# UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MODENA E REGGIO EMILIA

### **Dottorato di ricerca in Sicenze Umanistiche**

#### Ciclo XXXV

Ten years of representing Isis' Foreign Fighters in news discourse: from 2011 to 2021

Candidato

Marta Giallombardo

Relatore (Tutor): Prof.ssa Marina Bondi

Coordinatore del Corso di Dottorato: Prof.ssa Laura Gavioli

#### **Abstract**

Syrian Civil conflict, which started in 2011, as a consequence of the uprisings that spread across the whole country to overthrow Assad's regime, is the conflict that witnessed the highest mobilization of foreign fighters in human history. Particularly noteworthy was that the majority of those who decided to take part in the war, also joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a terrorist organization. This aspect made them troublesome, as their home countries started to see foreign fighters as a threat to national security. Besides, Isis' claims of credit for several attacks carried out in Western highlighted the urgency to address this specific aspect of terrorism. Given the importance media have in contributing to shaping discourses, this study contributes to enlarging the field of studies of the representation of terrorism in news discourse. Yet, the aim of the present work is not simply to identify biased discourses in newspapers, but especially to uncover the relations of power and dominance that hide in apparently neutral pieces of texts.

Thus, by combining a more quantitative Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies approach, with a more qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis methodology, this study has examined a corpus of articles published in six different newspapers from Australia, the UK and the USA. In particular, the analysis carried out in the present work investigates the corpus through three different perspectives: diachronic, gendered, and cross-cultural. The study shows how the discursive construction of foreign fighters evolved through the decade under examination and how the events contributed to shaping their representation: while, in the first years under analysis, there was more of a focus on actors such as rebels and militants, that also reflected the fact that several Western countries were supporting the rebellious factions in Syria, in more recent times, especially following the terrorist attacks carried out by Isis in Europe and the loss of power by Isis towards the end of the analysed decade, the discourses surrounding foreign fighters were more and more related to terrorism and to the threat they were said to be posing to their home countries. Furthermore, the present work questions the discursive representation of female foreign fighters, showing how they were often infantilized in the news and represented as mere young girls who wanted to rebel against their families and communities and become jihadi brides. Finally, after having highlighted that the discourses surrounding foreign fighters in the six analysed newspapers were rather similar, this research suggests that there has been a rather homogeneous representation of foreign fighters in the news of three of the most influential countries in Western society. Indeed, this study shows how discourse is a powerful tool in shaping and maintaining power relations, especially when dealing with a phenomenon such as terrorism, that – through a recurring 'us' vs 'them' discourse – contributes to creating differences and divisions between different cultures and religions.

**Declaration** 

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and research, has been written by me and

it has not been submitted for any other degree or award. When use has been made of the

work of other authors, it has been fully acknowledged and referenced.

Marta Giallombardo

October, 2024

5

# **Table of contents**

1.	Introduction	15
	1.1. Aims of the study and research questions	18
	1.2. Outline of the thesis	19
2.	Literature Review	22
	2.1. Discourse Studies	22
	2.2 The Analysis of Discourse	26
	2.2.1. Corpus Linguistics	26
	2.2.2. Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies	28
	2.2.3. Discourse Analysis	30
	2.2.4. Critical Discourse Analysis	30
	2.2.4.1. Ideology and Power in Critical Discourse Analysis	37
	2.2.4.2. Criticism to Critical Discourse Analysis	39
	2.3. News Discourse	42
	2.3.1. News discourse and terrorism	46
	2.4. Conclusion	48
3.	Background and context of the present study	49
	3.1. Arab Springs and Syrian Civil War	50
	3.2. Terrorism	55
	3.2.1. Jihad and Jihadism	57
	3.3. Foreign Fighters	60

	3.4. Conclusion	62
ŧ.	Methodological Framework	64
	4.1. Introduction	64
	4.2. Corpus description and collection	64
	4.3. CADS approach	68
	4.3.2. Tools used	70
	4.3.2. Keywords analysis	71
	4.3.3. Concordances analysis	72
	4.3.4. Collocations	75
	4.4. Critical Discourse Analysis	76
	4.4.1. Fairclough's Sociocultural Approach to News Discourse Analysis	77
	4.4.2. The representation of social actors	83
	4.5. Analytical chapters	85
	4.5.1. Diachronic study	86
	4.5.2. Gender perspective	88
	4.5.3. Cross-Cultural study	89
	4.6. Conclusions	90
5.	Diachronic representation of foreign fighters from 2011 to 2021	92
	5.1. Introduction	92
	5.2. Analysis of the corpus	92
	5.2.1. Keyword analysis	93

5.2.2. Concordance-keywords analysis	98
5.2.3. Keywords and Concordance – Keywords analyses: conclusions	111
5.2.4. Collocates analysis	112
5.3. The discursive construction of foreign fighters from 2011 to 2021	118
5.3.1. Foreign fighters: a matter of numbers	120
5.3.2. The diachronic evolution of the link between foreign fighters and te	errorism
	132
5.3.3. 2019 subcorpus and the focus on returning foreign fighters' families	140
5.3.4. Analysis of concordances: Conclusions	143
5.4. The diachronic discursive construction of foreign fighters as a social actor	in news
articles	145
5.4.1. Assimilating foreign fighter*	147
5.4.2. Different ways of addressing the same social actor through the years.	157
5.4.3. The focus on foreign fighters' families in 2019 corpus	165
5.4.4. Intertextuality vs journalists' opinions	169
5.5. Conclusions	173
6. Women foreign fighters in news discourse	177
6.1. Introduction.	177
6.2. Gender sub-corpus: collection and description	178
6.3. Analysis of collocates	179
6.3.1. Collocates of <i>female</i> *	180
6.3.2. Collocates of woman*	182

6.3.3. Collocates of <i>girl</i> *	84
6.5. Concordance analysis	86
6.5.1. Female* foreign fighters	87
6.5.2. Woman* foreign fighters	94
6.5.3. Girl* foreign fighters	01
6.5.4. Concordance analysis – conclusions	05
6.6. The discursive construction of female foreign fighters in the news	06
6.6.1. The infantilization of women foreign fighters: young teenagers becomin	ng
jihadi brides20	06
6.6.2. Intertextuality	18
6.6. Conclusions	21
7. Representing foreign fighters in three different English-speaking countries: a cross	SS-
cultural perspective	23
7.1. Introduction	23
7.2. Description of the subcorpus	23
7.3. Analysis of the collocates	24
7.2.1. Looking for similarities: shared collocates. 22	25
7.2.2. Looking for differences in collocates that are not shared	29
7.3. Concordance analysis	34
7.3.1. The returning foreign fighter*	34
7.4. A threat to Western security	43
7.5. Conclusion	52

8. Conclusion	254
8.1. Summary of the thesis	254
8.2. Answers to the research questions and discussion about the findings	256
8.3. Limitations and suggestions for further studies.	264
9. Bibliography	266
Appendix	276

# **List of Tables**

Table 1. Numbers of articles collected per newspaper per year	66
Table 2. Number of tokens per article per year.	68
Table 3. The first twenty keywords per year.	94
Table 4. 2012 concordance – keywords.	101
Table 5. 2014 concordance-keywords.	104
Table 6. 2015 concordance-keyword lists.	106
Table 7. 2019 concordance-keywords.	109
Table 8. Concordances of foreign fighter* indicating quantity, in the 2012 subo	corpus.
	121
Table 9. Concordances of foreign fighter* indicating quantity, in the 2014 subo	corpus.
	124
Table 10. Number of articles composing the sub-corpus based on gender, per new.	spaper
per year	178
Table 11. Number of tokens composing the articles in the sub-corpus based on g	gender
per newspaper, per year	179
Table 12. The first 40 collocates occurring most often with female*	181
Table 13. The first 40 collocates occurring most often with woman*	183
Table 14. The first 40 collocates occurring most often with girl*	185
Table 15. Concordances of female describing female foreign fighter*.	189
Table 16. Concordances of woman* in the subcorpus of female foreign fighters	197
Table 17. Concordances of girl* in the subcorpus	202
Table 18. Collocates shared by the Australian and the British sub-corpora	225
Table 19. Collocates shared by the British and American sub-corpora	226
Table 20. Collocates shared by the American and the Australian sub-corpora	22 <i>6</i>

Table 21. Collocates recurring most often only in the Australian sub-corpus	. 230
Table 22. Collocates recurring most often only in the British sub-corpus	. 230
Table 23. Collocates recurring most often only in the American sub-corpus	. 231
Table 24. Concordances of returning in the Australian sub-corpus	. 235
Table 25. Table 7. Concordances of returning in the British sub-corpus	. 236
Table 26. Concordances of returning in the American sub-corpus	. 236
Table 27. Concordances of threat in the Australian sub-corpus	. 244
Table 28. Concordances of threat in the British sub-corpus.	. 244
Table 29. Concordances of threat in the American corpus.	. 244
Table i. 2011's List of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log_L,	, and
Log_R	. 276
Table iii. 2012's List of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Lo	g_L,
and Log_R	. 276
Table iii. 2013's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Lo	g_L,
and Log_R	. 277
Table iv. 2014's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log_L,	, and
Log_R	. 277
Table v. 2015's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log_L,	, and
Log_R	. 278
Table vi. 2016's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Lo	g_L,
and Log_R	. 278
Table vii.2017's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Lo	g_L,
and Log_R	. 279
Table viii. 2018's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Lo	g_L,
and Log R	279

Table ix. Table viii. 2019's list of the first 20 keyword	ds, showing their frequency, keyness,
Log_L, and Log_R	280
Table x. 2020's list of the first 20 keywords, showing	their frequency, keyness, Log_L, and
Log_R	280
Table xi. 2021's list of the first 20 keywords, showi	ng their frequency, keyness, Log_L,
and Log R	281

## 1. Introduction

Islamic terrorism threatening the Western way of life has been an important issue that public opinion had to deal with for the last two decades, after 9/11. This largely contributed to the rise of a collective sense of anxiety and helplessness towards something that seemed to be jeopardising people's everyday lives and activities. Moreover, all of this resulted in a growing fear of 'the other' and an increasing sentiment of islamophobia all over the Western world and societies. Since it is believed that news and media generally play a crucial role in shaping public opinion's perception of everyday issues, it is also widely accepted that they played a particularly central role in how terrorism has been discursively constructed in the years that followed 9/11. Generically, for their social importance and relevance in contributing to people's viewpoints, media have always been focused on by research in language and linguistics fields of study. As stated by Bell and Garrett (2005), indeed, this happened mainly for four reasons:

Firstly, media are a rich source of readily accessible data for research and teaching. Secondly, media usage influences and represents people's use and attitudes towards language in a speech community. Thirdly (and related), media use can tell us a great deal about social e meanings and stereotypes projected through language and communication [...]. Fourthly (and again relatedly), the media reflect and influence the formation and expression of culture, politics and social life.

(Bell and Garrett, 2005: 3-4)

Furthermore, even though the media should be as objective and neutral as possible, they are still part of a market and that, in a capitalist society, means they need to follow the market's rules to survive. Thus, it is imperative that they earn as much as possible – by selling the highest number of copies as possible in the case of printed newspapers, or by reaching the highest share as possible in the case of TV and radio programmes – and, to

do so, they have to produce news pieces that are sold easily. Also, being closely tied to the market and its logic means that the way in which media are produced is subject to the logic of capital and power and, thus, they cannot be completely neutral in conveying meanings and ideologies. Actually, according to Van Dijk (1997), the ideologies and opinions expressed in the media are social, institutional, and political, and tend to reflect the positions of those in power. As it has been largely demonstrated, media play a central role in shaping and spreading (dominant) ideologies. All that has been said so far is what makes news discourse particularly interesting from a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective. Indeed, the main purpose of CDA – and, more generally, of Discourse Studies – is that of examining how language contributes to building and maintaining unequal power relations in our society (Fairclough, 2010).

Mass media have also played a crucial role in what had been defined as the 'war on terror', following 9/11 2001. Indeed, the September 2001 attacks started to be defined as being a violation of American (and Western) civilization, grounded on a preexisting discourse of fear and on the representation of 'Arabs' as 'others' and as a threat to national security (Altheide, 2007). The result was that the public opinion, feeling vulnerable, started to largely support American military intervention in Iraq before and in Afghanistan later. Almost ten years after 2001, in 2010 and 2011, the so-called Middle East, started a new period of instability, called 'the Arab Springs', with several Arab nations facing uprisings and attempts to overturn the existing dictatorships. In particular, the countries affected by these waves of rebellions were Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. While some of them were repressed by authorities, the revolts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya resulted in crises and civil wars that are still going on nowadays, after more than ten years. In particular, the Syrian civil war, in addition to being extremely destructive and cruel for the civilians, played a central role in the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis),

a terrorist group whose origins could be traced back to al-Qaida in Iraq (Gulmohamad, 2014). Thanks to its ability to propagate its ideas and to the use of social media, Isis was able to recruit thousands of fighters and, especially, of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters can be defined as people who travel to a country to join and fight in a conflict that does not involve their home countries. The phenomenon of foreign fighters has always been rather common throughout human history but, nowadays, it is mostly linked to asymmetric conflict, i.e. those types of conflicts where at least one part is not a state. The Syrian conflict is however said to be the war that saw the highest mobilisation of foreign fighters since the Second World War, as, according to the Global Terrorism Index report, released in 2019, almost 50,000 people joined the fighting. However, not all the people who fled to Syria joined Isis: this number takes into account also those who joined the YPG (People's Defence Units), the Kurdish units composing the Syrian Democratic Forces. There is nevertheless a main difference between these two categories of foreign fighters which lies in the reasons behind the choice of joining the conflict: religion in the case of Isis, politics in the case of YPG.

However, the focus of this thesis is on people who travelled to Syria to join ISIS. This is because, as said before, terrorism has been an important issue the Western countries have been dealing with in the last two (and more) decades and how it has been discursively constructed through the news has shaped our lives from many different points of view. Also, even though there have been a variety of studies on the way in which discourses on terrorism have been shaped after 9/11, foreign fighters represent a peculiar aspect of terrorism. Indeed, while most previous studies focused mostly on terrorist attacks, the present one examines social actors who are seen as potential terrorists and considered as people who might carry out terrorist attacks after having joined a conflict and/or after having been trained by terrorist organizations.

## 1.1. Aims of the study and research questions

As briefly outlined previously, the present study aims to examine how foreign fighters who joined Isis have been represented in the news in the decade between 2011 and 2021. In particular, the focus will be on news coming from English-speaking countries, namely Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.A. For each country, it has been decided to collect articles published in two newspapers: *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* for Australia, *The Guardian* and *The Times* for The U.K., and *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* for the U.S.A. Also, it has been decided to analyse ten years of articles, collecting them from March 2011, when there had been the uprising in Syria escalated into a conflict, until March 2021, marking the first tenth anniversary of the war.

By using a Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies approach, thus combining Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis, the present study aims at answering the following research questions:

- 1. How is the social actor of *foreign fighters* discursively constructed by the press in the given corpus? What types of discourses are mostly related to *foreign fighters* in the corpus?
- 2. What changes in the news discourse related to *foreign fighters* emerge from a diachronic study of the corpus?
- 3. Assuming gender is constructed discursively, how are female foreign fighters represented in the corpus?
- 4. By investigating the corpus from a cross-cultural perspective, how have foreign fighters been discursively shaped in the three different countries? Since they are all Western countries, are there more similarities or differences in their representation?

#### 1.2. Outline of the thesis

After this first introductory chapter, the second one will situate the study in its theoretical field. In particular, chapter two will focus on describing the theoretical foundation of Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies, starting with the origin of Discourse Studies themselves. Then, it will move to highlight the available literature about Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis. Also, it will focus on the description of the main features of news discourse and on how Discourse Studies have been used as a theoretical framework for the analysis of this specific type of discourse.

After having analysed the available literature, Chapter Three illustrates the background of the present study. It will describe the chronological events that characterized the Syrian conflict, starting with the Arab Springs, focusing also on the Islamic State. Moreover, chapter three will try to give a definition of terrorism and jihadism.

Chapter four will be dedicated to the description of the methodological framework used to analyse the corpus. It will start by describing both how the corpus has been collected and the final data composing the corpus itself. It then will focus on the description of the tools used to carry out the analysis and the methodologies that will be employed in the analysis carried out in chapters 5, 6, and 7. It will also briefly introduce the analytical chapters.

The analytical section of this work will start in chapter 5, which will focus on the diachronic study of the corpus. Thus, it will examine the discursive construction of foreign fighters in the news throughout the ten years under analysis. By analysing the corpus at a more quantitative and qualitative level, using a CADS approach, this chapter will investigate how the discursive representation of foreign fighters as a social actor has evolved. In particular, the analysis in this section will focus on the different discursive

representations that have been made of foreign fighters at first – when the Syrian conflict had just started and its effects on the rest of the world were not enough clear yet – and later on, when the power of the Islamic State was growing and it started to be understood that the number of foreign fighters joining the conflict was rather high.

Chapter 6 will instead investigate how female foreign fighters have been discursively represented in a sub-corpus, only composed of articles dealing with female foreign fighters. So, this chapter will analyse the corpus from a gender perspective, by triangulating Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies with Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis. Here, in particular, the analysis will be focusing on examining whether there are differences in the discursive construction of female and male foreign fighters and on the figure of *jihadi brides*, often used as a tool for delegitimizing women's roles in the action.

Chapter 7, will be the last analytical section and will be analysing the corpus from a cross-cultural perspective, thus comparing three different sub-corpora, one for each country under examination. Always using a CADS approach, this chapter will focus on analysing differences and similarities between the three sub-corpora, offering the chance to examine whether the discursive construction of foreign fighters as a social actor changed significantly from one country to the other.

So, the present thesis analyses the discursive representation of foreign fighters and how this specific social actor has been constructed in the news in three English-speaking countries, focusing on the decade between 2011 and 2021. Thus, this work represents a contribution to the available studies on the discursive representation of terrorism and terrorists in news discourse.

# 2. Literature Review

This second chapter is dedicated to the review of the available literature. In particular, the first section is dedicated to the description of the field of Discourse Studies and the definitions of Discourse available in Linguistics. After having dealt with the main branches of Discourse Studies, I will examine how and when the analysis of discourses started to become a field in Linguistics. Sciffically, this section will focus on Corpus Linguistics, Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, and the use which is being made of corpora to carry out a Discourse Analysis – particularly by examining the field of Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies.

Finally, in the last section, the focus will be on News Discourse and on the media representation of terrorism.

#### 2.1. Discourse Studies

Discourse started to become an academic research field in the 1960s, in France. Albeit it is almost impossible to say who their founder was or the school from where it originated, it can be claimed that Discourse Studies is a heterogeneous field of research and, as such, it came from different approaches to the study of Discourse. The starting point in the study of discourses is that language is not a mere tool that enables people to communicate and to talk about the concrete world, but it is rather something through which we construct the social world. This view finds its origin mainly in the structuralist and poststructuralist idea that our access to reality always happens through language. Consequently, changes in discourses often reflect changes in society. Deriving mainly from de Saussure's theories, structuralism is usually employed to explain meaning by using a set of grammar rules. de Saussure (1857-1913), argued that meaning is conceived by grammar and that language is a grammatical system that allows to use linguistic units correctly and to

produce meanings. According to de Saussure, "The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its environment" (de Saussure, 1959:116). Meaning is then believed to be produced by grammar and by how linguistic units are used and put together. de Saussure distinguished two different language levels: *langue*, which is believed to be the structure of language, and *parole*, the signs people use in specific situations. Therefore, a key role is played by the idea that no sign can be defined independently of other signs. Hence, de Saussure's theories are quite far from the concept of discourse as we mean it and as it was developed later, since, by conceiving meaning as produced by grammar and by the relations signs have with one another, it is rather impossible to find space for an analysis of meaning whose goal would be to exploit ideologies and power relations expressed through language use.

Structuralist theories became rather successful in Eastern Europe, especially in the field of narrative, in the period between the Russian Revolution and the Second World War, with philologists such as Propp (1895-1970) and Bakhtin (1895-1975). The latter elaborated the polyphonic or dialogic conception of language and culture and saw the novel as a multiplicity of social speech types and individual voices, artistically organized. Discourse, thus, is here not seen as the expression of a single point of view but as being rather dialogic. In Linguistics, De Saussure's theories were re-elaborated by Trubetzkoy (1890-1938), founder of the Prague linguistic circle (1926), who "distinguished between the study of actual speech sounds (phonetics) and the study of underlying systems of phonic differential features (phonology) linked with the differences of meaning in various languages" (Grishakova, 2018: 54). Also, Saussurean structuralism inspired the further Moscow-Tartu school's works on Semiotics.

Later, after the war, structuralism spread even in other parts of the world and, with Harris (1909-1992), we had the very first theorization of Discourse Analysis. According to

Harris, Discourse Analysis is "a method for the analysis of connected speech (or writing)" (Harris, 1952:1), a way of discovering how a text is saying something. So, it was a type of Discourse Analysis that did not focus on meaning but on single morphemes and on their connections within a given text. Indeed, for its being disconnected from meaning and context, this type of Discourse Analysis has been looked at with small interest by further studies on discourse that are more relevant to the present study.

Pragmatics, instead, refusing the idea that language is simply a set of rules to be followed, started focusing on the performative dimension of language. Starting from Wittgenstein's late philosophical theories, in which he claimed that every word has a meaning that is correlated with the word itself, and that the meaning of a word is the use language makes of it (Wittgentstein, 1963), several language theorists started to be interested in the way in which language is used to carry out specific actions. Particularly worth mentioning is Austin's speech act theory, further developed by Searle, affirming that specific utterances are used at specific times and in specific contexts to carry out a certain meaning (Austin, 1962). They were particularly interested in studying how we use utterances beyond their mere grammatical scope, as, for example, in "I declare you husband and wife". This is what Austin defined 'performative sentence', so a sentence that "indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something" (Austin, 1962: 6). Also, Austin focused on the importance of the context when examining the meaning of an utterance and on the necessity of using performative utterances in appropriate circumstances. Even though Austin and Searle's theories mostly focused on spoken discourse and on conversations, the way in which they investigated the meaning beyond the utterance itself and how the contexts and circumstances can change the meaning and the intentions of the person pronouncing them influenced further discourse studies.

Poststructuralism, then, originated from structuralist theories but made some fundamental changes. They agreed with the concept that what gives signs meaning is their relation to other signs and the way in which they interact, rather than their relation to reality. However, poststructuralist theories refused the structuralist idea that language is something fixed and unchangeable.

It was, however, with the French philosopher Michael Foucault, who is largely considered to be a poststructuralist and the forefather of Discourse Studies, that discourse started to be studied as a social practice, both producing and reproducing social relations of power. Foucault, in fact, analysed how discourses are organized within society, particularly focusing on who is included and who is excluded in the formation of discourse, underlying that "if discourse may have some power, nevertheless it is from us and us alone that it gets it" (Foucault, 1981:52). Foucault did not see power as being merely negative and repressive. On the contrary, he believed that what makes people largely obey power is its characteristic of being also productive. Indeed, he thought that

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs thorough the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.

(Foucault, 1980:119)

Also, Foucault criticized structuralism, as he was more interested in studying and analysing the relations of power in language, rather than the relations of meaning.

What Pragmatics and Foucauldian discourse theories - and, consequently, further discourse studies theories – have in common is that, as previously underlined, they both study discourse as a social practice, so as something that originates from the use that is being made of language in specific contexts (Angeruller, Maingueneau, Wodak, 2014).

Starting from Foucault's discourse theories, discourse began to be studied as something that reflects ideology through the use of language, developing in Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis.

Discourses can thus be defined as:

Ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the 'mental world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world. [...] Different discourses are different perspectives on the world, and they are associated with the different relations people have to the world, which in turns depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities, and the social relationships in which they stand to other people. Discourses do not only represent the world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions.

(Fairclough, 2003:123)

This definition of discourse given by Fairclough particularly recalls the Foucauldian theory of discourse as being active and able to represent imaginaries that are not yet available in our world. Thus, they can have a central role in the struggle against power relations and in the construction of a type of society that would be an alternative to the one that we live in.

## 2.2 The Analysis of Discourse

After having defined what discourse is, I will now focus on its analysis by exploring Corpus Linguistics (CL), Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS), Discourse Analysis (DA), and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

### 2.2.1. Corpus Linguistics

Even though there is no unique definition of what a corpus is, it can be defined as "a collection of texts or parts of texts upon which some general linguistic analysis can be conducted" (Meyer, 2002: xi). Also, a distinction needs to be made between two different

types of corpora. Although, nowadays, the analysis of corpora is mostly linked to the use of special computerized software, it existed even hundreds of years before the advent of computers. The type of corpora created before the computer era can be defined as 'pre-electronic corpora'; the type of corpora created after the computer era are instead called 'electronic' (Meyer, 2008).

Corpus Linguistics can be defined as "the study of language based on examples of 'real life' language use (McEnery and Wilson, 2001:1). It is also seen as "a set of studies into the form and/or function of language which incorporate the use of computerised corpora in their analysis" (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013:4).

CL cannot be defined as a branch of Linguistics, such as syntax or semantics, which are usually used to describe or explain something. CL is rather a methodology, an approach that can be used in almost any area of linguistics, without delimiting an area of linguistics itself (McEnery and Wilson, 2001).

Even before the advent of computers, several linguists used a corpus-based methodology to carry out their studies, as expressed by Boas (1940) in his study of American Natives' language, "while until about 1880 investigators confined themselves to the collection of vocabularies and brief grammatical notes, it has become more and more evident that large masses of texts are needed to elucidate the structure of languages", underlying a change in the approach used to analyse large corpora.

Between the end of the 19th century and the end of the 1950s, several studies saw the use of corpora to analyse child language acquisition, such as Prayer (1889), Stern (1924), and Ingram (1978); some of the corpora collected throughout that period are still used today. Even the field of foreign language pedagogy saw a huge use of corpora analysis in the first half of the 20th century, with scholars such as Traver (1940) and Bongers (1947). In the 40s there were also studies using corpora for comparing two or more languages.

However, it was with the advent of electronic corpora analysis that Corpus Linguistics took the shape of the approach we know today. It is what Leech (2000) called the 'corpus revolution', one that "has provided the means to conduct detailed quantitative and qualitative investigations of the formerly elusive nature of spoken language. For the first time, it has offered an opportunity to study broadly and in-depth the grammatical characteristics of spoken discourse" (Leech, 2000:676). It was particularly after the spread of Personal Computers in the 1980s that Corpus Linguistics started to be used widely as the powerful methodology it is today, i.e., "a way of using computers to assist the analysis of language so that regularities among many millions of words can be quickly and accurately identified" (Baker and McEnery, 2015: 1). The use of specific software thus helped researchers in processing vast corpora, by easily providing them with objective evidence, albeit the basic method remained unchanged (Sinclair, 1991). This big change in Corpus Linguistics has been well described by Sinclair (1991): "Thirty years ago when this research started it was considered impossible to process texts of several million words in length. Twenty years ago, it was considered marginally possible but lunatic. Ten years ago, it was considered quite possible but still lunatic. Today it is very popular." (Sinclair, 1991:1). In his work, in particular, he gives practical examples of how to analyse the main characteristics of a corpus, such as concordances and collocations, through the use of specialised software. Also, the advent of computers made it easier to collect and build corpora, using specific programs and software.

# 2.2.2. Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies

After the so-called 'corpus revolution', then, Corpus Linguistics started to be widely employed in many different linguistic fields. However, what I am interested in the most is how Corpus Linguistics has been used as a tool for Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis. This synergy between the two approaches gave birth to a field called

Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies, or CADS, which can be defined as "that set of studies into the form and /or function of language as a communicative discourse which incorporate the use of computerised corpora in their analysis" (Partington, Duguid, Taylor 2013:10).

Starting from evidence - as that deriving from a computerised analysis of the corpus - can help the researcher in identifying specific discursive characteristics that they could not notice by looking at the corpus themselves. In fact, discourses are not abstract entities, but they rather circulate through language use and are strictly embedded in everyday language use. So, in making us notice how a certain piece of language is constructed, corpora can also help us in identifying a recurring type of discourse. As Baker (2006) puts it: "By collecting numerous supporting examples of a discourse construction, we can start to see a cumulative effect". We can, thus, uncover the so-called "non-obvious meaning", i.e., meanings we could not have noticed in the first place (Partington Duguid, Taylor 2013). This may be particularly relevant when dealing with news discourse, as being implicit is one of its peculiar features. Indeed, the main aim of CADS is to discover the hidden meanings in discourses through the analysis of corpora. Therefore, as underlined by Partington et al.:

By combining the quantitative approach, that is, statistical overviews of large amounts of the discourse in question [...] with the more qualitative approach typical of discourse analysis, that is, the close, detailed analysis of particular stretches of discourse [...] it may be possible to better understand the processes that play in the discourse type.

(Partington et al., 2013:11)

Hence, CADS has become particularly popular as an approach in Critical Discourse Analysis, also because they somehow help in overcoming what is a main criticism that has been largely made to CDA and that sees it as an approach that is too much driven by the researcher's bias and prejudices.

#### 2.2.3. Discourse Analysis

Discourse Analysis can be defined as "the study of the language in use" (Gee, 2011:8). Discourse Analysis rose as an approach in Linguistics in the early 70s, when the linguistic study of Discourse started to be supported by other disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Indeed, as stated by Van Dijk,

Discourses do not only consist of (structures of) sound or graphics, and of abstract sentence forms (syntax) or complex structures of local or global meaning and schematic forms. They also may be described in terms of the social actions accomplished by language users when they communicate with each other in social situations and within society and culture at large.

(Van Dijk, 1997: 13-14)

Thus, Discourse Analysis was born to satisfy the need to study and analyse discourse as a social practice, i.e., as something that is not neutral, but that rather conveys meanings and is used to accomplish precise actions. Central to the analysis of discourse, thus, are the social and cultural relations that exist between the 'actors' involved in a particular Discourse. Therefore, the analysis of the context in which a certain Discourse is produced plays a crucial role in the analysis of the Discourse itself: context can be defined as "the structure of all properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or the reception of discourse. Context features not only influence discourse but also vice versa: discourse may typically also define or change such context characteristics" (Van Dijk, 1997: 19).

# 2.2.4. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is largely considered to be an evolution of Critical Linguistics, a discipline that originated in the 70s and whose forefathers are believed to

be Kress and Fowler. In their Language and Control (1979), they claim that "Linguistic variations reflect and [...] express the structured social differences which give rise to them. They express social meanings" (Fowler et al., 2019: I). They saw language as being 'part of a social process', thus not something neutral but something capable of affecting our relationships. Also, they underlined the important role played, in this framework, by the context in which language and discourses are used. People do not always use the same type of language, but they rather adapt it to the context they are in at a specific time and place. Moreover, people belonging to different social classes communicate differently from each other; the same can be easily said by people with different cultural backgrounds. Another important point they focused on was the relationship between language and ideology:

If linguistic meaning is inseparable from ideology, and both depend on social structure, then linguistic analysis ought to be a powerful tool for the study of ideological processes which mediate relationships of power and control. [...] The need is for a linguistics which is critical, which is aware of the assumptions on which is based and prepared to reflect critically about the underlying causes of the phenomena it studies, and the nature of the society whose language it is.

