented in the four richest deciles (with a difference increasing along the deciles), while being underrepresented in the other six;
- In the UK, EU13 movers are underrepresented in the four richest deciles, and overrepresented in deciles two to six;
- In Spain the income differential between natives and Third Country Nationals is more pronounced than at EU level;
- In UK TCNs have an income distribution much more similar to natives and EU15 movers: Third Country Nationals are overrepresented in the richest deciles (15% are in this group, 5% higher than people having the citizenship of the country).

Educational attainment, skills, and employment of EU movers and TCNs in comparison with natives

As mentioned in the literature review section, education and skill level of the foreigners can play a role in the attitudes towards them, being reflected in EU movers and TCNs performances in the labour market in terms of employment rates and wages, and how they fare relative to natives. The tables below provide a summary concerning their qualification level (divided in primary, secondary, and tertiary attainment) in 2014 for people aged between 16 and 64 years old, according to LFS data. Before commenting the results, a word of caution for the figures concerning foreigners in Czechia, derived from a sample which is considerably smaller than those for the other selected Member States, especially for what concerns EU 15 movers. Consistently with the previous section, no EU13 mover was covered in Sweden.

Table 2 – Educational level of natives in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

Citizen of reporting country	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total obs
EU28	27,81%	48,70%	23,49%	2742639
DE	16,73%	59,34%	23,94%	280280
CZ	13,12%	69,60%	17,28%	26177
ES	44,46%	23,56%	31,98%	64320
SE	20,63%	47,24%	32,13%	195810
UK	24,14%	42,18%	33,68%	46107

Table 3 – Educational level of EU15 movers in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

EU 15 mover	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total Obs
EU28	26,19%	35,66%	38,16%	36903
DE	35,62%	40,46%	23,92%	6688
CZ	11,54%	46,15%	42,31%	26
ES	30,52%	24,95%	44,53%	521
SE	23,45%	30,42%	46,13%	3228
UK	12,53%	32,15%	55,31%	1101

Table 4 – Educational level of EU13 movers in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

EU 13 mover	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total Obs
EU28	26,63%	51,85%	21,53%	32721
DE	27,49%	51,58%	20,93%	5314
CZ	15,24%	59,76%	25%	164
ES	35,43%	44,31%	20,26%	844
SE				0
UK	18,28%	49,39%	32,33%	1466

Table 5 – Educational level of Third Country Nationals in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

TCNs	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total Obs
EU28	47,00%	34,08%	18,92%	83858
DE	51,36%	32,30%	16,34%	16484
CZ	22,05%	52,31%	25,64%	195
ES	50,46%	31,66%	17,87%	2277
SE	52,67%	21,50%	25,84%	16484
UK	18,87%	29,90%	51,23%	2194

The most notable outcome of the tables are the following:

- At EU level EU15 movers have, on average, higher qualifications (15pp. more tertiary education than natives, thereof 13% stems from fewer people with primary education);
- This is particularly evident in Czechia (+25%, yet with only 26 observations overall) and UK (+22%)
- Germany is a great exception, having the same level of tertiary education for natives and EU15 movers, and having attracted a lot of EU15 movers with primary education (36% of the incoming, against the 17% of the natives). To be noted that, among the five countries selected, Germany has the second-lowest share of people with tertiary education (24%, in line with the EU average), trailing UK, Sweden, and Spain (all above 30%);
- Germany is the country attracting relatively more people with primary education (+11% in comparison to Germans living in the country);
- As regards EU13 movers, their educational attainment distribution is very similar to the one of natives. On average, they are overrepresented in terms of share of individuals with secondary education (+3%), balanced by lower levels of people with tertiary (-2%) and primary (-1%) education ;
- Spain has the same trend yet much more skewed. People with secondary education are overrepresented by 21 pp., balanced by those with tertiary (-12) and primary education (-9);
- Czechia is the only country attracting EU13 movers which have relatively higher qualifications than natives (+8%);
- Third Country Nationals are worst performing group in terms of educational attainment, having on average relatively more people with primary education (47% of the total, against an EU average level of 28%);
- Germany is, also for Third Country Nationals, the country having attracted those with the lowest human capital: the share of TCNs with primary education is 35 pp. higher than the one of natives, compensated by lower levels of TCNs with secondary (-27%), and tertiary (-8%). Among the five countries examined, they have the lowest share of TCNs with tertiary education (16%, against a 19% EU average);
- UK and Czechia are the exceptions, attracting TCNs with a higher share of tertiary education than natives: by 18 and 8 pp. respectively. In the UK the majority of TCNs has tertiary education (51% of the total).

While controlling for educational attainment sheds light on the different characteristics of the population subgroups, it is not enough. Indeed, people fare differently in the labour market based on their unobserved characteristics (e.g. effort, network, skills that go beyond those certified by the education system), different types of secondary and tertiary education (general or vocational, but also different fields of study), and language skills (especially relevant for mobile workers and TCNs). In order to reduce the effects of these characteristics, and try to have a better estimate of the skills levels and characteristics of native, mobile workers, and TCNs, it is possible to check at macro-level for occupational groups of the foreigners. Given the relatively small sample sizes of foreigners per country, it is advisable to regroup occupations at ISCO-08 1 digit[40] in four main

[40] LFS has occupations coded in ISCO 4 digits, here recoded for the purpose of the research.

samples, following the dichotomies high-low skilled and white- and blue-collar used in the literature (e.g. European Commission, 2017; OECD, 1998), thus obtaining:[41]

1. White collars high skilled workers (including "managers", "professional", and "technicians and associate professionals"
2. White collars low skilled workers ("clerical support workers", and "service and sales workers")
3. Blue collars high skilled workers ("skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers" and "craft and related trades workers")
4. Blue collars low skilled workers ("plant and machine operators, and assemblers" and "elementary occupations")

Table 6 – Occupational group of natives in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

Citizen or reporting country	WhiteHigh	WhiteLow	BlueHigh	BlueLow	Total Obs
EU28	39,63%	26,30%	17,51%	16,55%	1717291
DE	45,62%	27,66%	14,15%	12,57%	208878
CZ	35,88%	25,06%	19,25%	19,81%	17495
ES	33,70%	32,48%	14,82%	19%	36205
SE	49,18%	27,33%	11,44%	12,05%	149257
UK	47,66%	29,57%	10%	12,77%	33685

Table 7 – Occupational group of EU15 movers in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

EU 15 Mover	WhiteHigh	WhiteLow	BlueHigh	BlueLow	Total Obs
EU28	48,88%	24,57%	11,75%	14,80%	25831
DE	38,34%	27,92%	14,21%	19,53%	5003
CZ	64,71%	23,53%	5,88%	5,88%	17
ES	44,76%	28,25%	10,48%	16,51%	315
SE	55,40%	23,90%	9,98%	10,72%	2444
UK	59,73%	22,26%	4,87%	13,14%	822

Table 8 – Occupational group of EU13 movers in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

EU13 Mover	WhiteHigh	WhiteLow	BlueHigh	BlueLow	Total Obs
EU28	16,27%	25,62%	20,60%	37,51%	22908
DE	23,90%	23,40%	20,05%	32,65%	3795
CZ	37,72%	11,40%	12,28%	38,60%	114
ES	5,14%	22,92%	23,13%	48,82%	467
SE					0
UK	18,23%	22,78%	15,61%	43,38%	1185

[41] "Armed forces occupations" are excluded from the categorization, following the literature (e.g. European Commission, 2017).

Table 9 – Occupational group of Third Country Nationals movers in EU and selected countries, year 2014. Source: author calculation based on LFS microdata.

TCNs	WhiteHigh	WhiteLow	BlueHigh	BlueLow	Total Obs
EU28	16,88%	25,89%	17,54%	39,68%	46914
DE	23,92%	25,78%	15,91%	34,39%	9022
CZ	24,48%	34,97%	16,78%	23,78%	143
ES	6,88%	31,74%	11,84%	49,54%	1192
SE	33,11%	29,84%	10,26%	26,78%	1374
UK	48,80%	29,22%	5,27%	16,72%	1328

From a comparison among the tables, it is possible to notice that:

- At EU level, on average, EU 15 movers tend to be overrepresented in high skilled white collar occupations (+9%) in comparison to natives, while being underrepresented in the others, especially in the high skilled blue collars ones (-6%);
- The main exception is Germany, where white collar high skilled workers are underrepresented (-7%), balanced by more blue collar low skilled individuals;
- Czechia has very few EU movers, and therefore it has a low reliability;
- As for education, there seems to be a marked difference in the average profile of EU13 and EU15 movers;
- More specifically, EU13 movers, in comparison with natives, are overrepresented in blue collar low skilled occupations (+21%), while being underrepresented in white collar high skilled ones (-23%);
- This pattern is particularly visible in the UK, with blue collars low skilled at +31% and white collars high skilled at -29% in comparison to natives;
- The notable exception in the country analysed is Czechia, where white collars high skilled are overrepresented (+2%), along with blue collar low skilled (+19%), balanced by underrepresentation among blue collar high skilled (-7%), and white collar low skilled (-14%);
- In Spain, only 5% of EU13 movers is working in white collar high skilled occupations, 11 pp. below EU average; by contrast, blue collar low skilled individuals account for half of the workers;
- Immigrants are very similar to EU13 movers in terms of occupations, being just slightly more present among blue collar low skilled and less among blue collar high skilled workers;
- In Czechia, Third Country Nationals tend to be overrepresented, on average, in white collar low skilled occupations (+10%), while being underrepresented in white collar high skilled ones;
- In Spain, half of the immigrants are working in blue collar low skilled occupations;
- A notable outlier is the UK, where the occupational pattern mirrors the educational one: 49% of Third Country Nationals work in white-collar high skilled occupations.

The perceived effect of EU movers and TCNs on welfare state

The next aspect to consider following the structure presented in the literature review section is the effect of movers and TCNs on welfare state. To this end, LFS does not offer any valuable information. Hence, it is necessary to resort to another data source, the European Social Survey, which will be the main source of data for the remainder of this section. The ESS is a bi-annual survey managed by academics conducted across geographical Europe since 2001. The interviews are conducted through face-to-face interviews and cross-sectional sample. Each wave of the survey is composed by a standard section and two specialised thematic modules. The standard survey section foresees questions on socio demographics characteristics of the individuals, gender, household, media and social trust, politics, subjective well-being, and human values. The seventh wave of the survey, conducted in 2014, contains a thematic ad hoc module on immigration, which constitutes the privileged source of information for this subsection and the following ones.

More specifically, the survey contains a question on the perceptions of respondents in terms of the net effect of the foreigners on the public finances.[42] Differently from other questions, unfortunately this one does not allow for a distinction between EU movers and TCNs. Moreover, not all EU countries are included in the sample, but only 19 among them.[43] The charts below display the results. These omit respondents that did not reply to the question, refused to reply, and did not know how to reply. The replies are presented in eleven groups, from those believing that foreigners take from the welfare state more than what they contribute for (the columns on the left), to the ones believing that they contribute more than what they receive (those on the right).

Charts 15-20 – beliefs of respondent on net impact of foreigners on welfare states, selected EU countries. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.



[42] The question is phrased as: "Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?"

[43] Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, and United Kingdom.



From the charts above, it is possible to see that:

- All the countries reported have at least one fourth of the respondent that believe the overall effect of foreigners on public finances is neutral. This figure reaches 38% in Germany;
- On average, for the 19 countries in EU represented in the ESS sample, people tend to believe more often that foreigner take out more (the five columns on the left of each chart) from the welfare than what they contribute to (the five columns on the right), 43% to 25%;
- The country in which this belief is more strong is Czechia (where the two shares are 60 and 12%), followed by Spain (53 to 17%);
- Sweden is the only country in which more people believe Third Country Nationals contribute more to the welfare state (45% of the respondents) than what they take from it (26%);
- In Germany and the UK, the trend is more similar to the European average, but in both cases respondents beliefs are more nuanced;

It is worth noticing that different beliefs on the net balance position of foreigners towards the national welfare may be linked with prejudices, reflect different realities at country level, or a combination of the two factors.

The perceived effect of movers and TCNs on crime

Economic consideration, educational, skills, and employment level of movers and TCNs are hardly the only factors shaping the attitudes towards migration flows (Hooge and de Vroome, 2016). As seen in the literature review section, the link between crime and migration is debated, although for Europe the majority of the evidence available seems to suggest that foreigners tend to have a higher propensity to crime, often linked with lower access to labour market. ESS allows to control for the perceptions of the link between crime and immigration with a specific question,[44] as done for the welfare contribution section.

Some clarifications concerning the question on welfare:

- not all EU countries are covered, but the same 19 as before;
- the question does not allow to distinguish between movers and Third Country Nationals;
- the graphs omit respondents that did not reply to the question, refused to reply and did not know how to reply.
- Similarly to the previous section, the reply options are 11 categories, ranging from "crime problems made worse by immigration" (at the left of the charts below) to "crime problems made better by immigration" (at the right of the charts).

From the charts presented in the following page, it is possible to see that:

- Analogously to the welfare section, almost all the countries reported have at least one fourth of the respondent believing that the overall effect of foreigners on crime is neutral. The average for the EU 19 countries coveredby the ESS is 31%;
- The exception is Czechia, where the central value reaches 23%;
- On average, for the 19 countries in EU included in the ESS, people tend to believe that foreigners worsen the crime situation (the five columns on the left of each chart) rather than improving it (the five columns on the right), in a stronger way than for what refers to welfare, 57% to 12%;
- Similarly to the section above, Czechia is the country in which this belief is stronger (the respondents believing in a negative effect are 10 times more than those believing in a positive effect, 70 to 7%), followed by Spain (63 to 7%) and Germany (64 to 10%);
- Sweden (55 to 13%) and the United Kingdom (52 to 14%) are the countries in which the negative effect is less pronounced.

[44] The question is phrased as: "Are [country name]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?".

Charts 21-26 – beliefs of respondent on the nexus between foreigners on crime, selected EU countries. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.











As for the previous section, different perception may be linked with different crime propensity by foreigners in the hosting countries, be linked with prejudices, or a combination of the two.

As said in the literature review section, in the analysis presented in the next subsection two further variables will be included, to check whether the crime situation in the country, and the perception of safety by the respondent, could play a role in the attitudes towards migrants. The first one relates to events of burglary and assault the respondents or a member of his/her household, suffered in the

previous 5 years.[45] The second one describes the sense of safety of the respondent in walking after dark in their neighbourhood or local area.[46] Both charts (27 and 28, below) omit respondents that did not reply to the question, refused to reply, and did not know how to reply, consistently with previous cases. Interestingly, at country level the two charts seem to be at odds: while Spain and Sweden are the two countries with the highest percentage of respondents declaring to have been victim or burglary or assault, they display the highest level of perceived safety while walking at night in their own neighbourhood. The opposite seems to be true for Czechia. While controlling at micro level though, 24% of the respondents who feel unsafe (or very unsafe) in walking in their neighbourhood after dark were victims of burglary or assault in the previous five years. The percentage drops to 16% among non-victims.

Charts 27-28 – Share of respondents being victims of burglary/assault, and their fear in walking in their neighbourhood after dark, selected EU countries. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.





[45] In the ESS, the question is: "Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?".

[46] The question is "How safe do you – or would you - feel walking alone in [Respondent's local area or neighbourhood] after dark?"

Allowing people in the country based on ethnicity

In the previous sections, the focus of the descriptive statistics was on beliefs concerning the relationship between foreigners and a number of dimensions impacting the residents. In this section and in the following three the attention shifts to the policy preferences of the respondent on allowing further foreigners in their country of residence. All of those revolve around asking the respondents whether their country should allow people to come into their country based on a specific characteristic, or a combination of different ones. For ease of reading, respondents choosing the categories "don't know" or that did not answered are not reported (this will hold also in the following sections). The first couple of variables presented deals with allowing foreigners in the country based on their race. ESS asks two questions in this regard, one focusing on foreigners of the same ethnic group of the respondent, and the other question on people belonging to a different ethnic group.[47] The charts below show the following features:

- In all countries examined, and in the EU19 pooled results, the overall population shows a preference in favour of people of the same ethnical group;
- For the EU19 the combined options of "allow many people" and "allow some people" of the same race is 14% higher than in the case of different race (69 to 55%);
- Czechia and Germany record the two highest difference among countries analysed, at 14 and 15% respectively. In the UK, the difference is 8%, followed by Spain (7%), and Sweden (2%);
- The EU19 average combined reply for accepting "many" or "some" foreigners of the same race is 69%; Germany and Sweden have higher share of people more willing to allow people of the same race (89 and 95% respectively), UK and Spain have slightly lower values (63 and 62%) while Czechia has only 41%, failing to reach the 50% mark;
- For all country but Czechia, "allow some" was the response having been selected the most;
- Shifting from people of the same race to those of a different one, the relative country ranking remains the same. Yet, while in Sweden 92% of the respondents would allow "many" or "some" foreigners to settle in Sweden, just over a third would do so in Czechia (27%);
- In both scenarios, the majority of respondents tends to choose more often one of the two central options; this is particularly the case in UK, with almost 80% of respondents choosing the options "allow some" or "allow a few".

[47] The questions are, respectively: "to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?" and "How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?"

Charts 29-30 – Respondents' replies on allowing people of their same race (left), or another one (right) in their countries, selected EU countries. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.



Allowing people in the country based on their provenience from poor countries: the role of the European threshold

While the previous section focused on racial characteristics of the foreigners, this one will dig into the attitudes towards people coming from relatively poorer countries. Following the example introduced in the racial part, it will present results linked to a pair of questions.[48] Moreover, as for the following sections, it will consider also the presence of a European stigma,[49] i.e. control, while keeping everything else equal, potential changes in the attitude towards a characteristic (in this case coming from a relatively poorer nation) linked with the fact of coming from another European country. The graphs below show that:

- Coming from a poorer country, both inside and outside Europe, is seen as a bigger negative factor among respondents than race: while the combined figure of the two groups of respondents more willing to allow foreigners based on their race stood 69% (in case they share the same race) and 55% (in case of a different race), the figures in this case are 55 (in case of European country) and 46% (in case of an extra-European country);
- In the question on allowing foreigners from Europe, a majority of the respondents in EU19 would choose either "allow many" or "allow some" of them. Among the countries selected (and with the exception of Czechia where the question was not present in the questionnaire), only UK has a majority tilting towards "allow a few" and "allow none", by less than a percentage point;[50]
- Similarly to the previous section, Sweden is the country more in favour of allowing people, followed by Germany and Spain;

[48] The wording for the two questions is: "And how about people from the poorer countries in Europe?" and "How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?". The first question was not asked in Czechia.
[49] This feature is due to questionnaire design, and unfortunately not replicable for the previous section.
[50] While respondents from the UK favour European migration to the one coming from outside Europe, the effect seems to have reduced in comparison to previous decades (e.g., what found by Dustmann and Preston in 2000 referring to the period 1983-1991).

- European origin reduced the opposition to further inflows in the country: shifting to countries outside Europe, for all the groups reported, respondents are less in favour of welcoming foreigners, with the 19 EU countries covered by ESS recording a majority in favour of allowing a few foreigners (35%), or allowing none (19%);
- As in the questions concerning race, Czechs are the ones preferring a stricter immigration policy, with only 27% of the respondents being in favour of allowing many or some foreigners to move in their home country. Britons are the second strictest EU citizens among the countries covered by ESS, with 42% of the respondents favouring a more lenient immigration policy;
- Swedish (87%), Germans (64%), and Spanish (53%) all display majorities of respondents in favour of allowing "many" or "some" people from poorer countries outside EU;

Charts 31-32 – Respondents' replies on allowing people from poorer countries inside (left), or outside (right) the EU in their home countries, selected EU Member States. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.