(Fowler et al., 2019:186)

What is particularly of interest here – which is, indeed, what basically laid the foundations for further studies on CDA – is the emphasis on the need for a critical type of Linguistics, capable of understanding and examining how power and ideology are embedded in language use. Yet, it is possible to define CDA as

[...] Being fundamentally interested in analysing the opaque as well as transparent structural relationship of dominance, discrimination, power and control when these are manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse).

(Wodak, 2004: 187)

CDA, then, just as Critical Linguistics, has a particular interest in the social and political role language plays in society. Thus, what makes CDA different from other linguistic approaches is its characteristic of being more focused on the socio-political aspects of language, rather than on language itself. As Wodak said, "the approach is problemoriented, rather than focused on specific linguistic items. Complex social problems are the items of research" (Wodak, 2004:188). This is, indeed, coherent with the fact that, as previously outlined, CDA sees language as a social practice, through which social differences are produced and reproduced, and, thus, it focuses on "the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of power" (van Dijk, 1993:249). Therefore, the adjective 'critical' is used here in order to connote a type of analysis that combines the examination of texts – from a linguistic point of view – with that of the relations embedded in and surrounding those texts. As Fairclough points out, then,

By 'critical' discourse analysis, I mean discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor of securing power and hegemony.

(Fairclough, 2010:93)

Another important characteristic of CDA is its being an interdisciplinary approach. This mainly led to the fact that different scholars applied their different academic backgrounds and specializations to the field, giving birth to different trends. The first trend that originated is the socio-semiotic one, which developed from Halliday's theories on the social semiotic aspect of language and his systemic functional grammar. Halliday, indeed, believed that

A social reality (or a 'culture') is itself an edifice of meanings – a semiotic construct. In this perspective, language is one of the semiotic systems that constitute a culture; one that is distinctive

in that it also serves as an encoding system for many (though not all) of the others. This summary term is what is intended by the formulation 'language as social semiotic'. It means interpreting language within a sociocultural context, in which the culture itself is interpreted in semiotic terms – as an information system, if that terminology is preferred.

(Halliday, 1978:2)

Halliday (2004) made a distinction between three different linguistic metafunctions: (i) textual metafunction, which can be identified with the 'information flow patterns' (Halliday, 2004: 588-589) in texts; (ii) the interpersonal metafunction, which has to do with changes in texts according to the existing relationships between the participants involved in the exchange; (iii) ideational metafunction, through which experiences are narrated within texts. Scholars such as Kress and van Leeuwen were highly influenced by Hallidayan school of thought. Kress studied the sign and its relations with meaning, saying that they are "always motivated by the producer's 'interests'" (Kress, 1993: 173), thus highlighting that it is the producer the one that selects the signs according to the meaning they want to convey. Hence, "the relation of signifier to signified, in all human semiotic systems, is always motivated, and is never arbitrary" (Kress, 1993: 173). He stressed particularly on the idea that CDA is highly affected by this, as "all texts equally code the ideological positions of their producers. The everyday, innocent and innocuous, the mundane text is as ideologically saturated as a text which wears its ideological constitution overtly" (Kress, 1993: 174). van Leeuwen (1993) also focused on this aspect of texts and discourses, for example by examining a corpus of texts dealing with the social practice of 'going to school for the first time': indeed, even though this type of exchange seems to be rather innocuous, they are however led by some type of power relations (such as that of school and teachers over parents and children). According to van Leeuwen, CDA should focus on "the way in which linguistic analysis can bring to light, for instance,

inequalities between addressers and addressees, or systematic omissions and distortions in representations" (van Leeuwen, 1993:194). Kress and van Leeuwen, together, also focused on the discursive and grammar aspects of images (1996 and 2006), theorizing ways in which pictures could be analysed to uncover the embedded relations of power between the involved social actors. They highlighted that

Critical Discourse Analysis seeks to show how language is used to convey power and status in contemporary social interaction, and how the apparently neutral, purely informative (linguistic) text which emerges in newspaper reporting, government publications, social science reports, and so on, realize articulate and disseminate 'discourses' as ideological positions just as much as do texts which more explicitly editorialize or propagandize. To do so we need to be able to 'read between the lines', in order to get a sense of what discursive/ideological position, what 'interest', may have given rise to a particular text, and maybe to glimpse at least the possibility of an alternative view. It is this kind of reading for which critical discourse analysis seeks to provide the ways and means. So far, however, critical discourse analysis has mostly been confined to language, realized as verbal texts, or to verbal parts of texts which also use other semiotic modes to realize meaning.

(Kress, Van Leeuwen, 2006: 14)

Thus, they were interested in studying the many different ways in which discursive practices take place.

Another important trend that developed in CDA studies is the poststructuralist one, which mainly originated from the Foucauldian 'order of discourses' (see above). In 1985, Laclau and Mouffe published *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, which became fundamental for the emerging poststructuralist CDA studies. They reviewed the concept of hegemony, its theorization in Western philosophy, and its importance in modern capitalist societies. Also, they highlighted the role of discourse in the attempt to challenge the hegemony and asymmetry in our social world. Indeed, they pointed out that

A discursive structure is not a merely 'cognitive' or 'contemplative' entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations. We can thus talk of a growing complexity

and fragmentation of advanced industrial societies – not in the sense that [...] they are more complex than earlier societies; but in the sense that they are constituted around a fundamental asymmetry. This is the asymmetry existing between a growing proliferation of differences – a surplus of meaning of 'the social' – and the difficulties encountered by any discourse attempting to fix those differences as moments of a stable articulatory structure.

(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001:96)

Thus, discourse practices are not only seen as a way of constructing and maintaining hegemony, but also as a possible tool to challenge the existing differences between those detaining power and those who belong to the lower layers of society.

Fairclough is one of the main representatives of this poststructuralist development in Critical Discourse Studies. However, albeit his work has largely been influenced by Foucauldian theories on discourse and Discourse Analysis, some differences need to be underlined: first, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis was rather abstract, thus in contrast with the more textually-oriented CDA theorized by Fairclough; secondly, Foucault's focus was on a rather specific type of discourse – that of human sciences – while Fairclough underlines the field interest for many different types of discourses; finally, Foucault saw Discourse Analysis as the analysis of statements and verbal performances within human sciences discourse, whereas Fairclough's focus is on the analysis of texts and interactions (Fairclough, 1992). However, as highlighted by Fairclough himself in his works, there are parts of the Foucauldian discourse theories that need to be included in further Critical Discourse Studies:

First is a constitutive view of discourse, which involves seeing discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various dimensions [...]. The second is an emphasis on the interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or institution: texts always draw upon and transform other contemporary and historically prior texts, [...] and any given type of discourse practice is generated out of combinations of others, and is defined by its relationship to others.

(Fairclough, 1992: 39,40)

Moreover, the poststructuralist approach to discourse studies developed its theories following other Foucauldian considerations on discourse, such as 'the discursive nature of power', 'the political nature of discourse', and the 'discursive nature of social change', as a change in discursive practices often give rise to social changes. Fairclough theorized the sociocultural approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, combining the analysis of text with the social context. His approach to CDA has, indeed, three different dimensions: the text, the discourse practice, and the sociocultural practice. Fairclough's sociocultural approach will be dealt with more deeply in section 4.4.1., as it will be used as a method for the analysis of the recurrent discursive patterns identified during the CADS analysis. Another approach that developed in the Critical Discourse Studies field is the Sociocognitive approach, whose main exponent is van Dijk. His main research interest is in the production and reproduction of racism in discourse, with a particular focus on media discourse. As claimed by van Dijk himself - just as Critical Discourse Analysis - "Socio-Cognitive Discourse Studies is a multidisciplinary type of CDA relating discourse structures with social structures through a cognitive interface" (van Dijk, 2018: 28). The last trend in Critical Discourse Studies that will be mentioned here is the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), which started to develop between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, thanks to a group of researchers working in Vienna at the time. Its main representative is Wodak, whose pioneering work was an analysis of the construction of anti-Semitic discourses that emerged in the Austrian 1986 presidential campaign of the politician Kurt Waldheim. In the last 30 years, the DHA has probably become the prominent type of analysis in Critical Discourse Studies. As Wodak explained, the DHA "provides a vehicle for looking at latent power dynamics and the range of potential in agents, because it integrates and triangulates knowledge about historical, intertextual sources and the background of the social and political fields within

which discursive events are embedded" (Wodak, 2018: 8). Hence, the main goal of this type of approach is to incorporate into Discourse Analysis all the available background information, in order to analyse and show how the context may influence discourse production.

Since Critical Discourse Analysis is, by definition, a multidisciplinary approach, in this thesis, all of the trends described above will be considered when I will be dealing with the proper analysis of the corpus.

### 2.2.4.1. Ideology and Power in Critical Discourse Analysis

As emerges from the previous paragraphs of this work, ideology and power are key concepts in Critical Discourse Studies.

Ideologies can be defined as "general systems of basic ideas shared by the members of a social group, ideas that will influence their interpretation of social events and situations and control their discourse and other social practices as group members" (van Dijk, 2011: 380). Ideologies – as anything else in the world – are expressed through language use, hence, analysing language can be extremely useful in the analysis of any type of ideology. In Fairclough's view, ideology is what "directly or indirectly legitimizes existing power relations" (Fairclough, 1989: 33). In particular, – since discourse is seen as a social practice and, thus, cannot be analysed without keeping an eye on the societal context in which discourses are produced – he focuses on the existing power relationship between different classes in today's capitalist society. Yet, a capitalist society is based on the production and – then – sale of products on the market: as a result, "the class relationship on which this form of production depends is between a (capitalist) class which owns the means of production, and a (working) class who are obliged to sell their power to work to the capitalists, in exchange for wage, in order to live" (Fairclough, 1989:32). However,

this power relation between the two classes is only made possible by state control and ideologies:

In capitalist society, a whole range of social institutions such as education, the law, religions, the media, and indeed the family, collectively and cumulatively ensure the continuing dominance of the capitalist class. [...] Institutional practices which people draw upon without thinking often embody assumptions which directly legitimize existing power relations. Ideological power, the power to project one's practices as universal and 'common sense', is a significant complement to economic and political power, and of a particular significance here because it is exercised in discourse. There are in gross terms two ways in which those who have power can exercise it and keep it: through coercing others to go along with them, with the ultimate sanctions of physical violence or death; or through winning others' consent to [...] their possession and exercise of power. In short, through coercion and consent. [...] Because it is the favoured vehicle of ideology, discourse is of considerable social significance in this connection.

(Fairclough, 1989: 33)

Thus, again, discourse, ideology and power are three strongly connected concepts: discourse is seen as the main way in which ideologies spread, helping those in power to keep exercising it over lower classes. However, it is important to underline that any social group – be they linked by social, political, or economic ties – can develop their ideology. As a consequence, not all ideologies are used in order to maintain certain relations of power: some of them have, on the contrary, the specific goal of resisting, challenging and trying to overcome those power relations. Class struggle, which is fundamental in capitalist society, is hence also expressed through language: "language is both a site of and a stake in class struggle, and those who exercise power through language must constantly be involved in struggle with others to defend (or lose) their position (Fairclough, 1989: 35). Therefore, since CDA is also seen as a mean to struggle and develop discourses that can help antagonizing existing dominance of

some social groups over others, this is an important feature of ideologies that needs to be kept in mind when analysing discourses.

Another important aspect regarding ideologies is that there are certain types of texts where they are expressed rather explicitly, as – for instance – in party programs; however, most of the time, they are embedded in texts and discourses more subtly, especially in those types of texts where the expression of ideologies is considered to be inappropriate and the author is usually required to be as neutral as possible. In these cases, "an analysis of the context may be necessary to show that the use of specific expressions (e.g., code words) in specific situations should be interpreted as ideological" (van Dijk, 2011: 393).

Thus, in Critical Discourse Studies, when referring to power, we focus on social power in terms of control of a social group over other groups. According to van Dijk, the study of the way control is carried out through discourse is fundamental because "control does not only apply to discourse as social practice, but also to the minds of those who are being controlled" (van Dijk, 2008:9). As a consequence, controlling discourses and minds means to also control actions of those who are not in power, making it fundamental for those in power to have control on discourses. In this framework, it becomes particularly important "to examine in detail the ways access to discourse is being regulated by those in power" (van Dijk, 2008: 10), thus making it fundamental to focus on mass media discourse and the role they play in minds control and discursive reproduction of power relations – as underlined by van Dijk (2008).

## 2.2.4.2. Criticism to Critical Discourse Analysis

CDA has been largely criticized. Hammersley (1997), in particular, criticizes it from a philosophical point of view, by claiming that the main philosophical positions on which CDA should stand seem not to be convincing. In particular, he criticizes the use that is made of the adjective 'critical' and what CDA analysts mean by it, by saying that "the

term 'critical' seems to function as an umbrella for any approach that wishes to portray itself as politically radical without being exclusive in its commitments" (Hammersley, 1997: 244). However, as largely described in the previous paragraphs, CDA is a rather heterogeneous methodology, which has also different philosophical and theoretical origins, according to each different approach that has developed throughout the years. Moreover, a way for the researcher to avoid this critique may be to explain the epistemological framework of their work.

Another aspect of CDA that has been criticized widely is its political stance and the fact that it cannot be totally unprejudiced, nor biased. Widdowson is one of the scholars who mostly criticized CDA on this point, as he argues that "if critical discourse analysis is an exercise in interpretation, it is invalid as analysis" (Widdowson, 1995:159). He also insists on the concept that CDA is deeply biased, by claiming that it

aims at explaining not how social inequalities are reflected or created in language itself, as social semiotic, but in the *use* of language as social action. You cannot explain how people express their ideology by assuming in advance that ideology is already fixed in the language.

(Widdowson, 1995:168)

However, Fairclough (1996) replies to these claims, accusing Widdowson of misinterpreting CDA. He challenges Widdowson's statements first of all by pointing out that CDA is nothing but a precise 'analytical procedure', which can be applied to different data. Also, he is in contrast with Widdowson's view of CDA analyst's political stance, as he points out that

Practitioners of CDA are indeed generally characterised by explicit political commitments. They are people who see things wrong with their societies, see language as involved in what is wrong, and are committed to making changes through forms of intervention involving language [...]. Having said that, CDA is emphatically not a political party, and the particular nature of political commitments and strategies of intervention differ widely [...]. CDA has developed in a particular

location within a particular political situation – out of a tendency on the political left and within the new social movements (feminism, ecology, etc.) towards cultural and ideological forms of political struggle from the 1960s onwards. CDA has correspondingly been attracted to theories of power and ideology, and to analysis of for instance media, institutional interactions, and language and gender or ethnicity.

(Fairclough, 1996:52)

Thus, Fairclough in a certain way confirms Widdowson's critique, by explaining that CDA itself generated from a specific socio-political situation and with the even more specific aim of challenging the power relations existing in capitalist society. In his view, being a CDA analyst, inevitably means taking a stand against social injustice, as it means trying to overcome them by analysing how they are expressed in and perpetrated through language use. The inevitable political aspect of CDA has also been underlined by Van Dijk (1993), who claims that "CDA analysts should take an explicit political stance" (Van Dijk, 1993: 252). He points out that their work cannot be unpolitical, as:

Their critical targets are the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice. That is, one of the criteria of their work is solidarity with those who need it the most. [...] Their critique of discourse implies a political critique of those responsible for its perversion in the reproduction of dominance and inequality. Such a critique should not be ad hoc, individual or incidental, but general, structural and focused on groups, while involving power relations between groups.

(van Dijk, 1993: 252, 253)

Also, he pointed out that Critical Discourse Studies cannot be described as being less scientific nor biased a priori, because CDA scholars follow specific methodologies and theories (van Dijk, 2008). Hence, Critical Discourse Studies aim to study language structures – such as grammatical and syntactical structures – and to examine how those structures can contribute to the reproduction of unbalanced power relations in society

(van Dijk, 2008). On the other hand, he also makes a distinction between the role played by politicians and activists and that played by CDA analysts, as the latter has as an aim to give a specific contribution and to (possibly) demonstrate the role of discourse in the (re)production of power relations.

As outlined above in this work, however, a possible way of avoiding the critique of an impartial analysis is to use a CADS approach, thus combining a more quantitative study of the corpus with CDA.

#### 2.3. News Discourse

As said before, discourses are a rather heterogeneous phenomenon and there is a plurality of discourses, differing from each other depending on their purposes, kind of language, social actors involved, and so on. This thesis, however, focuses on written news discourse, so the type of discourse you can find in newspapers. As any other kind of discourse, news discourse has its own characteristics. First of all, it is a written type of discourse and, indeed, this work will mainly deal with the analysis of written texts. Moreover, in newspapers, the public is usually not addressed directly but rather indirectly and implicitly: it is indeed quite uncommon to read a newspaper article in which the journalist writes to someone directly - except for the type of columns where the journalist replies to readers' letters. Also, the journalist is seen as having a certain authority, for he is someone 'who knows', who has the authority to write about something (Fairclough, 1995). Furthermore, news discourse is a type of 'public discourse' as it can potentially reach billions of people. In fact, albeit, often, the public of a newspaper consists of people having a given political orientation, a newspaper usually addresses a large public. So, news discourse cannot be seen as an interpersonal social practice involving a few people at most and that is why, in it, a certain amount of information remains implicit and is taken for granted by the writer. Thus, the reader of newspapers must have a certain 'knowledge of the world' to fully understand what is being written. In fact, as underlined by Van Dijk,

This applies to any type of mass-mediated discourse. Socially and cognitively, this means that a considerable amount of generally shared knowledge, beliefs, norms and values must be presupposed. Without such taken-for-granted information, the news would not be intelligible. More specific is the tacit presupposition of a vast political database, which the news regularly intends to update. News style must bear the marks of these shared presuppositions.

(Van Dijk, 1988b: 74 - 75)

Another characteristic of news discourse is that it mainly involves formal language. However, the kind of language register used in the news depends on the type of article, i.e., sports news and political news will not be written using the same lexicon. Nonetheless, the language implied in the news is usually rather formal and the syntactic choices are quite complex. When analysing the characteristics of the language used in news discourse, Van Dijk focuses on the rhetorical choices implied to persuade the public:

At the cognitive-semantic level, we want people to understand what we say about some event or situation. That is, we want to get a message across. [...] This means that the reader or listener is expected to build a textual representation and a situation model as intended by the speaker/writer. [...] In terms of rhetoric or of the study of speech communication, this means that we are involved in a process of persuasion.

(Van Dijk, 1988b: 82)

Also, he re-elaborates Tuchman's theories (1972) on the persuasive strategies used in news discourse:

- (A) Emphasize the factual nature of events, e.g., by
- 1. Direct descriptions of ongoing events.
- 2. Using evidence from close eyewitnesses.

3. Using evidence from other reliable sources (authorities, respectable people, professionals).

4. Signals that indicate precision and exactness such as numbers for persons, time, events, etc.

5. Using direct quotes from sources, especially when opinions are involved.

(B) Build a strong relational stricture for facts, e.g., by:

1. Mentioning previous events as conditions or causes and describing or predicting next events as

possible or real consequences.

2. Inserting facts into well-known situation models that make them relatively familiar even when

they are new,

3. Using well-known scripts and concepts that belong to that script.

4. Trying to further organize facts in well-known specific structures, e.g. narratives.

(C) Provide information that also has an attitudinal and emotional

dimensions:

1. Facts are better represented and memorized if they involve or arouse strong emotions (if too strong

emotions are involved, however, there may be disregard, suppression and hence disbelief of the

facts).

2. The truthfulness of events is enhanced when opinions of different backgrounds or ideologies are

quoted about such events, but in general those who are ideologically close will be given primary

attention as possible sources of opinions.

(Van Dijk, 1988b: 84,85)

Thus, news probably represents the most persuasive type of discourse. People are exposed

to news every moment of their lives, particularly nowadays, with newspapers publishing

also on social media, to reach as many people as possible. Moreover, people read the news

in order to keep updated with what happens around them and to elaborate an opinion

about it, assuming the social and educational role of media. However, what finally reaches

the public is not the event itself, but a mediated version of what happened: "news is the

44

report or recontextualization of an event. The treatment of any topic will always depend on who is chosen to comment and whose opinions and definitions are sought. Journalists follow a series of criteria to determine what is newsworthy" (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003:273). So, the final result depends on the choices made by who writes the article and who publishes it.

The thinker whose work has been fundamental for further news discourse and news Discourse Analysis studies is Gramsci, who focused on the hegemonic and ideological aspects of journalism. In particular, he believed that the conquest of the political power in a society is obtained especially through the construction of certain images and interpretations of the social sphere, conveyed by the media. In fact, in this framework, the role of the intellectuals is that of creating hegemony by securing the consent of the masses, on which the hegemony itself – as political leadership – is based (Bates, 1975). CDA has been one of the academic fields that has produced the highest number of materials about media in the 80s and the 90s (Bell and Garrett, 1998). If we bear in mind the aims of CDA, this actually is not surprising:

CDA has an explicit socio-political agenda, a concern to discover and bear witness to unequal relations of power which underlie ways of talking in a society, and in particular to reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging sociopolitical dominance. The media are a particular subject of CDA analysis because of their manifestly pivotal role as discourse-bearing institutions.

(Bell and Garrett, 1998:6)

As pointed out by van Dijk – and as previously outlined here – having the power to control discourses may mean having the power to control minds and – thus – actions. This is the main reason why the study of media discourse is so relevant to CDA.

Finally, what needs to be kept in mind when dealing with news discourse is that, in our capitalist society, news themselves represent a market and, as such, the main goal of the

editors is to sell them. "This profit orientation does not merely structure but also constrains news production, in ways which are both reflexive and supportive of the wider class-based division of capitalist societies" (Richardson, 2004:35). Thus, what is being told in the news and the way it is represented is market-oriented. It means that deciding what is more newsworthy and how news is told may increase or decrease a newspaper's income. On the other hand, newsworthiness may itself influence the public opinion's perception of what is worth paying attention to and what is not. It also means deciding whether a voice is economically worthy to be represented.

#### 2.3.1. News discourse and terrorism

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Islamic terrorism started to have more and more media coverage in the Western world. As a consequence, terrorism and its representation in the news started to be largely studied by CDA scholars. Indeed, how terrorism is covered in news discourse may influence public opinion's perception of other matters, such as immigration, or whether being or not in favour of Middle Eastern wars (the socalled 'wars on terrorism'). As underlined by Töngür and Kara, "The press has the potential to misguide the society, affect the fight against terrorism in negative ways, unintentionally support terrorism by supporting racism, and develop wrong perceptions among the general public as a result of how it handles the terrorism issue" (Töngür & Kara, 2016: 1629). For example, it has been demonstrated that G.W. Bush's re-election as President of the United States in 2004 has been largely influenced by the belief that Al-Qaeda – the terrorist group that carried out the 9/11 attacks – had been helped by Iraq, that, also, owned mass-destruction weapons (Castells, 2013). Even though it can be defined variously, "terrorism is seen as a threat to the very nature of our societies" (Baker-Beall, 2016:3): this means that news discourse insisting on fear and on the threat of what is perceived as 'different' can lead to a sense of apprehension amongst public opinion,

which can easily be exploited by political leaders and people in power. As Altheide (2006) underlines,

the extensive use of fear to highlight crime news has produced a discourse of fear, which may be defined as the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment or the physical and symbolic environment as people define and experience it in everyday life.

(Altheide, 2006: 114)

After 9/11, it thus became crucial how media represented not only terrorism and terrorists but also (and especially) Muslims and Islam in general. This has actually become one of the main focus in Discourse Studies related to media and terrorism, as there was the perception that feelings such as Islamophobia and racism towards Muslims were rising in the Western world. In this regard, was crucial the discursive construction and representation of 'otherness'. Van Dijk (1998) has theorized the ideological representation of others in discourse, by formulating the 'ideological square', consisting of four main moves:

- 1 Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us.
- 2 Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them.
- 3 Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them.
- 4 Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us

(Van Dijk, 1998:267)


These four moves imply that the representation of other and otherness has not only to do with the representation of one or more people but rather with the representation of different social groups. Of course, what often happens when dealing with terrorism news, is that we see a contraposition between the 'good', 'free', and 'democratic' West, and the 'bad' and 'undemocratic' Middle Eastern countries. Indeed, the so-called 'war on terror'

has sometimes been referred to also as the 'clash of civilizations', with the 'civilized' West on one side and the 'uncivilized' East on the other. Moreover, studies regarding the representation of Muslims before and after 9/11 found that what happened had changed it massively. In particular, what emerged was that there was not only a contraposition between the West and the East, but also a contraposition between Muslims themselves. In particular, there started to be a difference in referring to 'good' Muslims – being those who were more 'integrated' in our society and did not seem to represent a threat to our democracy – and 'bad' Muslims – referring to those who were seen to be 'active' in their communities in ways that could be seen as threatening the democratic order of the West (Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011).

#### 2.4. Conclusion

Terrorism and its representation in the news have been widely studied even from a discursive point of view. On the one hand, we have media discourse, which has always represented quite an attractive type of discourse for discourse studies themselves, for its being extremely persuasive, implicit, and reachable by billions of people. On the other hand, we have a theme such as terrorism, which has affected our society in many ways, especially after 9/11.

However, whilst there have been several discourse studies focusing on media and terrorism, they have usually been examining the representation of terrorist attacks and the representation of Muslims and Islam. The main purpose of the present dissertation is thus to fill the existing gap in studies about media discourse and terrorism, focusing on the discursive representation of Foreign Fighters, a phenomenon which has been quite discussed in the last years, especially in the aftermath of Isis' attacks in Europe. Moreover, by studying it keeping a diachronic perspective, this work is likely to offer a wide



# 3. Background and context of the present study

Since the aim of the present study is that of analysing the media representation of Foreign Fighters, this chapter will focus on the description of the topic. In particular, it will describe what happened during the Arab Spring and how the Syrian civil war started and

evolved until today, including a section on the Islamic State. Finally, this part of the thesis will define the phenomenon of FF. Before starting the proper chapter, a premise needs to be made: what Syria is facing today (and has been facing for the last 12 years) is the result of several episodes, wars, and events that characterised its history for the last one hundred years. Indeed, the current situation in Syria finds its origins during the negotiations that followed the I World War, between the winning forces – France and Great Britain – and the founders of what would have become the Turkish Republic soon after (Trombetta, 2014). However, the purpose of this thesis is not to focus on Syrian history, nor on the Syrian civil war itself, and that is why, in this chapter, I will only try to outline what facts led to Arab Springs first and to a civil war then, in order to better describe the foreign fighters phenomenon and to understand what makes it relevant and worth being studied also from a discursive point of view.

# 3.1. Arab Springs and Syrian Civil War

In 1970, following a period of wars and tensions with Israel, Hafez al-Asad carried out the "Corrective Coup", after which he managed to hold power for thirty years, introducing changes in Syrian politics, society, and economy (Rabinovich & Valensi, 2021).

After his death, Hafez al-Asad was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Asad, who, at first, seemed to be willing to modernize Syria. However, in 2010, after ten years of Bashar's regime,

the net effect of Bashar's choices was to create a new, coherent governing elite with a stake in the regime's survival and prosperity – but that elite rested on a very narrow base of support. Bashar was aware of his inherent weakness and employed several strategies to expand his basis of support. He gave civil society more space and invested a particular effort to deal with the growing influence of Salafi Islam over large segments of the population. The regime fought public manifestations of Islamism, forbidding, for example, schoolteachers to cover themselves with the niqab; but he also

cultivated Sufi orders and other groups that advocated personal piety. In the end, however, as the events of 2011 were to show, these measures were no avail.

(Rabinovich, Valensi, 2021: 39,40)

In 2010 and 2011, a wave of protests and uprisings spread in the Middle East and North Africa, challenging authoritarian regimes in favour of the establishment of democracies. In particular, this began in Tunisia and Egypt, where the regimes were overthrown rather quickly, thus inspiring other countries to do the same. However, the uprisings were not successful everywhere: in some countries, such as Syria and Yemen, they led to unprecedented civil conflicts.

At first, Syria seemed to be the only Middle Eastern country in which those demonstrations had not spread. In fact, both Bashar al-Asad and his wife appeared in Western newspapers, claiming the stability of their country. However,

recent developments in the country – demographic explosion, drought, the water crisis, impoverishment of the lower and middle classes by the transition to a neo-liberal economy of sorts – had created a large population of disenchanted Syrians, particularly in the countryside and on the fringes of its major cities. The events of the Arab Spring provided a pretext for public expression of this discontent.

(Rabinovich, Valensi, 2021:42)

In March 2011, in the city of Darʻā, a group of young boys were arrested, on charges of having written anti-regime graffiti on the walls of a school. Any request coming from their family to have them released was ignored and, when two of them had finally been released, they said that they had been tortured and that their companion had been tortured and killed. Thus, this was the drop that broke the camel's back, and, on the 18<sup>th</sup> of March, a massive demonstration was organized in Darʻā, followed by other demonstrations in other towns of the Houran region, spreading also to cities in the North-East of the country. Even though these demonstrations were peaceful, they were repressed with the use of

violence by the Syrian regime, that on one hand arrested, tortured and murdered activists, while, on the other, tried to appease Syrian citizens with a series of symbolic and limited reforms. However, in that moment, Syria's situation was slightly different from what was happening in Egypt and Tunisia, where major events were breaking what had been the order of things until that moment: the two largest Syrian cities – Damascus and Aleppo – had been untouched by demonstrations, that only started to spread there at the end of March. Two weeks after the first protests, Asad delivered the first of three speeches addressed to the demonstrations, saying that protests in Syria were not genuine, but rather controlled by its worldwide enemies: the US, Israel, and other Arab states. In June, he gave his third and last speech, during which he claimed to be defending Syria against Jihadi Islam. Even so, he decided to release several hundreds of Jihadi prisoners. At that point, what had started as a series of spontaneous protests, began to be coordinated under the Local Coordination Committees, a network that used social media in order to spread their political views and to organize the demonstrations. Moreover, there were also two other groups that helped in coordinating the uprisings, one made up of civil society people, while the other one composed by Syrian regime critics who lived abroad. During the period between July 2011 - when the Free Syrian Army was formed, as the main opposition army - and December 2012, the peaceful uprising escalated into a civil war between the Syrian government, supported by Iran, Russia and Hezbollah, and the rebel groups, helped by the US, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

To some extent, Russia's position was affected by the developments in Libya, where the United States exploited Security Council resolutions in order to legitimize its military intervention against Qaddafi's regime. Iran and Hezbollah, alarmed by the threat to the Asad regime, began their military intervention in Syria in 2012.

(Rabinovich, Valensi, 2021:53)

In July 2012, the United Nations – following a consistent number of victories gained by the opposition front – decided to declare the Syrian conflict to be formally a civil war. After several failed attempts to conciliate the parties – made by the international community and the Arab League –the civil war grew dramatically, especially in the years 2013 and 2014. It is estimated that, at the end of 2013, the number of refugees created by the conflict reached 2.3 million, while the deaths were estimated to be close to one hundred thousand (Rabinovich & Valensi, 2021).

It was during 2013 that started to emerge that, amongst the Free Syrian Army, there also were terrorist organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusrah; somehow, the presence of members of Jihadi groups overshadowed the main reason why the war broke at first – an opposition trying to overcome a regime – and threatened the rest of the world, which saw a growing danger of terrorist attacks. Jabhat al-Nusrah appeared In Syria for the first time in 2011, when the leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq and of al-Qaeda, right after the start of the Syrian civil war, appointed Abu Muhammed al-Julani to establish a new Jihadi group in Syria. On January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2012, Jabhat al-Nusrah announced its formation, and, during the following year, it managed to take control of the Syrian Air Force base Taftanaz in Idlib, the city of al-Thawrah – near al-Raqqah – and of al-Tabaqah Dam, the largest dam in Syria. In 2013 they took the city of al-Raqqah and carried out several successful military operations in Damascus (Rabinovich & Valensi, 2021).

After this first period of activity, Jabhat al-Nusrah broke its agreement with the IS' leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. In this phase, indeed, the Islamic State's actions were not directed against the Syrian regime, but rather against other Jihadi groups in Syria – such as Jabhat al-Nusrah – in order to take control over those Syrian territories bordering with Iraq. The Islamic State's first military operation was carried out in September 2013, when they managed to take the city of A'zaz. After that, they fought against Jabhat al-Nusrah

and conquered the cities of al-Raqqah and Palmyra. In Iraq, their major conquest was the city of Mosul. Also, their control of several territories on the Syrian-Iraqi border led them to announce the formation of a Caliphate, under the name Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL; also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS) whose capital would have been al-Raqqa.

During Spring 2013, the battle of al-Qusayr – a town located on the road connecting Damascus to the coast – marked the active entry of Hezbollah – whose participation, until that moment, had only been partial – into the Syrian civil war.

After hundreds were killed on August 21<sup>st</sup>, 2013, by suspected chemical weapons attacks in the area surrounding Damascus, U.S., British and French leaders claimed that they were reflecting on the possibility of a proper military intervention. Russia, Iran, and China spoke out against a military intervention. The Syrian opposition accused al-Assad's regime forces of being responsible for the chemical attacks, while governmental forces rejected the accusations and blamed the rebels for the attacks. Since the military intervention was internally opposed in the U.S. and the U.K., an agreement between Russia, Syria and the United States has been made, in order to place all Syria's chemical weapons under international control. By the end of June 2014, all of Syria's chemical weapons were removed.

Meanwhile, Syrian Kurdish forces that, until that moment, had not taken part in the civil war, joined the fight due to the military pressure of Jihadi groups, under the leadership of YPG (People's Protection Units), the military arm of the PYD (Democratic Union Party). In January 2014, an International Conference was held in Geneva, with the purpose of negotiating the end of the conflict. However, the conference did not make any progress and was suspended only one month later. In Autumn 2014, the U.S. reinforced their air campaign, targeting ISIL sites in Iraq and Syria.

At this point, the Syrian civil war had become a total regional and international crisis. In September 2015, Russia began its military intervention in Syria and carried out its first air strikes and, in March 2016, Syrian troops, backed by Russia and Hezbollah, managed to retake the city of Palmyra, that previously had been conquered by ISIL. In December 2016, the Syrian government declared its victory in Aleppo, after defeating the rebel groups. After Trump's election, the U.S. policy in Syria changed. In April 2017, the U.S. struck an air force base controlled by the Syrian government, responding to a chemical weapons attack carried out by government forces. In October 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces declared that the city of Al-Raggah had been freed from ISIL, following an attack that had begun at the beginning of Summer. In Spring 2018, U.S., British and French forces carried out air strikes targeting chemical weapons facilities near the cities of Damascus and Homs. During the Spring and Summer of 2019, the Syrian government assaulted Idlib, helped by Russia, but the rebels managed to resist. In October 2019, following a sudden statement released by U.S. President Trump, announcing the retirement of their troupes from the Kurdish region of northeast Syria, Turkey started launching an offensive towards the territories controlled by Kurdish forces. In December 2019, Syrian government forces launched another offensive in Idlib, gaining back the control over the city in March 2020.

## 3.2. Terrorism

Before moving to the definition of Foreign Fighters, it is essential – for the purpose of the present study – to define a few key concepts, such as that of 'terrorism'. To give a unique definition of terrorism has always been rather difficult. Even in international humanitarian law, it is almost impossible to find a common and clear definition of terrorism, as it may have many different connotations, such as political, religious, and so forth. The Oxford

Dictionary defines terrorism as "the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act". However, this definition finds its origins back in the 18th century, at the time of the French Revolution, when the ruling Jacobites used to terrorize those who were believed to be enemies of the regime (Herrington, 2022). Also, as underlined by Herrington (2022), acts of terrorism are usually attributed only to non-state actors, with States that often tend to favour the side which is more congenial to their ideological views. As a result, "political actors frame some groups as freedom fighters while simultaneously delegitimising competitors by applying the terrorist label" (Herrington, 2022: 7). Nevertheless, there have been times in history when it was mostly claimed that the term 'terrorism' should have been reserved to acts of violence carried out by States and not by small groups of people (Laqueur, 1999). Also, as previously said, the motivation behind an act of terrorism may vary, and, consequently, state laws often describe terrorism depending on the motivations behind the attack itself. Moreover, terrorism is not a recent phenomenon, with many European and Western States having experienced different types of terrorism throughout their history. That is why there is a tendency to distinguish between old and new terrorism:

within 'old terrorism' we could include the different waves of political violence deployed in the 1970s and 1980s by organizations that operated at a very localized level and that sought social revolutions, independence or the promotion of nationalism. Among those groups we could mention Die Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Brigate Rosse or the Irish Republican Army (IRA). On the contrary, 'new terrorism' refers to those groups that seek to transform reality based on a fundamentally religious ideology, attacking people and objects indiscriminately throughout the world.

(Rocha & Mendoza, 2019: 9)

For a matter of clarity, for the purpose of this research, when using the term 'terrorism' the main reference will be the definition given by Herrington (2022), who defines

terrorism as "the performance of lethal violence by non-state actors, deliberately targeted at non-combatants with foreknowledge that such behaviour will likely influence policymakers both foreign and domestic" (Herrington, 2022: 8).

#### 3.2.1. Jihad and Jihadism

After having tried to define the term 'terrorism', another key concept that needs to be analysed here is that of 'jihad', a word that is often misused in Western cultures. The Islamic meaning of the word 'jihad' can be found in the Qur'an and in the Hadith, which are the main sources of Islamic Laws:

the term jihād is derived from the verb jāhada (abstract noun, juhd) which means "exerted"; its juridical-theological meaning is exertion of one's power in Allah's path, that is the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world. The individual's recompense would be the achievement of salvation, since the jihad is Allah's direct way to paradise.

(Khadduri, 1955: 55)

The Oxford dictionary, instead, defines 'jihad' as being both "a spiritual struggle within yourself to stop yourself breaking religious or moral laws" and "a holy war fought by Muslims to defend Islam". Indeed, the term 'jihad' is often translated into English (and the same translation can be found in other Western languages) as 'holy war', but this term is not liked by many Muslims who believe it highly reminds the Christian Crusades (Cook, 2005): "In Arabic, the word's literal meaning is "striving" or "exerting oneself", with the implication, based on its usage in the Qur'an, "with regards to one's religion" (Cook, 2005:1,2).

However, a mistranslation of the concepts contained both in the Qur'an and in the Hadith - "sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and accounts of events in his life recounted by his close companions" (Cook, 2005:13) - is what lies behind the Western

misinterpretation of such expressions. This is explained by Lang (2004) as being due to a cultural divergence that makes it strenuous to translate certain notions:

Translation is not really the act of converting one set of expressions into an equivalent set of expressions; it involves taking meanings innate to one culture and projecting them onto an alien one. A translator is essentially an interpreter, whose work involves choosing one meaning from a variety of possible meanings on both sides of the process. [...] The more two cultures diverge, the more difficult it becomes to translate between them. It is hard to conceive of two cultures more remote from each other than the seventh-century Arabian and the modern Western.

(Lang, 2004: 52)

So, the literal translations of concepts that do not exist in other cultures may cause huge misunderstanding and may lead to these terms being used wrongly, as underlined by Al Jalahma and Gomaa (2023): "the available Hadith translations have come under criticism for depending heavily on the strategy of literal translation, not taking into consideration cultural discrepancies, and failing to anticipate the potential effects of such translations on the target recipients" (Al Jalahma & Gomaa, 2023: 2).

However, according to Roy (2004), when we deal with phenomena such as that of terrorism, we are dealing more with people and their acts than we are dealing with religion. What is true, anyway, is that terrorists claiming that what they do finds its origin in the Qu'ran, of course, introduces some 'religious innovations' (Roy, 2004), amongst which

the most important is the status of jihad. Whatever the complexity of the debate among scholars since the time of the Prophet, two points are clear: jihad is not one of the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimage) and it is therefore a collective duty (fard kifaya), under given circumstances. But radicals [...] explicitly consider jihad a permanent and individual duty (fard'ayn). This is probably the best criterion with which to draw a line between conservative neofundamentalists and radical ones [...]. Among the few writings of Osama Bin

Laden, the definition of jihadi as a permanent and personal duty holds a central place. His concept of suicide attack is not found in Islam. It is paradoxical that the very few people who claim to follow the path of the ancestors (the Salaf), and declare kafir (infidel) anybody who seems to stray from the imitation of their forefathers, graft their political activism onto an obvious innovation (bid'a), jihad as a fard'ayn. From that example it is clear that, far from being a collective answer from the 'Muslim community' to Western encroachment, the new jihad is an individual and personal decision. As we shall see, most radical militants are engaged in actions as individuals, cutting links with their 'natural' community (family, ethnic group and nation) to fight beyond the sphere of any real collective identity. This overemphasis on personal jihad complements the lonely situation of the militants, who do not follow their natural community, but join an imagined one.

(Roy, 2004: 41, 42)

Thus, Roy underlines that one thing is jihad as a concept, defined and explained in the Qu'ran and in the Hadith, another is what people decide to do to achieve the duty that comes with it, and he does so by highlighting that the concept of suicide attacks cannot be found anywhere in Islam. Another important feature he focuses on is that while Islam defines jihad as a collective duty, often the radicalization of people by terrorist organizations is carried out by isolating them from their families, friends and societies. This aspect is particularly important for the purpose of this research for two main reasons: first of all, often, in the attempt to understand what motivates FF to take certain decisions, the news focuses on how were their lives before they decided to join terrorist organizations and fight; secondarily, it is interesting to notice how the personal and collective levels intersect, as, on the one hand there it is a decision that affects one's personal life, while, on the other hand, its consequences influence the community.

## 3.3. Foreign Fighters

Foreign Fighters can be defined as "individuals who leave their state of origin or residence and travel elsewhere to take part in an armed conflict or terrorist activity" (Pokalova, 2020:2). So, they are "non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or ideology enter a conflict zone to participate hostility es" (Warren, 2019:10). Thus, they are also different from mercenaries, who usually join conflicts because of the high incomes their participation in conflicts guarantees. Nowadays, FF are mostly linked to asymmetric conflicts, i.e. those types of conflicts where at least one part is not a state – as the Syrian civil war – but, throughout human history, this phenomenon has always been rather common. For the purpose of the present study, however, the focus will be on those Foreign Fighters who decided to join the Syrian civil war after having also joined – or while joining – terrorist organizations, thus on those called *Foreign Terrorist Fighters* by the United Nations Security Council, that defined them as being

Individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.

(United Nations Security Council, 2014:2)

Consequently, the characteristics FF should have in order to be given the status of Foreign Terrorist Fighters are: they must travel from their State of origin to another State, they must make that decision to join a terrorist organization, in order to be trained, and, finally, they must be willing of using their terrorist training to carry out military and/or terrorist attacks once they go back to their countries. In a nutshell, there are certain features characterizing foreign fighters that make them different from those usually defined as 'Islamist terrorists'. However, this border blurs when they decide to carry out terrorist attacks after having fought abroad.

In this framework, a concept that needs to be highlighted is that of radicalization, as it is what usually characterizes the choice of joining a terrorist organization and that, as a term, is often used in a rather confusing way. Usually, indeed, it seems to indicate that there exists some kind of progression between the involvement in defensive jihad and, later on, the involvement in Islamist terrorism (Warren, 2019). Schmid (2013) defines radicalisation as

an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (nonviolent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate.

(Schmid, 2013:19)

Moreover, the decision to focus on a ten-year period that covers the first ten years of the Syrian conflict lies in the fact that – according to the Global Terrorism Index 2019 – it is estimated that, since 2013, a number of 50,000 foreign affiliates travelled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL from at least 83 countries, making it one of the conflicts that saw the highest mobilization of FF since 1945. Also, previous conflicts did not attract such high numbers of Western FF, which is due to the rise of ISIS, especially after the establishment of a Caliphate in 2014: "many Westerns were attracted to the state-building experiment and travelled to live in an Islamic state" (Pokalova, 2020:6).

Moreover, according to Pokalova (2020), after the Caliphate's dismantlement, not only those who joined ISIS from the West did not have a territory to defend anymore, but they also had a common enemy, it being Western world, seen as responsible for the Caliphate's failure. Foreign Fighters thus became the focus of the present work for their being a particular terrorist phenomenon, slightly different from any other aspect of terrorism that has been studied – from a linguistic perspective – until now. In fact, what makes them of high interest to the Western World is their characteristic of being potential terrorists and being considered as people who may carry out a terrorist attack, especially after having joined a conflict and/or having been trained by the terrorist organization they decided to join. As stated by Baker-Beall (2016),

The 'returning foreign fighter' is unique in the sense that they traverse the distinction between the internal and external dimension of terrorist threat. [...] In particular, it helps to strengthen the notion that the 'open' or 'globalized' society of the EU is 'vulnerable' to acts of terrorism, as well as confirming the logic that increased border control and the development of new technologies of surveillance for 'border crossers' should be essential elements of the EU counter-terrorism response. The discourse focuses specifically on policies designed to 'disrupt' and 'detect' any form of 'suspicious travel'.

(Baker-Beall, 2016:123)

Thus, the representation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the news may be relevant in shaping the Western public opinion's perception on matters such as immigration and border security. Also, Foreign Fighters are a slightly heterogeneous phenomenon that may be studied – at a linguistic level – from many different points of view, such as gender, age, socio-cultural, and economic background.

### 3.4. Conclusion

The Arab Springs, in the beginning, were favourably received as a chance for oppressed people to overthrow the power of those who were considered to be dictators. However, in

Syria and in other Arab countries, the uprisings soon escalated into a civil conflict. Several Western countries decided to support rebel factions in the war. What makes the Syrian conflict so important for the purpose of the present study is that, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2019, it is estimated that, since 2013, a number of 50,000 foreign affiliates travelled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL from at least 83 countries, making it one of the conflicts that saw the highest mobilization of FF since 1945. Moreover, foreign fighters, despite not being a new phenomenon in human history, in the decade under investigation here, have been a peculiar aspect of terrorism that merits further analysis, particularly from a linguistic perspective.

# 4. Methodological Framework

### 4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will describe how the analysis will be organized and how I will work from a methodological point of view. In particular, I will first delineate the corpus and how it has been collected; after that, I will illustrate the methodology used to carry out this study. As has already been pointed out previously in this work, CADS and CDA approaches were the two main methodological frameworks used here.

## 4.2. Corpus description and collection

The Corpus investigated here is composed of articles coming from six different newspapers, two for each English-speaking country I decided to focus on: the UK, the United States, and Australia. In particular, I collected articles coming from *The Guardian* and The Times for the UK, The New York Times and The Washington Post for the USA, and The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald for Australia. The decision to focus on English-speaking countries and newspapers lies in the fact that I wanted to mainly focus on the English language. As for the choice of which newspapers to analyse, it was taken by following different factors, such as the political spectrum of the newspapers, the number of articles available for each newspaper, and so on. In particular, by using LexisNexis, I looked for a few broadsheet newspapers for each of the countries I wanted to focus on, after having seen how many articles they published on the topic, I tried to pick those that could give a wider political perspective as possible. Also, I decided to focus on two newspapers for each country in order to have a quite representative sample. The corpus has been collected by using the database *LexisNexis*, which contains many different newspapers, coming from several countries, and allows users to look for newspapers and articles by selecting the wanted features, such as the country, the name

of the newspaper, the year in which a certain article has been published, the month, and so on; it is also possible to search for a specific topic. Thus, firstly I typed 'foreign fighters' in the search bar, then I selected the name of the newspaper and the year I was interested in. I repeated this procedure for every year – from March 2011 until March 2021 – and for each newspaper I was interested in. The articles have been downloaded in .doc format and have then been converted into .txt format – the type of format needed to analyse the corpus using WordSmith Tools – through AntFile Converter. The corpus files have been organized as follows: first of all, three folders were created, one for each country, and so named 'Australia', 'UK', and 'USA'; then, in each of the three folders, other two folders were created and named after each newspaper; after that, in each newspaper subfolder, were created as many subfolders as the analysed years; finally, each article's file was saved in its specific subfolder and named in a way that would have made it possible to easily identify and find it, thus with an abbreviation of the newspaper's name, the year and a number (for instance, 'GUA 2011 1' indicates the first article collected for *The Guardian*, for the year 2011). Moreover, it has been decided to save the corpus in folders divided per year and on a conventional twelve-month basis for practical reasons.

After having collected all the articles, it was necessary to 'clean' the corpus, in order to check whether all the collected articles were about foreign fighters and to delete articles that were available several times in the database. For instance, in *The Times* corpus, certain articles were occurring more than once, because they may have been published in different inserts and supplements, so it was necessary to eliminate all the superfluous copies.

In the end, the Corpus results as follows:

	The Guardian (UK)	The Times (UK)	The New York Times (USA)	The Washington Post (USA)	The Australian (AUS)	The Sydney Morning Herald (AUS)	Total year	per
2011	12	13	39	22	7	3		96
2012	46	24	47	19	15	1		152
2013	36	35	64	49	23	4		211
2014	149	110	137	112	151	87		<b>746</b>
2015	210	99	128	109	234	94		874
2016	124	63	112	57	101	39		496
2017	33	63	119	35	81	44		375
2018	32	30	53	18	45	22		200
2019	79	34	83	27	87	33		343
2020	29	11	26	29	7	6		108
2021	2	2	2	14	1	1		22
Sum	752	484	810	491	752	334	3	3,623

Table 1. Numbers of articles collected per newspaper per year.

As can be easily noticed, the number of articles increased dramatically in the years between 2014 and 2016, as those were the years when the IS was rising and gaining more and more territories, the civil war in Syria and Libya was reaching their peaks – resulting in what has been labelled as a 'migrant crisis' in Europe, with a number higher than 1.2 million asylum seekers registered in Europe in 2015, 123% more than in 2014 (Eurostat, 2016) – and terrorist attacks were carried out in European cities, hitting Paris, Nice, Brussels, Manchester, Barcelona, just to name a few. Given the 'migrant crisis' and the several foreign fighters, it was often affirmed that, amongst the migrants, there could have been foreign terrorist fighters coming back to Europe to carry out attacks. As underlined in the report *Terrorist Attacks. Youngsters and Jihadism in Europe*, published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) in the IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2018,

A common fear relating to foreign fighters has to do with the so-called 'blowback effect' – namely, the risk that a number of combatants may return to their home countries to conduct a terrorist attack.

This threat was highlighted by Europol as early as 2012: *mujahidin* may take advantage of the training, the experience, the knowledge and the contacts acquired at the front to strike at home. Such concerns are not unfounded: in recent years, jihadist veterans took part in various attacks worldwide, including the November 2015 Paris attacks and the March 2016 Brussels attacks.

(Vidino, Carenzi, 2018)

It is thus easy to understand that all of these not only influenced institutional, political, and media discourses surrounding the foreign fighters' phenomenon in those years, but also the frequency with which it was possible to find the topic in newspapers, with the number of articles about it published between 2014 and 2016 appearing quantitatively most prominent.

Another consideration that needs to be made about the number of articles is that, as can be seen by looking at the table above, 2011 and 2021 are the years with the smallest number of articles published. First, as previously said, the corpus has been collected from March 2011, when the Syrian civil war began, to March 2021, marking ten years of war, so those were the only two years in which the news collected did not cover the whole twelve months (nine months of articles in 2011 and only three months in 2021). Moreover, in 2011 the media attention was mostly concentrated on the results of the Arab Springs and on trying to understand how the factions were divided in the conflict: IS and foreign fighters were not yet worth focusing on at the time. In 2021, instead, not only the articles were collected for only three months, but it was also a period in which the whole world was facing another important crisis – that of Covid-19 – and that inevitably affected the content of the news.

After that, *AntConc* was used to calculate the number of tokens composing the corpus, per newspaper, per year, resulting as follows:

	The	The	The NY	The	The	The	Total per
	Guardian	Times	Times (USA)	Washington	Australian	Sydney	year
	(UK)	(UK)		Post (USA)	(AUS)	Morning	
						Herald	
						(AUS)	
2011	6,722	9,201	50,053	25,670	6,237	4,719	102,602
2012	70,854	17,286	60,544	20,868	13,216	1,132	192,900
2013	48,858	21,215	70,358	52,350	18,626	4,632	216,039
2014	349,018	80,537	155,075	121,149	136,476	69,531	911,786
2015	379,044	70,821	174,267	145,911	136,026	80,463	977,532
2016	193,013	40,983	181,603	63,823	102,487	33,730	615,639
2017	54,822	52,292	146,633	37,917	75,862	35,573	403,099
2018	58,073	21,130	78,899	19,738	37,093	24,959	239,892
2019	232,776	34,666	119,076	31,913	72,766	31,433	522,630
2020	58,073	10,530	40,047	31,737	4,706	2,907	148,000
2021	12,482	1,662	1,973	19,956	457	465	36,995
Sum	1,435,920	360,323	1,618,528	580,032	666,992	289,544	4,354,632

Table 2. Number of tokens per article per year.

Lastly, as a reference corpus, the freely downloadable sample of the News On the Web corpus was used. The News On the Web corpus is a corpus that contains 18.5 billion words of data, collected from 2010 to the present. It is composed of articles from magazines and newspapers published in English on the web. Even if there is a rather big difference between the study corpus and the reference corpus, as the former is made of broadsheet newspaper articles, while the latter is made of articles written for the web, the NOW corpus was the one that mostly fit the characteristics of the reference corpus needed here.

# 4.3. CADS approach

As already mentioned in section 2.2.2., the methodology that will be used in the analysis of the corpus will combine Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis. Indeed, CADS approach "explores discourse (i.e., language as social practice) through examining corpora (i.e., large computerised sets of textual data)" (Gillings, Mautner, Baker, 2023:1). Even though CADS, as a methodology, is often seen as something that unites different

approaches, namely Corpus Linguistics and Discourse Studies, it should rather be considered as something that unites similar approaches, because while CL offers the chance of analysing regularities in the use of certain words, DS tries to explain their relationship with the sociopolitical context (Gillings, Mautner, Baker, 2023). Moreover, even though CL is largely considered to be a more quantitative approach, it actually gives the researcher the possibility of qualitatively starting the analysis of the corpus. Indeed, according to Lischinsky's definition,

CADS in particular seeks to capture the recurring traces left by social routines, 'the ways in which society creates itself' (Mahlberg 2007: 196) by discursively producing and reproducing habitual patterns of understanding and acting. From this point of view, the starting point of the analysis is not linguistic but social (Biber 1993: 244): what CADS seeks to characterise is not a particular language or linguistic variety, but rather a particular situation, purpose, or function repeatedly enacted within a speech community.

(Lischinsky, 2018: 61)

Thus, CADS methodology is blurring the distinction between quantitative and qualitative analysis, as its main purpose is to "achieve a useful synergy between CL and DS" (Gillings, Mautner, Baker, 2023: 7).

One of the ways in which these two approaches can be put together is explained by McEnery and Wilson (McEnery and Wilson, 2015: 2-3), who identify four different stages of analysis. Combining both CL and CDA, this type of analysis appears to be more quantitative at its early stages and to become more and more qualitative while it gradually advances. Thus, also how the software and tools for analysis are used changes with the progression of the work: at first, they are used in order to extrapolate quantitative data, then they may be used to examine fragments of the text under analysis, offering the chance of focusing on a more qualitative analysis. Therefore, the first step of the analysis is

usually a frequency analysis, where keywords and collocations are examined, to identify 'quantitative patterns' (McEnery and Baker, 2015: 3). However, the keywords will not be examined in all of the three analytical chapters. Indeed, an analysis of keywords will only be carried out in the diachronic section. Following McEnery and Baker's theory, the second step is a more 'quantitative and context-led' (McEnery and Baker, 2015: 3) analysis: the analysis of concordances. Tables of concordances can be easily obtained thanks to the used software and, as explained by McEnery and Baker (2015: 3), concordances analysis can help to draw some type of interpretation about the way in which a word that we are analysing is used in the text. Also, in this case, the software allows the examination of small samples of concordances lines, thus making it possible to analyse concordances more qualitatively. The third stage of analysis is what McEnery and Baker call 'explanation' and it "involves positioning our descriptive and interpretative findings within a wider social context". So, at this point, the context starts to play a central role in the analysis. Then, a fourth step can be added and is that of evaluation: it is the stage through which it is possible to "point out consequences of such uses of language (asking 'who benefits?' or who is potentially disempowered), perhaps making recommendations for good practice" (McEnery and Baker, 2015: 3).

#### 4.3.2. Tools used.

As outlined previously, the Corpus analysis will be carried out through the use of a specific software: *WordSmith Tools 8.0. WordSmith*, indeed, is "an integrated suite of programs for looking at how words behave in texts" (Scott, 2019). *WordSmith Tools 8.0* is a downloadable software that makes it possible for the researcher to analyse large corpora and to identify linguistic patterns such as keywords, concordances, collocations, and clusters of words. Also, as already mentioned, through the function 'conversion' it is possible to convert the format of a large corpus and to create a wordlist out of it.

However, as previously said, also *AntConc Converter* has been used here with this goal, in order to convert the target corpus from a .doc format to a .txt format.

### 4.3.2. Keywords analysis

A keyword can be defined as being "a word which occurs statistically significantly in one corpus when compared against a second corpus" (Gillings et al, 2023: 33). Namely, the corpora that have to be compared in order to get a keyword list are the corpus under study – so the one we are focusing on to carry out our analysis – and a reference, more generic, corpus. For the case of the present study, as already mentioned, the NOW corpus will be used as a reference corpus.

To obtain keyword lists, *WordSmith* carries out the following procedure:

[It] takes into account the size of each sub-corpus and the frequencies of each word within them. It then carries out statistical tests on each word, which gives each word a p (or probability) value. The p value, a number between 0 and 1) indicates the amount of confidence that we have that a word is key due to chance alone – the smaller the p value, the more likely that the word's strong presence in one of the sub-corpus is not due to chance but a result of the author's (conscious or subconscious) choice to use a word repretedly.

(Baker, 2006:125)

In particular, in the present study, a *p*-value of 0,000001 was set for this analysis, in order to obtain words that were as key as possible.

The analysis of keywords was mainly used here in the diachronic study, in order to have a general view on the evolution of discourses surrounding foreign fighters in the news throughout the years. For the two other analytical sections, instead, since they were mostly focusing on foreign fighters' discursive construction and representation, keywords were not analysed, because it was thought that it would have been better to only focus on concordances and collocates.

### 4.3.3. Concordances analysis

A concordance list is "a list of all the occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus, presented within the context that they occur in; usually a few words to the left and right of the search term" (Baker, 2006: 71). As many other concordancers, WordSmith Tools 8.0 uses the Key Word in Context (KWIC) format (Sinclair, 2003): the analysed word appears in the centre of the lines, usually in a different colour. Moreover, many concordance tools offer the chance to expand the concordance line and to look at the cotext, at the level of a sentence, or paragraph, or also at the entire text. Since the goal of CADS is that of finding and examining how hegemonic and power relations are constructed and reproduced linguistically and discursively, the analysis of concordances can lead the researcher to focus on some important preliminary findings, as it offers the chance of examining how some patterns are repetitively associated with the word under examination. Also, as underlined by Baker (2006) and Fairclough (1989), the importance of finding and analysing recurring patterns of language in their context is particularly interesting when dealing with newspapers, since "the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency" (Fairclough, 1989: 54). Thus, CADS researchers are not interested in analysing the mere syntactic position of a word, but they are rather interested in understanding whether the syntactic use of a word can say something about discursive representation (Gillings, Mautner, Baker, 2023). According to Gillings, Mautner and Baker (2023):

CADS work focuses on linguistic signs less for what they are and how they are related to one another, and more on what signs do and how they are related to the extra-linguistic world. Due to this interest in the social function of language, we also need to look beyond the concordance line. Here, 'beyond' means two things: on the one hand it means reading and interpreting not just the line itself, but an expanded stretch of co-text before and after that line [...]. On the other hand, we need

to go beyond the concordance line in the sense of relating it to the wider social context which shapes the corpus and is shaped by it.

(Gillings, Mautner, Baker, 2023: 23)

Thus, analysing the concordances is useful in CADS, because it is a first step in the identification of what type of discursive patterns recur more often, in the corpus, in relation to the word under examination.

Concordance analysis also offers the possibility of investigating the semantic preference in a given corpus. According to Stubbs (2001:65), semantic preference is "the relation, not between individual words, but between a lemma or word-form and a set of semantically related words" (Stubbs, 2001:65). For example, as will be shown in the analysis sections, in the corpus under analysis here, the terms Foreign Fighters\* are often related to words that indicate their quantity: it is both possible to find precise numbers or words such as \*flow, \*number, etc. Therefore, the concept of semantic preference is strictly linked to that of collocation, which will be discussed in section 4.3.4. However, as suggested by Stubbs (2001) and Baker (2006), semantic preference is also related to the concept of discourse prosody, "where patterns in discourse can be found between a word, phrase or lemma and a set of related words that suggest a discourse" (Baker, 2006: 87). Indeed, as Baker points out, the difference between the two concepts is not that sharp. Still, both Stubbs (2001) and Baker (2006) underline that discourse prosodies are more related to the speaker's attitude, as they are highly evaluative and express "the speaker's reason for making the utterance, and therefore identify functional discourse units" (Stubbs, 2001: 65). On the contrary, semantic preference often "denotes aspects of meaning which are independent of speakers" (Baker, 2006: 87), for instance, the cooccurrence of a lexical set of words indicating types of drinks if we look at the concordances of the word 'glass' in a corpus (Baker, 2006). However, even if the semantic

preference has less to do with the speaker's attitude, a speaker may deliberately decide not to show their attitude, thus blurring the distinction between semantic preference and discursive prosody. That is why other scholars, such as Louw (1993) and Sinclair (2003) use the term "semantic prosody", which is used to indicate how semantic preference is very close to discourse prosody and to blur even more their distinction.