Allowing professionals from foreign countries and the European threshold

This section will maintain the European threshold introduced in the previous one, to check for the persistence of a European stigma effect. This may affect attitudes towards foreigners by the respondents. Differently from the previous section, in this set of questions the interviewers refers to foreigners with two specific nationalities: the two poor countries with the highest number of citizens in the country where the interview took place, both inside and outside Europe.[51] For all countries analysed but Czechia, this meant another European Member State (and for three out of five countries, it meant Poland).[52] Moreover, the European origin will be analysed in combination with another factor, the skills-bias of the respondent. While the previous pair of questions dealt with foreigners as a unique block, in this one the attention would shift to a subset of potential incomers,[53] the professionals.[54] The countries used are reported in the table below:

Table 10 – Main poor countries of origin of foreigners, in and outside in EU for selected countries, year 2014, five most relevant in bold. Source: European Social Survey, Appendix A10, Immigration, Survey experiment, ESS7-2014 ed. 3.0.

ESS Country	Poor European country providing the largest number of migrants	Poor country outside EU providing the largest number of migrants
Austria	Serbia	Turkey
Belgium	Poland	Turkey
Czechia/Czech Republic	Ukraine	Vietnam
Denmark	Poland	Turkey
Estonia	Belarus	Vietnam
Finland	Estonia	Somalia
France	Portugal	Algeria
Germany	Poland	Turkey
Hungary	Romania	China
Ireland	Poland	Nigeria
Latvia	Belarus	Vietnam
Lithuania	Belarus	Turkey
Netherlands	Poland	Turkey
Poland	Belarus	Vietnam
Portugal	Ukraine	Brazil
Slovenia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	China
Spain	Romania	Morocco
Sweden	Poland	Somalia
United Kingdom	Poland	India

[51] Yet, the questions reported in this and in the next section have a much lower level of missing replies than those reported in the previous two sections. While the other questions have a response rate of above 90%, these have around a 25% of replies.

[52] Interestingly, the ESS survey designers decided to use a geographical rather than political definition of Europe, possibly to align the questionnaire to a similar ESS module, dating back to 2002, before the 2004 enlargement process.

[53] The formulations of the questions are: "please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?" and "please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?".

[54] These are defined in the ESS questionnaire as "workers who are typically engaged in highly skilled occupations".

The charts below show that:

- Being a professional tend to soften respondents' stance towards people inflows: while the shares of respondents willing to allow "many" or "some" people from poor countries in and outside Europe were 55 and 46%, these increase to 68 and 62% in case of professionals;
- Yet, the figure remains lower than the one referring to allowing people of the same race (69%);
- Differently from the average, and from the previous pair of questions, respondents from Czechia and UK show softer stances towards professionals coming from the country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants rather than those coming from the country within Europe: therefore, the specific pair of nationalities seem to play a role in this regard.
- Germany and UK are the countries with the highest "skills-bias", overtaking Sweden and Spain as the first and third most welcoming country towards professionals;
- European origin plays a positive role on average (6% difference at EU level), but the differences are negative in Czechia (2%) and UK (1%), hinting at a preference towards the two specific non-European groups of citizens present in those countries vis-à-vis the two European ones.

Charts 33-34 – Respondents' replies on allowing professionals from poorer countries inside (left), or outside (right) Europe in their home countries, selected EU Member States. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.



Allowing unskilled labourers from foreign countries: the EU threshold

The last pair of dependant variables for which descriptive statistics are presented mirror those on professionals since they present replies by respondents on welcoming unskilled people from poor countries inside and outside Europe.[55] The main results of the charts below are the following:

- Respondents seem to pay particularly attention to the skillsets of the incomers: while professionals in the previous set of questions enjoyed a rather welcoming stance from the respondents, the opposite can be said for unskilled workers: with 42 (for those with European citizenships) and 33% (for those without it), unskilled workers record the two lowest level of support in the survey, measured as a combination of the replies "allow many" and "allow some";
- European origin has a particular positive effect in Germany (16% difference) and UK (9%), while being only slight above zero in Czechia, and negative for both Spain (4%) and Sweden (3%). This may be linked with the fact that the question does not talk about European and non-European countries in general rather focussing on the two poor countries with the highest presence in the country where the interview takes place (as shown in table 10);[56]
- The drop off in the positive stance (measured as a combination of the replies "allow many" and "allow some") in percentage points between professionals and unskilled labour at EU19 level is 26 pp. for EU citizens and 29 pp. for non-EU citizens;
- At country level UK (36%) and Spain (32%) register the highest difference for people coming from poor EU countries, while UK (46%) and Germany (41%) register the highest drop off for those coming from non-EU countries;
- In terms of absolute value, Czechia remains the country with the average toughest stance towards foreigners, while Sweden has the mildest one;

[55] The questions are formulated as follows: "please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?" and "please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?".

[56] Yet, the countries with a negative difference are not the same as in the previous section, hinting at a different skills composition among incoming foreigners from the countries taken into account, or possibly at hidden factors.

Charts 35-36 – Respondents' replies on allowing unskilled labour from poorer countries inside (left), or outside (right) the EU in their home countries, selected EU Member States. Source: author calculation based on ESS microdata.





Conclusions

This paper tries to build upon the rich and ever-growing literature on attitudes towards foreigners, combining it with descriptive statistics derived by a variety of sources. The first part attempts at making a list of the factors that the literature most often associates with the formation of attitudes towards foreigners. The list covers factors such as share of foreigners in the country, recent increase in their share, country recent economic performances, socio-economic characteristics of the survey's respondent, ethnicity of foreigners, effect of the presence of the foreigners on the country (in terms of jobs, public finances and crime), on top of natives' perceptions on this whole set of dimensions.

Therefore, an analysis was conducted trying to study these dimensions for the EU, investigating whether the country differences were associated to possible different types of welfare capitalism. In order to do so, different descriptive statistics are presented, drawing from different statistical sources. Given the lack of a recent census, the most accurate data source used were administrative data. When a more subtle level of granularity was needed (such as for employment, education, and skills level for different subgroups of the population), LFS data were used. Finally, for data on perceived effects of EU-movers and Third Country Nationals on the receiving country, and on preferences for allowing different groups of foreigners to come in the country, data from the European Social Survey were used. For all these dimensions, the analysis narrowed down on EU averages (and on 19 EU Member States for data extracted from the ESS, which lacks a EU-28 coverage) and five countries. Each of them represented a different world of welfare capitalism: the conservative welfare state (Germany), the liberal one (the United Kingdom), the southern one (Spain), the social democratic one (Sweden), and the eastern/central European one (Czechia). Differences among the countries were indeed observed, possibly linked with the factors listed in the literature review. Future investigation is necessary to build on these conclusions, carrying out regressions linking two aspects. On the one hand the willingness of respondents to allow different types of foreigners in their country, and on the other hand their socio-economic characteristics and their beliefs.

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Annex B – the choice of the five countries

Table 1 shows the four criteria for the choice of the five countries that will be analysed more thoroughly. Data come from ESS round 4, which does not include all EU Member States. Most notably, it does not include Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia.

Grouping the remaining countries by welfare group. I can rank each of them based on the other three criteria, namely:

- Overall population
- Share of EU movers
- Share of Third Country Nationals

For instance, for the liberal welfare countries, only UK and Ireland are included in the ESS 2014. The table below shows the detail.

	Type of welfare state regime	Overall population (2014)	Share of EU Movers (2014)	Share of TCNs (2014)
Ireland	Liberal	4637852	8,76%	2,61%
United Kingdom	Liberal	64351203	4,08%	3,77%

The choice was made by awarding an equal number of points for each of three categories (1 point for the one with higher overall population, 2 points for the second, and repeat it for shares of EU movers), and award the country with the lowest number of points.

Ireland	Liberal	2	1	2	5
United Kingdom	Liberal	1	2	1	4

I will therefore award UK (in green). Please find below similar pair of charts for the other four different worlds of welfare capitalism.

	Type of welfare state regime	Overall population (2014)	Share of EU Movers (2014)	Share of TCNs (2014)
Belgium	Conservative	11180840	7,40%	3,67%
Germany	Conservative	80767463	3,94%	4,74%
France	Conservative	66165980	2,22%	4,17%
Netherlands	Social Dem	16829289	2,39%	1,96%
Austria	Conservative	8507786	6,10%	6,34%

Belgium	Conservative	4	1	4	9
Germany	Conservative	1	3	2	6
France	Conservative	2	5	3	10
Netherlands	Conservative	3	4	5	12
Austria	Conservative	5	2	1	8

	Type of welfare state regime	Overall population (2014)	Share of EU Movers (2014)	Share of TCNs (2014)
Czechia	Eastern/central	10512419	1,65%	2,49%
Estonia	Eastern/central	1315819	0,60%	14,22%
Lithuania	Eastern/central	2943472	0,13%	0,54%
Hungary	Eastern/central	9877365	0,82%	0,60%
Poland	Eastern/central	38017856	0,07%	0,19%
Slovenia	Eastern/central	2061085	0,79%	3,90%

Czechia	Eastern/central	2	1	3	6
Estonia	Eastern/central	6	4	1	11
Lithuania	Eastern/central	4	5	5	14
Hungary	Eastern/central	3	2	4	9
Poland	Eastern/central	1	6	6	13
Slovenia	Eastern/central	5	3	2	10

	Type of welfare state regime	Overall population (2014)	Share of EU Movers (2014)	Share of TCNs (2014)
Denmark	Social Dem	5627235	2,84%	4,14%
Finland	Social Dem	5451270	1,54%	2,24%
Sweden	Social Dem	9644864	3,00%	3,99%

Denmark	Social Dem	2	2	1	5
Finland	Social Dem	3	3	3	9
Sweden	Social Dem	1	1	2	4

	Type of welfare state regime	Overall population (2014)	Share of EU Movers (2014)	Share of TCNs (2014)
Spain	Southern	46512199	4,28%	5,77%
Portugal	Southern	10427301	0,96%	2,88%

Spain	Southern	1	1	1	3
Portugal	Southern	2	2	2	6

3 - Determinants of attitudes towards migration

Introduction

Labour mobility among different EU Member State is enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Yet, intra EU labour mobility remains at lower levels in comparison to capital, goods, and services mobility in the Union. Nevertheless, in recent years, it is at the centre of the political debate and social in several EU Member States, often intertwined with other migration flows, involving third countries.

Against the background of the growing prominence foreigners gained in political agenda, this paper wants to reply to the following research questions: what are the factors associated with attitudes towards foreigners? Do macroeconomic conditions matter more than personal characteristics? Or is it rather the institutional setting of a country affecting attitudes the most? Do attitudes differ across different subgroups of foreigners? By how much?

This thesis attempts to reply to these questions, building on the existing literature and on the cross-country differences examined in the previous chapter. The analysis is based on a thorough and extensive study of the European Social Survey database, more specifically its seventh round, referring to the year 2014. This round contains a module on immigration, which allows distinguishing among the different groups of foreigners. Moreover, the survey allows checking for correlations with a comprehensive set of economic and social characteristics of the respondent, his/her political beliefs, institutional trust, religious beliefs, interactions with foreigners, beliefs on the effects of immigration, and qualifying factors for foreigners to migrate in the country. Furthermore, a set of macroeconomic indicators was included to complement the dataset. This covers share and increase of foreigners in the country, employment levels by nationality, and types of public expenditure. This original database allows for an investigation of the determinants of attitudes towards different sub groups of foreigners, taking into account a high number of variables. Hence, it goes beyond the existing literature in this domain.

Based on this dataset, this work tries to shed light on the factors linked with attitudes towards foreigners, divided into eight groups:

- foreigners of the same race of the respondent,
- foreigners of a different race,
- foreigners from poor countries in Europe,
- foreigners from poor countries outside Europe,
- professionals from the poor country in Europe providing the largest number of EU-movers to the country of the respondent,
- professionals from the poor country outside Europe providing the largest number of migrants,
- unskilled workers from the poor country in Europe providing the largest number of EU-movers, and

- unskilled workers from the poor country outside Europe providing the largest number of migrants,

The results of the regressions carried out for the whole dataset (and partly with a previous wave of the same dataset, from 2002) and for five selected countries (one for the five main typologies of welfare states present in the EU) will be analysed. The large number of variables taken into account, the coverage of 19 EU Member States and the focus on five different case studies allows a comparative approach, covering both different sub groups of foreigners and Member States characterised by different institutional settings.

The first section of this work briefly summarizes the main groups of factor linked with the formation of attitudes towards foreigners. The second section sketches the methodology used. The third presents the analysis of the results (both for all countries pooled together, for the five selected countries, and merged with a previous similar wave of the database, hold in 2002) and compares them with available literature. Finally, the last section draws the conclusions of the analyses.

Literature review

Intra EU-labour mobility[57] and migration from third countries to the EU had a constant growth in the last decade. Moving to another country is a decision taken at personal level, based on the combined effect of push and pull factors (e.g. Kahanec and Fabo, 2013; Jaccob, 2013; Simpson, 2017). Yet, these decisions contribute to the creation of attitudes towards foreigners in the receiving country. This research domain, throughout the last century, has theorized a number of factors concurring to the creation of attitudes towards people of foreign countries. Following the second chapter, this one divides these factors in the following groups:

- Educational attainment of the respondent (Card et al, 2009; O'Connell, 2011) or the respondent's parents (Fertig and Brenner, 2006), and skills (Mayda, 2004)
- Those relating to the number of people living in a specific area or country, relating both to the "power threat hypothesis" (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hopkins 2010) "contact theory" (Allport, 1954; Hewstone and Swart, 2011). Also increases in their share can lead to changes in perception towards them (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017; Kawalerowicz, 2017), possibly following a volatile (Evans and Kelley, 2019) and reverse u-shaped relationships (Havekes et a., 2011);
- The effect (also perceived) of immigrants on employment and wage levels on the individuals (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Borjas, 2003; European Commission, 2018, Peri, 2014). ESS includes a question on the belief of the respondent on the net effect of foreigners in the country labour market (i.e. if they take away jobs, or if they help create new ones);
- The effect of immigrants on welfare (Card et al., 2005; Scheepers et al, 2002) and benefits (Peterson and Rom, 1990; Ingvarsson 2014) and the perception related to it. Also in this case, ESS includes a specific question that allows gaining knowledge on the opinion of the respondent in this regard;
- Effect of foreigners on crime (e.g. Butcher and Piehl 1998; Ousey and Kubrin, 2018; Entorf and Larsen 2004; Hällsten et al., 2013) and perception of it (Semyonov et al, 2008). As for the jobs and the welfare bullet point, thanks to the ESS we would be able to focus on the perception of the respondents on the link between migration and crime. Moreover, through the questionnaires, it is possible to control whether the respondent (or the respondent's household) was a victim of burglaries in the last five years, or if he/she is afraid of going out at night in the area of residence. Thus, it would be possible to understand if such considerations factored in, in case of preferences towards stricter (or more lenient) immigration control policies;
- Receiving country economic (Blalock, 1967; Semyonov et al., 2006; Semyonov et al., 2008) and employment (Schissel et al, 1989) conditions;
- The ethnic group of the immigrants (Bogardus, 1925; Blumer, 1958; Kleg and Yamamoto, 1998; Dustmann and Preston, 2000; Scheepers et al, 2002; Ford, 2011; Taras, 2013;

[57] Following other works (European Commission, 2019), this work will use the term "labour mobility" when referring to stock and flows of EU citizens living in the EU in a country different from the one they have citizenship of. When referring to flows and stocks of Third Country Nationals, the terms migration would rather be used.

Kawalerowicz, 2017). ESS allows to test the attitudes of the respondent towards foreigners of a different race or ethnic group;

- Political orientations of the respondent (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008; Alesina et al, 2019). Also in this case, ESS contains some three interesting variables to analyse the potential drivers of attitudes towards foreigners (i.e. a variable on the left/right positioning of the respondent in the political spectrum; another one on his/her stance on the government taking measures to reduce differences in income levels; and finally a variable asking the respondent to make a guess of the share of foreigners in the country).[58]

Moreover, given the fact that ESS is a database which has already been used for analysis on similar topics (among which the abovementioned Alesina et al., 2019; Card et al., 2005, and Fertig and Brenner, 2006; Semyonov et al., 2008) it is important to use previous results as benchmark for the analyses. Most notably, among the evidence not having been mentioned so far, are those from Timothy Hatton: in his research, he found that age and being born in the country have negative effect on attitudes towards migrant. Declaring to be part of an ethnic minority conversely, has positive effect. Finally, being woman is often significant, but the effect depends on the dependent variable (Hatton, 2014; Hatton, 2017).

Interestingly, while different sciences analysed the attitudes towards migration, very few studies tried to cover most of these factors simultaneously. This gap in the literature sparkled the interest in engaging in this research.

Data

The analysis of this paper is based on the database European Social Survey. The European Social Survey is a bi-annual survey overseen by researchers and academics and focusing on geographical Europe (the relevant part for this work), Cyprus, Russian Federation, Israel, and Ukraine. Its aim is to help understand Europe social conditions, behaviours, and values in the countries covered.

Most of the tables will report regressions results based solely on the seventh wave of the Survey, referring to 2014. This information is enriched with variables coming from other database (i.e. LFS and World Bank data series) and referring to macroeconomic characteristics of the different countries. This decision stems from the fact that the 2014 release contains a module on migration. Yet, the section on the analysis comparison between 2002 and 2014 will allow a comparison between the first release of the ESS (referring to 2002 and also containing a similar module on migration) and the seventh. This will be based on a reduced number of regressors, since the structure of the survey changed across the years.

[58] The latter was found to be significant and conducive to more hostile attitudes towards foreigners in Semyonov et al, 2008.

The methodology

The work has exploratory ambition, and relies on Average Marginal Effects based on a probit specification of a general linear model. Probit models assume a binary dependent variable. Building on the analysis carried out in the second chapter, the dependent variables used in this paper are the replies to questions with the following structure: "to what extent do you think that this country should allow a 'specific group of foreigners' to come and live here?". The following eight groups of foreigners are considered:

- foreigners of the same race of the respondent,
- foreigners of a different race,
- foreigners from poor countries in Europe,
- foreigners from poor countries outside Europe,
- professionals from the poor country in Europe providing the largest number of EU-movers to the country of the respondent,
- professionals from the poor country outside Europe providing the largest number of migrants,
- unskilled workers from the poor country in Europe providing the largest number of EU-movers, and
- unskilled workers from the poor country outside Europe providing the largest number of migrants

The survey respondents had then the following options as replies: "allow many to come and live here", "allow some", "allow a few", "allow none", "refuse to reply", "don't know", and "no answer". Against this background, for each regression, the replies "refuse to reply", "don't know", and "no answer" have been excluded from the analyses. Moreover, the other replies were coupled in the two groups: "allow many to come and live here or allow some" and "allow a few or allow none". The choice to use a general linear model allows for multivariate regression analyses with the use of a high number of variables included in the European Social Survey. Moreover, and differently from normal probit OLS regressions in Stata software, general linear models allow the use of weight, a prerequisite in the analyses with this database. In this regard, a combination of post-stratification weights and population size weight, in line with what recommended by the database recommended weighting guide (European Social Survey, 2014). The use of the Average Marginal Effects allows for a straightforward interpretation of the independent variables. Every unit coefficient in the independent variable X would lead to a percentage change as big as the estimated b coefficient in the dependent variable Y. As sensitivity checks, general linear model logit and OLS regressions[59] were carried out for every regression, yielding similar results, both in terms of coefficients significance and their size, corroborating the findings presented in this paper.