The concordance analysis will follow the steps identified by Baker (2006: 92, 93). So, after having obtained a concordance list of the term under examination, having cleaned the concordance lines from repetitions and other irrelevant lines (such as ads and so on), the concordance will be looked at on the right and the left, in order to sort grammatical, semantic or discursive patterns. The following step will be to "look for further evidence of such patterns in the corpus" (Baker, 2006: 92). After that, the presence of certain terms will be examined further, even by looking at how they behave in the reference corpus, to investigate differences and similarities. Then, the other concordance lines will be examined, in order to sort similarities and/or discursive patterns. Then, the final part of concordance analysis will focus on the reasons why those patterns are in the corpus and try to hypothesize their function in both text production and reception.

An aspect of concordance analysis that cannot be left aside methodologically is that dealing with a corpus of more than four million tokens may lead, in some cases, to getting concordance lists of hundreds of lines. In such cases, Sinclair (1999) suggests selecting 30 random concordance lines, identifying the discursive patterns these lines show, then moving to the other 30 random lines and seeing whether those patterns repeat themselves several times. Hunston (2002), instead recommends the 'hypothesis testing' method, "in which a small selection of lines is used as a basis for a set of hypotheses about patterns. Other searches are then employed to test those hypotheses and form new ones" (Hunston, 2002: 52). For the present study, the concordance lines will be randomly selected to reach

the number of 200 concordances; when the search for concordances of a given term will not reach the number of 200 lines, then all the concordance lines will be examined.

#### 4.3.4. Collocations

After the analysis of concordances, collocations will be focused on. That is because, as underlined in section 4.3.3., concordances can be extremely useful in identifying patterns of meaning and discourse; however, they also have a few limits. First of all, concordances can result in such a high number of lines that it may be difficult to efficiently examine them all and, thus, to identify all of the present patterns. Also, sometimes words appear next to each other in ways that are not detected by a concordances list. These are the main reasons why it is useful, at some point in the analysis, to also focus on collocations. Collocations can be defined as words that co-occur with each other so frequently that their co-occurrence becomes statistically important (Baker, 2006). They play an important role in discourse analysis because their analysis can help to understand the author's viewpoint and judgments shared by speech communities (Gillings, Mautner, Baker, 2023). Indeed, according to Stubbs (1996: 172), "words occur in characteristic collocations, which show the associations and connotations they have, and therefore the assumptions which they embody".

When considering collocations, a problem the researcher may face is that, often, those words are function words, such as articles, prepositions, pronouns, and so on. A way to solve this matter, as suggested by Baker (2006), may be, after having calculated a collocates list, to look down the list, until we find a lexical word.

WordSmith offers the possibility of calculating collocations through specific functions of the Concord settings. In particular, you can select how many collocates to look for, both on the left and right of the term under analysis. In this case, I followed the default settings and chose to have five words on the left and five on the right. I also set ten as the minimum frequency of the collocates, four as the minimum length of collocates, and one as the minimum text. Another important thing to focus on when dealing with collocates is to calculate how strong is their relationship with the word we are examining. That is because, as previously outlined, it is likely that, once we have a collocates list, the words that will appear to be mostly related to the one we are analysing will be grammar words, thus words that will often relate to any possible other word. In order to calculate the collocates, a possible procedure, using WordSmith, is, after having selected the word, to click on the *Compute* control, and select 'collocates'. Once the collocates list is done, it is possible, again through the *Compute* control, to select 'relationship'. In this way, Concord 'will look up each of your collocates in the word list and compute a set of relationship statistics using the information in the reference corpus word list' (Scott, 2021).

In the end, as suggested by Baker (2006), collocates can help in the identification of discourses: once having calculated a list of collocates for the term we are analysing, we can indeed observe whether they can be grouped semantically, thematically, and so on. This can help in analysing whether what was examined through the concordances analysis is confirmed or whether other discursive patterns we did not notice previously emerge.

# 4.4. Critical Discourse Analysis

As previously outlined, after having identified the main discursive patterns that recur most often in the corpus, they will be analysed by following the Critical Discourse Analysis methodology. Indeed, as CDA is concerned with analysing language use and how power relations are embedded in and expressed through language in context, it focuses on the examination of regularities and patterns as shown in a text and interpretates them within their economic, political, social, racial, and gender context. So, the first step will be that of understanding the existence of discourses in the patterns of language

identified previously. Then, samples of texts will be analysed in order to examine the way in which discourses are built through the use of such patterns. The focus will thus be on understanding how the social actors are represented discursively, and how power relations and ideologies are embedded into the analysed pieces of texts through such representations.

# 4.4.1. Fairclough's Sociocultural Approach to News Discourse Analysis

For the analysis of the discursive patterns previously identified in the corpus, Fairclough's sociocultural approach will be used. The reason why this approach, was chosen over other approaches that have been used to carry out critical discourse analysis of media discourse – such as, for instance, van-Dijk's socio-cognitive approach – lies in the fact that Fairclough's approach gives more importance to the intertextual analysis of discourses, which is something I will focus on in the analytical sections. As briefly outlined in section 2.2.4., Fairclough theorized the sociocultural approach to Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992), an approach that

foregrounds links between social practice and language, and the systematic investigation of connections between the nature of social processes and properties of language texts. [...] It is moreover a 'critical' approach to discourse analysis in the sense that it sets out to make visible through analysis, and to criticise, connections between properties of texts and social processes and relations (ideologies, power relations) which are generally not obvious to people who produce and interpret those texts.

(Fairclough, 2010: 131, 132)

Thus, the sociocultural approach combines the analysis of text with the investigation of the social context that produces the analysed texts. Influenced by Halliday's functional analysis (see section 2.2.4. for more information about Halliday's theories), Fairclough

believes that any discursive practice is made of three dimensions: it simultaneously is "(i) a language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text production and text interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice" (Fairclough, 2010: 132). These three dimensions composing discourses correspond to three methods for Critical Discourse Analysis, them being (i) description of the language text (text analysis), (ii) interpretation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes (Fairclough, 2010).




Figure 1. Fairclough's diagrammatic representation of the sociocultural three-dimensional approach.

It can thus be said that this approach to CDA is made of three different stages of analysis. First of all, we have the description phase, in which a text analysis is needed. However, it is a text analysis in which linguistic categories are to be analysed in relation to the function they have in the construction of discourses. That is why, according to Fairclough, at this stage, it is of fundamental importance to look also at the way in which a text is organized. Indeed, it is an analysis that involves not only phonology, grammar, vocabulary, and semantics, but also "analysis of the textual organization above the

sentence, including intersentential cohesion and various aspects of the structure of texts which have been investigated by discourse analysts" (Fairclough, 1992: 194).

The second phase of the analysis is the interpretative one, which has to do with the discursive practice dimension. As Fairclough indicates, "discursive practice involves processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors" (Fairclough, 1992a: 78). Therefore, it is the stage of analysis in which the linguistic features of the text are to be interpreted in relation with the role they play in the process of construction of discursive practice. For example, in the case of newspapers, news articles are very often the result of collective work where a team works together with different people involved at different stages of text production (Fairclough, 1992a). Another important factor to be considered during the interpretative phase is that of the consumer of the discursive process: "texts are consumed differently in different social contexts" (Fairclough, 1992a: 79). Exactly as production, also text consumption can be individual or collective. According to Fairclough (1992a), the production and interpretation of texts are constrained in two senses:

Firstly, they are constrained by the available members' resources, which are effectively internalized social structure, norms, and conventions, including orders of discourse, and conventions for the production, distribution, and consumption of texts of the sort just referred to, and which have been constituted through past social practice and struggle. Secondly., they are constrained by the specific nature of the social practice of which they are parts, which determines what elements of members' resources are drawn upon, and how [...] they are drawn upon.

(Fairclough, 1992a: 80)

Therefore, this three-dimensional approach tries to examine these constraints in order to explain the relationship between "the nature of discourse processes" and "the nature of the social practices they are a part of" (Fairclough, 1992a: 80). This is thus the phase

during which intertextuality and interdiscursivity are explored, but these concepts will be further explored in section 4.4.1.2.

Finally, at the macro-level, we have the third and last step of analysis, which is that of explanation. This third analytical level is the one in which discourse is analysed as a social practice and is highly linked to the concepts of ideology and hegemony, and to their relationships with discursive practices. So, this is the moment of analysis when the researcher can explain the connection between the discursive practice built through the analysed text and the shaping and maintenance of relations of power within society.

As any other method for Critical Discourse Analysis, even the sociocultural approach is not something to be followed rigidly, but it rather is adaptable to the analyst's exigences. So, the researcher may decide to focus on particular aspects of the analysis, rather than on others. In particular, for the present study, the focus will be on interdiscursivity and intertextuality – as they are central aspects in the analysis of news discourse – and on the representation of social actors.

#### 4.4.1.2. Orders of discourse (or interdiscursivity) and intertextuality

These two concepts have to do with the characteristics of discourses of being able to intersect with each other. In his theorization of orders of discourses, Fairclough has highly been influenced by Foucault's work (see section 2.1.). Foucault is largely considered to be the forefather of CDA and, as already pointed out in this thesis, the main difference between his approach and that of further critical discourse analysts is that the latter tended to focus on the analysis of texts, while Foucault had a rather more abstract approach. Indeed, Fairclough outlines that his concept of CDA is a "textually oriented discourse analysis (TODA)". Since the premises on which the two different approaches are based are completely different, Fairclough tried to fill the gap between Foucault's theories and their possible use in CDA. What Fairclough insists on is the importance of bearing in

mind – while analysing a certain type of discourse – that discourses are not so easily analysable, as, very often, they are the result of a mix of different discourse types and genres. This is especially true when dealing with news discourse: a newspaper article may actually contain in itself other types of discourses. For instance, a newspaper article on a political issue, in which the journalist interviews a political expert or a politician, in order to ask them about the given issue. However, different types of discourses involve in themselves different types of social conventions involved in themselves, as "the orders of discourse of a social institution or social domain is constituted by all the discursive types which are used there" (Fairclough, 1995: 55). Therefore,

the point of the concept of 'order of discourse' is to highlight the relationship between different types in such a set (e.g. in the case of a school, the discursive types of the classroom and of the playground): whether, for instance, a rigid boundary is maintained between them, or whether they can easily be mixed together in particular texts.

(Fairclough, 1995: 55)

So, media discourse cannot be analysed without examining its adjacent discourses, thus the discourses to which it is related. That is because, in the representation of a given social practice, the way in which discourses are intersected and correlated may itself be the manifestation of certain power relations that are expressed through the text: "orders of discourse can be seen as one domain of potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert and maintain particular structuring between them" (Fairclough, 1995: 56).

Closely related to the concept of 'order of discourse' is that of intertextuality, which actually is another key concept in the analysis of media discourse. Intertextuality can be defined as "the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict,

ironically echo, and so on." (Fairclough, 1992a: 84). Fairclough (1992a) theorized intertextuality by using as a starting point the works of Bakhtin and Kristeva. In particular, he reconceptualizes Kristeva's claim that discourses are 'ambivalent', since intertextuality "implies the insertion of history (society) into a text and of his text into history" (Kristeva, 1986:39), and points out that, indeed, intertextuality presupposes the use of texts from the past in the building of new texts, thus making the relationship between different texts both synchronic and diachronic.

Exactly as for the orders of discourse, also in the case of intertextuality, it is important to focus on its relationship with hegemony. Indeed, intertextuality has to do with the property of texts of being reproductive and of always being able to use existing conventions and transform them into new ones.

However, as underlined by Fairclough (1992a), "this productivity is not in practice available to people as a limitless space for textual innovation and play: it is socially limited and constrained, and conditional upon relations of power" (Fairclough, 1992a: 103). This is the reason why intertextuality cannot be analysed without taking into account power relations. If we think, for instance, of reported speech in newspaper articles, usually, the voices that are being reported are those who have the socially established authority to speak of a certain topic, while other voices often do not find any type of representation in the media.

Also, Fairclough distinguishes between 'manifest intertextuality' and 'interdiscursivity': 'manifest intertextuality' is when the presence of other texts in a given text is explicit; in 'interdiscursivity', instead, texts are incorporated into each other less explicitly. Particular attention will be given to intertextuality and how texts are embedded together in the analytical sections of this work.

Indeed, deeper analysis of how different texts interact in the corpus will be necessary in order to understand what types of discourses are expressed by what types of social actors, them being the journalist expressing the newspaper's views or simply reporting what other people – such as politicians – said about the matter. This aspect is particularly crucial here, in order not to make the mistake of attributing all the discourses that will emerge from the analysis of the corpus as being spread by a newspaper. Also, it will be important to understand how the journalist uses other texts and see whether they tend to agree or not with the discursive pattern under examination.

#### 4.4.2. The representation of social actors

As has been outlined in previous sections, the main objective of this work is to analyse how foreign fighters have been represented in news discourse from 2011 to 2021. Thus, the focus is on the discursive representation of a specific social actor related to terrorism. Moreover, an analysis of how social actors are represented in a given discursive practice may help to identify the way in which power relations have been built and maintained through language. For the purpose of the present study, the 'sociosemantic inventory' of the different ways in which social actors may be represented, theorized by Van Leeuwen (1996, 2008), will be used. It must be said, however, that there is a difference between Fairclough's approach to CDA and Van Leeuwen's theory and it lies in the fact that Fairclough's sociocultural approach is much more text-oriented, while Van Leeuwen, in the attempt of creating this 'inventory', starts from establishing sociological and critical relevance of the categories, before trying to understand how they are realised through language (Van Leeuwen, 1996). However, the categorization he theorized is of notable interest in discourse analysis and will be used in the present study, with a particular focus on categories of inclusion/exclusion, passivation/activation, and assimilation.

In the case of inclusion/exclusion, Van Leeuwen points out that exclusions may be realised 'innocently' in cases where the information is actually irrelevant, but they may also be the result of the author's willingness to deliberately include or exclude a social actor, based on which type of reader they are addressing. In some cases, exclusions are total and leave no trace of the social actors or their activities. In other cases, instead, the activity is mentioned but the social actor is not. In this second case, the exclusion leaves a trace and is recognizable. There are two different types of exclusion: suppression, which occurs when there is no mention of the social actor anywhere in the text, and backgrounding, which, instead, occurs when the social actor is not mentioned about a specific action but is mentioned somewhere else in the text. Suppression may be realized in many different ways, such as through passive agent deletion, through non-finite clauses, through the deletion of 'beneficiaries' social actors, through nominalization and process nouns, and the use of adjectives. Backgrounding, instead, can be realised through ellipses in non-finite clauses, with -ing and -ed participles, through infinitival clauses with 'to', and through paratactic clauses.

The passivation/activation is instead presented under the label of 'role allocation', which is defined as the "roles that social actors are given to play in representations" (Van Leeuwen, 1996:42). As outlined by Van Leeuwen, this aspect of social actors representation plays an important part in CDA, as it is important to analyse who is represented as 'agent' and who as 'patient' of activity in a given text, "for there need not be congruence between the roles that social actors actually play in social practices and the grammatical roles they are given in texts. Representation can reallocate roles, rearrange the social relations between the participants" (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 43). So, in analysing the representation of social actors in relation to their role allocation, it is

important to try to examine what choices are made in which social and institutional context and what type of interests are being served (Van Leeuwen, 1996).

Finally, the third type of category I decided to focus on while analysing the articles is that of assimilation, which occurs when social actors are represented as groups (Van Leeuwen, 1996). Assimilation can be contraposed to individualisation, which, instead, occurs "when social actors are referred to as individuals" (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 48). Assimilation can play an important role in the critical discursive analysis of the representation of social actors, because, as exemplified by Van Leeuwen (1996: 48), the choice of representing a social actor as an individual or as part of a certain group is rather related to hegemony and power. Indeed, in his study, he shows how "middle-class oriented newspapers tend to individualise elite persons and assimilate 'ordinary people', while working-class oriented newspapers quite often individualise 'ordinary people'" (Van Leeuwen, 1996:48). Van Leeuwen also makes a further distinction between two different types of assimilation: aggregation, "which quantifies groups of participants, treating them as 'statistics'" (Van Leeuwen, 1996:49), and collectivisation, which does not treat participants as pure statistics. Aggregation is often realised through quantifiers, which may be both definite and indefinite, and "is often used to regulate practice and to manufacture consensus opinion, even though it presents itself as merely recording facts" (Van Leeuwen, 1996:49).

### 4.5. Analytical chapters

This paragraph will briefly describe the three different analytical chapters. In particular, as already mentioned in the previous sections of this work, the analysis will be divided into three different parts: a diachronic study, one where a gender perspective will be taken into account to examine the sub-corpus, and a cross-cultural study.

#### 4.5.1. Diachronic study

In this section, the corpus will be analysed from a diachronic perspective. To study a corpus diachronically means to analyse the way in which language has changed and evolved through time. In this case, as it has already been outlined in previous sections, the years under analysis are those between 2011 and 2021, thus covering the first ten years of the Syrian conflict. However, after having carried out a keyword analysis with keyword lists obtained for each of the ten years under examination, for all the other steps of the analysis, for matters of space, it has been decided to only focus on four years, namely 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016. They have been selected by following two main criteria: the representativeness in terms of quantity of articles available for each year, and the chronology of events, thus by choosing years in order to have almost the whole ten-year period represented in the analysis.

In order to carry out the diachronic analysis, the corpus has been analysed by only maintaining the year's division, thus by putting all the articles together for each year, without keeping them divided for newspaper. This decision has been taken because the focus on the different newspapers and, therefore, on the three different English-speaking countries under examination will be the focus of the cross-cultural section of this thesis. Furthermore, as outlined previously, it has been decided to focus on different years on a twelve-month basis for practical reasons: in this way, it has indeed been easier to collect and save the corpus. So, after having created a sub-corpus, this has been analysed first of all by looking at the keywords. Indeed, even though the focus of the study is on the representation of FF, keywords are an important tool in diachronic studies, as they help in investigating the evolution of language and discourses over time.

In order to carry out the keywords analysis, it was necessary to compare the corpus under examination with a reference one, and, as already mentioned, the NOW corpus has been used here. After the keywords analysis, a concordance-keywords one has been carried out, by following the methodology theorized by Taylor (2010) for the analysis of diachronic corpora. The methodology of concordance-keywords has been employed as follows:

- 1. The years under analysis and, thus, the articles have been selected, adhering to the abovementioned criteria.
- 2. For each of the four examined years, a list of concordances of *foreign fighter\** has been created and saved in *txt*. format.
- 3. Then, four WordLists have been obtained out of the concordance lists.
- 4. At this point, the four different WordLists have been compared to each other in order to calculate the keywords. In particular, they have been matched as follows (the second WordList is the one that has been used as a Reference corpus):
  - ➤ 2012WL vs 2014WL; 2012WL vs 2015WL; 2012WL vs 2019WL.
  - > 2014WL vs 2012WL; 2014WL vs 2015WL; 2014WL vs 2019WL.
  - > 2015WL vs 2012WL; 2015WL vs 2014WL; 2015WL vs 2019WL.
  - ➤ 2019WL vs 2012WL; 2019WL vs 2014WL; 2019WL vs 2015WL.
- 5. Finally, each of the four concordance WordLists has been compared to the NOW reference corpus used in other analyses in this thesis in order to have a more complete look at the data.

After this, collocates were calculated and examined, and, after having identified the discursive patterns occurring most often, the concordance lines of *foreign fighter\** were analysed. Finally, a critical discourse analysis of a sample of articles from the corpus has been carried out.

#### 4.5.2. Gender perspective

In section 6, the corpus will be analysed from a gender perspective. In order to do so, a subcorpus has been selected, by looking for articles that were dealing with women FF (see section 6.2. for a detailed description of how the subcorpus has been collected).

At this point, a disclaimer needs to be made, as, from now on, I will refer to *female* or *women* foreign fighters in order to indicate all of those people who identify themselves with the female gender or that, at least, have been called so in the articles.

Since the focus of this chapter is to analyse the representation of female foreign fighters, so, by focusing on gender, the analysis will be carried out by triangulating CADS with Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis (FCDA). The decision to focus specifically on gender, amongst all the other characteristics of foreign fighters that could have been studied further, lies in the fact that, by analysing samples of the corpus, it was possible to notice how, often, gender was given a rather great importance. Consequently, it started to be evident that it probably would have been interesting to analyse this feature further, also to see the differences in the discursive representation of women and men foreign fighters. Indeed, FCDA focuses on the way in which patriarchal power is constructed and maintained through language. Moreover, feminism, by looking at society with an intersectional approach – thus by keeping as a starting point the fact that, in a capitalist system like ours, each struggle in fact 'intersects' with each other – is, actually, one of the most complete lenses we have to examine the hidden power relations:

As a critical social research framework, the intersectional approach is primarily a means for centring power and oppression in the exploration of identities. It is grounded in a profound acknowledgment that power, privilege, oppression, and discrimination impact the sense of self as well as life experiences and expectations. [...] Intersectionality provided a framework for triangulating gender, race, and class as three foundational categories of inequality, intertwined and mutually constitutive in women's identities, experiences, and struggles for empowerment.

Therefore, in this specific section, it will be useful to use triangulation – thus to use different approaches to discourse studies – in order to better examining the female foreign fighters phenomenon in a more complete way. Albeit analysing the representation of female foreign fighters and the discursive patterns mostly related to it may be interesting from the perspective of language and terrorism, it can also be relevant in the field of feminist discourse studies.

#### 4.5.3. Cross-Cultural study

The last analytical chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of the corpus from a cross-cultural perspective. Indeed, even though the three countries on which the present study focuses are all Western and English-speaking, it has been thought that it would have been interesting to further investigate differences and similarities in the way in which the social actor of *foreign fighter\** had been constructed in the news. In order to do so, in this case, the corpus has been analysed by only keeping the division per country. The corpus has then been divided into three different sub-corpora: one with Australian articles, one with British articles, and one with articles from American newspapers.

Following the above-described steps, the three sub-corpora have been analysed first of all by calculating the concordance lines for *foreign fighter\**, for each of the three corpora. After that, a list of collocates was created, again one for each analysed sub-corpus. Then, as suggested by Taylor (2018), *Excel* was used to compare the collocate lists and to look both for differences and similarities. Indeed, Excel allows for the comparison of two different tables and highlights what items are present in both tables and what are not. Thus, the collocate lists have been compared as follows:

#### AUS vs UK

- UK vs USA
- AUS vs USA

In this scheme of comparisons, AUS stands for the sub-corpus composed by the articles of the Australian corpus, UK for the sub-corpus composed by articles of the UK corpus, and USA the sub-corpus composed by articles of the USA corpus.

After that, the collocates were examined in order to identify the discourses occurring the most in the three corpora. Then, an analysis of concordances was carried out, based on the results of the analysis of collocates. After that, a Critical Discourse Analysis of a sample of articles was carried out.

#### 4.6. Conclusions

This chapter outlined the methodological framework used to analyse the discursive representation of foreign fighters in news discourse from 2011 to 2021. It also described the corpus, made of articles coming from six different newspapers – *The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Guardian, The Times, The New York Times, and The Washington Post* – published in three different English-speaking countries: Australia, the UK, and the USA. Furthermore, this section explained how the corpus has been collected and what criteria were used in order to collect it.

Besides, this methodological chapter described the way in which Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies will be used in the beginning of the analysis, with a focus on more quantitative data. Moreover, it was underlined how CADS should be seen more as an approach combining two similar methodologies, rather than two different ones, as its main purpose is to investigate language in order to identify hidden meanings by analysing

quantitative data. Therefore, after that, a Critical Discourse Analysis approach will be used, in order to simply continue the analysis by focusing on more qualitative data.

This section also briefly described the methodological steps which have been followed in each of the three analytical chapters.

# 5. Diachronic representation of foreign fighters from 2011 to 2021.

# 5.1. Introduction

This section will be dedicated to the analysis of the discursive construction of foreign fighters in news discourse from a diachronic perspective. Indeed, as has been outlined previously (see, in particular, section 4), the articles composing the corpus have been collected from 2011 to 2021, thus focusing on the first ten years of the Syrian conflict. The choice of focusing on this particular Middle Eastern conflict lies in the fact that, as pointed out in section 2, the Syrian war is the one that saw the highest number of mobilizations of FF in human history.

The corpus, in this chapter, will be analysed without the maintenance of the division between countries and newspapers, but only from a diachronic perspective, so the articles have been grouped for years.

# 5.2. Analysis of the corpus

In this part of the chapter, the analysis of the corpus will be carried out. It will start with an analysis of keywords, that will focus on the keywords of the corpus divided per year, in order to have a complete picture of the possible changes in discourses surrounding foreign fighter over time. Then, following the procedure of Modern Diachronic Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (MD-CADS) (Partington, 2010; Taylor, 2010; Partington et al., 2013), and by only focusing on articles published in four of the ten years, namely in 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2019, a concordance-keywords analysis has been carried out, making it possible to compare each subcorpus with one another and also to better focus on key themes and on differences and similarities between each subcorpora.

#### 5.2.1. Keyword analysis

Even though, in section 4, it has been outlined how the analysis of concordances will be focused on for the purpose of the present study, in the case of the diachronic perspective an analysis of keywords has been useful to give an overview of how discourses surrounding FF evolved throughout the years, while the Syrian conflict was getting worsen and the political scenarios were changing.

To obtain these keywords, I first put together all the articles, divided per year; secondly, through WordSmith Tools 8.0, I created a WordList for each year; then, I also created a WordList for the reference corpus. After all of that, I compared each WordList obtained with the corpus under investigation with the WordList of the reference corpus. As a reference corpus, the freely downloadable sample of the News On the Web corpus was used. The News On the Web corpus is a corpus that contains 18.5 billion words of data, from 2010 to the present. It is composed of web-based articles from magazines and newspapers. Even if there is a rather big difference between the study corpus and the reference corpus, as the former is made of broadsheet newspaper articles, while the latter is made of articles written for the web, the NOW corpus was the one that mostly fit the characteristics of the reference corpus needed here, for the genre of the corpora is the same and there is a rather synchronic relationship between the two. However, since the whole NOW corpus is not freely downloadable, the sample – which is a corpus of 1.6 million tokens – was used for the purpose of this keyword analysis. After all the aboveoutlined steps had been undertaken, the keywords obtained resulted as shown in the table below. It must be underlined that Table 3 only shows the first 20 keywords per year, while the total data resulted as follows: 246 positive keywords in the 2011 corpus, 303 in the 2012 corpus, 340 in the 2013 corpus, 381 in 2014 corpus, 375 in 2015 corpus, 346 in 2016 corpus, 324 in 2017 corpus. 237 in the 2018 corpus, 274 in the 2019 corpus, 218 in the 2020 corpus, and 171 in the 2021 corpus. The decision to focus only on the first 20 keywords per year has been taken both for a matter of space, both because this is only a preliminary step in the analysis and its goal is simply to give a first insight into the evolution of discourses surrounding foreign fighters in the corpus through the ten years under examination.

2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Al	Al	Al	Syria	Islamic	Islamic	Islamic	Islamic	Syria	Syria	Biden
fighters	Syria	Syria	Iraq	Syria	Syria	fighters	Syria	Islamic	fighter	Hifter
forces	Syrian	Syrian	Islamic	State	Iraq	Syria	fighters	fighters	Islamic	Syria
Military	fighters	fighters	fighter	Iraq	fighters	state	Isis	Isis	Taliban	fighters
Qaeda	Assad	Assad	Al	fighter	State	Iraq	Kurdis h	Al	Isis	Libya's
rebels	Aleppo	foreign	Isis	Isis	Isis	Isis	State	foreign	foreign	Afghanist an
Afghanistan	foreign	Qaeda	foreign	foreign	terrorist	forces	Iraq	Kurdish	Iraq	country's
Iraq	regime	Iraq	State	terroris m	attacks	foreign	forces	Iraq	terrorism	militias
Libya	rebels	rebels	Syrian	terrorist	Turkey	terroris m	Syrian	State	Syrian	Laming
Somalia	rebel	rebel	security	Al	Al	terrorist	foreign	forces	Australia	Tripoli
Libyan	militar y	forces	terrorist	security	foreign	militants	terroris m	Syrian	terrorist	Libyans
Gaddafi	forces	military	terroris m	Syrian	terroris m	Raqqa	military	Turkey	Turkey	Russia
rebel	army	Islamic	forces	forces	forces	Iraqi	terrorist	security	security	Iranian
Foreign	Qaeda	groups	military	attack	Syrian	Syrian	Austral ian	terrorist	war	Covid
Taliban	Iraq	Nusra	Turkey	Turkey	intellig ence	military	Turkey	terrorism	Hifter	Syrian
troops	Syria's	Weapons	Intellige nce	citizens hip	military	Al	Al	Turkish	Begum	mercenari es
Afghan	Turkey	war	Iraqi	Paris	security	security	Turkish	Morrison	Kurdish	Kabul
Qaddafi	border	oppositi on	Qaeda	Intellige nce	Brussel s	Mosul	Kurds	Governm ent	counterter rorism	peace
NATO	Damas cus	fighting	section	Abbott	Iraqi	Islam	security	Australia ns	Trump	talks
Tripoli	fightin g	conflict	threat	military	war	docume nt	fighting	Trump	State	Trump

Table 3. The first twenty keywords per year.

The keywords are here put in order of keyness rather than in order of frequency. Moreover, the table does not contain the keywords' quantitative data, which can instead be found in the appendix in section 9. A p value of 0,000001 was set for this analysis, in order to obtain words that were as key as possible. Also, again for matters of space, the table does not show quantitative statistic data, such as the words' frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R, which, however, can be found in the appendix, in section 9. Moreover, as outlined previously, a preliminary analysis of keywords was only used here

in order to illustrate the evolution of discourses surrounding foreign fighters in the news in the ten years under study, while a closer examination of keywords resulting from concordance-keywords lists will be carried out in the next paragraphs. Still, a first analysis of keywords can represent a starting point for the further steps of the analysis.

Before starting with the analysis of the keywords, it is also important to remind that, as outlined in section 4, the articles published in 2011 were collected only from December to March, while those published in 2021 from January to March (see section 4.2). Thus, the data regarding those two years are partial.

What can be noticed at very first sight is that there is a rather substantial difference between the first three analysed years, namely 2011, 2012, and 2013, and the rest of the years. In all of those three corpora, the Arab prefix 'al-' appears to be the word with the strongest keyness and, indeed, in Arabic, it is often used before surnames, in order to indicate where the family's ancestors were from; here, however, it is probably mostly used in relation to 'Qaeda' – which is another word that appears to have a rather strong keyness – and, so, it refers to the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, what is primarily interesting is that, in 2011, 2012, and 2013 corpora, the lexicology refers more to a situation of rebellion. Indeed, an exception was made for *fighters*, which – not surprisingly, since the corpus has been collected by looking for articles containing the words foreign fighter\* – appears to be rather key as a word even in the first three years under examination, rebel and rebels only emerge in the first three years amongst the first twenty keywords of the corpus. Indeed, 2011 was the year of the Arab Springs (see section 3.1.) and the two years following this event were those during which the uprising escalated into a war. However, what is interesting and noticeable, even from this partial analysis of keywords, is that, although at the end of 2011, and during 2012 and 2013, the war had already begun, there still was a strong use of rebel and rebels. It is starting from 2014, with the rise of the Islamic State, that we do not have rebel and rebels to appear amongst the first twenty keywords anymore, substituted by terrorist and terrorists. This is strongly related to the evolution of the events, because, as it has been pointed out in section 3.1., during 2013, it started to emerge that, amongst the Free Syrian Army – which had so far been rather supported by many Western countries in the Syrian conflict – there also were Islamists and Jihadi organizations. Moreover, the years following 2014 were those during which many Western countries experienced several Islamic terrorist attacks and this is another factor that inevitably influenced the discourses in the news. Indeed, amongst the keywords, we find names of places such as Paris and Brussels, where a rather high number of terrorist attacks took place during those years. The fact that those were the years that saw the rise of the Islamic State is shown in the above table as well: not only *Isis* appears as one of the most prominent words after 2014, but it is also possible to notice that, in many cases, the first positions are occupied by the words *Islamic* and *State*, suggesting that those terms were often used together in news about foreign fighter, thus linking the two phenomena quite often. Another feature of the keywords indicating that, at some point, terrorism started to be a salient discourse to be related to foreign fighters, is the presence of expressions such as security, intelligence, and even counterterrorism. All of this makes it rather intuitive that the involvement of some returned foreign fighters in the attacks carried out after 2014 made governments worry about the consequences of such a high mobilization of FF in the Syrian conflict and their affiliation with the Islamic State. Also, the appearance of the word threat suggests that there was a feeling of fear related to terrorist organizations and foreign fighters. Moreover, the fact that the word citizenship appears amongst the first twenty keywords more than once indicates the fact that one of the foci of the debate surrounding FF in the news was their characteristic of owning the citizenships of the countries that were being threatened by terrorism, and this

allowed them to come back after having taken part into the Syrian conflict and having joined terrorist organizations. Indeed, there are also words demonstrating the importance of the Syrian conflict for the mobilization of FF, as words such as Syria, Syrian, Syria's, and Damascus show up rather often in the corpus. Another consideration that can be made, by looking at the keywords, about the link between FF and the conflict, is that there is a significant use of a military semantic field, with words such as forces, military, troops, weapons, militias, and mercenaries, indicating how much the narrations of the main war events and the representation of FF were related. Also, Assad emerges in the first years, showing his important role in trying to suppress the Arab Springs before and in the war later. Furthermore, a few keywords refer to places and nationalities (other than Syria, Syrian, and Syria's), such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Afghan, Libya, Libyan, Tripoli, Turkey, Turkish, Kurdish, and Iranian. In the case of Iraq, its high presence is likely to be because the acronym 'ISIS' actually stands for "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria". Afghan and Afghanistan's presence amongst the most prominent keywords is linked with the fact that the country was crucial in Al-Qaeda's activity and, related to this, to the hypothesis that many foreign fighters were travelling or had previously travelled to Afghanistan. Words related to Libya are especially key in the first three analysed years (exception made for 2021), probably due to the fact that Libya was one of the countries mostly affected by the consequences of Arab Springs. Indeed, Gaddafi also appears as a key name: he was Libya's ruler in 2011, when he was overthrown and killed by the rebels. The presence of Turkey and Turkish does not come as a surprise either, for Turkey has played a central role in the Arab Springs before and in the Syrian conflict later (see section 3.1.). Finally, it is not also the presence of the adjective *Kurdish* amongst the keywords analysed here is not unpredictable, as Kurdish PKK and YPG contrasted the Islamic State in Northern Syria territories, during the years under examination (see section 3.1. for more).

The last thing that needs to be underlined here Is the presence of the word *Covid* in the 2021 corpus: at the time, the whole world was struggling with the Covid-19 pandemic, and that inevitably affected also news related to foreign fighters and the Syrian conflict. Even though the analysis of keywords and their changes over the analysed period has been rather useful in seeing the evolution of the jargon used, the focus of the present chapter is to see how the representation of FF changed through time, so it has been decided to also examine concordance-keywords lists, as described in the next paragraph.

#### 5.2.2. Concordance-keywords analysis

After the analysis of keywords carried out in the previous section, it has also been decided to examine lists of concordance-keywords, calculated by following the methodology theorized by Taylor (2010) for the analysis of diachronic corpora. First of all, it must be said that not all the years under analysis have been investigated, but, on the contrary, it has been decided, from now on, to focus on four years only. In particular, the years selected are 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2019, and they have been chosen by following two main criteria: the representativeness in terms of quantity of articles available for each year, and the chronology of events, thus by choosing years in order to have almost the whole ten-year period represented in the analysis. The methodology of concordance-keywords has been employed as follows:

- 1. The years under analysis and, thus, the articles have been selected, adhering to the above-mentioned criteria.
- 2. For each of the four examined years, a list of concordances of *foreign fighter\** has been created and saved in *txt*. format.
- 3. Then, four WordLists have been obtained out of the concordances lists.

- 4. At this point, the four different WordLists have been compared to each other in order to calculate the keywords. In particular, they have been matched as follows (the second WordList is the one that has been used as a Reference corpus):
  - > 2012WL vs 2014WL; 2012WL vs 2015WL; 2012WL vs 2019WL.
  - > 2014WL vs 2012WL; 2014WL vs 2015WL; 2014WL vs 2019WL.
  - > 2015WL vs 2012WL; 2015WL vs 2014WL; 2015WL vs 2019WL.
  - ➤ 2019WL vs 2012WL; 2019WL vs 2014WL; 2019WL vs 2015WL.
- 5. Finally, each of the four concordance WordList has been compared to the NOW reference corpus used in other analyses in this thesis in order to have a more complete look at data.

This methodology indeed offers the chance of calculating keywords that are even more key, as they come as a result of a comparison made between two lists of concordances of the same term, in the collected corpus. Moreover, this approach appears to be especially useful for the purpose of the present study, as it makes it possible to calculate lists of keywords that are particularly linked to the way in which foreign fighters are represented in the corpus. However, while Taylor (2010) applies this method to very large corpora, in this case, I am working with much smaller corpora and, as a result, some of the keyword lists obtained by the comparison of the concordances appear to be rather small. Nevertheless, this is the main reason why a more traditional analysis of keywords has been carried out In the previous section. Furthermore, even though their number may seem to be quantitatively irrelevant, they still offer the chance to focus on particularly key topics and thus analyse how discourses surrounding foreign fighters have changed through the years.

As already mentioned, each of the three concordance-keywords lists has been compared also to the NOW reference corpus and it intuitively resulted in quantitatively more

representative data. This indeed indicates how similar each year's corpus is to the other and thus suggests that the keywords displayed in the tables below are as representative as possible of the way in which foreign fighters have been discursively constructed in the news each year.

# **5.2.2.1. 2012** cocnordance-keywods analysis

	2012 vs 2014		2	012 vs 2015		2	2012 vs 2019		2012 vs reference corpus		
keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness
Somalia	6	13,80	militants	11	21,71	militants	11	13,95	fighters	158	1.782,98
militants	11	3,42	Somalia	6	9,34	fighting	7	9,52	foreign	166	1.522,81
fighting	7	2,94	rebel	6	9,34	Somalia	6	6,84	Syria	17	100,45
			here	4	6,56	presence	8	6,53	Somalia	6	43,76
			stood	4	6,56				presence	8	26,37
			uprising	4	6,56				fighting	7	22,96
			opposition	5	5,55				uprising	4	20,42
			growing	6	4,17				number	12	19,62
									Marka	2	11,41
									Amisom	2	11,41
									officers	2	11,41
									jihadist	3	11,41
									armed	5	9,93
									growing	6	8,39
									jihadis	2	7,60
									stood	4	7,53
									Afghanistan	4	7,16
									Libyan	3	6,53
									opposition	5	4,87

				weapons	4	4,69
				responding	3	4,46
				arriving	3	4,26
				warned	4	4,26
				role	6	3,89
				flocked	2	3,79
				resistance	3	3,08
				sectarian	2	3,05
				Libya	3	2,50

Table 4. 2012 concordance - keywords.

The results shown in Table 4 somehow confirm the analysis carried out in section 5.2.1. In particular, if we look at the first three columns, where the concordance-keywords of the 2012 corpus have been compared to the concordance-keywords of the other three years under examination, it is possible to notice how *militant\** and *rebel\** have been used predominantly in 2012 when writing about foreign fighters. This indicates that, as concluded in section 5.2.1., it was a period where the borders between foreign terrorist fighters and rebels or militants were still blurred. This hypothesis is confirmed also by the presence of *uprising* as a statistically outstanding term in the comparison between the 2012 concordance-keyword list and the 2015 one, which reveals how – even if the Syrian conflict at already started – the focus still was on the insurrections that had been affecting the region in the previous years and from where several civil wars originated. Indeed, Somalia is one of the countries where – since 2009 – there has been a civil conflict going on, which saw a high presence of foreign fighters amongst the ranks of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to Al-Qaeda. So, when talking of foreign fighters, at the time, the focus in English-speaking newspapers was still not on Syria, nor on the Islamic State.

Finally, the last column of the table shows the results obtained by the comparison of the 2012 concordance-keyword list with the reference corpus wordlist. Precisely, 33 positive

keywords were displayed in the list, while here I only reported 28, because more grammatical items – such as *don't* – were excluded from the analysis. If we look at this last column, however, we can first notice that – unsurprisingly – *foreign* and *fighters* are the lexemes with the highest keyness, which can be explained by the fact that what was compared with the reference corpus was a WordList derived from the concordance lines of *foreign fighter\** in the 2012 corpus. It is however interesting to notice that, even in this case, *uprising* is the term with the highest keyness, underlying, once again, how the focus was more on the rebellions than it was on the war at that point. The lexeme *resistance* is also present here, somehow confirming what has just been said. On the other hand, terrorism was already something the news was focusing on when discursively constructing foreign fighters, with the presence of terms such as *jihadist* and *jihadis*. Moreover, a certain degree of attention is paid to the number of foreign fighters, with terms such as *number* and *growing*, and also to their movements, with the presence of *arriving* and *flicked*.

5.2.2.2. 2014 concordance-keywords

	2014 vs 2012		2	2014 vs 2015			2014 vs 2019		2014 vs reference corpus		
keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness
bill	62	8,75	bill	62	32,4	flow	82	37,21	fighters	977	8.599,00
flow	82	7,87				threat	50	27,45	foreign	1.015	7.980,97
threat	50	5,15				conflict	22	6,44	Syria	207	1.458,40
Isis	43	3,05							Iraq	81	560,63
									flow	82	547,46
									Isis	43	249,5
									bill	62	243,22
									fighter	40	242,35
									Syrian	42	223,21

				terrorism	35	189,76
				Turkey	32	158,75
				returning	28	136,92
				Australians	15	82,94
				government's	9	68,81
				militants	14	63,71
				jihadist	10	53,47
				Qaeda	12	49,64
				Abbott	9	42,72
				Western	19	42,60
				Iraqis	6	41,10
				number	33	33,195
				Uzbeks	5	31,86
				state's	5	31,86
				joining	12	30,23
				Nusra	7	29,77
				Isil	7	29,77
				return	21	29,23
				jihad	7	28,58
				legislation	12	24,41
				estimated	14	24,11
				counterterrorism	4	22,63
				Chechnya	4	22,63
				magnet	6	22,14
				Iraqi	7	21,70
				stopping	8	21,51
				travelled	8	20,17
				amendment	7	15,86
				Sunni	5	15,70
				travelled	6	15,63
				weapons	10	15,60
				travelling	9	15,56
				bases	6	13,92
				ASIO	3	13,39
				ICSR	3	13,39
				Turkey's	3	13,39
				<u> </u>		

				radicalisation	4	13,12
				disrupt	5	12,97
				financing	6	12,91
				prospect	7	11,57
				tackling	5	11,57

Table 5. 2014 concordance-keywords.

Table 5 offers even more chances for reflection, as 2014 was one of the years with the highest number of articles published on the theme, as shown in section 4. Even in this case, though, the results are displayed in section 5.2.1. are somehow confirmed. Indeed, already in the column containing the results of the comparison between the 2014 concordance-keywords corpus and the 2012 concordance-keywords corpus, the keywords are more related to foreign fighters than they are to a situation of uprisings and rebellions. In two of the first three columns of the table, the most prominent keyword is flow, indicating that the movement of FF was one of the leading discourses in the news. Also, security discourse is present already in the first column, with bill and threat stressing on the peculiar aspect of foreign fighters being potentially dangerous for their home countries, thus forcing them to act. Furthermore, security discourse being present in the first column also highlights the fact that discourses had changed from 2012 to 2014 when probably Western countries started to understand more deeply the phenomenon they were dealing with. Bill is present also in the second column, which, unsurprisingly, is the least representative, proving that discourses surrounding foreign fighters were rather similar in 2014 and 2015.

Finally, the last column shows the results obtained by comparing the 2014 concordance-keyword list with the NOW reference corpus wordlist and, in particular, for a matter of space, it displays only the first 50 non-grammatical items of the list, which, in total, was composed, of 114 positive keywords. Here, again, *foreign* and *fighters* are the most

outstanding words of the corpus, for the same reason outlined in section 5.2.2.1. above. Terrorism-related terms appear to be prominent in this list, with lexemes such as *Isis*, *terrorism*, *jihadist*, *Qaeda*, *jihad*, *radicalisation*, and *Isil*. Furthermore, several lexemes indicate that countries were taking actions in order to contrast the risk of terrorist attacks, as exemplified by *bill*, *legislation*, *counterterrorism*, *amendment*, and by the acronyms *ASIO* (which stands for *Australian Security Intelligence Office*), *ICSR* (which stands for *International Centre for the Study of Radicalization*). It is also possible to see the presence of words having to do with the numbers of foreign fighters travelling, such as *flow*, *number*, *estimated*, *returning*, *return*, *travelled*, and *travelling*.

#### 5.2.2.3. 2015 concordance-keywords

	2015 vs 2012		20	015 vs 2014		2	2015 vs 2019		2015 vs reference corpus		
keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness
state	86	13,43	citizenship	29	26,76	flow	80	30,92	fighters	1.091	9.412,00
Islamic	90	7,63	supplies	19	7,48	threat	40	17,31	foreign	1.182	9.197,53
flow	80	5,15	Belgium	13	6,23				Syria	174	1.150,93
			strip	12	4,95				fighter	91	642,14
									Islamic	90	560,62
									flow	80	514,62
									Iraq	76	503,54
									Isis	43	240,66
									citizenship	29	195,77
									returning	37	193,93
									state	86	155,44
									Turkey	30	138,69
									Australian	40	137,33
									terrorism	27	126,69
									Australians	17	95,23
									Australia's	11	84,97
									government's	11	84,97

					supplies	19	77,07
					terrorist	21	76,51
					posed	15	76,00
					joining	19	67,36
					influx	13	62,35
					Abbott	11	56,13
					Belgium	13	53,95
					jihadi	9	53,49
					estimated	20	48,98
					Syrian	16	47,50
					number	39	45,35
					radicalisation	8	45,07
					thousands	20	41,50
					stop	24	40,00
					disillusioned	6	39,84
					year's	6	39,84
					stopping	11	38,56
						13	
					suspected		37,09
					dual	10	33,98
					Syrians	7	32,68
					recruit	8	32,27
					returned	15	31,77
					Daesh	6	30,89
					brides	5	30,81
					state's	4	30,81
					Turkey's	5	30,81
					jihadist	7	28,31
					crossing	9	26,48
					act	22	24,98
					bishop	7	23,25
					recruits	7	23,25
					Dreyfus	4	21,79
					group's	4	21,79
Table 6, 201	I 1	nd Linta					

Table 6. 2015 concordance-keyword lists.

Also in this case, security discourse and the movement of foreign fighters appear to be the most prominent discourses, with *flow*, *citizenship*, and *threat*. Moreover, by computing the concordances of *strip*, it was possible to notice that – even though they were only twelve lines – it was mostly used in contexts such as 'proposals/plans/decision/powers/provisions to strip citizenship from foreign fighters' and similar, indicating the urge for countries of trying to find legal strategies to deal with the matter of foreign fighters. Also, the first column clearly shows the focus on the Islamic State, with *Islamic* and *state* having similar results both in frequency and in keyness, making it possible to claim that they were mostly used together. Indeed, it is not surprising that the Islamic State was more related to foreign fighters in 2015 news discourse than it was in 2012, since 2015 was the year when several terrorist attacks were carried out by Isis and, thus, particular attention was paid to the Islamic State in the news. Indeed, *Belgium* is amongst the keywords obtained by the comparison of 2015 with the 2014 concordance-keyword list, as Belgium was one of the European countries that were mostly affected by terrorist attacks in 2015.

As for the last column of keywords, in this case, for a matter of space, only the first 50 positive keywords were selected, out of 134 positive keywords in total. Even in this case, as in the previous two, *foreign* and *fighters* are the most prominent keywords. Also, similarly to what showed the table in section 5.2.2.2., several lexemes refer to terrorism, such as *Isis*, *terrorism*, *terrorist*, *jihadi*, *radicalisation*, *Daesh*, and *jihadist*, and also to the fact that foreign fighters are likely to 'join' something (in this case, terrorist organizations), as *joining* and *recruits*. Moreover, once again the characteristic of foreign fighters of moving from one place to another is underlined, with lexemes such as *returned*, and *crossing* amongst the keywords. Particular attention is also given to the quantity of foreign fighters moving, with terms such as *flow*, *influx*, *estimated*, *number*, and

thousands. However, even here it is possible to find lexemes that recall the fact that Western countries were trying to repress the problem, such as *citizenship*, *stop*, *suspected* and *stopping*. Also, interestingly, we find here the term *brides*, making it possible to hypothesize that there were also worries due to foreign fighters' families. Yet, particular attention to the use of terms such as 'bride' linked to foreign fighters will be given in chapter 6 of this work, since, as will be better explained at that point, often, terms such as *bride\** and *wife\** are used improperly to define foreign fighters' wives, while women actually took part in the fight.

5.2.2.4. 2019 concordance-keywords

	2019 vs 2012		2	019 vs 2014		2	2019 vs 2015		2019 vs reference corpus		
keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness	keyword	frequency	keyness
children	31	9,63	children	31	61,96	children	31	48,24	fighters	431	4.310,48
returning	28	7,81	families	25	35,26	families	25	25,30	foreign	462	3.972,69
bill	25	5,99	held	14	22,45	bill	25	13,26	Syria	53	341,68
return	23	4,77	Dutton	10	13,16	take	12	9,40	fighter	32	230,40
state	23	4,77	back	18	11,42	captured	12	9,40	returning	28	180,05
legislation	20	2,94	captured	12	7,83	held	14	8,13	Isis	22	131,62
			wives	10	7,21	detained	7	7,15	bill	25	86,54
			detained	7	6,19	exclusion	6	4,68	Dutton	10	74,62
			tens	9	5,09	ban	6	4,68	government's	8	72,08
			ban	6	3,87	back	18	3,40	Australian	19	64,71
			exclusion	6	3,87	forces	9	3,04	thousands	16	50,42
			Kurdish	6	3,87	wives	10	2,58	Kurdish	6	41,50
			legislation	20	3,06				radicalise	5	39,68
									Western	13	34,79
									exclusion	6	31,43
									Australia	15	30,13
									state's	4	28,88
									Iraqis	4	28,88
									SDF	4	28,88
									detained	7	26,95

						returned	10	25,83
						repatriate	4	23,89
						held	14	22,21
						least	15	19,21
						citizenship	5	18,53
						ASIO	3	18,08
						camps	6	16,66
						Kurds	3	13,59
						temporary	6	13,24
						recruited	4	12,22
						joined	8	11,20
						ranks	5	9,35
						Begum	3	8,56
						orders	6	8,53
						prevent	7	8,39
						ban	6	7,96
						conduit	2	7,28
						detain	2	7,28
						organization's	2	7,28
						Qa'ida	2	7,28
						backed		
							5	6,62
						trained	5	6,44
						Turkish	4	5,84
						fate	5	5,59
						Europe	8	5,59
						dual	4	5,56
						suspected	5	5,43
						effectiveness	3	4,13
						grapples	2	3,47
	2010	cordance-key	1					

Table 7. 2019 concordance-keywords.

In this case, the comparison between 2019 and other years' concordance-keywords lists was quantitatively more fruitful, indicating that discourses around foreign fighters had changed significantly through the years. In particular, the focus here seems to be on the

fact that, then, countries found themselves having to deal with the families of foreign fighters, with *children* being the most outstanding word in each of the first three columns. Linked to that, in the second and third columns, we find *families* and *wives*. It is thus interesting to see how the focus of discourses surrounding foreign fighters changed eight years after the Arab Spring: when Isis started to lose power in the Middle East, Western countries started to worry about how to solve the problem of returning foreign fighters and that of foreign fighters' families.

Another confirmation of the fact that, after Isis' weakening, the center of attention was how to deal with foreign fighters returning home is given by the presence of lexemes such as *returning*, *return*, *bill*, *legislation*, *ban*, and *back*. Also, here are present lexemes that recall the prison system, such as *captured*, *held*, and *detained*, suggesting that repression was one of the solutions mostly used to deal with the matter.

The last column shows the results obtained by the comparison of the 2019 concordance-keywords list with the NOW reference corpus WordList, again for matters of space, the first 50 non-grammatical keywords are displayed, out of 68 positive keywords resulting in a total. Once again, we find *fighters* and *foreign* at the top of the list. Similarly to the other columns of the table, there are terms referring to the movement of foreign fighters, such as *returning* and *returned*. Also, we find *repatriate*, which indeed indicates a movement, but forced by others – in this case, probably, western countries' authorities. Moreover, even in the fourth column, it is possible to notice terms referring to the repressive measures taken in order to tackle the problem, such as *bill*, *detained*, *exclusion*, (again) *repatriate*, *citizenship*, *ASIO*, prevent, *ban*, *detain*, and *suspected*.

What makes the fourth column of the table different from the other three, is the presence of lexemes referring to terrorism, such as *Isis*, *radicalise*, and *Qa'ida*, and the absence of

those referring to foreign fighters' families, which, thus, highlight the huge difference between 2019 and 2012, 2014, and 2015 corpora.

## **5.2.3.Keywords and Concordance – Keywords analyses:** conclusions

The analysis of keywords carried out in this section offered a few important starting points for the following parts of the analysis.

In particular, the keywords displayed in Table 3, obtained by the comparison of each year's corpus with the NOW reference corpus, preliminarily showed the evolution of discourses surrounding foreign fighters in the news, throughout the ten years under analysis. What emerged is that, while in the first years – namely 2011, 2012, and 2013 – there was more reference to a situation of uprisings and rebellions, with the escalation of the conflict and the Islamic State gaining more and more power, territories, and visibility, after 2014, the focal points started to be terrorism, foreign fighters' movements, and the repression of the phenomenon. As a result, in the first years, it is possible to find terms such as *rebel* and *rebels*, that, instead, are completely absent in the following years, replaced by lexemes as *terrorist*, thus suggesting that the Western view on the phenomenon changed following the events. In particular, what probably represented a breaking point were the several terrorist attacks carried out in Western countries by former foreign fighters who joined terrorist organizations in Syria and other Middle Eastern countries.

The results shown In Table 3 were somehow confirmed by the concordance-keywords analysis carried out in section 5.2., which, by comparing WordLists obtained by the concordance lines of *foreign fighter\** in 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2019 corpora with each other, offered the chance of analysing the keywords that were mostly related to foreign fighters in the news in each of the analysed years. Indeed, table 2 showed that, in 2012,

there was an outstanding use of terms such as *rebel*, *rebels*, *militant*, and *militants*, and almost no reference to *terrorist\** or *terrorism*, thus showing, once again, that the extent of the phenomenon was still unclear or that, at least, the focus was merely on Arab Springs and their direct consequences. On the other hand, 2014 and 2015 concordance-keywords analyses – with rather similar results – showed a change in the narrative surrounding foreign fighters, with terms such as *flow*, *threat*, *bill* and *Isis* being used prominently. Finally, the 2019 concordance-keywords analysis showed another significant change in discourses, since, following the weakening of the Islamic State, the focus started to be on the foreign fighters returning to their home countries and on how to deal with the matter represented by foreign fighters' families. Indeed, the most peculiar keywords in this case were terms such as *children*, *wives*, *families*, *return*, *returning*, *detained*, *legislation*, *bill*, *captured*, and so on.

In a nutshell, even from this preliminary analysis of the corpus, it is possible to claim that the way in which foreign fighters have been discursively constructed in the news has changed following the evolution of events and that, while at the beginning there was a focus on the rebellions going on in several countries of the Middle East, after the terrorist attacks carried out by Isis towards Western and, especially, European countries, the narrative on the phenomenon changed and there was a greater stress on terrorism and the threat represented by foreign fighters to their home countries. Indeed, this once again resulted in a slight change in discourses towards the end of the ten years, when Isis' power started to be weaker and when foreign fighters started to return home.

### 5.2.4. Collocates analysis.

As already pointed out, in this chapter the corpus is being analysed from a diachronic perspective, thus the focus is on the way in which the representation of foreign fighters has evolved throughout the ten years under examination. Therefore, after a preliminary

analysis of keywords in section 5.2.1., I decided to analyse the collocations of *foreign fighter\** in the corpus because it can help in better understanding what discourses mainly surrounded the construction of a certain actor, as in this case. The collocations have been calculated by following the procedure described in section 4.5. above: first of all, the concordance lists of *foreign fighter\** were calculated – one for each year under examination; after that, the collocates were calculated and analysed. Also, a 'stop list' has been created, in order to limit the results only to lexical words, thus avoiding the presence of grammatical words which would not be particularly interesting in the case of the present study. In the end, the collocates of *foreign fighter\** resulted as shown in the table below, where they are divided per year and where the 'n' between brackets indicates the ranking of each word in the collocates lists, while the numbers in the 'F' columns indicate the frequency of each collocate. Also, the table displays only the first 50 collocates of *foreign fighter\** per year, while the total collocates of *foreign fighter\** were 196 in the 2012 corpus, 781 in the 2014 corpus, 904 in the 2015 corpus, and 455 in the 2019 corpus.

Foreign fighter*									
2012		2014		2015		2019			
word/ranking F		word/ranking	F	word/ranking	F	word/ranking	F		
Syria (n= 11)	14	Syria (n=7)	177	from (n=7)	149	from (n=7)	50		
from (n=17)	11	from (n=8)	126	Syria (n=8)	148	Syria (n=12)	40		
number (n=14)	11	flow (n=12)	80	flow (n=15)	78	returning (n=18)	30		
militants (n=20)	9	Iraq (n=18)	63	Said (n=20)	66	children (n=22)	28		
many (n=24)	8	bill (n=20)	55	Iraq (n=21)	63	families (n=24)	28		
country (n=27)	8	including (n=24)	50	Islamic (n=23)	61	bill (n=25)	23		
presence (n=28)	8	threat (n=25)	42	state (n=24)	57	Islamic (n=26)	21		
said (n=29)	8	more (n=26)	41	more (n=29)	47	more (n=28)	20		
including (n=30)	8	Said (n=30)	35	into (n=31)	46	Said (n=30)	19		
other 8(n=31)	other 8(n=31) 7		33	including (n=33)	45	legislation	18		
						(n=31)			