Unfortunately, the methodology does not allow for a causal interpretation of the regressors, but it represents a first step for analyses in this research direction based on ESS database.

[59] With heteroscedasticity-consistent Eicker–Huber–White standard errors.

Following the previous chapter, the analyses will focus on the EU (proxied by the 19 Member States[60] included in the 2014 round of ESS). A particular attention will be paid on five EU countries representatives of different worlds of welfare capitalism:[61] Germany, the UK, Sweden, Spain, and Czechia (representing, respectively, the conservative, the liberal, the social democratic, the southern, and the central/eastern welfare states models).

Before the analysis section, a word of caution should be spent on the issue of endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms, thus breaching the zero conditional mean assumption.[62] Endogeneity can have different origins. In these analyses, the most plausible causes are: omitted variable bias, measurement errors and reverse causality. The measurement error in these analyses can happen when people misreport a particular data. The issue is particularly delicate for the income variable (see, Hauser and Becker, 2013). As for the omitted variable problem, this is somehow limited thanks to the ample scanning of the ESS variables conducted during the analyses (although there may be other variables at personal level, omitted by the survey, that could have been correlated with the error term). As for reverse causality, this seems the most serious threat, and can be seen in at least three independent variables: "employment rate of migrants", "employment rate of EU movers", "respondent has contact with foreigners never or less than once per month, or once a month".

Given the threat of endogeneity, in the remainder of the work the links between dependent and independent variables are always expressed in terms of correlation rather than causation. It is a clear limitation which nevertheless does not imply that the analysis has no added value. On the contrary, it allows going beyond the existing literature, facing the same endogeneity issues (e.g. Mayda, 2004, Semyonov et al., 2006 and 2008, Hatton 2014 and 2017). Two standard techniques are often used to go beyond the issue of endogeneity: instrumental variables and difference in differences analysis. Unfortunately, neither of the two was applicable in this case. Instrumental variables are third variables inducing changes in the explanatory variable without doing the same on the depending variable. Their use would allow obtaining unbiased results. Yet, no clear instrumental variable was available to correct the estimates in this case. As for difference-in-differences, this technique allows to obtain the effect of a treatment on an outcome by comparing average effects on two groups, the treated and the non-treated (e.g. countries or regions where the share of foreigners increase against those where it remain stable). Yet, difference-in-differences analyses is a viable option only when panel data are available. This is unfortunately not the case for the ESS, which is rather a dataset based on repeated cross-sectional surveys.

[60] Austria, Belgium, Czechia/Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

[61] Based on: Esping Andersen (1990; Ferrera, 1996; Lipsmeyer, 2000; Aidukaite, 2009.

[62] Formally, $E(u_i|X_i)=0$, i.e. u_i , the error term, should not have a recurring pattern, and its mean should equal to zero.

Analysis

This section presents dependent variables with a potential link with immigration preferences of the respondents. Around 100 variables were considered initially, trying to gauge which factors have a higher correlation with the attitudes towards EU movers and Third Country Nationals.

The database for the analysis is based on the ESS 7, dating back to 2014, completed with a battery of macroeconomic variables. The choice of the variables followed the literature examined in the chapter "Literature review on attitudes towards migrants". Annex C shows a table including the main variables considered for the analysis. Its left column lists them (grouped under thematic clusters for ease of reading), while the right column reports the name of the variable (as shown in all the following regression tables), or whether these were ultimately excluded from the analyses. In the regressions, while the great majority of the variables are on the same scale (ranging from minus one to one, and often from zero to one), some are not. These exceptions are:

- Increase in percentage of foreigners in the previous five years
- Employment rate of EU-movers
- Employment rate of Third Country Nationals
- Employment rate of nationals
- Expenditure in Public Employment Services (as a %of GDP)
- GDP per capita in PPS

These six macroeconomic variables have been multiplied by a factor of one hundred in order to have a more logical interpretation of the coefficients. Having kept these macroeconomic variables in a scale between minus one and one would have equalled to ask to the programme to estimate the change in the number of foreigners to allow in the country (according to the respondent) following, for instance, the increase in the employment rate of Third Country Nationals by 100%. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in obtaining average marginal effects above one, which should not be possible given the dependent variables considered in this study. Related to this issue is that using the same scale for these variables yields very large estimated coefficients, dwarfing the others.

Eight main regressions were carried out on the sample with individuals from all the nineteen Member States pooled together, one for each sub group of foreigners considered. In the tables 1-8, presented in the following pages, five specifications are reported per regression, with an increasing number of variables and controls. All regressions include the basic demographic variables took into account by Hatton in his works based on ESS, namely: age, gender, being born in the country, education level, belonging to an ethnic minority, and country dummies. The first regression considers only these variables, and a dummy for belonging to the labour force (i.e. being employed or looking for a job). The main difference is that Hatton used dummies to define education level. In this work the ISCED code of the highest educational attainment achieved by the respondent was used (27 different entries are included in the database, rescaled between 0 and 1 in the variable used for the regression). This approach was preferred to fully exploit the granularity of the ESS. The use of the ISCED code is not a novelty in these sort of analyses (see Mayda, 2004).

The second regression expands the variables considered, including most of the macro-variables listed above,[63] on top of dummies for tertiary education of the parents (following Fertig and Brenner 2006), and two dummies for political beliefs of the respondent (either right or left wingers supporters). Finally, the binary variable for the participation in the labour force is replaced by two other labour market status dummies: one for the employed, and the other one for the retired. The rationale for the choice of replacing the labour force participation dummy with those for employed and retired respondent is that a dummy like labour force puts together workers (52% of the sample) and unemployed but looking for a job (less than 5% of the sample), and that most of all behaved differently while tested separately.[64]

The third regression adds variables on: "fear of walking at night in the respondent's neighbourhood", "opposition towards further European integration", and three dummies on the respondents' beliefs on the qualifying factors to migrate in the country (those relating to the importance of language of the host country, being white, and having working skills needed in the country). The fourth regression replaces the macro variable "GDP per capita in PPS" with the one "Expenditure in Public Employment Services (as a %of GDP)". These two are highly collinear, and controlling for both of them together alters significantly the results in three out of the eight variables. Moreover, it adds three other variables on qualifying factors to migrate in the country: two categorical variables on the perceived effect of foreigners (on vacancies and public finances), and a dummy on perceived worsening of the crime situation. Finally, it removes the dummies on European integration and on the sensation of fear while going out at night.

The last column shows the results for the fifth regression, which consider all the variables hitherto listed (apart for the macro on expenditure in PES), and adds the final two: a dummy for respondents having small or no interactions with foreigners, and a categorical variable for the income decile of respondent.[65] While looking at the eight tables, it is worth noticing that the first four tables have samples that are normally around four times larger than the last four. This may be the cause for the higher number of non-significant correlations in the second group.

As for the results showed in the tables, the main ones are the following:

- Several demographic regressors controlled by Hatton in his papers, such as age, gender, being born in the country, and belonging to an ethnic minority are significant in columns (a) of the eight regression tables. Yet, they tend to lose significance while adding new variables, which seem to better capture the dynamics underpinning the creation of an attitude towards foreigners (macro variables and qualifying factors to move in the country). This holds both for significance level and for size of the estimated coefficients;
- While the majority of the macro variables were not included for lack of a statistically significant effect (see annex C), in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients, the remaining

[63] All of the macro variable but "expenditure in Public Employment Services (as a %of GDP)", since it is highly collinear with "GDP per capita in PPS".

[64] The employed and retired status were considered with two other labour market status binary variables, namely "unemployed and actively looking for a job in the last 7 days" and "unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job in the last 7 days". Yet, the latter two were mostly not significant for most of the regressions, these were not included (as shown in Annex B).

[65] 16% of the respondents did not share information on the income. Therefore, these were excluded from the sample in the last column of the tables, which therefore relies on a smaller sample of respondents.

macro-variables are the ones normally linked with a higher correlation with the dependent variable;

- The difference between the real share of foreigners in the country and the perception expressed by the respondent is significant in the majority of the regressions (as in Semyonov et al, 2008), but with very low coefficients. Hence, the regressor was excluded from the analyses;
- More positive attitudes towards immigration from European countries hold across all analyses with the 19 countries pooled together, in line with the descriptive statistics seen in the previous section;
- Recent increases in the number of foreigners in the country is always linked with a more lenient stance towards further immigration. This contributes to complement the findings in the literature and seem to support the "contact theory", which assumes that, within a set of conditions, interactions with people reduce the prejudice towards them. Yet, it has to be noted that the increase in the share of foreigners were incremental. The 2015 migration crisis took place after the seventh round of ESS and may have led to the opposite reaction, in line with the power threat hypothesis (i.e. the natives are afraid to losing their hegemonic power with higher number of foreigners, as suggested by, among others: Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967) and with the theory that attitudes towards migrants are prone to sudden changes (Evans and Kelley, 2019);
- In the great majority of the regressions, when significant, the employment rate of nationals is negatively correlated with a positive stance towards more foreigners in the country (the exception are in the regressions on allowing migrants from a different race, and one on migrants from the same race). This is possibly linked to the fact that, among the countries analysed, only Germany and Sweden tend to have a positive stance and a higher employment rate. Eastern European countries with high employment rates tend to have a much stronger, and negative, attitudes towards foreigners. The same holds true for Denmark and Finland;
- Similarly, in all regressions, when significant, the employment rate of movers is correlated with a more negative stance towards more foreigners in the country. This is most likely due to the fact that the employment rate of the movers is highly correlated with the one of nationals;
- The effect of the employment rate of third country nationals, from its part, is more ambiguous; it may suffer from collinearity with GDP per capita regressor. When this is excluded, the employment rate of TCNs, when significant, is always positively associated with a softer stance towards foreigners;
- Public expenditure in Public Employment Services, present only in columns "d" of each regression charts, is the only variable on public expenditure that tends to remain significant (the other two, referring to active and passive labour market policies respectively, mostly do not). The effect is the biggest among those recorded in five out of eight regressions. If the GDP per capita control is omitted and the variable is included in all regressions, its effect tends to decrease while increasing the number of variables and loses significance in the two regressions dealing with allowing people from poor countries to immigrate;
- In line with previous literature (Card et al, 2009; Margaryan et al., 2018), the discrete variable on education of the respondent (expressed by the respondent highest educational

attainment level, coded following ISCED classification) is always statistically significant at 1%, and has very large coefficients (always among the four largest coefficients). When macro variables are excluded, it has always the largest coefficients;

- Tertiary education of the parents is also associated with a more tolerant attitude towards new immigration flows, although the correlation tends to lose significance in the regressions focussing on professional and unskilled migrants;
- Interestingly, being employed, when statistically significant, is correlated with a tougher stance towards foreigners. Unemployment and inactive statuses (not included in the tables) are mostly not significant;
- Further analyses were carried out to estimate the effect of belonging to a specific skills group on the attitudes towards foreigners of the respondent. Rather than using highest educational attainment as a proxy for skills, the choice fell on using groups of occupations.[66] To avoid multicollinearity, while controlling for occupational groups the binomial variable on employed status of the respondent were omitted. The results, not presented here,[67] are somewhat in line with economic literature (e.g. Borjas, 2003; Gang et al., 2002), which assumes that high skilled individuals should favour migration inflows if immigrants are mainly low skilled, while low skilled should favour immigration if immigrants are mainly high skilled. More specifically:
    - The variable linked with being a "white collar high skilled" worker is significant in only one case (with a positive estimated marginal effect of 2% on the attitude foreigners of the same race), but loses significance while adding other variables. In terms of relative presence of natives and foreigners among white collar high skilled workers, while 40% of natives is in this skills group, only 25% of the foreigners are;[68]
    - The regressor on "white collar low skilled" is only significant in two occurrences, both with a negative effect (3% and 4% estimated marginal effect). Natives and foreigners are equally represented in this skills group, which gives a job to one fourth of the employed in both groups;
    - Being in the "blue collar high skilled" group is associated with a strong and negative impact on the preferences on allowing more foreigners to come in the country in all but one regressions (the effect is of around 10% in the first regressions and diminishes until 5% with the complete set of regressors). Both natives and foreigners have 17% of their employed people in this skills group;

[66] This is done by regrouping occupations at ISCO-08 1 digit in four main samples, following the dichotomies high-low skilled and white- and blue-collar used in specific literature (e.g. European Commission, 2017; OECD, 1998), thus obtaining:

a. White collars high skilled workers (including "managers", "professional", and "technicians and associate professionals"
b. White collars low skilled workers ("clerical support workers", and "service and sales workers")
c. Blue collars high skilled workers ("skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers" and "craft and related trades workers")
d. Blue collars low skilled workers ("plant and machine operators, and assemblers" and "elementary occupations")

[67] The choice of not reporting the regressions using skills group rather than the binomial on occupation is due to the fact that most regressors lose significance while adding variables. This is not the case for the dummy on being employed.

[68] Source: LFS microdata.

- The variable linked with being a "blue collar low skilled" worker is significant in all but two regressions. It has always a negative effect, but lower than in its high skilled counterpart (average marginal effects diminish from around 8% in the basic regressions to around 3% in those with all the regressors included). 32% of the foreigners are in this skill groups, mostly EU13 movers and TCNs, while this figure is 17% for natives;[69]

Overall, the effect seems therefore to be non-linear, with the high skilled blue-collar workers being most hostile against foreigners (in line with, among others, Margaryan et al, 2018). Another specification for the regressions was used, using a single variable with the reverse of the ISCO 4 digit level occupational group of the respondent as independent variable, and this was mostly non-significant, confirming the non-linear relation between skills and attitudes towards foreigners;

- From its part, the status of pensioner has a more ambiguous effect, but it tends to be correlated with a tougher stance towards foreigners;
- While controlling for political beliefs and qualifying factors for migrating in the country, institutional trust dummies were almost never statistically significant, and were therefore excluded;
- As an alternative way to control for the importance of foreign origin, the information on the languages most spoken at home was operationalised. In principle, this would have allowed for a better grasp of the foreigners' capacity to interact in the country. Yet, also in this case, the variable was never significant, possibly due to the relatively low number of foreigners in the survey;
- Declaring to be closer to left-wing parties is statistically significant in seven out of eight regressions, with a fairly high coefficient. From its part, being closer to right-wing parties is statistically significant in only four regressions and with a smaller coefficient than its counterparts. This is in line with previous literature (e.g. Semyonov et al, 2006; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017). Yet, the outcome is blurred by the inclusion of several dummies concerning the qualifying factor for foreigners to move into the country. When excluded, the correlation is always strong and statistically significant;
- In almost all the regressions, and excluding the macro variables and the country dummies, the belief that the process of European integration has gone too far is among the regressors with the largest coefficients among the negative ones, along with the belief that being white is important and that immigration worsens the crime situation;
- In the majority of the regressions, the fear of going out at night in the respondent's neighbourhood is significantly correlated with a tougher stance towards foreigners. Interestingly, the fact of having been victim of burglary is almost never significant. This hints at a stronger role of perceptions rather than first-hand experience;
- The importance of being white for joining the country, among the qualifying factors to migrate in the country, is the regressor with the strongest negative coefficients in five of the first six tables (and the second one in the sixth).
- The importance of allowing foreigners with skills that the country needs to move to the country has a relative big coefficient and 1% statistical significance in almost all

[69] The share of the foreigners is still around 10% of the overall employed in this skill group.

regressions. The correlation holds with the dependent variables on allowing migration to people of the same race, a different one, from poor European or poor extra European countries, to unskilled people from poor countries in or outside Europe. Interestingly, it loses significance in the two regressions having as dependent variables professionals from poor countries in or outside Europe;

- The correlation with the beliefs of a positive (or negative) effect of migration in the country on the job market is the regressor with the second strongest positive correlation (ISCED level being the first) in six out of the eight tables. This is always followed by the regressor linked with the welfare state effect of migration, corroborating evidence from previous literature. In the regression with the unskilled workers from poor countries in Europe, the order is swapped;
- The belief that immigration has a negative effect on the crime situation has a steady and sizeable effect in all regressions, supporting existing literature (e.g. Semyonov et al, 2008);
- Taking into account one qualifying factor at a time rarely change the order of these six regressors in terms of correlations with the dependent variables. If it does, the changes happen when the size of the coefficients are small;
- The belief that foreigners are treated worse from the governments than migrants is consistently positive and significant. In four out of the eight regressions, the coefficient of this regressor is the highest among the positive ones at micro level (outside those on the qualifying factors to migrate, and those on the effects of foreigners on labour market and welfare state). It is correlated with the regressor on political preferences leaning to the left. The opposite can be said of its counterpart regressor: "belief that natives are treated worse by the government";
- Meeting people of a different race or ethnic group “rarely” or “never” is significantly negatively correlated with a tougher stance towards foreigners in six out of eight types of immigrations considered, the exceptions being the attitude towards professional from a poor country outside the EU and unskilled migrants from a poor European country. This result provides further evidence that interactions with foreigners may reduce prejudices against them (as seen in, among others, Allport, 1954);
- Having a higher income is correlated with a more positive attitude towards migrants in a statistically significant way in four out of the eight regressions. This seems to corroborate the finding of the literature stating that immigration flows tend to have little to no negative effects on higher salaries. Still, non-economic factors seem to be more important than economic ones.
- In three of the first four regressions (and in the third one Czechia replies are not reported in the dataset), Czechia is the country showing a tougher stance against welcoming more foreigners; as soon as the skills factor is considered though (and the number of observations is reduced by three quarters), Spain becomes the country with the toughest stance;
- As in the descriptive statistics section, Sweden is usually the country with a softer stance towards welcoming more foreigners. An exception is when considering professionals and unskilled workers from Poor EU MS, where the German country dummies have the largest coefficient among the country binomial variables (interestingly, the question in both countries refer to Polish people).