growing (n=38)         6         Isis (n=40)         27         many (n=38)         34         including (n=35)         18           grovernment (n=49)         5         state (n=41)         27         Australian (n=39)         34         Australia (n=36)         18           government (n=41)         5         returning (n=42)         27         returning (n=42)         33         countries (n=39)         16           (n=41)         more (n=44)         5         many (n=44)         25         under (n=47)         30         Australian (n=40)         16           extremists (n=45)         5         thousands (n=45)         25         threat (n=48)         30         thousands (n=42)         16           extremists (n=48)         5         other (n=46)         24         citizenship (n=48)         29         back (n=45)         14           stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         Isis (n=49)         13           some (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13	Somalia (n=33)	7	number (n=33)	31	number (n=37)	35	return (n=32)	18
government (n=41)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	6	· · · · ·	27	l ' '	34	ì î	18
government (n=41)	Iraq (n=39)	5	state (n=41)	27	Australian	34	Australia (n=36)	18
(n=41)         more (n=44)         5         many (n=44)         25         under (n=47)         30         Australian (n=40)         16           extremists (n=45)         5         thousands (n=45)         25         threat (n=48)         30         thousands (n=42)         16           well (n=48)         5         other (n=46)         24         citizenship (n=49)         29         back (n=45)         14           stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         lsis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         lsis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=53)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government         11           mumbers (n=61)         4         could (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers					(n=39)			
(n=41)         more (n=44)         5         many (n=44)         25         under (n=47)         30         Australian (n=40)         16           extremists (n=45)         5         thousands (n=45)         25         threat (n=48)         30         thousands (n=42)         16           well (n=48)         5         other (n=46)         24         citizenship (n=49)         29         back (n=45)         14           stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         lsis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         lsis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=53)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government         11           mumbers (n=61)         4         could (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers	government	5	returning (n=42)	27	returning (n=42)	33	countries (n=39)	16
extremists 5 thousands (n=45) 25 threat (n=48) 30 thousands (n=42) 16 (n=45) well (n=48) 5 other (n=46) 24 citizenship (n=49) 29 back (n=45) 14 several (n=52) 4 home (n=53) 20 Isis (n=52) 27 state (n=49) 13 some (n=55) 4 Turkey (n=57) 19 laws (n=60) 23 held (n=53) 13 fighting (n=58) 4 groups (n=60) 18 Australia (n=61) 22 western (n=55) 13 held (n=53) 13 held (n=59) 4 new (n=61) 17 Turkey (n=62) 22 government (n=57) 3 australia (n=61) 22 western (n=55) 13 held (n=53) 13 held (n=53) 13 held (n=53) 13 held (n=53) 13 held (n=59) 14 new (n=61) 17 Turkey (n=62) 22 government (n=57) 3 western (n=55) 13 held (n=59) 14 new (n=61) 17 Turkey (n=62) 22 government (n=57) many (n=58) 11 held (n=64) 17 australia (n=64) 22 Europe (n=59) 10 across (n=62) 4 join (n=65) 17 group (n=65) 21 wives (n=62) 10 role (n=63) 4 among (n=66) 17 join (n=66) 21 most (n=64) 10 insurgents 3 laws (n=67) 17 terrorist (n=67) 20 take (n=67) 9 (n=67) arriving (n=68) 3 joined (n=68) 16 some (n=68) 19 other (n=71) 9 associated 3 countries (n=69) 16 Australians 18 Dutton (n=73) 8 (n=69) include (n=70) 3 Western (n=70) 16 thousands (n=71) 18 against (n=74) 8 national (n=71) 3 some (n=71) 16 supplies (n=72) 18 also (n=76) 8 Afghanistan 3 terrorist (n=73) 16 ranks (n=73) 18 government's 8 (n=77) all (n=76) 3 security (n=75) 16 legislation 16 joining (n=68) 7 (n=77) all (n=77) 3 most (n=78) 15 joined (n=78) 16 likely (n=87) 7 Amriki (n=78) 3 out (n=79) 15 new (n=80) 16 number (n=90) 7								
extremists (n=45)         5         thousands (n=45)         25         threat (n=48)         30         thousands (n=42)         16           well (n=48)         5         other (n=46)         24         citizenship (n=49)         29         back (n=45)         14           stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         Isis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=62)         4         join (n=66)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4<	more (n=44)	5	many (n=44)	25	under (n=47)	30	Australian	16
(n=45)         well (n=48)         5         other (n=46)         24         citizenship (n=49)         29         back (n=45)         14           stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         Isis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government (n=55)         13           Syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63) <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>(n=40)</td> <td></td>							(n=40)	
well (n=48)         5         other (n=46)         24         citizenship (n=49)         29         back (n=45)         14           stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         Isis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         mew (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government (n=57)         11           Syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         3	extremists	5	thousands (n=45)	25	threat (n=48)	30	thousands (n=42)	16
stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         Isis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           jihadists (n=57)         4         Turkey (n=57)         19         laws (n=60)         23         held (n=53)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         3	(n=45)							
stood (n=51)         4         stop (n=48)         22         other (n=50)         29         Isis (n=48)         14           several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           jihadists (n=57)         4         Turkey (n=57)         19         laws (n=60)         23         held (n=53)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government (n=55)         13           syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4	well (n=48)	5	other (n=46)	24	citizenship	29	back (n=45)	14
several (n=52)         4         home (n=53)         20         Isis (n=52)         27         state (n=49)         13           some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           jihadists (n=57)         4         Turkey (n=57)         19         laws (n=60)         23         held (n=53)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government (n=55)         13           syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3					(n=49)			
some (n=55)         4         return (n=55)         20         stop (n=59)         23         captured (n=50)         13           jihadists (n=57)         4         Turkey (n=57)         19         laws (n=60)         23         held (n=53)         13           fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government (n=55)         13           Syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           (n=67)         3         w	stood (n=51)	4	stop (n=48)	22	other (n=50)	29	Isis (n=48)	14
jihadists (n=57)	several (n=52)	4	home (n=53)	20	Isis (n=52)	27	state (n=49)	13
fighting (n=58)         4         groups (n=60)         18         Australia (n=61)         22         western (n=55)         13           Al-Qaeda (n=59)         4         new (n=61)         17         Turkey (n=62)         22         government (n=55)         11           Syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3         laws (n=67)         17         terrorist (n=67)         20         take (n=67)         9           (n=67)         arriving (n=68)         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           associated (n=69)         3         western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national	some (n=55)	4	return (n=55)	20	stop (n=59)	23	captured (n=50)	13
Al-Qaeda (n=59)   4	jihadists (n=57)	4	Turkey (n=57)	19	laws (n=60)	23	held (n=53)	13
Syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3         laws (n=67)         17         terrorist (n=67)         20         take (n=67)         9           (n=67)         arriving (n=68)         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           associated         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           (n=69)         include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           A	fighting (n=58)	4	groups (n=60)	18	Australia (n=61)	22	western (n=55)	13
Syria's (n=60)         4         Europe (n=62)         17         act (n=63)         22         many (n=58)         11           numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3         laws (n=67)         17         terrorist (n=67)         20         take (n=67)         9           (n=67)         arriving (n=68)         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           associated         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           (n=69)         include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           A	Al-Qaeda (n=59)	4	new (n=61)	17	Turkey (n=62)	22	government	11
numbers (n=61)         4         could (n=64)         17         all (n=64)         22         Europe (n=59)         10           across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3         laws (n=67)         17         terrorist (n=67)         20         take (n=67)         9           (n=67)         arriving (n=68)         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           associated (n=69)         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians (n=70)         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           (n=69)         include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         government's         8							(n=57)	
across (n=62)         4         join (n=65)         17         group (n=65)         21         wives (n=62)         10           role (n=63)         4         among (n=66)         17         join (n=66)         21         most (n=64)         10           insurgents         3         laws (n=67)         17         terrorist (n=67)         20         take (n=67)         9           (n=67)         arriving (n=68)         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           associated         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians (n=70)         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           (n=69)         include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           Afghanistan (n=73)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           (n=74)         against (n=75)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=75)         17         act (n=84) </td <td>Syria's (n=60)</td> <td>4</td> <td>Europe (n=62)</td> <td>17</td> <td>act (n=63)</td> <td>22</td> <td>many (n=58)</td> <td>11</td>	Syria's (n=60)	4	Europe (n=62)	17	act (n=63)	22	many (n=58)	11
role (n=63)	numbers (n=61)	4	could (n=64)	17	all (n=64)	22	Europe (n=59)	10
insurgents (n=67)	across (n=62)	4	join (n=65)	17	group (n=65)	21	wives (n=62)	10
(n=67)       arriving (n=68)       3 joined (n=68)       16 some (n=68)       19 other (n=71)       9         associated (n=69)       3 countries (n=69)       16 Australians (n=70)       18 putton (n=73)       8         (n=69)       3 Western (n=70)       16 thousands (n=71)       18 against (n=74)       8         national (n=71)       3 some (n=71)       16 supplies (n=72)       18 also (n=75)       8         now (n=73)       3 all (n=72)       16 ranks (n=73)       18 among (n=76)       8         Afghanistan (n=74)       3 terrorist (n=73)       16 joining(n=74)       18 government's (n=77)       8         against (n=75)       3 through (n=74)       16 countries (n=75)       17 act (n=84)       7         all (n=76)       3 security (n=75)       16 legislation (n=77)       16 joined (n=86)       7         left (n=77)       3 most (n=78)       15 joined (n=78)       16 likely (n=87)       7         Amriki (n=78)       3 out (n=79)       15 new (n=80)       16 number (n=88)       7         members (n=80)       3 over (n=80)       15 most (n=81)       16 over (n=90)       7	role (n=63)	4	among (n=66)	17	join (n=66)	21	most (n=64)	10
arriving (n=68)         3         joined (n=68)         16         some (n=68)         19         other (n=71)         9           associated (n=69)         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians (n=70)         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           (n=69)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         among (n=76)         8           Afghanistan (n=74)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           against (n=75)         3         through (n=74)         16         countries (n=75)         17         act (n=84)         7           all (n=76)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=77)         16         likely (n=87)         7           Amriki (n=78)         3         out (n=79)         15         new (n=80)         16         number (n=88)         7           members (n=80)	insurgents	3	laws (n=67)	17	terrorist (n=67)	20	take (n=67)	9
associated (n=69)         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians (n=70)         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         among (n=76)         8           Afghanistan (n=74)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           (n=74)         against (n=75)         3         through (n=74)         16         countries (n=75)         17         act (n=84)         7           all (n=76)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=77)         16         joined (n=86)         7           left (n=77)         3         most (n=78)         15         joined (n=78)         16         likely (n=87)         7           Amriki (n=78)         3         out (n=79)         15         new (n=80)         16         number (n=98)         7	(n=67)							
associated (n=69)         3         countries (n=69)         16         Australians (n=70)         18         Dutton (n=73)         8           include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         among (n=76)         8           Afghanistan (n=74)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           against (n=75)         3         through (n=74)         16         countries (n=75)         17         act (n=84)         7           all (n=76)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=75)         16         joined (n=86)         7           left (n=77)         3         most (n=78)         15         joined (n=78)         16         likely (n=87)         7           Amriki (n=78)         3         out (n=79)         15         new (n=80)         16         number (n=98)         7           members (n=80)	arriving (n=68)	3	joined (n=68)	16	some (n=68)	19	other (n=71)	9
include (n=70)         3         Western (n=70)         16         thousands (n=71)         18         against (n=74)         8           national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         among (n=76)         8           Afghanistan (n=74)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           against (n=75)         3         through (n=74)         16         countries (n=75)         17         act (n=84)         7           all (n=76)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=77)         16         joined (n=86)         7           left (n=77)         3         most (n=78)         15         joined (n=78)         16         likely (n=87)         7           Amriki (n=78)         3         out (n=79)         15         new (n=80)         16         number (n=88)         7           members (n=80)         3         over (n=80)         15         most (n=81)         16         over (n=90)         7	associated	3	countries (n=69)	16	Australians	18	Dutton (n=73)	8
national (n=71)         3         some (n=71)         16         supplies (n=72)         18         also (n=75)         8           now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         among (n=76)         8           Afghanistan (n=74)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           against (n=75)         3         through (n=74)         16         countries (n=75)         17         act (n=84)         7           all (n=76)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=77)         16         joined (n=78)         16         likely (n=87)         7           Amriki (n=78)         3         out (n=79)         15         new (n=80)         16         number (n=88)         7           members (n=80)         3         over (n=80)         15         most (n=81)         16         over (n=90)         7	(n=69)				(n=70)			
now (n=73)         3         all (n=72)         16         ranks (n=73)         18         among (n=76)         8           Afghanistan (n=74)         3         terrorist (n=73)         16         joining(n=74)         18         government's (n=77)         8           against (n=75)         3         through (n=74)         16         countries (n=75)         17         act (n=84)         7           all (n=76)         3         security (n=75)         16         legislation (n=77)         16         joined (n=86)         7           left (n=77)         3         most (n=78)         15         joined (n=78)         16         likely (n=87)         7           Amriki (n=78)         3         out (n=79)         15         new (n=80)         16         number (n=88)         7           members (n=80)         3         over (n=80)         15         most (n=81)         16         over (n=90)         7	include (n=70)	3	Western (n=70)	16	thousands (n=71)	18	against (n=74)	8
Afghanistan (n=74)       3       terrorist (n=73)       16       joining(n=74)       18       government's (n=77)       8         against (n=75)       3       through (n=74)       16       countries (n=75)       17       act (n=84)       7         all (n=76)       3       security (n=75)       16       legislation (n=77)       16       joined (n=86)       7         left (n=77)       3       most (n=78)       15       joined (n=78)       16       likely (n=87)       7         Amriki (n=78)       3       out (n=79)       15       new (n=80)       16       number (n=88)       7         members (n=80)       3       over (n=80)       15       most (n=81)       16       over (n=90)       7	national (n=71)	3	some (n=71)	16	supplies (n=72)	18	also (n=75)	8
(n=74)       against (n=75)       3       through (n=74)       16       countries (n=75)       17       act (n=84)       7         all (n=76)       3       security (n=75)       16       legislation (n=77)       16       joined (n=86)       7         left (n=77)       3       most (n=78)       15       joined (n=78)       16       likely (n=87)       7         Amriki (n=78)       3       out (n=79)       15       new (n=80)       16       number (n=88)       7         members (n=80)       3       over (n=80)       15       most (n=81)       16       over (n=90)       7	now (n=73)	3	all (n=72)	16	ranks (n=73)	18	among (n=76)	8
against (n=75)       3       through (n=74)       16       countries (n=75)       17       act (n=84)       7         all (n=76)       3       security (n=75)       16       legislation (n=77)       16       joined (n=86)       7         left (n=77)       3       most (n=78)       15       joined (n=78)       16       likely (n=87)       7         Amriki (n=78)       3       out (n=79)       15       new (n=80)       16       number (n=88)       7         members (n=80)       3       over (n=80)       15       most (n=81)       16       over (n=90)       7	Afghanistan	3	terrorist (n=73)	16	joining(n=74)	18	government's	8
all (n=76)       3       security (n=75)       16       legislation (n=77)       16       joined (n=86)       7         left (n=77)       3       most (n=78)       15       joined (n=78)       16       likely (n=87)       7         Amriki (n=78)       3       out (n=79)       15       new (n=80)       16       number (n=88)       7         members (n=80)       3       over (n=80)       15       most (n=81)       16       over (n=90)       7	(n=74)						(n=77)	
left (n=77) 3 most (n=78) 15 joined (n=78) 16 likely (n=87) 7  Amriki (n=78) 3 out (n=79) 15 new (n=80) 16 number (n=88) 7  members (n=80) 3 over (n=80) 15 most (n=81) 16 over (n=90) 7	against (n=75)	3	through (n=74)	16	countries (n=75)	17	act (n=84)	7
left (n=77)     3     most (n=78)     15     joined (n=78)     16     likely (n=87)     7       Amriki (n=78)     3     out (n=79)     15     new (n=80)     16     number (n=88)     7       members (n=80)     3     over (n=80)     15     most (n=81)     16     over (n=90)     7	all (n=76)	3	security (n=75)	16	legislation	16	joined (n=86)	7
Amriki (n=78) 3 out (n=79) 15 new (n=80) 16 number (n=88) 7 members (n=80) 3 over (n=80) 15 most (n=81) 16 over (n=90) 7					(n=77)			
members (n=80) 3 over (n=80) 15 most (n=81) 16 over (n=90) 7	left (n=77)	3	most (n=78)	15	joined (n=78)	16	likely (n=87)	7
	Amriki (n=78)	3	out (n=79)	15	new (n=80)	16	number (n=88)	7
fray (n=83)   3   border (n=81)   15   last (n=82)   15   returned (n=91)   7	members (n=80)	3	over (n=80)	15	most (n=81)	16	over (n=90)	7
	fray (n=83)	3	border (n=81)	15	last (n=82)	15	returned (n=91)	7

views (n=84)	3	posed (n=82)	15	estimated (n=83)	15	Iraq (n=92)	7
want (n=85) 3		against (n=83)	15	around (n=85)	15	detained (n=93)	7
training (n=86)	raining (n=86) 3		15	two (n=86)	15	tens (n=94)	7
group (n=87)	3	issue (n=85)	14	among (n=87)	14	into (n=96)	7
used (n=88)	3	Syrian (n=86)	14	returned (n=88)	14	during (n=98)	6
estimated (n=89)	3	estimated (n=87)	13	suspected (n=89)	13	after (n=99)	6
entered (n=91)	3	likely (n=88)	13	country (n=90)	13	some (n=100)	6
conflict (n=92)	conflict (n=92) 3		13	return (n=91)	13	hundreds	6
						(n=101)	
established	3	terrorism (n=90)	13	known (n=92)	13	orders (n=102)	6
(n=93)							
help (n=95)	3	problem (n=91)	13	largest (n=94)	13	through (n=103)	6

Table 6. Collocates of *foreign fighter\**, divided per year and showing their ranking and their frequency.

Table 6 shows results that are similar to what was discussed in the keywords analysis above: discourses surrounding foreign fighters inevitably changed through the years, with certain aspects being more stressed in certain years than in others, following the events. However, the first visible result is that, while, in Table 3, the results in the 2012 column showed a focus on rebellions, uprisings, and insurrections, here, already in 2012, the collocates are mostly related to a jargon that has to do with terrorism, probably because collocates were calculated out of *foreign fighter\** concordance lines.

In all of the four analysed corpora, the first two words that more often occur as collocates of *foreign fighter\** are *Syria* and *from*, indicating probably a focus on foreign fighters coming back from Syria. Also, in all of the four years analysed here, particular attention is given to the number of foreign fighters, with words such as *number*, *numbers*, *flow*, *many*, *more*, *some*, *estimated*, *group*, *groups*, *thousands*, *most*, *all*, *tens*, *hundreds*, and *largest*, indicating that the number of foreign fighters was something that needed to be underlined. Moreover, expressions such as *growing*, presumably were used as a collocate together with words expressing some type of quantity. Another discourse that – unsurprisingly – seems to recur often in all of the four corpora is that of terrorism, with

terms such as *extremists*, *terrorist*, *terrorism*, *jihadists*, *Al-Qaeda*, and *Isis*. It is also paid particular attention to the fact that foreign fighters join something else – often terrorist organizations, with *join*, *joining*, and *joined* being among the first fifty collocates of *foreign fighter\** in 2014, 2015, and 2019 corpora.

However, even though the four lists of collocates seem to be rather similar at first sight, they still are different from each other and their differences somehow follow what was noticed through the analysis of keywords. First of all, in the 2012 corpus, *militants* (f=9) is one of the words that most often collocates with foreign fighter\* and, if we look at the first column, it is also possible to find *insurgents* (f=3); both terms are only present as collocates of foreign fighter\* in the 2012 corpus. In the other three corpora, instead, it seems clear that the *foreign fighter\** phenomenon, that in 2012 was still considered only partially – and this is also shown by the frequencies of the collocates of *foreign fighter\** if we compare them to the other three columns, demonstrating that it was being paid less attention to the issue of foreign fighters at the beginning, even in a corpus of article collected by looking for *foreign fighter\** in the search bar – started to be focused on from different perspectives. In particular, in 2014 and 2015 corpora, the aspect of the risk represented by foreign fighters, with threat appearing amongst the first fifty collocates only in these two corpora, respectively with a frequency of 42 and 30. In the 2014 corpus, it is even possible to notice that security discourse started to be prominently related to that of foreign fighters, with security (f=16) and border (f=15) among the collocates. Indeed, the aspect of security is particularly touched in all of the three corpora -2014, 2015, and 2019 – with several words attributable to the semantic field of law and security amongst the first fifty collocates of foreign fighter\*, such as bill, laws, act, citizenship, legislation. This concept is also reinforced by the presence of suspected (f=13) in the 2015 corpus, and of *detained* (f=7) and *orders* (f=6) in the 2019 corpus.

Another result that inevitably needs to be commented on is the presence of *Islamic* as a collocate of *foreign fighter\** in the 2014, 2015, and 2019 corpora, in all of the three cases occupying a rather high position in the rankings, with a frequence, respectively, of 33, 61, and 21. This frequent occurrence of *Islamic* as a collocate of *foreign fighter\** is interesting in that it shows an urge to underlying the faith of foreign fighters.

Unsurprisingly, in 2014. 2015, and 2019 there is a focus on the 'returning foreign fighters', with return, returned, and returning among the words collocating most often with foreign fighter\*. In this regard, it is also important to underline that, in the 2019 corpus, returning is the third non-grammatical word occurring more often as a collocate of foreign fighter\* (n= 18 / f= 30), while return is the eleventh non-grammatical collocate of foreign fighter\* (n=32 / f=18), thus showing amongst the highest levels of frequency in the list. Moreover, the 2019 corpus is the only one showing back (n=45 / f= 14) amongst the first fifty nongrammatical collocates of foreign fighter\*. Yet, it can be claimed that this is because, after eight years of war, after the terrorist attacks that affected the West, and after Isis had lost power, the eventuality that foreign fighters were coming back to their home countries after having fought or having being trained started to worry governments and to be a focal point in the discursive construction of such a social actor. Furthermore, as already shown in the analysis of concordance-keywords, in section 5.2.2.4. above, also here it is possible to notice that particular attention was given to foreign fighters' families, with children (n=22 /f =28), families (n=24/f=28), and wives (n=62 / f= 10) amongst the first fifty nongrammatical collocates of foreign fighter\*. This demonstrates that not only the return of foreign fighters was concerning Western countries, but also how to treat the delicate aspect of foreign fighters' families was something governments had the urge to deal with.

To sum up, the analysis of collocates confirmed what had already been discussed in the analysis of keywords and in the concordance-keyword analysis above: the discursive construction of foreign fighters has changed throughout the period under examination. Indeed, 2012 collocates show results that are quantitatively less satisfying than what is displayed in the other three lists, but still, it is coherent with the fact that the analysis carried out in the previous section showed how, in the beginning, the focus was still more on the Arab Springs' uprisings and revolutions and on their direct preliminary consequence, rather than it was on foreign fighters. Then, in 2014 and 2015, the events evolved so much that there started to be a change in the discourses surrounding foreign fighters, with more and more focus on terrorism and on the security measures developed by governments to tackle the problem. Also, there started to be a focus on the eventuality that foreign fighters might go back to their home countries, a concern that grew even more in 2019, with the last list of collocates showing even references to foreign fighters' families.

In a nutshell, the analysis of keywords and collocates based on diachronic changes showed three main discursive patterns and ways of discursively constructing foreign fighters: the assimilation of foreign fighters as a social actor, the link between foreign fighters and terrorism, and the focus on foreign fighters' families in 2019 subcorpus.

### 5.3. The discursive construction of foreign fighters from 2011 to 2021.

This part of the chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of how foreign fighters, as social actors, have been discursively constructed in the news in the ten years under examination, using as a starting point the results obtained from the analyses carried out in the above sections. In particular, an analysis of concordances will be carried out here, followed by

a more detailed analysis of texts contained in the corpus, in order to examine discourses in their context.

A premise regarding the concordanc" lin's must thus be made at this point: as already mentioned in the methodological section, not every concordance line will be analysed here, but, for each of the years under analysis in this case, 200 randomly selected lines will be the focus of the study. In cases where the number of concordance lines obtained was lower than 200, all the available lines became object of study. For instance, from the 2012 corpus it was possible to obtain only 163 concordance lines of *foreign fighter\**, so all of them were analysed. Instead, higher numbers of lines were available for the other three corpora, respectively 998 in the 2014 corpus, 1170 in the 2015 corpus, and 456 in the 2019 corpus. Hence, in all these three cases, a smaller sample of 200 concordance lines was randomly selected, by adopting the following procedure in the Concordance list in *WordSmith Tools*: Edit – Deleting – Reduce to N, where N was set to 200. Furthermore, the concordances have been calculated by setting the *WordSmith* concordance control to calculate five collocates on the left (L5) and five on the right (R5), with a minimum frequency of 10 and minimum presence in texts 1 (see section 4.3.3.).

As outlined in paragraph 5.2.4., if we focus on the evolution of discourses surrounding foreign fighters in the news during the ten years under examination, it is possible to claim that three main patterns of discourses emerge, evolve, and change during the years: the way in which assimilation has been used to refer to foreign fighters in the news, the focus on terrorism, and the attention given to foreign fighters' families when discursively constructing the returning foreign fighters in 2019 subcorpus.

#### 5.3.1. Foreign fighters: a matter of numbers

The previous sections of this chapter showed that, in the corpus, it was often paid particular attention to the estimated number of people deciding to become foreign fighters and to join a conflict and/or a terrorist organization. As it has also been mentioned in the methodological chapter, the stress on quantity and the strategy of representing a social actor as a group is what Van Leeuwen defined as 'assimilation' and is one of the categories he identified as normally used in the discursive construction of social actors (Van Leeuwen, 1996). Moreover, in this specific case, insisting on numbers may also be seen as a way to stress fear discourse, because public opinion may feel threatened by the eventuality that this huge number of foreign fighters is actually going back to their home countries.

By analysing the samples of concordances, it was possible to notice that, among the four analysed subcorpora, the one where there was the highest number of lines stressing the quantity of foreign fighters was that of 2019, thus confirming that, towards the end of the examined period, it was given particular attention to the number of people who had joined the fighting and who could eventually go back to their home countries.

Extremism, estimated that there were 1,200-1,500 foreign fighters across Syria. The

Rebel leaders inside Syria say about 15-20 foreign fighters have been crossing each day

evening it was under the control of about 150 foreign fighters who described themselves

Syrian border town, said a jihadist group of 200 foreign fighters had grabbed control of that

an Amisom spokesman, believes an estimated 250 foreign fighters -from Britain, America,

protest movement and to claim that there are 5,000 foreign fighters in the country.

That its troops are up against as many as 5,000 foreign fighters. The armed opposition, I, the organization's ranks include several dozen foreign fighters, some with United States

Definitely." Mallah says he encountered few foreign fighters in his travels, save for one

There are believed to be several hundred foreign fighters in Somalia, The Associated

Bureau. He told reporters that there were so many foreign fighters and other external actors can talk about," he said. It is unclear how many "foreign fighters" have joined the Syrian volution, but then he said he was one of the many foreign fighters who had flocked to Iraq to situation in the south, and possibly draw in more foreign fighters. "I think it is going to be positions or resupply their ammunition or if **more** foreign fighters infiltrated the country. To emerge now as people query the number of foreign fighters among the insurgents. Lay a central role in the fighting. The number of foreign fighters entering the fray has also wing problem. Scores and perhaps even hundreds of foreign fighters -- from Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Last month a UN panel warned that the **number of foreign fighters** in the conflict was growing ividuals come, no problem." The rising numbers of foreign fighters in Syria comes at a moment of 'ida in Iraq. Accurate estimates of the number of foreign fighters in the country are difficult al-Shura, which appears to have lured a **number of foreign fighters**, including Britons, to The Syrian government facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq for many years, and pposition. There has been a rise in the number of foreign fighters, many of them Islamist opposition movement, which has seen thousands of foreign fighters across Syria's northern to make a big thing recently about the influx of foreign fighters," said one western diplomat. Tias, who are reportedly being joined by bands of foreign fighters. Saying that she had received ers in the network are Syrian, with the **number of foreign fighters** varying between 1200-150 in Lebanon and Iraq. Aware of the number of foreign fighters who have entered the country, city serves as a base for some of the **hundreds\_of** foreign fighters who have answered the call university student is among a growing number of foreign fighters whose involvement in Syria's There have been many reports of jihadis or other foreign fighters flowing into Syria, as if it and wariness Over the summer, Amriki and other foreign fighters left Marka, and African Union look into the jihadist life of Amriki and other foreign fighters, as well as the militia's us to wage jihad." In Marka, Amriki and other foreign fighters attended the local mosque,

Table 8. Concordances of *foreign fighter\** indicating quantity, in the 2012 subcorpus.

Table 8 shows the concordance lines of *foreign fighter\** that, amongst the 163 lines obtained from the 2012 subcorpus, defined the social actor through quantity. In seven lines we can see precise numbers occurring with *foreign fighter\**. Quantification is indeed one way through which foreign fighters were characterized from the beginning thus, in

these cases, the assimilation of foreign fighters is conveyed through a definite quantifier, as we are given precise data on their quantity. However, it is noticeable that the numbers displayed here are still quite low and that, from a diachronic perspective, it is probably because 2012 was still a moment when the extent of the phenomenon was still unclear. It is also interesting to notice that in the two lines where the highest number -5,000 - isused to modify *foreign fighters*, who is writing is rather certain of what they are reporting, with expressions such as *claim that there are*, and *there are as many as*, while elsewhere in the first seven lines the numbers are often accompanied by words that indicate some sort of uncertainty regarding the ciphers, such as about, and estimated. In other cases, the numbers are expressed more generically, with pre-modifiers such as hundreds of, thousands of, and several dozen. Other expressions occurring here before foreign fighter\* and used to indicate quantity are few, many, more, and other with the last two indicating that the numbers were likely to grow, thus expressing some sort of warning, as in if more foreign fighters infiltrated the country or in other foreign fighters flowing to Syria. A similar meaning is conveyed through expressions such as the rising number of, a rise in the number of, and a growing number of. Interestingly, in one case, the expression bands of foreign fighters is used to quantify foreign fighters, indicating a rather smaller amount of people than other modifiers used here, even though it is used in its plural form. Another way used to refer to foreign fighters that tells us something about their quantity is through liquid metaphors, such as flow and influx, which, indeed, not only indicate that we are dealing with a rather considerable number of people but also stress on one of the main characteristics of foreign fighters, which is that of being able to travel from a place to another quite easily. Moreover, they seem to be indicating that they are difficult to stop. In almost all of the other lines displayed in Table 8, foreign fighters are assimilated through the use of the number of – with number that, as showed in section 5.2.4., had a total frequency of 11 as a collocate of *foreign fighter\** in the 2012 subcorpus – sometimes in turn premodified by expressions as *estimated*. The use of *the number of*, especially when preceded by *estimated*, suggests that the journalist is hedging, thus trying to remain vague, even by still making it imaginable that the number of foreign fighters is high (or growing).

All in all, in the case of the 2012 corpus, when assimilation is conveyed through the use of undefined modifiers it seems to indicate that we are dealing with something which may be troublesome. Instead, when here assimilation is made through definite quantifiers, being them rather small numbers, the message that is being communicated to the public is that of a much weaker warning. In both cases, however, as already outlined in this section, it must be kept in mind the context of the 2012 subcorpus, which is that of a conflict that had started only one year before and of a period when – even though, as testified by the lines analysed here, foreign fighters had already caught the attention of the media and, thus, of the public opinion – the extent of foreign fighters' phenomenon was still unclear.

Lastly, also a quick look at the parts of concordance lines following *foreign fighter\** offers the chance of making a few considerations on the discursive construction of foreign fighters. First of all, the phrase expressing quantity is often followed by *in*, itself followed by the name of a country, such as *Syria* or *Somalia*, or by the expression *in the country*. Thus, even though the concordances originated by the subcorpora of the following years have not been examined yet, it can already be claimed that, at this point, the focus was not on returning foreign fighters, but rather on foreign fighters who were joining the fighting. However, in a few cases, it is specified the foreign fighters' provenience, as in *from Britain, America*, and in *including Britons*. Furthermore, in other cases, the phrase is followed by a relative clause, giving us some further information. However, what is

noteworthy here is that, in most cases, *foreign fighter\** is followed by an active verb, thus the subject is activated rather than passivated. As pointed out in section 4.4.2., the activation/passivation of social actors is crucial to discourse analysis, since, as explained by Van Leeuwen (1996), it has to do with role allocation. By activating a social actor as *foreign fighter\** – which are indeed depicted as threats and potential terrorists – the journalist is deliberately choosing to attribute them power: they are responsible for their actions and are not discursively constructed as victims or as being oppressed in any way.

D that about 60 Australians were among the 10,000 foreign fighters who have joined the the United Nations security council, some 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries have in Iraq and Syria are now estimated to have 3000 foreign fighters. Many are from Britain and London, which has assembled a database of 450 foreign fighters over the past 18 months, Terrorism Information Centre, there are 6000-7000 foreign fighters in Syria, overwhelmingly with intelligence services estimate that more than 7,000 foreign fighters from 50 countries have amass more resources, more arms, to attract more foreign fighters ...over time that could be a But in Denmark, a country that <u>has spawned</u> more foreign fighters per capita than almost l content- has attracted <u>unprecedented numbers</u> of foreign fighters. An <u>awful lot</u> of that is down agreed to staunch Isis funding and influx of foreign fighters, critical priorities for intelligence and its allies are the number of foreign fighters from Western countries who fact these terrorists include a growing number of foreign fighters from Europe is cause for Steven J. Sotloff. And it is drawing hundreds of foreign fighters from Western Europe and even ls at the time as an effort to stanch the flow of foreign fighters from Syria. The underlying to be seen. The debate over stemming the flow of foreign fighters has opened up new legal group, wherever it was operating. While the flow of foreign fighters heading for Syria and Iraq social media seems to be working. The numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq already said the organization has attracted thousands of foreign fighters, including Western passport The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq poses a threat for drafted by the United States, to stem the flow of foreign fighters into banned terrorist intelligence agencies are monitoring the flow of foreign fighters, many of whom are British, wrote. Denmark, with the second-highest <u>number of</u> foreign fighters per capita, has gone in the powers curb their arms supplies and the inflow of foreign fighters. Rather than trying to State (Isis) has begun emphasizing the torrent of foreign fighters the group has attracted from that the mullah had brought in "hundreds of foreign fighters." Two soldiers died during its ranks swelled by a steady influx of foreign fighters. Unable to take Fallujah, wants Turkey to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters who have used the country as ation to do more to halt the flow of thousands of foreign fighters who have swarmed into the d States needs Turkey to help control the flow of foreign fighters who have swelled the ranks of Indonesia–Indonesians have joined the **thousands of foreign fighters who** have travelled to Syria to officials say. Like thousands of other foreign fighters, many have been drawn on

Table 9. Concordances of *foreign fighter\** indicating quantity, in the 2014 subcorpus.