Table 1 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigSameRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000*	-0.000***	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.014**	-0.015**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.006
	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Born in the country	-0.063***	-0.051***	-0.042***	0.028*	0.015
	0.016	0.016	0.015	0.015	0.015
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.011	-0.001	-0.003	-0.017	-0.024
	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.02	0.02
LFparticipant	-0.012				
	0.008				
ISCED_rescaled	0.435***	0.361***	0.299***	0.220***	0.171***
	0.02	0.021	0.02	0.019	0.022
Czechia	-0.226***	-0.196***	-0.192***	-0.189***	-0.174***
	0.01	0.019	0.018	0.016	0.019
Germany	0.212***	0.161***	0.179***	0.189***	0.201***
	0.011	0.019	0.019	0.015	0.02
Spain	-0.044***	-0.006	-0.034*	-0.021	-0.012
	0.011	0.019	0.018	0.019	0.019
Sweden	0.310***	0.262***	0.211***	0.223***	0.174***
	0.018	0.02	0.019	0.019	0.019
UK	-0.064***	-0.072***	-0.026*	-0.061***	-0.032**
	0.011	0.015	0.014	0.014	0.014
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.013***	-0.006**		0.003
		0.002	0.002		0.003
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.015***	0.024***	0.025***	0.035***
		0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005
ER Nationals_x100		0.008***	0.007***	-0.003**	-0.001
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
ER EU movers_x100		-0.002***	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.003***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.004***	-0.002	0.003***	0.002
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
employed		-0.016*	-0.013	-0.016*	-0.018*
		0.009	0.009	0.009	0.01
retired		-0.039***	-0.018*	-0.038***	-0.012
		0.01	0.01	0.009	0.01
MomTertEdu		0.089***	0.074***	0.061***	0.043***
		0.015	0.014	0.013	0.014
DadTertEdu		0.051***	0.040***	0.027**	0.021*
		0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012
Leftie		0.063***	0.059***	0.049***	0.045***
		0.01	0.009	0.009	0.009
Rightie		-0.033***	-0.005	-0.006	-0.001
		0.009	0.009	0.008	0.009
LessEurope			-0.133***		-0.077***
			0.007		0.008
FearNight			-0.061***		-0.031***
			0.009		0.009
ImmigrLangGood			-0.054***	-0.037***	-0.026***
			0.008	0.007	0.008
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.129***	-0.086***	-0.071***
			0.014	0.013	0.015
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.060***	-0.045***	-0.045***
			0.008	0.007	0.008
Exppes_x100				0.329***	
				0.047	
ImmigrationJobs				0.106***	0.093***
				0.008	0.008
ImmigrationWelfare				0.075***	0.063***

				0.008	0.008
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.076***	-0.068***
				0.008	0.008
NativeWorse				-0.088***	-0.062***
				0.008	0.008
ForeignWorse					0.057***
					0.01
NoMeetForeigners					-0.062***
					0.008
IncomeDecile					0.063***
					0.014
Observations	33342	33342	33342	33342	26460

Table 2 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.000***	-0.000*	0	-0.000*	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.017**	-0.022***	-0.019**	-0.016**	-0.012
	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008
Born in the country	-0.052***	-0.034**	-0.029*	0.045***	0.026
	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.017
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.061***	0.035	0.03	0.013	0.008
	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.021	0.022
LFparticipant	0.01				
	0.009				
ISCED_rescaled	0.485***	0.400***	0.314***	0.219***	0.191***
	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.024
Czechia	-0.281***	-0.265***	-0.266***	-0.218***	-0.220***
	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.018	0.022
Germany	0.165***	0.092***	0.121***	0.106***	0.118***
	0.011	0.02	0.019	0.016	0.021
Spain	0.01	-0.012	-0.050**	-0.012	-0.036*
	0.012	0.021	0.02	0.022	0.021
Sweden	0.437***	0.392***	0.315***	0.295***	0.279***
	0.018	0.021	0.02	0.02	0.02
UK	-0.006	0.006	0.069***	0.049***	0.069***
	0.013	0.016	0.015	0.015	0.016
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.008***	0.001		0.009***
		0.003	0.003		0.003
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.004	0.016***	0.014***	0.014**
		0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006
ER Nationals_x100		0.009***	0.006***	0.003**	0
		0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
ER EU movers_x100		-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.007***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.004**	0	0	0.003*
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
employed		-0.022**	-0.016	-0.020**	-0.020*
		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.011
retired		-0.088***	-0.054***	-0.073***	-0.051***
		0.012	0.011	0.011	0.012
MomTertEdu		0.081***	0.062***	0.045***	0.026*
		0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015
DadTertEdu		0.070***	0.055***	0.042***	0.038***
		0.013	0.013	0.012	0.013
Leftie		0.098***	0.088***	0.076***	0.069***
		0.01	0.01	0.009	0.01
Rightie		-0.087***	-0.049***	-0.047***	-0.036***
		0.01	0.01	0.009	0.01
LessEurope			-0.163***		-0.088***
			0.008		0.009
FearNight			-0.068***		-0.031***
			0.01		0.01
ImmigrLangGood			-0.077***	-0.056***	-0.043***
			0.008	0.008	0.009
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.201***	-0.150***	-0.138***
			0.017	0.017	0.019
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.105***	-0.087***	-0.085***
			0.008	0.008	0.008
Exppes_x100				0.142***	
				0.049	
ImmigrationJobs				0.125***	0.114***
				0.008	0.009
ImmigrationWelfare				0.094***	0.082***

				0.009	0.009
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.117***	-0.108***
				0.009	0.01
NativeWorse				-0.097***	-0.068***
				0.008	0.01
ForeignWorse					0.067***
					0.01
NoMeetForeigners					-0.054***
					0.009
IncomeDecile					0.036**
					0.016
Observations	33330	33330	33330	33330	26467

Table 3 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.000***	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.011	-0.017**	-0.013	-0.011	-0.009
	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009
Born in the country	-0.051***	-0.037**	-0.031*	0.043***	0.021
	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.017
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.017	-0.005	-0.009	-0.026	-0.032
	0.024	0.023	0.022	0.022	0.024
LFparticipant	0.002				
	0.009				
ISCED_rescaled	0.460***	0.385***	0.298***	0.205***	0.178***
	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.022	0.025
Czechia	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)
Germany	0.120***	0.171***	0.200***	0.186***	0.206***
	0.011	0.021	0.02	0.016	0.022
Spain	-0.003	-0.065***	-0.105***	-0.071***	-0.110***
	0.013	0.022	0.021	0.023	0.022
Sweden	0.354***	0.419***	0.345***	0.330***	0.317***
	0.017	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019
UK	-0.064***	-0.012	0.056***	0.031**	0.070***
	0.013	0.017	0.016	0.015	0.017
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.009***	0.001		0.013***
		0.003	0.003		0.003
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.027***	0.039***	0.037***	0.039***
		0.006	0.005	0.005	0.006
ER Nationals_x100		-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.011***	-0.015***
		0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
ER EU movers_x100		-0.002**	-0.005***	-0.003***	-0.004***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.004**
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
employed		-0.037***	-0.031***	-0.033***	-0.031***
		0.011	0.01	0.01	0.011
retired		-0.093***	-0.059***	-0.078***	-0.057***
		0.012	0.012	0.011	0.013
MomTertEdu		0.079***	0.061***	0.043***	0.027*
		0.016	0.015	0.015	0.016
DadTertEdu		0.068***	0.053***	0.041***	0.040***
		0.014	0.013	0.013	0.013
Leftie		0.091***	0.078***	0.066***	0.056***
		0.011	0.01	0.01	0.011
Rightie		-0.081***	-0.040***	-0.038***	-0.030***
		0.011	0.01	0.01	0.011
LessEurope			-0.175***		-0.109***
			0.009		0.009
FearNight			-0.072***		-0.036***
			0.01		0.011
ImmigrLangGood			-0.083***	-0.063***	-0.047***
			0.009	0.009	0.009
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.172***	-0.120***	-0.112***
			0.018	0.018	0.02
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.101***	-0.085***	-0.083***
			0.009	0.009	0.009
Exppes_x100				0.179***	
				0.051	
ImmigrationJobs				0.115***	0.110***
				0.009	0.009
ImmigrationWelfare				0.093***	0.078***
				0.009	0.01
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.121***	-0.101***
				0.01	0.01

NativeWorse				-0.111***	-0.076***
				0.009	0.01
ForeignWorse					0.068***
					0.011
NoMeetForeigners					-0.041***
					0.01
IncomeDecile					0.028*
					0.017
Observations	31246	31246	31246	31246	24965

Table 4 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.000***	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.005	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	0.005
	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009
Born in the country	-0.024	-0.01	-0.007	0.062***	0.045***
	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.017
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.059**	0.032	0.028	0.008	0.002
	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.021	0.023
LFparticipant	0.015				
	0.009				
ISCED_rescaled	0.458***	0.391***	0.302***	0.213***	0.185***
	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.021	0.024
Czechia	-0.218***	-0.179***	-0.180***	-0.113***	-0.125***
	0.014	0.022	0.022	0.019	0.023
Germany	0.149***	0.187***	0.221***	0.182***	0.213***
	0.011	0.021	0.02	0.017	0.022
Spain	0.066***	0.019	-0.021	0.028	-0.027
	0.013	0.022	0.021	0.023	0.023
Sweden	0.435***	0.476***	0.397***	0.358***	0.370***
	0.016	0.019	0.018	0.019	0.019
UK	-0.062***	-0.033*	0.035**	0.026	0.050***
	0.013	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.017
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.003	0.008***		0.018***
		0.003	0.003		0.003
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.029***	0.041***	0.035***	0.036***
		0.006	0.006	0.005	0.006
ER Nationals_x100		-0.004**	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.014***
		0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
ER EU movers_x100		-0.002**	-0.005***	-0.003***	-0.004***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.001	0.003**	0	0.005***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
employed		-0.037***	-0.031***	-0.032***	-0.024**
		0.011	0.01	0.01	0.011
retired		-0.111***	-0.074***	-0.090***	-0.067***
		0.012	0.012	0.011	0.013
MomTertEdu		0.074***	0.057***	0.041***	0.033**
		0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015
DadTertEdu		0.055***	0.038***	0.026**	0.018
		0.013	0.013	0.012	0.013
Leftie		0.101***	0.087***	0.074***	0.068***
		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Rightie		-0.103***	-0.062***	-0.061***	-0.060***
		0.011	0.01	0.01	0.011
LessEurope			-0.166***		-0.105***
			0.009		0.01
FearNight			-0.070***		-0.036***
			0.01		0.011
ImmigrLangGood			-0.079***	-0.058***	-0.048***
			0.009	0.008	0.009
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.188***	-0.140***	-0.136***
			0.018	0.018	0.021
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.130***	-0.115***	-0.110***
			0.008	0.008	0.009
Exppes_x100				0.044	
				0.052	
ImmigrationJobs				0.111***	0.105***
				0.009	0.009
ImmigrationWelfare				0.106***	0.099***
				0.009	-0.01
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.108***	-0.086***
				0.01	0.011

NativeWorse				-0.108***	-0.080***
				0.009	0.011
ForeignWorse					0.052***
					0.011
NoMeetForeigners					-0.049***
					0.01
IncomeDecile					0.028*
					0.017
Observations	33212	33212	33212	33212	26390

Table 5 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigProfessionalsPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.001***
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.028**	-0.031**	-0.026*	-0.027**	-0.032**
	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.014
Born in the country	-0.075**	-0.062**	-0.061**	0.017	0.015
	0.031	0.031	0.03	0.028	0.029
Belonging to ethnic minority	-0.063	-0.061	-0.071*	-0.074*	-0.053
	0.043	0.042	0.041	0.041	0.038
LFparticipant	-0.018				
	0.015				
ISCED_rescaled	0.404***	0.353***	0.302***	0.227***	0.193***
	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.041
Czechia	-0.224***	-0.061*	-0.059	-0.094***	-0.047
	0.02	0.037	0.036	0.033	0.037
Germany	0.188***	0.105***	0.119***	0.173***	0.116***
	0.022	0.038	0.037	0.03	0.038
Spain	-0.108***	-0.151***	-0.172***	-0.215***	-0.164***
	0.02	0.035	0.034	0.037	0.035
Sweden	0.129***	0.142***	0.108***	0.166***	0.077**
	0.027	0.033	0.032	0.031	0.032
UK	0.003	0.094***	0.115***	0.074***	0.108***
	0.023	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.027
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.026***	-0.021***		-0.014***
		0.005	0.005		0.005
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.001	0.009	0.016*	0.007
		0.01	0.01	0.008	0.01
ER Nationals_x100		0.010***	0.009***	-0.011***	0.004
		0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
ER EU movers_x100		-0.004***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.005***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.013***	-0.011***	0	-0.008***
		0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
employed		0.01	0.009	0.017	-0.001
		0.018	0.018	0.017	0.018
retired		0.028	0.040**	0.033*	0.045**
		0.02	0.019	0.019	0.02
MomTertEdu		0.050*	0.039	0.02	-0.001
		0.029	0.028	0.027	0.028
DadTertEdu		0.049**	0.039	0.032	0.027
		0.025	0.024	0.024	0.024
Leftie		0.050***	0.048***	0.038**	0.017
		0.018	0.017	0.016	0.017
Rightie		-0.035**	-0.009	-0.016	-0.016
		0.017	0.017	0.016	0.017
LessEurope			-0.102***		-0.061***
			0.015		0.015
FearNight			-0.047***		-0.023
			0.017		0.018
ImmigrLangGood			-0.037**	-0.017	-0.021
			0.015	0.015	0.015
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.187***	-0.149***	-0.154***
			0.027	0.027	0.029
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.024	-0.016	-0.014
			0.015	0.015	0.015
Exppes_x100				0.487***	
				0.088	
ImmigrationJobs				0.108***	0.088***
				0.015	0.016
ImmigrationWelfare				0.057***	0.053***
				0.015	0.015
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.060***	-0.053***

				0.016	0.016
NativeWorse				-0.099***	-0.083***
				0.015	0.016
ForeignWorse					0.018
					0.018
NoMeetForeigners					-0.039**
					0.015
IncomeDecile					0.066**
					0.027
Observations	8288	8288	8288	8288	6693

Table 6 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent you think [country] should allow professionals from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigProfessionalsPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.000**	-0.000*	-0.000**	-0.000***	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.040***	-0.036***	-0.039***
	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015
Born in the country	-0.069**	-0.048	-0.045	0.028	-0.005
	0.032	0.032	0.031	0.029	0.032
Belonging to ethnic minority	-0.032	-0.041	-0.041	-0.059	-0.049
	0.042	0.041	0.04	0.038	0.04
LFparticipant	-0.044***				
	0.016				
ISCED_rescaled	0.407***	0.352***	0.291***	0.195***	0.148***
	0.041	0.042	0.041	0.039	0.044
Czechia	-0.175***	0.029	0.017	-0.025	0.06
	0.022	0.038	0.038	0.034	0.039
Germany	0.183***	0.109***	0.117***	0.177***	0.100**
	0.022	0.038	0.037	0.031	0.041
Spain	-0.082***	-0.136***	-0.154***	-0.148***	-0.133***
	0.022	0.039	0.038	0.04	0.04
Sweden	0.146***	0.177***	0.131***	0.176***	0.086***
	0.026	0.032	0.032	0.031	0.032
UK	0.078***	0.165***	0.196***	0.126***	0.195***
	0.024	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.03
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.020***	-0.017***		-0.010*
		0.005	0.005		0.006
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		-0.001	0.007	0.019**	0.003
		0.01	0.01	0.008	0.011
ER Nationals_x100		0.005*	0.006*	-0.011***	0.002
		0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
ER EU movers_x100		0	-0.002*	-0.002	-0.002
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.014***	-0.012***	-0.001	-0.010***
		0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003
employed		-0.056***	-0.048**	-0.041**	-0.036*
		0.019	0.019	0.018	0.02
retired		-0.032	-0.01	-0.029	0.003
		0.022	0.021	0.02	0.023
MomTertEdu		0.053*	0.047*	0.038	0.03
		0.029	0.027	0.025	0.027
DadTertEdu		0.068***	0.059**	0.042*	0.047*
		0.024	0.023	0.023	0.025
Leftie		0.046**	0.045**	0.040**	0.035*
		0.02	0.019	0.019	0.02
Rightie		-0.048**	-0.031*	-0.029	-0.029
		0.019	0.019	0.018	0.019
LessEurope			-0.108***		-0.036**
			0.016		0.017
FearNight			-0.033*		-0.008
			0.019		0.02
ImmigrLangGood			-0.041**	-0.031**	-0.016
			0.016	0.015	0.016
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.176***	-0.135***	-0.134***
			0.031	0.031	0.034
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.039**	-0.013	-0.012
			0.016	0.015	0.016
Exppes_x100				0.536***	
				0.1	
ImmigrationJobs				0.096***	0.090***
				0.015	0.016
ImmigrationWelfare				0.067***	0.053***
				0.016	0.017
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.120***	-0.120***

				0.018	0.02
NativeWorse				-0.083***	-0.062***
				0.016	0.018
ForeignWorse					0.091***
					0.019
NoMeetForeigners					-0.030*
					0.017
IncomeDecile					0.058*
					0.03
Observations	8274	8274	8274	8274	6533

Table 7 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor European country providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigUnskilledPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.036**	-0.035**	-0.038**	-0.038**	-0.047***
	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.017
Born in the country	-0.047	-0.039	-0.034	0.009	-0.025
	0.034	0.033	0.032	0.032	0.035
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.064	0.067	0.061	0.034	0.009
	0.044	0.044	0.043	0.041	0.044
LFparticipant	-0.013				
	0.018				
ISCED_rescaled	0.390***	0.330***	0.267***	0.177***	0.182***
	0.044	0.046	0.044	0.043	0.05
Czechia	-0.273***	-0.114**	-0.102**	-0.166***	-0.035
	0.029	0.045	0.045	0.04	0.049
Germany	0.112***	0.094**	0.124***	0.170***	0.149***
	0.023	0.041	0.04	0.033	0.045
Spain	-0.205***	-0.345***	-0.389***	-0.399***	-0.414***
	0.027	0.045	0.044	0.048	0.047
Sweden	0.179***	0.271***	0.218***	0.294***	0.218***
	0.028	0.034	0.033	0.035	0.035
UK	-0.120***	0.046	0.123***	0.035	0.123***
	0.026	0.033	0.033	0.031	0.035
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.027***	-0.016***		-0.002
		0.006	0.006		0.007
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.008	0.015	0.023**	0.016
		0.011	0.011	0.01	0.013
ER Nationals_x100		0.006*	0.003	-0.019***	-0.007*
		0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004
ER EU movers_x100		-0.010***	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.011***
		0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCNs_x100		-0.012***	-0.009***	0.005**	-0.006**
		0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003
employed		0.015	0.018	0.008	0.045*
		0.021	0.021	0.02	0.023
retired		0.025	0.059**	0.038	0.061**
		0.025	0.024	0.023	0.026
MomTertEdu		0.071**	0.055*	0.036	0.012
		0.03	0.029	0.027	0.03
DadTertEdu		0.013	-0.002	-0.006	-0.022
		0.026	0.025	0.024	0.026
Leftie		0.106***	0.089***	0.068***	0.066***
		0.021	0.02	0.02	0.021
Rightie		-0.047**	-0.009	-0.004	-0.005
		0.021	0.021	0.021	0.022
LessEurope			-0.129***		-0.064***
			0.018		0.02
FearNight			-0.055***		-0.031
			0.021		0.023
ImmigrLangGood			-0.095***	-0.077***	-0.069***
			0.018	0.017	0.019
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.079**	-0.014	-0.007
			0.037	0.035	0.04
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.136***	-0.117***	-0.119***
			0.017	0.017	0.019
Exppes_x100				0.870***	
				0.109	
ImmigrationJobs				0.087***	0.074***
				0.019	0.021
ImmigrationWelfare				0.101***	0.082***
				0.019	0.021
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.128***	-0.118***

				0.021	0.022
NativeWorse				-0.072***	-0.042*
				0.019	0.023
ForeignWorse					0.075***
					0.022
NoMeetForeigners					-0.019
					0.02
IncomeDecile					-0.036
					0.035
Observations	8500	8500	8500	8500	6585

Table 8 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent you think [country] should allow unskilled labourers from [poor country outside Europe providing largest number of migrants] to come to live in [country]?”. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigUnskilledPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.001*	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.011	-0.014	-0.006	-0.008	-0.011
	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.017
Born in the country	0.005	0.02	0.023	0.063**	0.043
	0.034	0.033	0.031	0.029	0.032
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.111**	0.089**	0.091**	0.074*	0.068
	0.046	0.043	0.04	0.039	0.042
LFparticipant	0.007				
	0.019				
ISCED_rescaled	0.389***	0.331***	0.239***	0.208***	0.201***
	0.044	0.045	0.043	0.043	0.048
Czechia	-0.184***	0.034	0.038	0.018	0.047
	0.029	0.045	0.045	0.041	0.048
Germany	0.054**	0.041	0.079*	0.081**	0.061
	0.023	0.043	0.041	0.034	0.045
Spain	-0.069***	-0.194***	-0.246***	-0.212***	-0.236***
	0.026	0.044	0.042	0.049	0.046
Sweden	0.281***	0.369***	0.308***	0.341***	0.287***
	0.027	0.034	0.033	0.037	0.034
UK	-0.090***	0.026	0.101***	0.022	0.070*
	0.028	0.035	0.035	0.034	0.037
GDPpcPPS_x100		-0.014**	-0.003		0.005
		0.006	0.006		0.007
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.008	0.015	0.022**	0.008
		0.012	0.012	0.011	0.013
ER Nationals_x100		-0.003	-0.006*	-0.017***	-0.010**
		0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004
ER EU movers_x100		0	-0.004***	-0.003**	-0.003*
		0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
ER TCNs_x100		-0.012***	-0.008***	-0.002	-0.007**
		0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003
employed		-0.022	-0.023	-0.028	-0.014
		0.022	0.021	0.021	0.022
retired		-0.082***	-0.053**	-0.066***	-0.043
		0.025	0.024	0.024	0.026
MomTertEdu		0.037	0.023	0.007	-0.008
		0.029	0.027	0.027	0.028
DadTertEdu		0.035	0.018	0.007	0.005
		0.025	0.024	0.023	0.024
Leftie		0.124***	0.107***	0.096***	0.096***
		0.019	0.019	0.019	0.02
Rightie		-0.089***	-0.049**	-0.043**	-0.050**
		0.022	0.021	0.021	0.022
LessEurope			-0.102***		-0.058***
			0.018		0.02
FearNight			-0.102***		-0.064***
			0.022		0.024
ImmigrLangGood			-0.079***	-0.065***	-0.053***
			0.017	0.017	0.018
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.103***	-0.063	-0.05
			0.038	0.038	0.045
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.152***	-0.137***	-0.126***
			0.017	0.017	0.018
Exppes_x100				0.584***	
				0.108	
ImmigrationJobs				0.079***	0.074***
				0.018	0.019
ImmigrationWelfare				0.077***	0.066***
				0.019	0.02
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.105***	-0.087***

					0.02	0.022
NativeWorse					-0.068***	-0.053**
					0.02	0.023
ForeignWorse						0.053***
						0.02
NoMeetForeigners						-0.045**
						0.02
IncomeDecile						0.015
						0.034
Observations	8086	8086	8086	8086		6554

The previous pages reported data and comments on regressions based on respondents from the 19 countries of the sample pooled together, with country dummies for five EU Member States. In the following sections, the attention will shift to regressions including only respondents of these five countries taken singularly, and later cross-country comparisons will be drawn. The regressions in the following five sections (one per country) will have shorter lists of variables, since macro ones and country dummies were excluded.