Table 9 shows – amongst the 200 lines randomly selected from the 2014 subcorpus – the concordance lines in which foreign fighters are quantified, and we can immediately notice a few changes from the results displayed in Figure 1. First of all, the first six lines show

precise numbers used as definite quantifiers of the keyword in context foreign fighter\* and, in this case, it is noticeable that the numbers used are way bigger than those found in 2012 subcorpus, which is because, after two years, the conflict had evolved, and the numbers of foreign fighters had increased. Also, public opinion started to focus more and more on the phenomenon of foreign fighters and this is also testified by the fact that, while in the 2012 subcorpus only 163 lines of concordances were available when looking at foreign fighter\* as a search term, in 2014 the total number of concordance lines was 998, demonstrating how foreign fighters started to become a central topic in the news. Hence, once again, using precise numbers to define the number of foreign fighters seems a way to imply that they are an issue public opinion should focus on and be aware of, with numbers that are increasing and increasing. The ciphers in the first six lines are preceded both by expressions that make the numbers uncertain, such as estimated, and some, both by expressions as there are, conveying the meaning that the numbers are rather certain. Yet, even in this case, the way in which foreign fighters have been assimilated is especially through the use of indefinite quantifiers. As in Figure 1, there are examples of numbers expressed more indefinitely, as in hundreds of and in thousands of. Indeed, even here we find more two times, but with a different meaning than that conveyed in Figure 1, where it was used to underline that the number of foreign fighters was increasing: here, it is also used in its comparative sense, when referring to the fact that Denmark has spawned more foreign fighters pro capita than, underlying the large number of people from Denmark who joined the conflict when compared to other countries.

As shown in the analysis of collocates carried out in section 5.2.4., *flow* occurs 80 times as a collocate of foreign fighter\* in the 2014 subcorpus and, even in the sample of 200 concordance lines, *flow* is used seven times; also, there are expressions having a similar meaning and occurring here, as *inflow*, *influx*, and *torrent*, which, as outlined previously,

at the same time, they highlight their quantity and their ability to move from a place to another. In one case, flow of is used together with thousands of foreign fighters, stressing the huge quantity of FF. Furthermore, the use of terms such as flow, inflow, influx, and torrent somehow seems to construct foreign fighters as something that is actually difficult to stop and, indeed, they are often preceded by expressions such as to stench, to stem, to crack down on, to control, all contributing to building the image of huge amounts of people traveling around the world without governments concretely being able to stop them. Moreover, the flow of foreign fighters, as a noun phrase, is almost always used as the subject of the active verb that follows and that, actually, – as said previously here – is a way of activating it and of attributing its power, as, for instance, in the case of the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq poses a threat. All of this may contribute to strengthening the public opinion's fears towards a phenomenon that is unclear and blurring on the one hand but that is presented in the news as being made of great numbers of potentially extremely dangerous people on the other.

In the concordance lines in Figure 2, the *number(s)* of foreign fighters are said to be *unprecedented* and *growing*, thus, again, underlining the huge amount of people joining the foreign fighters' ranks.

Finally, also in the case of the 2014 subcorpus, *foreign fighter\** is often used as a subject of an active verb and, again, activating a social actor is a practice through which the author is attributing them some sort of power. Avoiding representing them as passivated subjects contributes to constructing their image of a difficult issue governments were dealing with at the time the articles were published.

experts estimate that there are more than 18,000 foreign fighters involved in the conflict. To the kinetic battlefield. The roughly 20,000 foreign fighters it has recruited is about are not shown because they are off the map 21,475 foreign fighters who have joined Islamic State Isis's enemies. The group has more than 30,000 foreign fighters and many more local assessment that concludes that nearly 30,000 foreign fighters have 127rayelled to Iraq and wants a blanket hardline approach, seeing all foreign fighters as terrorists. Tony Abbott his life by using a smuggler. And indeed, many foreign fighters already have European posed by the Islamic State, which fields many foreign fighters who are often unfamiliar with co-ordinator, has said Belgium produces more foreign fighters for Syria per head than any behind the plot. Belgium reportedly supplies more foreign fighters to Syria than any other EU as already taken important steps to halt flows of foreign fighters and combat ISIL's messaging." Ended with agreement to "stem the flow of foreign fighters and secure Turkey's border pledged at last year's UNGA, to stem the flow of foreign fighters, and to respond to Isis's played "a significant role" among the **hundreds of foreign fighters** and families in Syria. He Islamic State on the ground say certain groups of foreign fighters appear to move like shock led by USA Today and other outlets. The **number of foreign fighters assisting** the Kurds is hat country may help explain the large numbers of foreign fighters. But were the United States to do more to control their end of the flow of foreign fighters crossing Turkey to reach which is an important step to stemming the flow of foreign fighters". He also spoke of efforts to offensive, buoyed by an unusually high influx of foreign fighters, including Uzbeks and Chinese progress, but not enough" in stemming the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria. Mr. plundered antiquities and attracted thousands of foreign fighters. Its brutality and deft use al Taliban fighters left him alone, the **influx of foreign fighters** over the past year or two strongholds would have much impact on the **flow of** foreign fighters. "They began arriving before given him commitments to help stop the flow of foreign fighters to Islamic State and to block into its financing and slowing the flow of foreign fighters to the group. Even so, some effort to cut off funding and the supply line of foreign fighters to Isis, but he rejected any posed of 30 countries working to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Syria. He said some of the Michael Keenan warned last night. The **flow of foreign fighters** to Syria and Iraq was The unprecedented threat posed by the **flow of foreign fighters** to the Islamic State terror is trying to stem the substantial flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. The flow of finance, we have to cut off the flow of foreign fighters, we've got to tackle the said they began the offensive after hundreds of foreign fighters were deployed as include finding ways of stemming the flow of foreign fighters, who have joined Isis from interpretation of Sharia and a steady stream of foreign fighters. Witnesses said that youths from Wisconsin, said that almost half of the foreign fighters that have joined the People's

Figure 2. Concordances of *foreign fighter\** indicating quantity, in the 2015 subcorpus.

Figure 3 displays the concordances of *foreign fighter\** indicating quantity, amongst the 200 concordance lines randomly selected from the 1170 lines of concordances of the 2015 subcorpus. Here, once again, the keyword in context *foreign fighter\** is assimilated – in seven cases – through the use of exact numbers as definite quantifiers. From a diachronic perspective, it is possible to notice how the numbers are increasing more and more. Indeed, exceptions made for the first two lines, where the numbers are rather low, and the other ciphers displayed here almost double those analysed in Figures 1 and 2. These numbers are preceded by expressions as *roughly*, *estimates*, and *nearly*, implying that,

even though the quantifier is definite and precise, the actual number is uncertain; in other cases, they are preceded by *more than*, which, indeed, is another way to imply that the real numbers are unknown (but, in any case, bigger). There are also numbers expressed through indefinite quantifiers, such as *hundreds of* and *thousands of*. Moreover, also *many* (f=34) is used here to indicate an imprecise number of foreign fighters; interestingly, in two cases here we find *more* (f=41) as premodifier of *foreign fighter\**, used to say that Belgium is one of the countries that has the highest number of citizens amongst the foreign fighters' ranks.

However, here, the main way to assimilate foreign fighter\* is by using flow (f=78). Even though the analysis of 200 concordance lines out of 1170 is inevitably partial, the expression flow of foreign fighter\* seems to portray a recurring discursive pattern in the construction of foreign fighters as a huge amount of people – moving from their home countries to places where they join terrorist organizations and take part in a conflict – whose movement is actually difficult to stop, as that of a flow. This image is shaped also through the use of synonyms of flow, all recalling a liquid metaphor, such as influx, and stream. To reinforce this idea of foreign fighters as a 'river' of people which is difficult to stop, expressions such as flow of foreign fighters are often preceded by verbs such as to stem, to halt, to stop, to slow, to cut off. Furthermore, one line talks about the unprecedented threat posed by the flow of foreign fighters, which, again, contributes to enhancing the discourse of foreign fighters as threatening their home countries; indeed, the expression used here is a statement and does not contain any sort of hedging. Even supply line of foreign fighters is used in one of the concordance lines, recalling, instead, a more industrial image.

Finally, in this case, we find fewer activations of the social actor of foreign fighters, as there are fewer occasions in which they are subject to an active form of a verb. Yet, exceptions made for the cases in which the articles talk about *flow of foreign fighters* that should be *stopped*, *steamed*, *halted*, and so on, even here they are more activated than they are passivated. This means that they are still represented as those in power that, indeed, Western governments are not able to stop.

Internment camps. Among the detainees are 1,000 foreign fighters and 9,000 of their wives and across northeastern Syria, along with about 1,000 foreign fighters and at least 60,000 Syrians -offences. The government has also stripped 12 foreign fighters of their citizenship under In the village of Bashund in Wardoj District, 120 foreign fighters still lived in houses they supporters and families, including about 2,000 foreign fighters, are held under Kurdish guard 9,000 local Syrians and Iraqis, as well as 2,000 foreign fighters —including scores from fighters, but there are a little over 2,000 foreign fighters, many of which come from estimates are slightly lower, counting about 2,200 foreign fighters among 11,000 prisoners. The me in July that these prisons are holding 2,500 foreign fighters, including about 1,000 Iraqi radical Islamists, this group included 2,500 foreign fighters, Mazloum said, with about 8,000 members in Iraq and Syria, including 3,000" foreign fighters". It had "solidified its introduce the TEO legislation, it's reported 40 foreign fighters have returned to Australia. Are our honour," the poster says, depicting 40 foreign fighters, who was killed in March say. The Islamic State recruited more than 40,000 foreign fighters and their families from 80 to Syria to support Islamic State. Maybe 40,000 foreign fighters went to Syria. Maybe half of e commander in Badakhshan, said that at least 400 foreign fighters had joined the Taliban, Al in Badakhshan, said there were at least 400 foreign fighters in the province who had and last year- 13 per cent of the total of 41,490 foreign fighters. According to a report last intelligence service, says that at least 44 foreign fighters continue to operate in the regrets for her support for Isis. More than 5,000 foreign fighters had already returned by the be Isis relatives and do not include more than 50 foreign fighters captured in the same period. Supported Syrian Democratic Forces was holding 800 foreign fighters from 50-plus countries. The take responsibility for them. There are about 800 foreign fighters in Kurdish custody, along held in special camps, as well as more than 800 foreign fighters. "That number will increase origin. "We need a sustainable solution for all foreign fighters. Nobody can wash their hands unclear: Does he really plan to send back all foreign fighters to Europe? Or is he opening weeks, gave instructions to the families of all foreign fighters to make their own choices as countries," she added. She said 800 to 900 Isis foreign fighters were currently held in prison darkness of IS rule, there are more than 1000 male foreign fighters and enthusiasts who've been and mother innocent of brutality. They lie. Many foreign fighters demanding a right of return UK law because she is not a dual citizen. Many foreign fighters from Western countries are News Corp papers over the weekend about how many foreign fighters had already returned to or Guardians of Religion, is known to have many foreign fighters. It split from the biggest 2011 "Jasmine Revolution" the country sent more foreign fighters to Isis per capita than any in captivity here, including a large number of foreign fighters, all of them captured at in north-east Syria, with tens of thousands of foreign fighters and families in cramped Isis has lost its territory and thousands of foreign fighters and their families have fled, he's right. "If there are... a large number of foreign fighters in captivity in Syria who governments, is the issue of tens of thousands of foreign fighters, including thousands

interconnected and transregional: "The flow of foreign fighters, the flow of resources and State "caliphate" galvanized tens of thousands of foreign fighters to flood into Syria. His remains unclear, especially the many hundreds of foreign fighters whose home countries refuse amid. The militia said it had also detained other foreign fighters, including citizens of he had journeyed along with thousands of other foreign fighters to join the Islamic State's to take back these women and hundreds of other foreign fighters who joined the Islamic State

Figure 3. Concordances of *foreign fighter\** indicating quantity, in the 2015 subcorpus.

Finally, figure 4 shows the concordances which contain some type of assimilation of foreign fighters, selected amongst the 200 randomly picked lines, out of the 456 concordance lines of foreign fighter\* calculated in the 2019 subcorpus. At a first sight, it is already noticeable that, contrary to what was showed in the previously examined figures, here, in most cases, the social actor of foreign fighter\* is assimilated through the use of numbers as definite quantifiers. Indeed, for instance, if we look at collocates in table 6, in section 5.2.4., we can see that flow – that, as highlighted previously here, is one of the words occurring most often when it comes to the assimilation of foreign fighter\* – is not even amongst the first fifty collocates of foreign fighter\* in 2019 corpus. As already pointed out, it seems that, in 2019, after Isis lost several important battles and became weaker and weaker, the focus of discourses surrounding foreign fighters started to be on their repatriation. The number used here to assimilate foreign fighter\* are bigger than those found in the concordance lines obtained from the other subcorpora, for the lines that refer to the total amount of foreign fighters that joined the conflict and/or Isis reporting the ciphers 40,000, and 41,490. Yet, in other cases where numbers are used to talk about smaller groups of foreign fighters as, for examples, those coming from a specific country or those who joined a specific terrorist group, the numbers are lower. In both cases, however, particular attention is paid to their return and that is an important aspect from a perspective of discursive construction of the social actor under discussion, because even the lowest ciphers possible may seem to be huge to public opinion,

especially when talking of potential terrorists. It is, indeed, the case of the line where it is said that it's reported that 40 foreign fighters have returned to Australia: 40 is not a great number if compared to 40,000, but the fact that forty people who fought in a conflict – and, probably, joined a terrorist group that trained them to carry out attacks – are now back to their home country may still stress on people's fears. The definite numbers used here are often preceded by terms and phrases that express a certain degree of uncertainty, such as about, at least, more than, roughly, and a little over, which indicate that who is writing is not totally aware of the extent of the phenomenon. Even this uncertainty may contribute to emphasize the public's fear, because they do not really know what they are dealing with and to what extent they should be worried or confident about it, especially when the reported numbers are quite high.

Speaking of uncertainty, even in this case, despite a predominant presence of definite quantifiers, the social actor of *foreign fighter\** was also assimilated through the use of indefinite numbers, such as *hundreds of*, and *thousands of*. *Thousands* (f=16) was also among the first fifty collocates of *foreign fighter\** in the 2019 corpus, displayed in Table 6 above, in section 5.2.4. *Many* (f=11) is another way in which foreign fighters are quantified indefinitely in the 2019 corpus.

Similarly to the other concordance lines analysed above, also here it is noticeable that foreign fighter\* is often used as a subject to an active verb and, thus, it is more often activated than passivated. As mentioned, this highlights that they somehow are those in power and it is a particularly interesting discursive pattern here, where the stress is put on the fact that they are likely to be returning to their home countries or, at least, to Western countries.

# 5.3.2. The diachronic evolution of the link between foreign fighters and terrorism

This section will focus on the way in which foreign fighters have been related to terrorism in the news, during the period under investigation. Indeed, both the analysis of keywords and that of collocates – carried out above in this chapter – showed that, often, foreign fighters have been depicted as potential terrorist and as threatening their home countries. However, keywords and collocates showed a few differences in the ways in which this type of discourse has been constructed during the ten years. The same procedure adopted above has been followed here and so, amongst the randomly selected 200 concordance lines per year, the lines in which the concordances deal with the theme of terrorism and threat to security have been manually selected. This has been repeated for each of the four subcorpora under analysis here.

Safety reasons to use more than one name. Not all foreign fighters are jihadists, either. One streets. It's also true that **Islamic militants and** foreign fighters are playing an increasing, which have cited the roles played by **Islamists and** foreign fighters as a reason not to arm the "terrorism in Syria with money, weapons and foreign fighters." In one of his more said Mr. Haggani ''helps lead insurgents and foreign fighters in attacks against targets in supporting "terrorism" by funnelling arms, money and foreign fighters to rebels seeking to topple later claimed this was a tactic used by **rebels and** foreign fighters to put blame on his forces. Led by **jihadist groups** dominated by heavily armed foreign fighters. Television pictures on putting him among the **jihadists** who are known as" **foreign fighters**." Answering my questions fied. It is a collection of hard-core extremists, foreign fighters and Somali nationalists ing it unsustainable. He opposed the detention of foreign fighters and terrorists at Guantanamo enya. The case has drawn attention to the role of foreign fighters in the militant group, which There have been many reports of jihadis or other foreign fighters flowing into Syria, as if it posed by Salafi extremists or al-Qaida- the same" foreign fighters" the mukhabarat used to help Now a third force has joined the fray: "terrorist foreign fighters" or al-Qaeda militants trying at the fighting has been made worse by "terrorist foreign fighters" or al-Oaeda militants re constructive politics". It is surprising "that foreign fighters and jihadis, for now, have the site said those who died at the bakery were foreign fighters and "terrorists," a word the

Figure 4. concordances lines of *foreign fighter\**, from the 2012 subcorpus, highlighting their relationship with terrorism.

In the concordance lines listed in Figure 5, there are no references to the Islamic State. It is indeed necessary to restate here that, in the case of the 2012 subcorpus, it was only possible to obtain 163 concordance lines of *foreign fighter\**, thus we can claim that –

even when linking foreign fighters to terrorism-related discourses – in 2012 the Islamic State was not mentioned. This has a strong diachronic value, as in the following years – as was also shown by the keywords, concordance-keywords, and collocates analyses carried out in the previous sections of this chapter – foreign fighters started to be mostly linked to Isis as a terrorist group. The only terrorist organization quoted here is Al-Qaeda, confirming that, at this initial stage the Islamic State was still almost unknown to the Western world's public opinion and, thus, the focus was on already-known organizations, which however were joined by foreign fighters themselves.

In a case, the adjective *Islamic* is used together with *militants* as another way to mention terrorists, with rather improper use of the adjective *Islamic* itself. In several cases, *foreign fighter\** is preceded or followed by *and*, used as a conjunction in lists where *foreign fighter\** are equated both to *Islamic militants*, *Islamists*, *insurgents*, *rebels*, *hard-core extremists*, and *terrorists*, both to objects such as *weapons* and *money*. It is interesting to notice that, in this phase, there are still several references to a situation of uprisings, with the use of terms such as *insurgents*, *rebels*, and *militants*. Another way used prominently here to refer to foreign fighters' affiliation with terrorist organizations is the use of *jihadis* and *jihadists*, which, as seen in section 3.2.1., is rather improper, because they are not synonyms for *terrorist\**.

Finally, compared to the concordance lines analysed in section 5.3.1. above, here, *foreign fighter\** as a social actor is less used as the subject of an active verb.

All in all, it can be said that, in the case of the 2012 corpus, foreign fighters are discursively constructed as affiliated with terrorism and terrorist organizations only partially: they are quoted in a context where the focus is on terrorism and its characteristics, but not as properly belonging to such organizations. The border between foreign fighters and terrorists is thus still blurring at this stage of events.

Citizens of the self-declared caliphate, and foreign fighters flocking to join the jihadist and try to starve terrorist groups of funds and foreign fighters. Mr Abbott told the special and Turkey to help cut off flows of money and foreign fighters to Isis. Get worse: An Al Qaeda affiliate group, aided by foreign fighters, battles with seven different defeating terrorism, including the threat posed by foreign fighters joining extremist groups," it last stronghold of al-Qaida and a focal point for foreign fighters coming to wage jihad against e described Syria as the most powerful magnet for foreign fighters hoping to wage jihad, with greater the confidence ISIS will have and the more foreign fighters will join them." Mr Cale fourth victim died 13 days later.) ISIS' cadre of foreign fighters are a rising threat not just agreed to staunch Isis funding and influx of foreign fighters, critical priorities for fact these terrorists include a growing number of foreign fighters from Europe is cause for terrorist acts globally. More than 60 per cent of foreign fighters in Syria have Joined ISIL stated, "we have to deal with the threat of foreign fighters planning attacks against our claimed in The Times yesterday that the bulk of foreign fighters that join ISIS come from State (Isis) has begun emphasizing the torrent of foreign fighters the group has attracted from concern are thousands of <u>increasingly</u> radicalized foreign fighters, including many carrying U.S. is impossible to rule out new attacks by returning foreign fighters, but we believe these fears and prosecute domestic extremists and returning foreign fighters". With premiers still fuming dcountry terrorism suspects, including so-called foreign fighters, in Germany are legitimate security agencies have gained the authority under the Foreign Fighters Act to detain terrorist or homegrown terrorists. It also means that these foreign fighter jihadists, while highly and at the UN to impede Islamic State's access to foreign fighters, and an expeditionary force in Syria have set up bases in Turkey to train foreign fighters for terrorist attacks on the in Syria have begun setting up camps to train foreign fighters to launch terrorist attacks an al-Qa'ida-aligned group devoted to training foreign fighters to conduct terror attacks in se the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have triggered foreign fighters to join extremist groups in based in Syria will appear on the site. Wannabe foreign fighters can go to them and ask answer for you. There is a real need to deal with foreign fighters and the counter-terrorism

Figure 5. concordances lines of *foreign fighter\**, from the 2014 subcorpus, highlighting their relationship with terrorism.

Figure 6 shows substantial quantitative differences from what was displayed in Figure 5, as – even though the lines displayed in Figure 6 were obtained by selecting them manually from a sample of 200 concordance lines out of 998 – here it was possible to find several more lines where foreign fighters were related to terrorism. In this case, Al-Qaeda is still quoted as a terrorist group, but *Isis* (f=27) becomes the one quoted the most when it comes to the terrorist organization attracting foreign fighters. Indeed, the analysis of collocations showed that not only *Isis* was among the first fifty nongrammatical words mostly occurring with *foreign fighter\** in 2014 subcorpus, but also its extended version *Islamic State* was prominently used in this context – with *Islamic* occurring 33 times and *State* 27, making it possible to affirm that they were often used together, as also demonstrated

in figure 6. Indeed, this was the period when the Islamic State had gained more and more power and territories, spreading its reputation all over the world (see section 3.1. for more). *Isis*, *Islamic State*, and also *ISIL* in one case, are thus said to have been joined by *foreign fighter\**.

So, at this point, it started to become clear the involvement of foreign fighters in terrorist organizations and activities. Indeed, even here *foreign fighter\** is preceded by *and* in a few lines: in the first concordance line, together with *citizens of the self-declared caliphate*, is used as a subject of *flocking to join the jihadist* (where, again, the term *jihadist* is used unproperly), also contributing to stress on the huge number of people being involved in such movements; in the other cases, the conjunction is used in contexts where the author wants to highlight that terrorist groups are feeding themselves with money and foreign fighters, both coming from other states. Indeed, there is also a case with a reference to *the funding and the influx of foreign fighter* to Isis, that is said should be *staunch*, thus making it clear that the matter was not only the movement of people but also that of money.

Also here, if we compare the lines in figure 6 to the concordance lines examined in section 5.3.1. above, it is noticeable how the *foreign fighter\** social actor is less activated, thus less used as a subject to an active verb.

Even though there are no cases in which terrorist\* and terrorism\* directly concord with foreign fighter\*, it is possible to find this type of correlation expressed in other ways: by looking at the lines, we can see how the words terrorist, terrorism, and attacks contribute to discursively construct foreign fighter\* as a social actor, so that is the reason why they were put in bold and/or underlined. It is also highlighted the relationship between foreign fighters and their home countries, with expressions such as homegrown terrorists and domestic extremism that underline how these people often chose to join terrorist

organizations after having grown up in another (often Western) country. This on the one hand makes the dangerous, because having another country's citizenship makes it easy for them to travel from one place to another (as demonstrated by the presence of *returning* concording with *foreign fighter* two times here), while, on the other hand, they make countries interrogate themselves on what might have gone wrong on the education and social involvement of their citizens and/or of second or third generation migrants.

Wants a blanket <u>hardline approach</u>, seeing all foreign fighters as terrorists. Tony Abbott push the successful link between the terror and foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria and pointed also means that fighting radicalisation and" foreign fighter" networks should not entail national agreements to curb the <u>flow of money</u> and <u>foreign fighters</u> to extremist groups in Syria Syria to cut off supply lines of resources and foreign fighters to Isis -at the same time The terrorism threat is evolving, he said, as foreign fighters or domestic 'lone wolves' will make it easier for intercepted Australian foreign fighters looking to join Islamic State gees. "One of the problems is that there might be foreign fighters, there might be terrorists, to make a living helping the Islamic State bring foreign fighters into Syria say that it is even more closely together on the threat posed by foreign fighters and other issues related to is <u>especially concerned</u> at the **threat posed by** foreign fighters, with about 30 thought to citizenship, and the need for -action to defeat foreign fighters and Islamic State has been a territorial gains than in global jihad; it sucks in foreign fighters by the thousand, but its pro-IS profiles, including those of Indonesian foreign fighters documenting their battles in to stem the **Islamic State**'s ability to **infiltrate foreign fighters** and supplies into Syria. Of the <u>highest concentration</u> in Europe of **jihadi** foreign fighters going to fight in Syria and ed to starve this terrorist organisation Daesh of foreign fighters from Australia and elsewhere, guerre for his contacts' safety. Islamic State foreign fighters, known as muhajireen, Londoners swelling the ranks of Islamic State's foreign fighter brigades. Northwest London's the French interior minister. Terrorist threats, foreign fighters and violent extremism were Indonesian archipelago, from former conflict areas to foreign fighters and individuals radicalised

Figure 6. Figure 6. Concordances lines of *foreign fighter\**, from the 2015 subcorpus, highlighting their relationship with terrorism.

Figure 7 shows the concordance lines where foreign fighter\*, as a social actor, was related to discourses of terrorism. The lines were selected manually from the sample of 200 concordance lines randomly obtained out of the 1170 concordances of *foreign fighter\** calculated through the 2015 subcorpus. Once again, in 2015, there is a strong bond between the discursive construction of foreign fighters as terrorists or potential terrorists and the Isis-related narrative. Indeed, as shown by the collocate analysis in section 5.2.4., *Islamic* occurred 61 times as a collocate of *foreign fighter\**, while *state* 57 times, which means that they probably occurred together almost always. *Isis*, instead, occurred as a

collocate of foreign fighter\* 27 times. In the above-shown lines of concordances, Isis is quoted for its ability to recruit foreign fighters, even from Western countries, as in *Islamic* State's ability to infiltrate foreign fighters and supplies into Syria, which is depicted as something to stem, in helping the Islamic State bring foreign fighters into Syria, and in Londoners swelling the ranks of Islamic State's foreign fighter brigades. In another case, it Is highlighted the willingness and attempts of Australian citizens to join the Islamic State. Indeed, several lines here it is highlighted the provenience of foreign fighters, as it is possible to find the adjectives Londoners, Australian, and Indonesian; underlining where foreign fighters come from, actually means to 'warn' these countries about the danger they may be facing. Indeed, threat is another recurring term in concordance lines shown in figure 7, with the phrase threat posed by foreign fighters occurring two times, and with a line where it is said that the terrorist threat is evolving because of foreign fighters and domestic "lone wolves". So, in this case, it is particular attention is paid to the fact that foreign fighters represent a terrorist threat and, in claiming this link between the discursive construction of the social actor of foreign fighter\* and that of the terrorist threat countries were facing, it must be kept in mind that, in 2015, the whole world was dealing with the consequences of Isis' increased power. Indeed, we also find phrases such as hardline approach, seeing all foreign fighters as terrorists, as successful link between terror and foreign fighters, and a reference to global jihad.

As happened also for the 2012 and 2014 subcorpora concordance lines above, also here the *foreign fighter\** social actor is almost never activated and used as a subject to an active verb, as it was found, instead, in the concordance lines analysed in section 5.3.1..

Thus, it can be claimed that, in 2015, similarly to what was found in the 2014 concordance lines, in discursively constructing this social actor, the focus is especially on foreign fighters joining the Islamic State and on Isis' power and ability to attract funds,

supplies and fighters coming from other countries, as shown by the fact that, often, it was highlighted the nationality of fighters. Finally, the fact that foreign fighters are involved in terrorist activities and organizations makes them be perceived as a threat.

That a majority of those who surrendered are foreign fighters. The Islamic State, as it Malaysians travelled to Iraq and Syria to act as foreign fighters for the Islamic State, men from both sides of the border, as well as foreign fighters, trained and armed by ISIS-Y. Both Sunni Muslim groups have attracted foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt stateless by the fall of Islamic State. Australian foreign fighters living in Syrian refugee temporary exclusion orders on Australian-born foreign fighters would help security agencies undertaking acts of terrorism or travel to become foreign fighters, or as an effective risk control over the complex network of Taliban groups, foreign fighters and narco-traffickers in As many as 500 senior Isis members, including foreign fighters, retrying to negotiate Hawl in northern Syria, populated by former Isis foreign fighters and their families. Last week area near the Turkish border where numerous ISIS foreign fighters have most likely traversed, oxy to fight Isis in Syria. But the **issue of Isis** foreign fighters, most of them European, has or dozens of their nationals who became jihadist" foreign fighters" over the past five years and re he had journeyed along with thousands of other foreign fighters to join the Islamic State's al to take back these women and **hundreds** of **other foreign fighters who** joined the **Islamic State**Figure 7. Figure 6. Concordances lines of *foreign fighter\**, from the 2019 subcorpus, highlighting their relationship

with terrorism.

Figure 8 shows the concordance lines where the discursive construction of foreign fighter\* was linked to the discourse of terrorism, in the 2019 corpus. As happened for all the other three investigated year, here the concordances were selected manually amongst the 200 concordance lines that were obtained randomly, out of a total of 456 concordance lines WordSmith calculated for the 2019 corpus.

At very first sight, it is already possible to notice that something had changed in the way in which terrorism and foreign fighters were discursively linked. Indeed, compared to the other three figures of concordance lines above, here the focus seems to be more on the eventuality that foreign fighters might go back home. The results of the collocate analysis carried out in section 5.2.4. above already showed that the focus, in 2019, was more on the fact that, after the Islamic State had faced several defeats and had lost power and territories, those foreign fighters who joined it were now willing to go back to their home countries, increasing the risk of terrorist attacks. Yet, returning was the third word

occurring more often with foreign fighter\* in the 2019 corpus, with a frequency of 30; also, there were return (f= 18) and returned (f=7) amongst the first fifty collocates of foreign fighter\* in the 2019 corpus. Indeed, even in the concordance lines shown in Figure 8, it is possible to notice high attention paid to foreign fighter's travel, with a few references to the easiness with which they moved from one place to another and joined terrorist organizations, such as in Malaysians travelled to Iraq and Syria to act as foreign fighters for the Islamic State, where also the nationality is underlined – as it happened in a few occasions in the concordances displayed in figure 7 – or as in or travel to become foreign fighters. However, there are also cases in which this idea of movement is expressed without the use of the verb travel, but in other ways, such as in Sunni Muslim groups have attracted foreign fighters, in the Turkish border where numerous ISIS foreign fighters have most likely traversed, or as in he had journeyed along with thousands of other foreign fighters to join the Islamic State's: all of these three cases carry the image of some sort of movement from a place to another, even though it is conveyed both in a more implicit way, as in the first one, where the verb to attract is used to imply that these foreign fighters travelled to join the Sunni Muslim groups, both in more explicit ways, with the use of synonyms of travel, such as to traverse or to journey.