Germany

Tables 9-12 report the results of 16 regressions focussing on respondents surveyed in Germany. The main results are the following:

- Germany is the only country where there is a positive correlation between being retired and being favourable to allow a significant number of foreigners of the same race. The correlation loses significance or becomes negative when the other three dependent variables are used;
- Germany is the only country where the female binomials is never significant, and one of the two where the one relating to labour force participant never is (the other country being Czechia);
- Along with the UK, Germany is a country where the employed regressor is never significant, while, with Spain, Germany is the country where belonging to ethnic minority is never significant;
- The dummies on the education of the respondents and those of their parents tend to lose significance while raising the number of regressors;
- Being right-wingers has statistical significance mainly concerning attitudes towards foreigner from poor countries;
- The regressor on less Europe is particularly large in size, never going below a 5% change in the outcome variable, and being above 10% in six out of eight regressions
- Germany is the country where the regressor on having fear while going out at night is stronger: it is always significant while keeping an estimated effect on the outcome variable larger than 5 percentage points,
- The regressors on the importance of being white and of skills sought after in the German labour market are significant, and its coefficients are large, in three out of four tables. In the two tables on foreigners from poor countries, the regressors linked with being white are the largest among the five Member States considered.

Table 9 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here?” in Germany. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Germany OkMigSameRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.000*	0	0	0	0.001**
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.01	-0.008	0.01	-0.01	0.007
	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
Born in the country	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.038*	0.02
	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.021	0.023
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.008	0.008	0.006	-0.006	-0.007
	0.033	0.033	0.031	0.031	0.031
ISCED_rescaled	0.276***	0.231***	0.159***	0.090**	0.053
	0.047	0.047	0.044	0.043	0.043
LF participant	-0.016				
	0.013				
employed		0.007	0.009	0.007	0
		0.016	0.015	0.015	0.016
retired		0.014	0.032*	0.011	0.017
		0.018	0.017	0.017	0.023
MomTertEdu		0.037*	0.028	0.021	0.022
		0.022	0.021	0.021	0.022
DadTertEdu		0.024	0.008	0.006	0.004
		0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015
Leftie		0.032**	0.028*	0.025*	0.026*
		0.015	0.014	0.014	0.014
Rightie		-0.025	-0.005	0.011	0.009
		0.019	0.018	0.018	0.018
Less Europe			-0.103***		-0.060***
			0.012		0.012
FearNight			-0.084***		-0.064***
			0.014		0.014
Immigr Lang Good			-0.064***	-0.052***	-0.039***
			0.014	0.014	0.014
Immigr White Good			-0.051	-0.018	-0.007
			0.04	0.04	0.037
Immigr Skills Good			-0.015	-0.011	0.001
			0.013	0.013	0.013
Immigration Jobs				0.062***	0.053***
				0.013	0.014
Immigration Welfare				0.033**	0.016
				0.014	0.014
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.072***	-0.054***
				0.013	0.013
Native Worse				-0.064***	-0.040**
				0.014	0.016
Foreign Worse					0.019
					0.016
No Meet Foreigners					-0.077***
					0.013
Income Decile					0.03
					0.022
Observations	2976	2976	2976	2976	2669

Table 10 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” in Germany. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Germany OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.001***	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000*	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.022	-0.023	-0.01	-0.017	-0.012
	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.016	0.017
Born in the country	0.096***	0.094***	0.081**	0.112***	0.085**
	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.03	0.033
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.066	0.057	0.041	0.028	0.005
	0.048	0.047	0.045	0.043	0.045
ISCED_rescaled	0.433***	0.370***	0.243***	0.114**	0.087
	0.058	0.059	0.057	0.054	0.058
LF participant	-0.015				
	0.018				
employed		-0.018	-0.017	-0.015	-0.038
		0.023	0.022	0.021	0.024
retired		-0.028	0.014	-0.011	0.002
		0.026	0.026	0.024	0.026
MomTertEdu		0.041	0.028	0.009	-0.016
		0.031	0.03	0.03	0.031
DadTertEdu		0.058***	0.032	0.028	0.02
		0.021	0.02	0.02	0.02
Leftie		0.096***	0.086***	0.075***	0.069***
		0.021	0.02	0.02	0.02
Rightie		-0.105***	-0.064**	-0.036	-0.04
		0.026	0.025	0.024	0.025
Less Europe			-0.164***		-0.078***
			0.017		0.018
FearNight			-0.099***		-0.066***
			0.02		0.021
Immigr Lang Good			-0.098***	-0.074***	-0.055***
			0.018	0.017	0.018
Immigr White Good			-0.221***	-0.152**	-0.146**
			0.062	0.062	0.063
Immigr Skills Good			-0.092***	-0.082***	-0.072***
			0.018	0.017	0.018
Immigration Jobs				0.136***	0.112***
				0.018	0.019
Immigration Welfare				0.072***	0.057***
				0.02	0.021
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.147***	-0.137***
				0.017	0.018
Native Worse				-0.059***	-0.028
				0.019	0.024
Foreign Worse					0.031
					0.021
No Meet Foreigners					-0.056***
					0.02
Income Decile					0.052
					0.032
Observations	2969	2969	2969	2969	2662

Table 11 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe?” in Germany. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Germany OkMigPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.001**	-0.000**	-0.000*	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.006	0.002	0.014	0.005	0.009
	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.017	0.019
Born in the country	0.082**	0.085**	0.072**	0.116***	0.087**
	0.034	0.033	0.032	0.031	0.034
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.028	0.015	0	-0.009	-0.018
	0.051	0.05	0.045	0.044	0.046
ISCED_rescaled	0.459***	0.402***	0.272***	0.159***	0.134**
	0.059	0.06	0.059	0.058	0.063
LF participant	0				
	0.019				
employed		-0.035	-0.03	-0.03	-0.034
		0.024	0.023	0.023	0.025
retired		-0.073***	-0.026	-0.052**	-0.03
		0.027	0.026	0.026	0.028
MomTertEdu		0.056*	0.046	0.022	-0.003
		0.033	0.031	0.033	0.033
DadTertEdu		0.069***	0.043**	0.039*	0.039*
		0.023	0.021	0.022	0.022
Leftie		0.075***	0.061***	0.054***	0.047**
		0.022	0.021	0.021	0.022
Rightie		-0.122***	-0.081***	-0.055**	-0.053**
		0.027	0.025	0.025	0.025
Less Europe			-0.187***		-0.119***
			0.018		0.02
FearNight			-0.097***		-0.059**
			0.022		0.023
Immigr Lang Good			-0.109***	-0.091***	-0.075***
			0.019	0.019	0.02
Immigr White Good			-0.192***	-0.139*	-0.134*
			0.07	0.075	0.073
Immigr Skills Good			-0.087***	-0.082***	-0.072***
			0.019	0.019	0.02
Immigration Jobs				0.128***	0.114***
				0.02	0.021
Immigration Welfare				0.058***	0.034
				0.022	0.023
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.118***	-0.089***
				0.019	0.021
Native Worse				-0.102***	-0.069***
				0.021	0.026
Foreign Worse					0.049**
					0.022
No Meet Foreigners					-0.026
					0.022
Income Decile					0.051
					0.035
Observations	2972	2972	2972	2972	2666

Table 12 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” in Germany. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Germany OkMigPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.001**	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.005	0.001	0.007	0.004	0.002
	0.02	0.019	0.019	0.018	0.02
Born in the country	0.090**	0.092***	0.072**	0.116***	0.087**
	0.036	0.035	0.034	0.033	0.036
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.019	0.005	-0.014	-0.023	-0.016
	0.052	0.051	0.048	0.045	0.046
ISCED_rescaled	0.415***	0.361***	0.224***	0.101*	0.071
	0.06	0.061	0.06	0.058	0.063
LF participant	0.004				
	0.02				
employed		-0.037	-0.034	-0.031	-0.043
		0.026	0.025	0.024	0.027
retired		-0.075***	-0.021	-0.042	-0.035
		0.029	0.029	0.028	0.031
MomTertEdu		0.073**	0.066**	0.042	0.014
		0.033	0.031	0.032	0.032
DadTertEdu		0.048**	0.015	0.012	0.008
		0.023	0.022	0.022	0.023
Leftie		0.115***	0.100***	0.091***	0.094***
		0.023	0.022	0.021	0.022
Rightie		-0.135***	-0.088***	-0.063**	-0.070**
		0.03	0.029	0.028	0.029
Less Europe			-0.187***		-0.115***
			0.02		0.021
FearNight			-0.090***		-0.061**
			0.023		0.025
Immigr Lang Good			-0.091***	-0.071***	-0.069***
			0.02	0.02	0.02
Immigr White Good			-0.355***	-0.286***	-0.270***
			0.088	0.098	0.093
Immigr Skills Good			-0.125***	-0.119***	-0.109***
			0.019	0.019	0.02
Immigration Jobs				0.132***	0.118***
				0.02	0.021
Immigration Welfare				0.071***	0.057**
				0.023	0.025
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.123***	-0.082***
				0.021	0.022
Native Worse				-0.107***	-0.075***
				0.023	0.028
Foreign Worse					0.044*
					0.023
No Meet Foreigners					-0.038
					0.023
Income Decile					0.073**
					0.036
Observations	2970	2970	2970	2970	2665

United Kingdom

Tables 13-16 report the same analyses for the UK, the country with the highest share of statistically significant regressors. This is characterised by a weaker than average role of socio-demographic variables and a constant significant and large effect from the regressors linked with the qualifying factors for migrating in the country are the two clearer trends in the country. Other relevant traits are:

- The UK is the only country, apart from Czechia, reporting a statistically significant and positive correlation between allowing migrants of the same race and leaning politically towards right-wing parties;
- Being unemployed is linked in a statistically significant way with a more positive attitude towards foreigners from poor European countries. The results are not reported in the charts since the possibility of being unemployed was not included in the list of selected variables;
- Several regressors linked with tougher stances towards foreigners reach the highest average values in the country:
    - the binomial linked with have little to no interactions with foreigners
    - the qualifying factors for remaining in the country linked with knowledge of the language and having the skills that the country need
    - the belief than natives are discriminated by the state in comparison to foreigners
- Analogously, in the UK the beliefs on the relationships between foreigners and the welfare states are having the strongest effect: the coefficient is always statistically significant (corroborating what found in Ford and Lowles, 2016). Moreover, the estimated average perceived effect on public finances of migrants in the country (i.e. the difference from those believing than foreigners put much more in the welfare system than what they get and those believing the opposite) ranges from 7 to 13%;
- Finally, UK is the only country where the regressor indicating the income decile is never significant (and the country had an overrepresentation of EU15 and TCNs in the tenth decile).

Table 13 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here?” in the United Kingdom. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

UK OkMigSameRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	-0.000*	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.034	-0.034	-0.035	-0.033	-0.046**
	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.021	0.023
Born in the country	-0.124***	-0.118***	-0.093**	-0.013	0.001
	0.041	0.042	0.04	0.038	0.04
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.002	-0.007	-0.014	-0.039	-0.065
	0.049	0.049	0.047	0.044	0.043
ISCED_rescaled	0.372***	0.299***	0.202***	0.112**	0.133**
	0.055	0.058	0.056	0.054	0.06
LF participant	-0.007				
	0.024				
employed		0.006	0.017	-0.003	0.024
		0.032	0.03	0.029	0.032
retired		-0.011	0.028	-0.018	0.032
		0.034	0.032	0.03	0.034
MomTertEdu		0.094**	0.071**	0.060*	0.048
		0.037	0.035	0.031	0.033
DadTertEdu		0.027	0.025	0	0.01
		0.036	0.034	0.032	0.034
Leftie		0.063**	0.035	0.022	0.046
		0.032	0.031	0.029	0.03
Rightie		0.009	0.076***	0.052*	0.062**
		0.031	0.029	0.027	0.03
Less Europe			-0.171***		-0.112***
			0.021		0.022
FearNight			-0.101***		-0.060**
			0.025		0.027
Immigr Lang Good			-0.141***	-0.113***	-0.077***
			0.028	0.026	0.028
Immigr White Good			-0.178***	-0.095*	-0.059
			0.056	0.056	0.06
Immigr Skills Good			-0.099***	-0.086***	-0.083***
			0.025	0.024	0.025
Immigration Jobs				0.127***	0.109***
				0.023	0.024
Immigration Welfare				0.102***	0.076***
				0.023	0.025
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.066**	-0.059**
				0.026	0.028
Native Worse				-0.104***	-0.097***
				0.024	0.026
Foreign Worse					0.02
					0.04
No Meet Foreigners					-0.101***
					0.028
Income Decile					0.035
					0.043
Observations	2152	2152	2152	2152	1826

Table 14 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” in the United Kingdom. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

UK OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.035	-0.043*	-0.052**	-0.043**	-0.065***
	0.024	0.024	0.022	0.021	0.023
Born in the country	-0.168***	-0.157***	-0.128***	-0.044	-0.051
	0.041	0.042	0.04	0.038	0.039
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.017	-0.009	-0.016	-0.038	-0.052
	0.049	0.049	0.046	0.043	0.042
ISCED_rescaled	0.405***	0.338***	0.214***	0.110**	0.1
	0.055	0.058	0.055	0.054	0.061
LF participant	0.036				
	0.025				
employed		0.003	0.019	-0.002	0.027
		0.033	0.031	0.029	0.033
retired		-0.079**	-0.026	-0.072**	-0.016
		0.035	0.033	0.031	0.034
MomTertEdu		0.067*	0.041	0.028	0.018
		0.037	0.034	0.031	0.033
DadTertEdu		0.051	0.053	0.023	0.037
		0.037	0.034	0.032	0.034
Leftie		0.084***	0.055*	0.036	0.053*
		0.032	0.031	0.029	0.03
Rightie		-0.054*	0.021	-0.002	0.025
		0.031	0.029	0.027	0.029
Less Europe			-0.188***		-0.126***
			0.021		0.022
FearNight			-0.091***		-0.051*
			0.026		0.027
Immigr Lang Good			-0.156***	-0.130***	-0.099***
			0.027	0.025	0.027
Immigr White Good			-0.355***	-0.267***	-0.214***
			0.062	0.063	0.065
Immigr Skills Good			-0.109***	-0.093***	-0.073***
			0.025	0.023	0.025
Immigration Jobs				0.102***	0.082***
				0.023	0.024
Immigration Welfare				0.122***	0.106***
				0.023	0.026
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.099***	-0.091***
				0.026	0.028
Native Worse				-0.113***	-0.102***
				0.024	0.026
Foreign Worse					0.056
					0.037
No Meet Foreigners					-0.080***
					0.028
Income Decile					-0.003
					0.043
Observations	2160	2160	2160	2160	1835

Table 15 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe?” in the United Kingdom. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

UK OkMigPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.013	-0.024	-0.029	-0.022	-0.048**
	0.025	0.024	0.023	0.022	0.023
Born in the country	-0.141***	-0.133***	-0.104***	-0.015	-0.007
	0.042	0.043	0.04	0.039	0.041
Belonging to ethnic minority	0	-0.028	-0.038	-0.057	-0.065
	0.05	0.05	0.047	0.045	0.045
ISCED_rescaled	0.453***	0.392***	0.265***	0.159***	0.147**
	0.055	0.058	0.055	0.054	0.06
LF participant	0.04				
	0.026				
employed		0.008	0.021	0.001	0.021
		0.033	0.031	0.03	0.033
retired		-0.056	-0.007	-0.054*	-0.014
		0.036	0.033	0.031	0.034
MomTertEdu		0.06	0.032	0.019	0.009
		0.037	0.035	0.032	0.034
DadTertEdu		0.052	0.053	0.024	0.029
		0.037	0.034	0.032	0.033
Leftie		0.108***	0.075**	0.051	0.073**
		0.033	0.032	0.032	0.032
Rightie		-0.075**	0.005	-0.021	-0.009
		0.032	0.029	0.028	0.029
Less Europe			-0.206***		-0.153***
			0.021		0.022
FearNight			-0.106***		-0.048*
			0.027		0.027
Immigr Lang Good			-0.154***	-0.129***	-0.069**
			0.028	0.027	0.028
Immigr White Good			-0.237***	-0.149**	-0.123*
			0.056	0.064	0.064
Immigr Skills Good			-0.122***	-0.108***	-0.097***
			0.025	0.025	0.026
Immigration Jobs				0.090***	0.085***
				0.023	0.024
Immigration Welfare				0.115***	0.094***
				0.023	0.025
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.129***	-0.112***
				0.027	0.028
Native Worse				-0.138***	-0.129***
				0.024	0.027
Foreign Worse					0.037
					0.036
No Meet Foreigners					-0.074***
					0.029
Income Decile					0.033
					0.044
Observations	2158	2158	2158	2158	1835

Table 16 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” in the United Kingdom. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

UK OkMigPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.050**	0.032	0.033	0.035	0.021
	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.022	0.023
Born in the country	-0.049	-0.041	-0.024	0.059	0.059
	0.04	0.041	0.037	0.036	0.039
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.115**	0.071	0.062	0.04	0.02
	0.047	0.047	0.044	0.041	0.044
ISCED_rescaled	0.439***	0.403***	0.268***	0.175***	0.172***
	0.055	0.058	0.055	0.054	0.061
LF participant	0.047*				
	0.025				
employed		-0.028	-0.014	-0.028	0.028
		0.033	0.03	0.029	0.032
retired		-0.126***	-0.075**	-0.114***	-0.04
		0.036	0.033	0.031	0.035
MomTertEdu		0.055	0.031	0.02	0.02
		0.036	0.034	0.032	0.034
DadTertEdu		0.019	0.018	-0.008	-0.02
		0.036	0.034	0.032	0.034
Leftie		0.099***	0.060**	0.036	0.045
		0.031	0.029	0.029	0.03
Rightie		-0.115***	-0.037	-0.057*	-0.064**
		0.033	0.031	0.029	0.032
Less Europe			-0.179***		-0.130***
			0.022		0.023
FearNight			-0.121***		-0.055**
			0.027		0.028
Immigr Lang Good			-0.144***	-0.118***	-0.083***
			0.026	0.025	0.027
Immigr White Good			-0.261***	-0.180***	-0.147**
			0.064	0.068	0.07
Immigr Skills Good			-0.141***	-0.132***	-0.115***
			0.024	0.023	0.025
Immigration Jobs				0.069***	0.059**
				0.023	0.024
Immigration Welfare				0.121***	0.115***
				0.023	0.024
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.099***	-0.080***
				0.028	0.029
Native Worse				-0.146***	-0.141***
				0.025	0.028
Foreign Worse					0.003
					0.036
No Meet Foreigners					-0.063**
					0.029
Income Decile					-0.003
					0.044
Observations	2153	2153	2153	2153	1831

Spain

Tables 17-20 reports the regression results for Spain. This is the second country, behind UK, for share of statistically significant regressors. The most notable traits are:

- ISCED level of the respondent is always statistically significant in all regression, and its average marginal effect on the different dependent variables is never below 12%, while also going above 40% in some regressions;
- Spain is the only country where the tertiary education of the father is more significant than the one of the mother. This holds for all regressions. In the specifications of the last columns, when significant, the average effect of the regressor is a positive 15% on the dependent variables. In the regressions on allowing foreigners from poor countries, while both lose significance while adding variables, the regressor linked with the mother tertiary education loses is significant only in the first specifications;
- Three binomial variables have the average highest effect among the five countries analysed, namely these related with:
    - "Being born in the country"
    - Having the "perception of a negative effect of immigration on crime"
    - Hold the "belief that European integration have gone too far"
- Similarly, while the variable on the income decile is only significant in the regression on allowing people of the same race in the country, it has the highest estimated average marginal effect among those calculated, at 10%;
- The estimated average effect on having migrants in the country on the job market (i.e. the difference from those believing than foreigners take away more jobs than those they create and those believing the opposite) is always significant and it the largest among all countries, ranging between 16 and 17% in all regressions;
- Spain is the only country where the negative coefficient linked with being employed resists while including all other variables;
- Feeling unsafe while walking alone at night in the respondent's neighbourhood almost never correlate with a dependent variable in the country. In the two case in which it does, surprisingly and the only case among all analysed countries, the effect is positive (although small);
- Spain is the only country where the importance of being able to speak the country official language is never statistically significant.

Table 17 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here?” in Spain. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Spain OkMigSameRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.003***	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.002**	-0.001
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Female	-0.057***	-0.043*	-0.047**	-0.018	-0.016
	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.023
Born in the country	-0.075*	-0.078*	-0.042	0.075*	0.075*
	0.043	0.042	0.042	0.04	0.042
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.012	-0.006	0.016	-0.002	0.008
	0.083	0.082	0.076	0.077	0.086
ISCED_rescaled	0.469***	0.361***	0.313***	0.203***	0.132**
	0.053	0.055	0.055	0.054	0.063
LF participant	-0.057**				
	0.025				
employed		-0.028	-0.031	-0.017	-0.017
		0.026	0.025	0.024	0.027
retired		-0.029	-0.021	-0.02	-0.022
		0.039	0.038	0.037	0.04
MomTertEdu		0.103*	0.073	0.076	0.012
		0.058	0.058	0.054	0.056
DadTertEdu		0.217***	0.221***	0.174***	0.168***
		0.049	0.049	0.047	0.052
Leftie		0.119***	0.104***	0.080***	0.067***
		0.024	0.024	0.023	0.025
Rightie		-0.062*	-0.054	-0.066**	-0.063*
		0.034	0.033	0.031	0.034
Less Europe			-0.192***		-0.097***
			0.026		0.03
FearNight			0.026		0.064**
			0.03		0.031
Immigr Lang Good			0.004	0.035	0.015
			0.024	0.024	0.025
Immigr White Good			-0.130***	-0.110**	-0.084*
			0.046	0.045	0.05
Immigr Skills Good			-0.103***	-0.068***	-0.049**
			0.023	0.023	0.024
Immigration Jobs				0.168***	0.158***
				0.02	0.022
Immigration Welfare				0.065***	0.047**
				0.021	0.023
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.090***	-0.108***
				0.025	0.026
Native Worse				-0.042*	-0.028
				0.023	0.027
Foreign Worse					0.045
					0.033
No Meet Foreigners					-0.053**
					0.025
Income Decile					0.096*
					0.05
Observations	1788	1788	1788	1788	1433

Table 18 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” in Spain. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Spain OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.004***	-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.001
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Female	-0.059***	-0.042*	-0.040*	-0.011	0.001
	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.021	0.023
Born in the country	-0.083*	-0.081*	-0.046	0.082**	0.079*
	0.044	0.045	0.043	0.041	0.043
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.035	0.014	0.026	0.03	0.054
	0.089	0.09	0.087	0.077	0.089
ISCED_rescaled	0.455***	0.352***	0.294***	0.176***	0.142**
	0.054	0.056	0.055	0.054	0.063
LF participant	-0.037				
	0.026				
employed		0	-0.002	0.012	0.02
		0.027	0.026	0.024	0.027
retired		-0.032	-0.023	-0.021	-0.031
		0.041	0.04	0.038	0.041
MomTertEdu		0.061	0.034	0.036	-0.011
		0.055	0.054	0.051	0.054
DadTertEdu		0.160***	0.161***	0.118***	0.120**
		0.047	0.046	0.044	0.048
Leftie		0.140***	0.121***	0.095***	0.065**
		0.025	0.025	0.023	0.025
Rightie		-0.102***	-0.089***	-0.102***	-0.093***
		0.035	0.034	0.032	0.035
Less Europe			-0.205***		-0.101***
			0.028		0.03
FearNight			0.002		0.062*
			0.031		0.032
Immigr Lang Good			-0.004	0.027	0.025
			0.025	0.024	0.025
Immigr White Good			-0.133***	-0.115**	-0.111**
			0.051	0.05	0.055
Immigr Skills Good			-0.145***	-0.102***	-0.091***
			0.023	0.022	0.024
Immigration Jobs				0.171***	0.164***
				0.021	0.022
Immigration Welfare				0.073***	0.070***
				0.022	0.024
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.116***	-0.117***
				0.025	0.027
Native Worse				-0.069***	-0.043
				0.024	0.027
Foreign Worse					0.075**
					0.033
No Meet Foreigners					-0.049**
					0.025
Income Decile					0.036
					0.051
Observations	1786	1786	1786	1786	1439

Table 19 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe?” in Spain. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Spain OkMigPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.004***	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.001
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Female	-0.083***	-0.074***	-0.070***	-0.044**	-0.047*
	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.021	0.024
Born in the country	-0.084*	-0.080*	-0.043	0.086**	0.06
	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.041	0.044
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.058	0.041	0.057	0.055	-0.009
	0.09	0.09	0.089	0.081	0.092
ISCED_rescaled	0.455***	0.391***	0.335***	0.217***	0.203***
	0.055	0.057	0.057	0.056	0.066
LF participant	-0.088***				
	0.026				
employed		-0.075***	-0.076***	-0.062**	-0.068**
		0.027	0.027	0.025	0.028
retired		-0.066	-0.055	-0.048	-0.052
		0.043	0.041	0.04	0.043
MomTertEdu		0.075	0.052	0.053	0.025
		0.056	0.055	0.052	0.057
DadTertEdu		0.075	0.073	0.035	0.043
		0.047	0.046	0.044	0.049
Leftie		0.126***	0.109***	0.082***	0.058**
		0.025	0.025	0.024	0.026
Rightie		-0.069*	-0.057	-0.070**	-0.059
		0.036	0.035	0.033	0.037
Less Europe			-0.217***		-0.111***
			0.029		0.031
FearNight			-0.008		0.031
			0.031		0.032
Immigr Lang Good			-0.009	0.021	0.019
			0.026	0.024	0.026
Immigr White Good			-0.099*	-0.08	-0.044
			0.051	0.049	0.053
Immigr Skills Good			-0.121***	-0.081***	-0.072***
			0.024	0.023	0.025
Immigration Jobs				0.173***	0.173***
				0.021	0.023
Immigration Welfare				0.070***	0.050**
				0.023	0.024
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.127***	-0.124***
				0.026	0.028
Native Worse				-0.080***	-0.045
				0.024	0.028
Foreign Worse					0.073**
					0.033
No Meet Foreigners					-0.071***
					0.026
Income Decile					0.035
					0.053
Observations	1779	1779	1779	1779	1429

Table 20 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” in Spain. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Spain OkMigPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	-0.004***	-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.001
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Female	-0.079***	-0.067***	-0.062***	-0.035*	-0.033
	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.021	0.024
Born in the country	-0.027	-0.022	0.012	0.144***	0.121***
	0.043	0.044	0.042	0.04	0.043
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.08	0.067	0.08	0.066	0.044
	0.083	0.082	0.077	0.076	0.085
ISCED_rescaled	0.434***	0.364***	0.304***	0.184***	0.129**
	0.055	0.057	0.056	0.054	0.064
LF participant	-0.073***				
	0.026				
employed		-0.054**	-0.056**	-0.041	-0.044
		0.027	0.026	0.025	0.028
retired		-0.052	-0.042	-0.035	-0.043
		0.043	0.041	0.039	0.043
MomTertEdu		0.072	0.043	0.057	0.011
		0.055	0.053	0.05	0.055
DadTertEdu		0.079*	0.080*	0.034	0.045
		0.046	0.045	0.041	0.045
Leftie		0.134***	0.114***	0.087***	0.074***
		0.025	0.025	0.024	0.026
Rightie		-0.115***	-0.100***	-0.112***	-0.096***
		0.036	0.035	0.032	0.036
Less Europe			-0.211***		-0.120***
			0.029		0.032
FearNight			-0.018		0.018
			0.03		0.032
Immigr Lang Good			-0.018	0.013	0.005
			0.025	0.024	0.026
Immigr White Good			-0.103*	-0.083	-0.058
			0.053	0.053	0.057
Immigr Skills Good			-0.154***	-0.114***	-0.103***
			0.023	0.022	0.024
Immigration Jobs				0.174***	0.170***
				0.021	0.023
Immigration Welfare				0.095***	0.083***
				0.022	0.024
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.111***	-0.103***
				0.026	0.028
Native Worse				-0.075***	-0.045
				0.024	0.028
Foreign Worse					0.062*
					0.033
No Meet Foreigners					-0.061**
					0.026
Income Decile					0.061
					0.051
Observations	1777	1777	1777	1777	1426

Sweden

Tables 21-24 show the results for the regressions focusing on respondents from Sweden, a country where the majority of the regressors controlled is not significant. Only Czechia has a lower share of significant regressors across all equations. The share ranges from one third of significant regressor in the table for allowing migrants of the same race to two thirds in allowing migrants form poor countries outside Europe. Moreover, coefficients are, on average, smaller than in other countries. In terms of patterns, the most remarkable ones are the following:

- While the regressor on the ISCED level of the respondent reaches the highest coefficients (in line with other countries), the only regressors that maintain statistical significance in all specifications are those linked with: respondents self-classified as left-wingers, belief that European integration went too far, skills as qualifying factor to move in the country, negative effect of migration on crime situation, and the belief of the effect of migration on welfare;
- As in the majority of the states, the demographic variables have poor explicatory power and low significance while adding regressors. Contrary to what happens in UK and Spain though, the regressor linked with women has a positive effect, linked with a 3% on the regressions on allowing people from poor countries, both inside and outside Europe;
- In the regressions on allowing people based on race, and on the one on allowing people from poor countries in Europe, the tertiary education of the mother is always significant (the only country among the five analysed displaying this feature), while the one of the father never is. Yet, in the regression on allowing people from poor countries outside Europe, almost the opposite is true, with the tertiary education of the mother losing significance while adding regressors, and the tertiary education of the father gaining it;
- The regressor on "feeling unsafe while walking alone at night (in the respondent's neighbourhood)" is only significant in the regressions on allowing people of a different race;
- Sweden is the only country where the importance of being white to migrate in the country is never significant. In the other four, this regressor is characterised by a statistical significance at 1%, and by comparatively large coefficients;
- The effect of the income variable is significant in three out of four regressions (most among the five countries considered), with an average marginal effect between 5 and 7% on the different dependent variables.

Table 21 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here?” in Sweden. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Sweden OkMigSameRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.019	0.019	0.014	0.008	0.007
	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.011
Born in the country	0	-0.003	-0.014	0.003	-0.003
	0.017	0.017	0.018	0.017	0.016
Belonging to ethnic minority	-0.032	-0.041	-0.042*	-0.038*	-0.036*
	0.026	0.026	0.024	0.022	0.021
ISCED_rescaled	0.138***	0.121***	0.100**	0.064*	0.005
	0.041	0.039	0.039	0.037	0.034
LF participant	0.006				
	0.012				
employed		0.011	0.009	0.01	-0.005
		0.016	0.016	0.016	0.015
retired		0.005	0.01	0.002	0.007
		0.019	0.018	0.021	0.023
MomTertEdu		0.039**	0.031*	0.017	0.016
		0.019	0.018	0.018	0.019
DadTertEdu		0.016	0.018	0.019	0.017
		0.017	0.017	0.016	0.016
Leftie		0.050***	0.054***	0.046***	0.052***
		0.016	0.016	0.015	0.015
Rightie		0.004	0.007	0.013	0.008
		0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012
Less Europe			-0.043***		-0.030**
			0.012		0.012
FearNight			-0.018		-0.006
			0.015		0.014
Immigr Lang Good			-0.003	-0.001	0.002
			0.014	0.013	0.012
Immigr White Good			-0.047	-0.037	-0.042
			0.042	0.036	0.038
Immigr Skills Good			-0.067***	-0.049***	-0.041***
			0.016	0.015	0.014
Immigration Jobs				0.014	0.015
				0.012	0.011
Immigration Welfare				0.048***	0.038***
				0.013	0.013
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.044***	-0.042***
				0.012	0.013
Native Worse				-0.028**	-0.02
				0.014	0.015
Foreign Worse					0.025*
					0.014
No Meet Foreigners					-0.019
					0.015
Income Decile					0.075***
					0.021
Observations	1732	1732	1732	1732	1602

Table 22 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” in Sweden. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Sweden OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0.001
Female	0.019	0.018	0.016	0.006	0.008
	0.014	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.012
Born in the country	0.024	0.021	0.002	0.026	0.017
	0.02	0.019	0.02	0.019	0.019
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.023	0.008	0.004	0.005	-0.009
	0.035	0.034	0.035	0.034	0.033
ISCED_rescaled	0.225***	0.203***	0.166***	0.126***	0.068*
	0.048	0.046	0.046	0.044	0.039
LF participant	0.005				
	0.014				
employed		0.005	0.002	0.004	-0.002
		0.019	0.018	0.019	0.019
retired		-0.006	-0.001	-0.013	-0.002
		0.021	0.02	0.024	0.027
MomTertEdu		0.064***	0.052**	0.033	0.022
		0.023	0.022	0.023	0.022
DadTertEdu		0.009	0.013	0.014	0.025
		0.02	0.02	0.021	0.019
Leftie		0.083***	0.083***	0.074***	0.075***
		0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019
Rightie		0	0.005	0.012	0.004
		0.015	0.014	0.013	0.013
Less Europe			-0.050***		-0.036***
			0.014		0.014
FearNight			-0.036**		-0.031**
			0.016		0.015
Immigr Lang Good			0.002	0.001	0.006
			0.016	0.015	0.014
Immigr White Good			-0.077*	-0.063	-0.041
			0.046	0.046	0.047
Immigr Skills Good			-0.097***	-0.073***	-0.071***
			0.017	0.016	0.015
Immigration Jobs				0.029**	0.029**
				0.014	0.014
Immigration Welfare				0.060***	0.053***
				0.015	0.014
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.050***	-0.045***
				0.013	0.013
Native Worse				-0.042***	-0.027
				0.016	0.017
Foreign Worse					0.038**
					0.016
No Meet Foreigners					-0.026
					0.019
Income Decile					0.049**
					0.025
Observations	1740	1740	1740	1740	1610

Table 23 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries in Europe?” in Sweden. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Sweden OkMigPoorEUMS	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	-0.001*
	0	0	0	0	0.001
Female	0.049***	0.046***	0.040**	0.032**	0.031**
	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.015	0.016
Born in the country	0.071***	0.070***	0.052**	0.082***	0.072***
	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.025
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.079*	0.065	0.052	0.056	0.037
	0.045	0.044	0.044	0.043	0.043
ISCED_rescaled	0.169***	0.135***	0.099**	0.042	0.013
	0.05	0.05	0.048	0.048	0.047
LF participant	0.024				
	0.018				
employed		0.031	0.028	0.025	0.033
		0.022	0.021	0.021	0.022
retired		-0.002	0.004	-0.002	0.043
		0.026	0.024	0.023	0.031
MomTertEdu		0.101***	0.088***	0.065**	0.058**
		0.027	0.026	0.026	0.028
DadTertEdu		0.022	0.026	0.027	0.032
		0.024	0.024	0.024	0.025
Leftie		0.060***	0.066***	0.044**	0.047**
		0.021	0.021	0.02	0.021
Rightie		-0.036*	-0.031*	-0.023	-0.031*
		0.018	0.018	0.017	0.017
Less Europe			-0.079***		-0.050***
			0.017		0.017
FearNight			-0.033		-0.018
			0.021		0.021
Immigr Lang Good			0.009	0.011	0.014
			0.02	0.019	0.019
Immigr White Good			-0.056	-0.033	0.009
			0.073	0.067	0.073
Immigr Skills Good			-0.115***	-0.084***	-0.087***
			0.022	0.02	0.021
Immigration Jobs				0.046***	0.050***
				0.017	0.017
Immigration Welfare				0.071***	0.065***
				0.018	0.019
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.063***	-0.043**
				0.017	0.017
Native Worse				-0.080***	-0.065***
				0.02	0.022
Foreign Worse					0.039**
					0.019
No Meet Foreigners					-0.002
					0.024
Income Decile					0.04
					0.03
Observations	1732	1732	1732	1732	1600

Table 24 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” in Sweden. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Sweden OkMigPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	-0.001
	0	0	0	0	0.001
Female	0.048***	0.045***	0.038**	0.029*	0.030*
	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.015	0.015
Born in the country	0.064***	0.064***	0.037	0.069***	0.071***
	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.024
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.109**	0.085	0.090*	0.095**	0.075*
	0.052	0.052	0.047	0.043	0.042
ISCED_rescaled	0.259***	0.234***	0.188***	0.126***	0.097**
	0.053	0.052	0.051	0.048	0.047
LF participant	0.043**				
	0.018				
employed		0.042*	0.039*	0.040*	0.037
		0.023	0.022	0.021	0.023
retired		-0.024	-0.015	-0.02	0.017
		0.026	0.024	0.023	0.031
MomTertEdu		0.070***	0.053**	0.024	0.006
		0.027	0.026	0.026	0.027
DadTertEdu		0.036	0.039	0.041	0.044*
		0.026	0.025	0.025	0.025
Leftie		0.074***	0.074***	0.058***	0.053**
		0.022	0.021	0.02	0.021
Rightie		-0.042**	-0.037**	-0.029*	-0.042**
		0.019	0.018	0.017	0.017
Less Europe			-0.065***		-0.035**
			0.017		0.017
FearNight			-0.034		-0.022
			0.021		0.021
Immigr Lang Good			-0.015	-0.01	0.005
			0.02	0.019	0.018
Immigr White Good			-0.083	-0.058	-0.023
			0.078	0.067	0.074
Immigr Skills Good			-0.128***	-0.097***	-0.098***
			0.021	0.02	0.02
Immigration Jobs				0.032*	0.043**
				0.018	0.017
Immigration Welfare				0.104***	0.099***
				0.018	0.019
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.052***	-0.040**
				0.017	0.017
Native Worse				-0.077***	-0.071***
				0.021	0.022
Foreign Worse					0.027
					0.019
No Meet Foreigners					0.007
					0.024
Income Decile					0.056*
					0.031
Observations	1733	1733	1733	1733	1601

Czechia

Tables 25-27 report the results of the regressions for Czechia. This country is an outlier among the five analysed, for two main reasons: on the one hand, six out of the 23 regressors considered have a different sign in comparison with other countries; on the other hand, several regressors are rarely significant for the country. These two features hint at different effects of the same factors and potentially at a different set of factors correlated with the attitudes towards migrants for the case of Czechia. These specificities may extend to countries with similar institutional settings.[70] From the comparative standpoint, and as reported in the section with the analyses results all the 19 countries pooled together, the survey did not include the question of allowing people from poorer countries in Europe. Thus, only three regression tables are reported. The main features of the analyses are the following:

- Several regressors are never significant in Czechia, namely: age, being born in the country, participation in the labour force, presence of either of the two parents of the respondent with tertiary education, feeling unsafe while walking alone at night in the respondent's neighbourhood, and the importance of knowing the language of the country as a qualifying factor to migrate;
- The level of education, captured by the variable with the ISCED level of the respondent, has very large coefficients. Comparing only the regressions in columns (e) among all Member States, three of the four largest coefficients refer to ISCED level in Czechia;
- Belonging to an ethnic minority is also associated with very large and statistically significant coefficients in the regressions on migrants form the same and from a different race. In most countries, this variable is not statistically significant. When it is, like in Sweden, the coefficient are much smaller;
- The regressor linked with having contact with people belonging to a different race or ethnic group is significant in only one regression. This is not surprising since Czechia is the country with the lowest level of migrants, by a significant margin (as seen in the second chapter of this work);
- The only regressors being significant in all regressions are the following: education of the respondent, retired status of the respondent, leaning towards right political positions, importance of being white as a qualifying factor to move in the country, the effects of foreigners on public finances, the dummy for the respondents believing that foreigners worsen the crime problems in the country, and the one on the belief that foreigners are treated worse than natives;
- Czechia is the only country in which income, when significant, has a negative effect on the attitudes towards foreigners, while the literature tends to find positive effects (e.g. Mayda, 2004);
- Czechia is the only country where the regressor linked to retired people is always statistically significant; moreover, it has large coefficients;

[70] For instance, Milanovic made a point that Eastern European countries have a generally tougher stance against migrants due to the history developments of the last two centuries, and of the meaning of the 1989 revolutions. These led to an indentification to the country with the concepts of ethnicla homogeneity (Milanovic, 2017). A similar stance is supported by Kepplova, who adds that multiculturalism may be a "tool of identity building" (Kepplova, 2019).

- Finally, and differently from the vast majority of the other regressions, the regressors linked with being woman, being right wingers, believing that natives are treated worse than foreigners,[71] and not meeting foreigners, have a positive effect.

Table 25 – Regression results using as dependent variable: "to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?" in Czechia. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Czechia OkMigSameRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.019	0.026	0.034	0.028	0.038
	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.028
Born in the country	0.024	0.019	-0.011	0.033	0.044
	0.094	0.093	0.087	0.093	0.108
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.247***	0.247**	0.217**	0.198**	0.244**
	0.095	0.099	0.093	0.091	0.108
ISCED_rescaled	0.304***	0.242**	0.201**	0.155*	0.320***
	0.087	0.094	0.092	0.092	0.106
LF participant	0.02				
	0.026				
employed		-0.032	-0.037	-0.036	-0.032
		0.031	0.03	0.03	0.036
retired		-0.105***	-0.095***	-0.101***	-0.142***
		0.037	0.037	0.036	0.045
MomTertEdu		-0.01	-0.025	-0.024	0.018
		0.049	0.048	0.047	0.06
DadTertEdu		0.024	0.016	0.001	-0.03
		0.04	0.039	0.038	0.048
Leftie		0.044	0.067**	0.068**	0.070**
		0.03	0.03	0.029	0.034
Rightie		0.136***	0.142***	0.137***	0.117***
		0.03	0.029	0.029	0.035
Less Europe			-0.103***		-0.081***
			0.025		0.03
FearNight			-0.022		0.024
			0.028		0.032
Immigr Lang Good			-0.021	-0.01	-0.035
			0.026	0.026	0.03
Immigr White Good			-0.160***	-0.132***	-0.163***
			0.033	0.033	0.039
Immigr Skills Good			-0.028	-0.022	0.013
			0.026	0.026	0.03
Immigration Jobs				0.095***	0.088***
				0.027	0.032
Immigration Welfare				0.063**	0.061*
				0.03	0.036
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.067**	-0.062*
				0.03	0.035
Native Worse				0.025	0.053*
				0.026	0.031
Foreign Worse					0.090**
					0.044
No Meet Foreigners					0.003
					0.028
Income Decile					-0.120*
					0.065
Observations	2061	2061	2061	2061	1492

[71] From the descriptive statistics we know that 25% of Czech respondents believed that government treated better or much better immigrants, against a 3% believing the opposite.

Table 26 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” in Czechia. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Czechia OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.046**	0.052**	0.055**	0.053**	0.034
	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.026
Born in the country	-0.076	-0.078	-0.101	-0.055	-0.045
	0.082	0.08	0.074	0.077	0.087
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.228***	0.229***	0.196**	0.171**	0.180**
	0.08	0.083	0.078	0.077	0.088
ISCED_rescaled	0.203***	0.144*	0.114	0.06	0.205**
	0.078	0.085	0.083	0.081	0.095
LF participant	0.006				
	0.024				
employed		-0.043	-0.046*	-0.046*	-0.024
		0.028	0.028	0.027	0.033
retired		-0.096***	-0.087**	-0.084**	-0.125***
		0.035	0.035	0.034	0.042
MomTertEdu		-0.008	-0.018	-0.021	0.005
		0.044	0.043	0.041	0.054
DadTertEdu		0.052	0.045	0.028	0.026
		0.035	0.035	0.033	0.044
Leftie		0.007	0.026	0.034	0.021
		0.028	0.028	0.028	0.032
Rightie		0.092***	0.098***	0.097***	0.079**
		0.027	0.026	0.025	0.031
Less Europe			-0.068***		-0.028
			0.023		0.028
FearNight			0.002		0.034
			0.025		0.029
Immigr Lang Good			-0.024	-0.013	-0.025
			0.024	0.024	0.028
Immigr White Good			-0.130***	-0.096***	-0.114***
			0.032	0.032	0.037
Immigr Skills Good			-0.046*	-0.040*	-0.015
			0.024	0.023	0.028
Immigration Jobs				0.065***	0.042
				0.025	0.03
Immigration Welfare				0.071**	0.074**
				0.029	0.035
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.123***	-0.134***
				0.028	0.033
Native Worse				0.024	0.059**
				0.024	0.029
Foreign Worse					0.119***
					0.039
No Meet Foreigners					0.034
					0.025
Income Decile					-0.194***
					0.058
Observations	2059	2059	2059	2059	1490

Table 27 – Regression results using as dependent variable: “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?” in Czechia. Data: ESS 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

Czechia OkMigPoorNoEU	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Age	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0.048**	0.053**	0.056***	0.050**	0.064**
	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.021	0.025
Born in the country	0.017	0.01	-0.01	0.029	0.087
	0.069	0.071	0.073	0.071	0.086
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.057	0.06	0.034	0.008	0.053
	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.086
ISCED_rescaled	0.150*	0.096	0.066	0.027	0.176*
	0.077	0.085	0.082	0.08	0.093
LF participant	0.035				
	0.023				
employed		-0.03	-0.035	-0.032	-0.02
		0.028	0.027	0.027	0.032
retired		-0.126***	-0.118***	-0.116***	-0.135***
		0.035	0.034	0.033	0.042
MomTertEdu		0.009	-0.001	-0.003	0.028
		0.043	0.042	0.041	0.052
DadTertEdu		0.04	0.033	0.019	0.006
		0.035	0.034	0.034	0.043
Leftie		0.013	0.027	0.036	0.028
		0.028	0.028	0.027	0.031
Rightie		0.094***	0.102***	0.099***	0.082***
		0.027	0.026	0.025	0.031
Less Europe			-0.036		0.012
			0.023		0.027
FearNight			-0.02		0.014
			0.025		0.03
Immigr Lang Good			-0.003	0.004	0.008
			0.024	0.024	0.028
Immigr White Good			-0.121***	-0.094***	-0.127***
			0.032	0.031	0.037
Immigr Skills Good			-0.078***	-0.069***	-0.052*
			0.024	0.023	0.028
Immigration Jobs				0.036	0.024
				0.025	0.03
Immigration Welfare				0.119***	0.148***
				0.028	0.035
Immigr Crime Bad				-0.067**	-0.065**
				0.028	0.033
Native Worse				0.01	0.023
				0.024	0.028
Foreign Worse					0.070*
					0.04
No Meet Foreigners					0.057**
					0.025
Income Decile					-0.096
					0.059
Observations	2055	2055	2055	2055	1488

Comparing results at country level

While previous sections analysed results at country level considering one Member State at the time, it is interesting to draw comparisons among the five countries analysed together. From the descriptive statistics section of the second chapter, it was clear that ESS replies differed based on the country where the interviews took place. Yet, regressors at the micro level may have different coefficient magnitude (and even signs in a couple of instances) across countries. This section allows then for a much greater level of information granularity than the one obtained in tables 1-8, where inter-country differences collapsed in the five country dummies. These comparisons remain not conclusive, and caution should be used with samples ranging from 1800 to 3000 respondents, especially for the regressions where the model seems to have lower explicatory power (which seems the case for Sweden and, above all, Czechia).

From the comparison of the regressions results across countries, the most striking features are the following:

- Only the binomial variable on the negative effect of foreigners on the crime situation in the host country maintains statistical significance across all country-level regressions in which it is present;
- Other regressors remain significant in almost all regressions, namely:
    - the regressor on the perceived effect on public finances of migrants in the country (indicating the effect on the dependent variable of the difference between those believing than foreigners put more in the welfare system than what they get and those believing the opposite), not significant only in two regressions for Germany (the columns "e" of the tables referring to migrants of the same race and migrants from poor countries in Europe);
    - the similar dummy on the respondents' beliefs on foreigners' effect in the labour market (always significant apart from one case for Sweden, and the three regressions for Czechia);
    - The dummy variable for respondents believing that European integration has gone too far (not statistically significant only in three occurrences, all in Czechia);
    - The binomial variable on having skills needed in the country as a qualifying factor to move in the country (not significant in the two tables dealing with allowing people of the same race in the country, for Germany and Czechia, and in another column for the latter);
- Conversely, some variables are barely relevant, especially with the complete set of regressors included. This is particularly the case for the regressors linked with:
    - being employed or having the mother with tertiary education, which are statistically significant only in one out of the nineteen complete regressions (while the other dummy for labour market status, being in pension, is significant in only three cases, all in Czechia);
    - age, statistically significant only in two out of the nineteen complete regressions, with very small coefficients and diverging signs;
    - belonging to an ethnic minority, with four significant occurrences;

    - Being female, with seven significant variables
- In line with evidence found in the descriptive statistics (presented in the "descriptive statistics and data sources" section of the second chapter) and in the section of this chapter presenting the analysis' results for all the countries pooled together, being European is always associated with an average softer opposition towards them by the respondents. The difference is stronger in the United Kingdom and in Germany, and minimal in Sweden;
- Interestingly, the variables linked with the education level of the respondent, those relating to the level of education of the parents of the respondents, and those on labour market status, tend to lose significance with the inclusion of the regressors on qualifying factors for migration and those on beliefs of effects of migration;
- The results presented in the tables on education are contradicting what was found by Mayda in 2004. Mayda[72] found that skills (also proxied by ISCED education level of the respondent) were linked with pro-immigration stances in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated in low per capita GDP countries. Yet, from the tables it is visible that the positive effect of skills is stronger in Czechia, the country with lower GDP per capita. The results presented are also contradicting her finding that if immigrants are more educated than natives, these should oppose immigrants more. Yet, from the descriptive statistics section, it is evident that foreigners have higher qualifications than natives in Czechia and UK, the first and the third country for size of the positive coefficient of the education level. Similar results were obtained replicating the Relative Skills Ratio index developed by Mayda;[73]
- Differently from the analyses with the 19 Member States pooled together, regressions including the four binomial variables linked with skills groups (white-collar high skilled, white-collar low skilled, blue-collar high skilled, blue-collar low skilled) did not yield statistically significant results for country level model specification. This may be linked with the lower number of observations at country level;
- The binomial variable for having little to no interaction with foreigners is always significant in UK and Spain and never significant in Sweden;
- The binomial variable on the importance of speaking the language of the country as a qualifying factor to move in the country is always significant in regressions for Germany and the UK, while being never significant in the other countries;

[72] The findings on education presented are different from the ones of Mayda. She resorts to the notion of relative skill ratio, which she defines as the log of one plus the relative skill composition (RSC). The RSC is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with levels of education ISCED 03 and above to the number of individuals with level of education ISCED 00, 01, and 02). Through the relative skill ratio Mayda found that "individuals with higher levels of skill are more likely to be pro-immigration in high per capita GDP countries and less likely in low per capita GDP countries" (Mayda, 2004). She does so through a combined interpretation of regressors on the respondent educational attainment (that Mayda uses as a proxy for skills), GDP, and interaction variable among these two. In the analyses presented, while GDP is confirmed to have a positive effect of GDP as she had, her sign for the education regressor was negative in her complete regression, and much smaller than the interaction variable between education and relative skill composition. The sign of regressor for education in this paper is positive, of similar size and much more statistically significant than the one of the interaction variable between education and relative skill composition.

[73] Since the results were not significant, these were not reported in this paper.

- Similarly, the dummy signalling fear of going out at night is significant in all the complete regressions in Germany and the United Kingdom while being never significant in Czechia, and rarely in Sweden;
- The correlation with the belief that natives are discriminated by the state against foreigners is often significant in the regressions with all coefficients in the most of the countries, while never being significant in Spain;
- As regards the belief that foreigners are discriminated, this is often significant in Germany, Spain, Czechia and Sweden, and never in the UK.

In terms of the size of the coefficients, the pattern tends to replicate the comment on regressors significance, namely:

- The regressor showing the ISCED level of the respondent is the one showing the highest positive coefficients, although these lose size while adding more regressors;
- Conversely, the importance of being white is, on average, the regressor with the biggest size among the negative ones;
- This is followed by the regressor on the beliefs of the respondent that European integration went too far, the beliefs that foreigners worsen crime situation, and the need for having skills needed in the country as a qualifying factor to migrate;
- Being politically closer to the right, from its side, while being significant in the great majority of regressions, has a small coefficient, especially in comparison with its counterpart on being closer to the left. Yet, this is explained by the fact that it correlates with other dummies (e.g. the one stating that immigration worsen crime problems)

The signs of the estimated coefficients of the regressors are relatively similar across countries and different dependent variables, probably indicating that individual characteristics affect the attitudes towards migrants with a recursive pattern. In terms of signs of the regressors, the main exceptions are in Czechia, with six regressors showing a different sign than in other countries. This is followed by Sweden, with three (all among demographic variables), Spain (with the positive sign linked to the regressor of being afraid of going out at night), and the UK (a positive correlation between allowing foreigners of the same race and leaning politically towards right wing parties).

The other results tend to be diverse across countries, highlighting how heterogeneous is the relation between natives and foreigners in these five Member States. This diversity strongly suggests that country specific factors (ranging from different cultures, migration histories, institutions, and types of foreigners that the country attracted in the country) play a role in the formation of attitudes towards foreigners. Based on the institutional literature presented in the literature review and in the selection of case studies sections, some possible explanations can be put forward:

- Fear at night and being white have the strongest effect in Germany, a country belonging to the continental group, characterised by labour market segmentations (Guzi et al., 2015) that could have repercussions going beyond the labour market and be reflected by this phenomenon;

- The large coefficients associated with the regressor on the effect of immigration on the labour market and negative effect of foreigners on crime in Spain can be explained in a similar way. Even if the access in the labour market is relatively easier in the Mediterranean countries in comparison to the continental ones (all other things being equal), significant barriers and segmentation characterise also their labour markets (ibid.);
- The two qualifying factors for migrating more linked with the integration in the labour market (i.e. knowledge of the country language and having skills sought after in the country) have the strongest effect in UK, the country that performs better in attracting skilled labour force in the labour market (see the "Descriptive statistics and data sources" section of the second chapter). This feature is particularly interesting since the regressor linked with the effect of migrants in the labour market has the highest coefficient among all countries examined. Hence, these findings fit well the theory that means tested benefit can exacerbate the divisions in the society (Titmuss, 1968): these three findings, taken together, seem indeed to suggest that in the UK attitudes towards migrant are strongly linked with their attachment to the labour market;
- Again for the UK, large and significant coefficients can be found in the binomial variables on "beliefs that European integration went too far" and "little to no interactions with foreigners". This potentially hints at a link with the "geography of discontent" divide in the country (Dijkstra et al., 2018), indicating a more conservative attitude in the poorest and most rural country areas. This hypothesis gains traction because in the UK case there was a statistically significant average marginal effect of around 5% in allowing foreigner from same or different race on the regressors linked with the rural-urban divide (these regressors were later omitted from the analyses because not significant in the majority of the calculations, see Annex C);
- As for Sweden, from the descriptive statistics section it was clear that, contrary to all the other countries analysed, people believe on average that migrants put more in the welfare state than what they take from it. This, coupled with the relative large size of the coefficients of the regressor linking welfare state and migration, may hint at the fact that universalistic welfare state do reduce welfare chauvinism (as argued in Crepaz and Damron, 2009);
- The highest coefficient for the income variable relates to Spain. This country, like other Southern EU Member States, is characterised by a truncated welfare state status (World Bank Group, 2015). This typology of welfare have a weak coverage of the bottom 20% of the population by social protection systems. This may raise competition between poorer natives and immigrants, leading to more hostile attitudes of the former against the latter;
- From its part Czechia, like other Eastern European Member States, has relatively lower shares of GDP devoted to social protection, and a similar effect of income on attitude towards foreigners should be found everything else being equal. Yet, the coefficient of the income variable, as shown before, is negative. This may due to the fact that the competition factor in Czechia should be lower in Czechia given the much lower share of foreigners in this country. Overall though, this is another occurrence of the relative poor fit between the model and Czechia, possibly hinting at the role of cultural factors and of other institutions characterising countries associated with this world of welfare capitalism (Aidukaite, 2009).

Taken together, these findings seem to corroborates the hypothesis that decommodification plays a role in the formation of attitudes towards foreigners (Crepaz and Damron, 2009). Further research on these factors represents a probable fertile avenue for further analysis.

Comparison between 2002 and 2014

The previous sections focus on the analyses based on the seventh wave of the ESS, referring to the year 2014. This was not the only wave with a module on migration, the first one being present in the first wave of the survey, conducted in 2002. This section aims at presenting the results of a similar analysis to the one conducted on 2014 based on a merged database of the two years. The reason behind the focus on 2014 for the great majority of the work stems from the fact that the 2002 wave is poorer than the one of 2014, not having regressors which proved to have a strong explicatory power for 2014 data. These are:

- The variable concerning the fact that European integration has gone too far
- The variable concerning the belief that natives or foreigners are discriminated by the government
- The variable indicating the level of interaction between the respondent and foreigners
- The variable on income, which was coded in a different way in 2002 (twelve categories rather than the 10 deciles, and without adjustments per country)

Moreover, Eurostat reports data on GDP per capita in PPS from 2007 onwards. Hence, this macro variable was replaced by the World Bank Data series referring to GDP per capita, in PPP.[74]

For what concerns the geographic coverage, this is reduced in the analysis, since Estonia and Lithuania were not present in the 2002 wave of the ESS. Therefore, the observations concerning these two countries were also omitted for 2014. Some adjustments were needed also for macro-variables,[75] and for the education level of the respondent since 2002 had less information granularity than 2014.[76] With this caveats in mind, the opinions of survey respondent towards allowing people from a different race or ethnic group from the majority of the population were analysed.

[74] Data available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.Similarly to the other macro variables used for the analysis of all European ESS countries pooled together (see section "Analysis"), the data series was rescaled so to have values ranging from 0 and 1.

[75] The following adjustments were needed in order not to lose macro variables on increase in the share of foreigners, employment rate of EU movers and migrants, and GDP per capita:

- Spain difference in share of foreigners is 2004-2002 (instead of 2002-1997) due to data availability;
- Portugal and France difference in share of foreigners is 2003-1999 due to data availability;
- Poland difference in share of foreigners is 2004-2001 due to data availability;
- Eurostat does not have data on GDP per capita PPS before 2007. Therefore, real GDP per capita was used, which has a longer time series;
- Employment rate of natives, migrants, and EU movers del 2006.

[76] Seven variables in 2002 wave against 27 in 2014.

The outcome is showed in table 28. The most striking features are the following:

- Results substantially hold while adding the 2002 data wave, although unfortunately do not allow to include some of the most significant regressors included in previous analyses;
- The results corroborate the findings presented in the previous sections;
- The main novelties of the results yielded concern the new variables included in this regression, namely the one referring to the different data wave, and the one on the GDP per capita PPP (as data GDP per capita PPS were not available for 2002);
- On the intertemporal differences, the positive sign of the regressor referring to the 2014 observations (named "Year 2014" in the table), shows that in 2004 the attitudes towards foreigners of a different race were tougher than in 2014 wave, by almost 8%;
- On the real GDP regressor, its effect is even smaller than the one in the 2014 regression, and it loses significance while adding regressors. This change may be linked to the different data series, as well as a lack of adjustment for inflation;
- The other big change is that the coefficient of the regressor concerning Czechia, while negative in the first regressions, become smaller while adding variables, and surprisingly positive in the last column. To be noted that, while in 2014 data for Czechia only 27% of the respondents would have allowed many or some immigrants of a different race or ethnic group to come and live in the country, the figure was 46% in 2002 (and also the share of people which would allow no foreigners from a different more than double from 2002 and 2014);
- Finally, the regressor concerning expenditure in PES, while remaining significant, has half the size of 2014 estimation.

Table 28 - Regression results using as dependent variable: "to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?", Data: ESS 2002 and 2014. Marginal effects from probit . *** significant at the 1%level, significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.

OkMigDiffRace	-1	-2	-3	-4
Age	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	0	0	0	0
Female	-0.008	-0.014**	-0.004	-0.005
	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Born in the Country	-0.075***	-0.055***	-0.057***	0.001
	0.014	0.013	0.013	0.012
Belonging to ethnic minority	0.079***	0.063***	0.057***	0.042**
	0.018	0.018	0.017	0.017
LF participant	0.004			
	0.007			
ISCED_rescaled	0.524***	0.423***	0.354***	0.255***
	0.018	0.018	0.017	0.017
Year 2014	0.057***	0.106***	0.086***	0.077***
	0.006	0.012	0.007	0.011
czechia	-0.162***	-0.053***	-0.026*	0.038***
	0.011	0.014	0.014	0.013
germany	0.104***	0.065***	0.097***	0.108***
	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.009
spain	0.019*	0.055***	0.01	0.018*
	0.01	0.011	0.01	0.01
sweden	0.406***	0.380***	0.386***	0.315***
	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.012
UK	0.003	0.001	-0.016	0.049***
	0.009	0.01	0.013	0.01
IncrForeigners5Y_x100		0.025***	0.025***	0.025***
		0.003	0.003	0.003
ER Nat_x100		0.002**	-0.008***	-0.003**
		0.001	0.001	0.001
ER EU Mov_x100		0.003***	0.004***	0.002**
		0.001	0.001	0.001
ER TCN_x100		-0.006***	-0.003***	-0.006***
		0.001	0.001	0.001
GDP pc PPP_x100		-0.002***		0
		0.001		0.001
Employed		-0.022***	-0.024***	-0.022***
		0.008	0.008	0.007
Retired		-0.083***	-0.055***	-0.058***
		0.009	0.009	0.009
MomTertEdu		0.091***	0.073***	0.056***
		0.013	0.012	0.012
DadTertEdu		0.089***	0.077***	0.056***
		0.01	0.01	0.01
Leftie		0.089***	0.076***	0.065***
		0.008	0.007	0.007
Rightie		-0.087***	-0.060***	-0.045***
		0.008	0.008	0.007
Exppes_x100			0.389***	
			0.05	
FearNight			-0.059***	-0.027***
			0.007	0.007
ImmigrLangGood			-0.089***	-0.061***
			0.006	0.006
ImmigrWhiteGood			-0.213***	-0.163***
			0.013	0.013
ImmigrSkillsGood			-0.119***	-0.090***
			0.006	0.006
ImmigrationJobs				0.126***
				0.006
ImmigrationWelfare				0.114***
				0.006
ImmigrCrimeBad				-0.130***
				0.006
Observations	57694	57694	57694	57694

Conclusions

This paper exploits the richness of the European Social Survey database to go beyond the current state of the academic analyses on the factors linked with the attitudes towards foreigners. The paper uses a multidisciplinary approach, building on the results of different research domains. It investigates which factors correlate with the willingness of the respondents to allow different subsets of foreigners in their home country. Around 100 factors were considered in the analysis (later reduced to the most significant 38), covering 19 EU Member States.

The first part of the analysis pooled together all Member States, complementing the information contained in the database with a set of macroeconomic factors thus obtaining a new and original database. Eight replies were considered as dependent variables, investigating the attitudes of the respondent towards welcoming different subgroups of foreigners. These are: people of the same race, people of a different race, people from poor European countries, people from poor countries outside Europe, professionals from two specific poorer countries (one outside and one inside Europe, the two providing the highest number of foreigners in the respondent country), and unskilled foreigners from the same two countries.

In line with standard literature, the eight main regressions record a general softer stance towards European foreigners, and a strong correlation with variables such as education level, family background, and political affiliations (O'Connell, 2011; Fertig and Brenner, 2006; Semyonov et al, 2006). Yet, thanks to the large set of variables considered, the analysis yields new results. For instance, classic demographic variables (such as age or gender), showing good statistically significance level in the literature (e.g. in Hatton's works), lose significance if a broader perspective is used. Moreover, employment of natives is positively correlated with a tougher stance towards foreigners. This holds both at macro (through employment rate), and micro (through the respondent working status) levels. In the second instance, this effect is driven by negative attitudes towards foreigners by blue-collar workers (especially highly skilled), a skill group competing more often than others against people from abroad. The explanation is consistent with labour economics theories and previous evidence (Gang et al., 2002). Differently from Mayda, no evidence was found of the pairing GDP-schooling chiasmus on attitudes towards migrants (i.e. schooling with a positive effect only in high GDP countries). Quite the opposite holds in the regressions presented, with the strongest effect of schooling taking place in Czechia and Spain. Interestingly, higher employment rate of Third Country Nationals correlates with softer stances towards foreigners.

Apart from macro and education variables, the regressors showing highest significance levels and having highest coefficients were mostly those linked to questions concerning socio-economic beliefs about migration. Most notably, the perceptions of the beneficial (or detrimental) effects of foreigners on jobs, public finances, and crime situation show consistently statistical significance and large sized coefficients. The same goes for the belief that either natives or foreigners are discriminated by the state in comparison to the other group. Large and significant regressors' coefficients are also linked with some of the deciding factors that respondents considered important for allowing foreigners to migrate in their country, most notably being white and having skillsets that are needed in the country. In line with previous research (Allport, 1954; Hewstone and Swart, 2011), having few or no interactions with people of a different race is correlated with a more hostile

attitude towards further inflows, while being better off financially is linked with a softer stance. Finally, the variable associated with a respondent believing that European integration went too far was often the micro regressor with the largest coefficients.

The analysis then narrowed down to five countries representing different worlds of welfare capitalism (Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, and Czechia), with a reduced number of regressors. The model seems to explain a significant portion of the differences in the attitudes towards foreigners in all countries (less so in Czechia). While controls for education level, family background, employment status, and language knowledge of the immigrants tend to lose significance when adding regressors, variables more directly linked with the effects of immigration in the receiving countries continued to show a remarkable trend of high significance and large coefficients size. These relate to the respondents' beliefs of immigrants' effect on jobs number in the country, public finance, crime, the conviction of the country discriminating one of the two groups (natives and foreigners), migration qualifying factors, and being against further European integration. The findings at country level contribute to the institutional literature, corroborating the hypothesis that decommodification affects the formation of attitudes towards foreigners (Crepaz and Damron, 2009).

A final analysis was conducted merging ESS round 1 (referring to 2002) with the ESS round 7 (referring to 2014). The results broadly held, while showing that attitudes towards foreigners were improving, at least until the outbreak of the migration crisis in 2015.

Significant differences exist at country level, with numerous variables losing and gaining significance according to the country where the interview took place. This country heterogeneity points us to the importance of cultural, institutional and country-specific factors, which in turn plays a role in the types of foreigners that a country attracts. Future studies could investigate these differences.

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Annex C – List of the regressors tested, including the labels used in the regression tables for those kept in the analyses

Variables	Occurrence of being kept in further analyses, name of the variable as shown in regression results, and other info
Macro variables	
Percentage of EU-Movers in the country (2014)	No
Percentage of Third Country Nationals in the country (2014)	No (when significant, positive)
Increase in percentage of foreigners in the previous five years, multiplied by 100	IncreaseForeigners5Y_x100
Employment rate of EU-movers, multiplied by 100	ER EUmover_x100
Employment rate of migrants, multiplied by 100	ER Migrants_x100
Employment rate of nationals , multiplied by 100	ER Nationals_x100
Unemployment rate	No
Unemployment rate of people with primary education or below (ISCED 0-2)	No
Unemployment rate of people with secondary education (ISCED 3-4)	No
Unemployment rate of people with primary education (ISCED 5-8)	No
Expenditure in active labour market policies[77] (as % of GDP)	No (when significant, always negative)
Expenditure in passive labour market policies[78] (as % of GDP)	No (when significant, always negative)
Expenditure in Public Employment Services (as a %of GDP) , multiplied by 100	Exppes_x100
GDP growth	No (when significant, negative)
GDP per capita in PPS, multiplied by 100	GDP pc PPS_x100
GDP per capita in PPP, multiplied by 100 (Source: World Bank Data)	
Education and labour market situation	
The respondent has primary education or less (ISCED 0-2) (DUMMY)	No
The respondent has tertiary education or less (ISCED 5-6) (DUMMY)	No
Variable rescaling, from 0 to 1, the ISCED level declared by the respondent	ISCED_rescaled
The respondent has worked in the last 7 days (DUMMY)	Employed
The respondent was unemployed and actively looking for a job in the last 7 days (DUMMY)	No
The respondent was unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job in the last 7 days (DUMMY)	No
The respondent was retired in the last 7 days (DUMMY)	Retired
The person is a labour force participant (i.e. either working or unemployed) (DUMMY)	LFparticipant
The respondent belongs to the skills group of the "white collars high skilled workers" (including occupational groups "managers", "professional", and "technicians and associate professionals", based on ISCO 4 digit information) (DUMMY)	No
The respondent belongs to the skills group of the "white collars low skilled workers" (including occupational groups "clerical support workers", and "service and sales workers", based on ISCO 4 digit information) (DUMMY)	No
The respondent belongs to the skills group of the "blue collars high skilled workers" (including occupational groups "skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers" and "craft and related trades workers", based on ISCO 4 digit information) (DUMMY)	No
The respondent belongs to the skills group of the "blue collars low skilled workers (including occupational groups "plant and machine operators, and assemblers" and "elementary occupations", based on ISCO 4 digit information) (DUMMY)	No
Variable rescaling, from 0 to 1, the ISCO level declared by the respondent	No
Personal information	
Female (DUMMY)	Female

[77] Defined, following Eurostat, as LMP measures that "cover interventions that provide temporary support for groups that are disadvantaged in the labour market and which aim at activating the unemployed, helping people move from involuntary inactivity into employment, or maintaining the jobs of persons threatened by unemployment." These include the following categories: training; Job rotation and job sharing; employment incentives; supported employment and rehabilitation; direct job creation; start-up incentives".

[78] Defined, following Eurostat, as LMP measures that "cover financial assistance that aims to compensate individuals for loss of wage or salary and support them during job-search (i.e. mostly unemployment benefits) or which facilitates early retirement." These include: "Out-of-work income maintenance and support" and "Early retirement".

Age of the respondent	Age
Mother with tertiary education (DUMMY)	MomTertEdu
Father with tertiary education (DUMMY)	DadTertEdu
The respondent lives in a big city or its suburbs (DUMMY)	No
The respondent lives in a country village or in the countryside (DUMMY)	No (when significant, always negative)
The respondent lived abroad for at least 6 months in the last 10 years (DUMMY)	No
The respondent has been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than 12 months, at least once in his/her past (DUMMY)	No
The respondent is a member of a trade union or similar organisation (DUMMY)	No
The respondent was a member of a trade union or similar organisation, but not anymore (DUMMY)	No
The respondent in the last week felt depressed most of the time or a lot the time (DUMMY)	No
The respondent experienced severe financial difficulties while growing up (often or always) (DUMMY)	No
The respondent uses one of the country official languages among the first two languages spoken at home	No
Institutional trust	
The respondent has a good op[inion of the Country Parliament (DUMMY)	No
The respondent has a bad op[inion of the Country Parliament (DUMMY)	No
Country legal system: good opinion (DUMMY)	No
Country legal system: bad opinion (DUMMY)	No
Country police: good opinion (DUMMY)	No
Country police: bad opinion (DUMMY)	No
EU parliament: good opinion (DUMMY)	No
EU parliament: bad opinion (DUMMY)	No
United Nations: good opinion (DUMMY)	No
United Nations: bad opinion (DUMMY)	No
Person political beliefs and perception of crime	
Person describes him/herself as a left supporter (DUMMY)	Leftie
Person describes him/herself as a right supporter (DUMMY)	Rightie
Person describe him/herself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country (DUMMY)	No
The respondent claims to belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]? (DUMMY)	Belonging to ethnic minority
The respondent thinks that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (DUMMY)	No
The respondent believes that EU integration should go further (DUMMY)	No
The respondent believes that EU integration has gone too far (DUMMY)	LessEurope
Difference between perception of foreigner presence in the country and real share of foreigners	No
Respondent or member of her/his household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years? (DUMMY)	No
Respondent does not feel safe walking alone in this area after dark? (DUMMY)	FearNight
Religion	
Respondent is Catholic (DUMMY)	No
Respondent is Protestant (DUMMY)	No
Respondent is Orthodox (DUMMY)	No (When significant, often negative)
Foreign origin of the respondent	
Respondent is a EU mover (DUMMY)	No
Respondent is a Third Country National (DUMMY)	No
Respondent was born in the country (DUMMY)	Born in the country
Respondent has a foreign mother (DUMMY)	No
Respondent has a foreign father (DUMMY)	No
Respondent beliefs on the qualifying factors to migrate in the country: they are asked the following questions: "how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here:	
Have good educational qualifications is very important (DUMMY)	No
Have good educational qualifications is not very important (DUMMY)	No
Being able to speak the country official language(s) is very important (DUMMY)	ImmigrLangGood
Being able to speak the country official language(s) is not very important (DUMMY)	No
Being committed to the country life style is very important (DUMMY)	No
Being committed to the country life style is not very important (DUMMY)	No
Have Christian background is very important (DUMMY)	No

Have Christian background is not very important (DUMMY)	No
Being white is very important (DUMMY)	ImmigrWhiteGood
Being white is not very important (DUMMY)	No
Have skillsets the country need is very important (DUMMY)	ImmigrSkillsGood
Have skillsets the country need is not very important (DUMMY)	No
Beliefs and interactions with migrants	
Respondent believes migrants create more jobs than those they take (DUMMY)	Merged, with values from -1 to 1 named ImmigrationJobs
Respondent believes migrants take away more jobs than those they create (DUMMY)	
Respondent believes migrants contribute to the welfare more than what they take out (DUMMY)	Merged, with values from -1 to 1 named ImmigrationWelfare
Respondent believes migrants take out more from the welfare than what they contribute (DUMMY)	
Respondent believes migrants reduce crime problems (DUMMY)	No
Respondent believes migrants worsen crime problems (DUMMY)	ImmigrCrimeBad
Respondent believes country treats natives worse than immigrants (DUMMY)	NativeWorse
Respondent believes country treats immigrants worse than natives (DUMMY)	ForeignWorse
Respondent has contact with foreigners never or less than once per month, or once a month (DUMMY)	NoMeetForeign
Respondent has contact with foreigners once or more a week, or every day (DUMMY)	No
Income	
The respondent belongs to the first and second quintile of income distribution (DUMMY)	No
The respondent belongs to the fourth and fifth quintile of income distribution (DUMMY)	No
Variable ranging from one (lowest decile) to 10 (highest decile), based on the income the respondent declares	IncomeDecile
Countries	
Country in which the respondent was interviewed: Czechia (DUMMY)	Czechia
Country in which the respondent was interviewed: Germany (DUMMY)	Germany
Country in which the respondent was interviewed: Spain (DUMMY)	Spain
Country in which the respondent was interviewed: Finland (DUMMY)	Sweden
Country in which the respondent was interviewed: United Kingdom (DUMMY)	UK