Similarly to figure 7, Figure 8 often highlights that foreign fighters came from other places to join terrorist organizations, such as in *from Saudi Arabia, Egypt*, in *Australian foreign fighters*, and in *Australian-born foreign fighters*; also, there is a line where we find the phrase *the issue of Isis foreign fighters, most of them European*, where, after defining foreign fighters as being *an issue*, it is said that they mostly come from Europe, thus underlining both their provenience and their potential dangerousness.

Finally, as already discussed in section 5.2.4. while analysing the collocates, the 2019 subcorpus shows a particular interest in foreign fighters' *families* (f=28), *children*(f=28),

and wives (f=10), and this is also noticeable here – where, actually, the focus of the analysis is on the diachronic representation of the relationship between foreign fighters and terrorism – with examples such as in *former Isis foreign fighters and their families*, and in *to take back these women*.

Again here, the *foreign fighter\** social actor is almost never activated, differently from the concordance lines analyzed in section 5.3.1., where *foreign fighter\** was often used as a subject to an active verb.

To sum up, the concordance lines in Figure 8 showed a significant change in the discursive construction of the relationship between foreign fighters and terrorism, with a stress on the fact that they are now part of an organization that is weakened by the several losses faced and, so, they are probably willing to go back home, representing an actual danger for the countries they are coming back to. Indeed, in several cases, these few lines highlighted their provenience, as if there is an attempt to try to warn those countries, which, actually, was present also in the concordances relating to the 2015 subcorpus, as shown in figure 7. Also, reinforcing the discursive construction of foreign fighters as representing a potential threat to their home countries, there is the image of travel – obtained in different ways – as being a peculiar characteristic of foreign fighters.

# 5.3.3. 2019 subcorpus and the focus on returning foreign fighters' families

As resulted from the collocate analysis in section 5.2.4., and as it was also possible to notice briefly from the concordances analyses in the above sections 5.3.1. and 5.3.2., in 2019 subcorpus there was a rather important focus not only on returning foreign fighters, but also on their families and children. Still, by looking at the randomly selected concordance lines of all of the other three subcorpora, apart from a few rather rare cases,

it was only possible to find references to foreign fighters' families in the 2019 subcorpus, which thus became the main focus of the present paragraph. Indeed, since this whole chapter focuses on the discursive construction of foreign fighters from a diachronic perspective, the fact that such a topic is only present in one of the examined subcorpora makes it an especially important aspect that needs to be further investigated. Indeed, as it was reported in Table 1, in section 5.2.4., *children* (n=22 / f=28), *families* (n=24 / f= 28), and *wives* (n=62 / f= 9) were amongst the first fifty non-grammatical words occurring most often with *foreign fighter\**, while they were not collocating with *foreign fighter\** in the other three examined subcorpora.

Internment camps. Among the detainees are 1,000 foreign fighters and 9,000 of their wives and supporters and families, including about 2,000 foreign fighters, are held under Kurdish guard say. The <u>Islamic State recruited more than</u> 40,000 foreign fighters and their families from 80 weeks, gave instructions to the families of all foreign fighters to make their own choices as debate over whether Western countries should allow foreign fighters and the children and wives of of Baghuz village near the Iraqi border. Foreign fighters and families have featured Turkey would now be responsible for those captured foreign fighters and their family members prospect of action to help the families of former foreign fighters in northern Syria, where 20 Hawl in northern Syria, populated by former Isis foreign fighters and their families. Last week enables the government both to delay the return of foreign fighters and their families, and to in north-east Syria, with tens of thousands of foreign fighters and families in cramped would make considerations for the children of foreign fighters. "Anyone attempting to themselves over, including the wives and children of foreign fighters, are bitterly complaining Paul Ronalds, said Australian children of foreign fighters are the victims of horrific e north-east of the country, to which partners of foreign fighters have fled or been at risk is reduced. The plight of the children of foreign fighters is causing concern across On whether children of foreign fighters who may have been forced to victims, including the children of their own foreign fighters," Mr. Longden says in the

is known about what has happened to the remaining foreign fighters and their families. The wanes, so will the Kurds' ability to detain the foreign fighters and their families. On a menu Put crudely, there is no good solution to the foreign fighters and their families. If we head. The remaining three are the children of the foreign fighter Yasin Rizvic and his wife, the government grapples with what to do with foreign fighters and their families being held

Figure 8. Concordance lines of *foreign fighter\** in the 2019 subcorpus, focusing on the returning foreign fighters' families.

As shown by Figure 9, where the concordance lines focusing on foreign fighters' families have been manually selected out of the 200 randomly selected lines in the 2019 subcorpus, towards the end of the first ten years of conflict and after the weakening of the Islamic State, the focus of both politics and media started to be not only on foreign fighters potentially returning to their home countries, but also on their families, children and wives. Reading the lines, there seems to be hesitation on whether to treat them as foreign fighters or whether they should be helped. Indeed, we find sentences as whether Western countries should allow foreign fighters and the children and wives, as enables the government both to delay the return of foreign fighters and their families, and as the government grapples with what to do with foreign fighters and their families being held, all of which underline that governments are struggling to decide what to do with foreign fighters' families.

All in all, however, foreign fighters' families and children seem to be more represented as victims and as people in need for help, rather than as being dangerous themselves, even though a certain degree of uncertainty seems to be expressed in the above-listed concordance lines. For instance, it is said that there is a *prospect of action to help the families of former foreign fighters*; also, particular attention is paid to the way in which foreign fighters' children should be treated, as in *would make considerations for the children of foreign fighters*, or as in *said Australian children of foreign fighters are the victims of horrific*, and in *victims, including the children of their own foreign fighters* —

where foreign fighters' children are expressly addressed as *victims* – and in *the plight of the children of foreign fighters is causing concern*. Thus, children are depicted both as victims and as plights governments are dealing with. It is also interesting to notice that in none of these cases the Saxon genitive is used, in favour of the preposition *of* to indicate possession.

In the first lines, again, the social actors are assimilated with definite quantifiers. In two cases, the families are assimilated with foreign fighters, as for example in *the Islamic State recruited more than 40,00 foreign fighters and their families*, while, in one of the lines, it is also underlined the precise number of foreign fighters' *wives*, which are said to be *9,000* and they are said to be *among the detainees*. In two cases there are references to *Kurds* detaining foreign fighters and their families and, actually, the Kurds had played an important role in the weakening of the Islamic State, as outline in section 3.1. above. Hence, the 2019 subcorpus differentiates itself from the other three subcorpora examined here by focusing on a particular aspect, which is that of returning foreign fighters and their families, children, and wives. Foreign fighters' children are especially depicted as victims, while, in the analysed concordance lines, governments and public opinion seem to have reservations on whether foreign fighters' families should or not be treated in the same ways as foreign fighters.

#### 5.3.4. Analysis of concordances: Conclusions

The analysis of concordances made it possible to analyse some important aspects of the examined subcorpora, which appeared particularly peculiar from a diachronic perspective, also confirming the results of the keywords and collocates analyses carried out in the previous sections of the present work. Indeed, the discursive construction of *foreign fighter\** as a social actor evolved and changed through the years.

Firstly – following the results of the analysis of collocates – focusing on the way in which foreign fighter\* was assimilated made it possible to make some considerations on how the numbers were stressed in the news. This section showed that the more the years passed, the higher became the numbers used to quantify foreign fighters. However, it was also shown that, even when the assimilation was not expressed through a definite quantifier, the use of certain adjectives – such as unprecedent – made it clear that the numbers of foreign fighters they were referring to were undoubtedly high. As also outlined in paragraph 5.3.1., the use of generic quantifiers such as *number*, by actually making it clear that the generic numbers being referred to are quite high, may increase a feeling of anxiety and fear in the public. It was also shown how the use of words such as flow, flux, influx, and so on, was prominent when discursively constructing foreign fighters, highlighting both the high numbers of people falling under the category of foreign fighters, both the fact that one of their peculiar characteristics is the fact that they can easily travel from a place to another. Also, the analysis demonstrated how the use of such expressions underlined that they seemed to be unstoppable. The analysis of the different ways of assimilating foreign fighter\* also showed that, in the examined concordance lines, foreign fighters were also often activated and used as subjects to active verbs.

After that, the focus moved to the diachronic representation of the link between foreign fighters and terrorism. Once again, it was possible to see how the discursive construction of *foreign fighter\** changed and evolved through the years. Indeed, in 2012, the Islamic State had not reached its peak of power yet and the focus was still more on the uprisings and rebellions of the Arab Springs. Even the Syrian conflict had only started the year before, making foreign fighters a phenomenon that was still rather unclear at the time. This changed significantly in 2014 and 2015, after several attacks that affected Western

and European countries. Moreover, these were the years when the Islamic State was at the top of both power and territories, and indeed it was the most quoted terrorist organization amongst those that were present in the concordance lines. In the 2019 concordances, instead, the focus was more on the returning foreign fighters and on the potential threat they represented to their home countries.

The 2019 subcorpus was also the focus of the last paragraph of the present section, as the analysis of collocates in section 5.2.4. had shown that *children* (n=22 / f=28), *families* (n=24 / f=28), and *wives* (n=62 / f=9) were amongst the nongrammatical first fifty words that occurred most often with *foreign fighter\** in the subcorpus. The analysis of concordances in Figure 9 showed that high attention was paid to foreign fighters' families. Most importantly, in the representation of foreign fighters' families, wives, and children, it emerged that the border between depicting them as victims and that of depicting them as an unclear phenomenon governments found themselves dealing with was rather blurring.

After the analysis of concordances, the next chapter will focus on the even more qualitative analysis of pieces of texts selected from the articles composing the corpus under investigation and it will examine further the discursive representations of *foreign* fighter\* as a social actor that emerged until now.

## 5.4. The diachronic discursive construction of foreign fighters as a social actor in news articles

At this stage, the analysis of pieces of news articles will be carried out, as explained in the methodological section (chapter 4). In order to examine the articles and to properly apply a Critical Discourse Analytical approach, the four sub-corpora on which the diachronic analysis is focusing needed to be down-sampled. Indeed, examining a text using CDA requires a quite strict and complex analysis, which cannot be carried out on a corpus of thousands of articles. Moreover, as has been outlined elsewhere in this thesis, CDA is a highly qualitative and evaluative approach to the study and analysis of discourse and this characteristic is what makes it rather difficult to carry out such an analysis of thousands of articles. Yet, to analyse each article of the 3,623 articles composing the whole corpus is not the goal of the present study and, actually, that would go beyond it. Also, as already mentioned on several occasions here, a methodology such as CADS is particularly useful when analysing large corpora, as it offers to the researcher – through the use of specialized software – the chance of identifying discursive patterns already by looking at more quantitative data, such as keywords, collocates, and concordances.

Thus, 16 articles have been randomly selected in order to be analysed in this section: 4 articles for each subcorpora that has been used in the present diachronic analysis. The texts of these 16 articles can be found in the appendix in section 9.

So, in this paragraph, a closer look will be taken at the way in which the social actor of foreign fighters has been constructed throughout the ten years under analysis. In order to do so, three main aspects will be taken into account, based both on the results of previous analytical sections of the present chapter and on the proper analysis of the articles: the assimilation of foreign fighters, the different ways of addressing them throughout the years, and the focus on foreign fighters' families in 2019. Also, there will be a subparagraph dedicated to the analysis of the different voices present in the articles, in order to understand whether the way in which FF have been discursively constructed is mostly attributable to journalists and newspapers, or whether other actors contributed to the depiction of a given image.

### 5.4.1. Assimilating foreign fighter\*

As seen when analysing keywords, collocates, and concordances in the above paragraphs, one of the most recurring ways of discursively constructing foreign fighters – according to Van Leeuwen's categorization of the ways social actors can be discursively represented (see section 4.4.2.) – is assimilation.

As already explained in section 4.4.2., Van Leeuwen defines assimilation as a way of representing social actors as a group, opposite to individualization, which, instead, means to refer to social actors as individuals (Van Leeuwen, 1996). Van Leeuwen further distinguishes assimilation in aggregation and collectivisation, where the former is the quantification of social actors, that, in this case, are being treated as statistics, while the latter is the representation of social actors as groups, through the use of expressions as 'the community'. Aggregation, which is the type of assimilation recurring most often here, can be realised both through definite and indefinite quantifiers.

By reading the 16 news articles randomly selected from the corpus, it was possible to find some types of assimilation of foreign fighters in all of them, thus confirming what has been claimed above when analysing keywords, collocates, and concordances.

What was noticeable, both by the analysis carried out in the previous paragraphs, and by analysing the 16 articles, was that the numbers used as definite quantifiers tended to grow proportionally with the passing of time.

Starting by looking at text 2, published by *The Guardian*, in 2012, let us consider the following piece of text:

"The overwhelming majority of fighters in the network are Syrian, with the <u>number of foreign</u> fighters varying between 1200-1500 members," Benotman says. He adds: "In most conflicts of which they are a part, jihadist groups represent a small percentage of combatants – this holds true in the Syrian case, where they represent less than 10% of all fighters. For these groups, militant uprising

is seen as an opportunity to exercise their influence in Syria; particularly as the peaceful revolutions of the Arab Spring rendered their role irrelevant in the nations' fight for freedom."

(The Guardian, 2012)

In this passage, the words of Noman Benotman – the founder of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), with the goal of overthrowing Gaddafi's regime in Libya in the 90s and also a member of The Quilliam, a British think-tank, active between 2008 and 2021, with a focus on contrasting Islamic extremism – are reported. So, Benotman was probably considered to be a reliable voice, as he was part of a rebel group, and, at the same time, working to tackle terrorism. In this interview, he seems to calm worries about the involvement of foreign fighters in terrorist organizations, as he starts firstly by underlining that, amongst those fighting in Syria, foreign fighters only represent a small percentage of people. Then, he claims that jihadist groups represent a small percentage of combatants. All in all, the wording here is rather positive. Yet, the text talks about militant uprisings instead of referring to the conflicts and also highlights that the revolutions were peaceful. It is clear, reading these lines, that the newspaper is reporting the words of a person who wants to stress separating rebels from terrorists and helping the public opinion to keep calm, by assuring them that foreign fighters are only a small part of fighters in Syria, that jihadist groups are only a small percentage, and that, however, they are *irrelevant*. Indeed, he considers to be low a number of foreign fighters between 1200 and 1500. Yet, it is not said where they come from, nor whether they joined terrorist organizations. Finally, in this case, it cannot be claimed that what is being said is said by the journalist, nor that it is the newspaper's opinion being depicted here; however, in the article, Benotman is presented as being an unusually well-placed expert, expression that highlights that the author sees him as being a reliable source.

Reading the other three articles from 2012, there were no other examples of the assimilation of foreign fighters through definite quantifiers. There was, however, another article in which numbers were used in referring to some type of social actor: in text 4, an article published in *The Times* right after the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, where it was given information about the death toll of the first fights.

Moving on to articles published more recently, it is interesting to notice how the numbers of foreign fighters involved in the conflict are sometimes given at the very beginning of the article, and sometimes at the end. Text 5, an article published in the Sydney Morning Herald in 2014, is indeed an instance of the latter category. It starts with the sentence a terrorist attack on Australian soil – possibly initiated by a lone wolf – is now regarded as "likely", with a double modality, expressed through the adverbs possibly and likely, indicating that there could be a terrorist attack in Australia and that it could be carried out by a lone wolf. The article then goes on by emphasizing that Australia is at risk and it is also said that Sydney is running a higher risk than other capitals because of its size and "iconic infrastructure". It also stresses the presence of terrorist organizations, such as Isis, in Syria and Iraq, and their ability to attract disaffected youth: in this case, young people are described as being fascinated by terrorist organizations that offer them an alternative to their everyday lives. The adjective disaffected is here used as a way of separating the 'rebellious' youth from those who, instead, well fit into society. Only at the very end, in the last line, it is said that there are some 60 Australians engaged in the conflict in Iraq and Syria among about 8000 foreign fighters. 60 out of 8000 does not seem to be such a huge number at first sight. However, it is put in the context of an article that stresses particularly the vulnerability of Australia and that, while it speaks about the likelihood that a hypothetic terrorist attack would be carried out by an Australian lone wolf – thus someone who had not joined the conflict, nor a terrorist organization, but has radicalized themselves through the internet and Isis' propaganda –, it does never mention foreign fighters, exception made for the final line reported above. Also, it is noticeable

that, while it is possible to find several examples of direct and indirect reported speech this last sentence is put there by the author, with no reference to eventual sources. Not containing any type of evaluative feature, the sentence seems here to be rather a warning, as if the journalist wanted to move the attention from lone wolves to those who were attracted by Isis' propaganda to the point that they decided to leave Australia and take part in the conflict.

As said previously, there are instead articles where the numbers are given at the beginning and this is the case of text 7, published in *The New York Times* in 2014, which begins as follows:

The European Union estimates that 2,000 European citizens have joined jihadist groups fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Other estimates put the number closer to 5,000. Most are Muslim youths who have fallen prey to recruiters and a romantic vision of the conflict as a holy war.

(The New York Times, 2014)

Here, the definite quantifier 2,000 is given as the first information of the article. Even though this has been published in an American newspaper, the sentence is constructing some sort of European (or Western) identity, as it both underlines European citizens and that this information comes from the European Union – here depicted as an animated subject able to estimate something. Also, by putting the European Union as a subject of the verb estimates it is made unclear what type of institution inside the EU is indeed carrying out the action of estimating the number of foreign fighters and this creates a sense of unity, as if all of the European administrative bodies were united and working against a common enemy. Right after, it is said that other estimates put the number closer to 5,000, which is a much higher number indeed. Also, here it is not specified where these estimates come from: previously it was said they were coming from the European Union, while now the source is not quoted. What is also to be noticed, however, is that, in the

first sentence, European foreign fighters are said to have joined jihadist groups fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which completely changes the frame from what was told in the passage from text 2 above: now, the groups rebelling against the Syrian government are depicted as *jihadists*, while before they were described as rebels and, indeed, it was felt as an urge to underline the existing difference between terrorist groups and rebel groups. This is peculiar because many Western countries backed the rebel groups that wanted to overthrow Assad's regime, supporting them not only militarily, but also by sending them money and supplies. Yet, it is also said that most of them – being it the 2,000 or 5,000 estimated foreign fighters – are Muslim youths who have fallen prey to recruiters and a romantic vision of the conflict as a holy war, underlining both the fact that many foreign fighters are young and also that they are Muslim, which introduces the religious aspect to the picture, that is reinforced right after when it is said that they are pursuing what is being called as a *holy war*. Thus, religion seems to be the reason that mostly motivates these people to become foreign fighters and join terrorist organizations, and implying such a thing may contribute to arousing a rather Islamophobic sentiment. Also, similarly to what was said before in the case of the disaffected youth, here again, it is underlined that those most often attracted by Isis' propaganda are young people. However, in this case, religion is highlighted as a way of distinguishing them from the others – namely those 'good' (and Western), who are not fascinated by such things. Moreover, here, the relation of power between who is talking and the category of people he is addressing is rather clear: the journalist has the authority to link terrorism to a certain minority in Western societies. What is also noticeable is that these people deciding to become foreign fighters are represented as being rather vulnerable, and to have fallen prey to recruiters. The decision they made, so, seems to be more attributable to the recruiters rather than to foreign fighters themselves, who are

instead depicted as too young to take such an important decision wittingly. The article keeps stressing this characteristic in another passage, where it is said that an estimated 700 French nationals, some quite young, have joined jihadists in Syria. We have again a number used as a definite quantifier which modifies French nationals. In this case, we have a suppression of foreign fighters as social actors, as they are not mentioned but it is still made quite clear that these French nationals now belong to this category. The journalist here is thus omitting information by taking for granted that the reader will get the real meaning of what is being said. Even though not mentioned directly, foreign fighters are again represented as *young*. Moreover, by choosing to say that they have joined jihadists in Syria, instead of a simpler 'have become foreign fighters', they are worsening the position of the 700 people mentioned here, because the reference to *jihadists* might – unfairly and unproperly – make the public directly link it with terrorism. Going back to assimilation, in this case, 700 is a lower number than those mentioned at the beginning of the article, but, again, it becomes proportionally higher as it refers to France alone, especially because these 700 people are represented here on their way to becoming terrorists. Also, once more, it is said that this number is estimated, but it is not mentioned by who, which is another way of suppressing a social actor – the source of data, in this case.

Another example of how the social actor of foreign fighter is assimilated – but also suppressed – in the news is given in text 8, an article published in *The Guardian* in 2014, in the following piece of text:

Britain's security services have warned for months about the <u>sheer number</u> of <u>homegrown terrorists</u> leaving cities across the UK to fight in Syria or Iraq, with an estimated <u>500 Britons</u>, joining up to <u>700 French</u> and <u>500 Belgians</u> on the frontlines.

(*The Guardian*, 2014)

In the above example, thus, foreign fighters are not mentioned, and the definite quantifiers indeed refer to the number of people fleeing to Syria from the UK, France, and Belgium. It is interesting to notice that the expression *foreign fighters* are here replaced by *homegrown terrorists* who are said to be *leaving cities across UK to fight in Syria or Iraq*, which, indeed, recalls the exact definition of foreign fighters. Using the expression *terrorists* gives the sentence a whole different connotation: the definition of foreign fighters is that of being 'potential terrorists', thus calling them so as soon as they leave to fight in Syria and/or Iraq is a rather strong claim which might end up to rise a feeling of fear among the public. Moreover, the *terrorists* are said to be *homegrown*, an adjective that could have the double result of making people feel afraid not to be safe – even though they are miles away from Syria – and of 'blaming' institutions that did not do enough to prevent this people from joining terrorist organizations. In this framework, even though the numbers used here as quantifiers are not high, they depict a totally different picture, because they refer to the numbers of *terrorists* who left the countries mentioned in the articles and who may, eventually, come back.

The numbers are however growing up following the timeline, as shown in text 9 - an article published again in *The Guardian* in 2015 - where it is said that

a report by the UN security council says there are more than <u>25,000</u> "foreign terrorist fighters" currently involved in jihadi conflicts and they are "travelling from more than 100 member states" and that officials described the estimate of numbers as conservative and said the true total may be more than 30,000.

(The Guardian, 2015)

In this case, *foreign fighters* are not suppressed but they are again assimilated; however, *terrorist* is added to *foreign* as a premodifier of *fighters*, and the whole noun phrase is put in quotation marks, probably in order to underline that these were the words used in the UN security council's report the article is mentioning. Indeed, the verb *say* has *a report* 

as a subject: the report – which is an inanimate thing – is thus given both the ability and the authority to carry out the act of 'saying' something. The use of quotation marks is also peculiar here because it makes it possible to think that what is outside quotes represents the author's voice and opinion. So, it is the journalist the one who is defining the conflicts in which FF are involved as 'jihadi conflicts'. Going back to assimilation, at first it is said that *foreign terrorist fighters* are – according to the report – 25,000; right after, it is instead said that this number is *conservative* and that they are probably *more than 30,000*; so, the number is uncertain and this stressing on such high numbers, while, at the same time, underlining that they are likely to be greater than that, is likely to generate anxiety and fear among the public. This is even truer if we focus on the fact that such a piece of information regarding the numbers of foreign fighters come from institutions – as the UN security council – that here appear not to have the situation under control. Also, here, we do not have any mention of their countries of origin – we are simply told that they come from *more than 100 member states* and this contributes to increasing confusion about the phenomenon.

The number used to define the amount of estimated foreign fighters kept Increasing until, arriving in 2019, text 14 (published in *The New York Times*) tells us that *more than 40,000* foreigners are thought to have travelled to territory controlled by the Islamic State, and most are missing, where there is no mention of foreign fighters but of simpler – and less dangerous – foreigners. Furthermore, it is said is thought that both suppresses the source of the information and also underlines uncertainty. Most of these 40,000 are said to be missing and, a few lines later, the article says even if we assume that, say, half of the Islamic State's foreigner fighters are dead – after all, many joined the group to die – that leaves about 20,000 alive. Yet, the focus, at this point, started to be on those who were potentially coming back. So, right after saying that most of those who are believed to

have fled to Syria died, the author seems to be warning the readers by claiming that, however, at least 20,000 of them are still *alive*.

Going through the 16 selected articles, it is also possible to find the assimilation of foreign fighters through indefinite quantifiers. The use of indefinite quantifiers, however, does not show much difference from a diachronic perspective, as it was for definite quantifiers. Nevertheless, some examples of their use in the corpus will be given hereinafter.

One of the most used definite quantifiers is *number(s)*, as was also shown in the analysis of collocates above.

Let us start by looking at this excerpt from text 6:

Of **primary concern** to U.S. intelligence and its allies are the <u>number of foreign fighters</u> from Western countries who have flowed into Syria. Intelligence officials are fearful they could return to their native countries and launch attacks.

(The Washington Post, 2014)

Here, the *number of foreign fighters from Western countries* is said to be *of primary concern to U.S. intelligence* and that, even though the real number is not mentioned, makes it possible to deduce that it is likely to be a huge amount of people, because otherwise it would not represent a *concern*. Also, the real reason behind this fear is underlined right after when it is claimed that the intelligence is afraid that *they could return to their native countries and launch attacks*. So, again, this discursive uncertainty about the numbers and, also, about the actions they would be able to carry out, can raise anxiety and fear amongst the public.

Another way in which foreign fighters are largely assimilated in the corpus is through the use of expressions such as *dozens*, *hundreds*, *thousands*, and so on, which still indicate numbers, but they cannot be considered definite quantifiers. This is exemplified in text 15, published in *The Times* in 2019:

Western countries are scrambling to figure out what to do with <u>thousands</u> of their citizens who joined the Islamic State, as the militant group loses the last of its territory in Syria and a U.S. military pullout puts pressure on the camps where many have been living.

(The Times, 2019)

Once again, this excerpt shows a different way of addressing foreign fighters which, indeed, suppresses them: they are not called foreign fighters properly, but still it is possible for people reading the article to understand that they are the main focus of it. As a matter of fact, saying (Western countries') *citizens who joined the Islamic State* is another way of calling foreign fighters. The discursive effect this choice creates is to make readers focus on the fact that there are citizens, from their same countries, who joined the Islamic State and who are likely to come back – putting them and their nations in danger. Particularly noticeable from a diachronic perspective, here, is that this passage mentions the fact that, at this point in time – 2019 – Isis was indeed losing territories and this inevitably changed the narrative linked to foreign fighters, because their comeback was not a hypothesis anymore, but started to be a certainty.

To sum up, it can be said that there are several different ways in which foreign fighters — as social actors — have been discursively constructed through assimilation, both with definite and indefinite quantifiers. However, from a diachronic perspective, the type of assimilation that was worth focusing on was conveyed through the use of definite quantifiers, because the numbers changed proportionally throughout the ten-year period examined here. This stress on the numbers of foreign fighters in the news may be seen as simply representing the willingness to give statistical information to the public. Yet, it was possible to see how emphasizing on numbers that, in many cases, were both high and uncertain, may contribute to establishing a sense of concern and fear among the public, making this type of assimilation ideologically oriented, rather than simple statistics. Also, the increasing worries about the growing numbers of foreign fighters seem to highlight a

discourse of alarm and concern, something the public should be afraid of. This becomes even more evident when these estimates are said to be coming from governmental institutions because they very often appear to be both concerned and confused about what to do in order to prevent foreign fighters from coming back to their home countries and carrying out attacks. Indeed, the analysis showed also cases in which the terms *foreign fighters* were not mentioned, but where, from the words used, it was possible to understand that the pieces of articles were referring to them. So, by taking advantage of the background and intertextual knowledge journalists share with their audience, the authors of such articles are also able to choose other terms to refer to the same social actor, which, however, give different discursive perspectives: it is the case, for instance, of the sentence *sheer number of homegrown terrorists leaving cities across the UK to fight in Syria or Iraq* above, where *terrorists* is used instead of *fighters*. Indeed, the two terms convey different meanings, especially in the context of articles published for the Western public, with *terrorist* being associated with a specific social actor – one who has carried out or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks.

The fact that, in the 16 analysed texts, it was possible to find many different ways of referring to foreign fighters will be the focus of the following paragraph.

# 5.4.2. Different ways of addressing the same social actor through the years

Analysing the 16 selected articles made it possible to notice that what was defined by Fairclough as 'overwording' was largely used when referring to foreign fighters and, most importantly, the many different ways in which foreign fighters have been called in the corpus also carry diachronic meanings. Indeed, according to Fairclough, *overwording* can be defined as "an unusually high degree of wording, often involving many words which

are near synonyms" and it is ideologically oriented, since "it shows preoccupation with some aspect of reality – which may indicate that it is a focus of ideological struggle" (Fairclough, 2001: 96). The diachronic aspect plays a central role here because, as shown also in the keywords and concordance-keywords analyses, the ways in which foreign fighters have been called also changed according to the analysed period. Indeed, it was possible to find references to foreign fighters only in two of the first four articles, selected from the 2012 subcorpus, and, in both cases, foreign fighters were not the real focus of the article. This confirms what was discussed above, in the sections where an analysis of keywords and concordance-keywords was carried out: in 2012 the focus was still more on the uprisings because the war had just started and the phenomenon of foreign fighters joining terrorist organizations was still unclear.

Beginning with text 1, which was published in *The Australian* in 2012, take a look at the following extract:

<u>FOREIGN insurgents</u> are leaving the tribal areas of Pakistan, some to join the Syrian <u>rebels</u>, as US drone strikes and dwindling funds make life increasingly uncomfortable for the Taliban's <u>"guest"</u> <u>fighters</u>. (*The Australian*, 2012)

Here, it is not only possible to notice different ways of referring to fighters, but also different ways of expressing the fact that they come from abroad, with *foreign insurgents* and *guest fighters*. The article thus starts by giving us the information that, following several strikes and decreased funding by the US, foreigners who were amongst the Taliban ranks are now leaving the rural areas of Pakistan and, some of them are joining the *Syrian rebels*. However, it is interesting to notice how the word *fighters* is only used when referring to those who were amongst the Talibans, while the word *insurgents* were employed at the beginning of the sentence. Indeed, even though it is the same group of people the journalist is writing about, the use of *insurgents* at the beginning of the sentence has probably been chosen because it is said that some of them are joining the

Syrian rebels: yet, we are in 2012, in a moment when several Western countries were supporting the rebels' faction in Syria, so, saying that part of foreign fighters who were fighting together with the Talibans in Pakistan were joining the rebels, would have been rather problematic, because it would have meant to admit that, amongst the Westernbacked rebels, there also were terrorists. That is likely to explain why it has been decided to only use the word *fighters* when referring to Talibans. In this case, also, the author is taking advantage of the reader's previous knowledge, as, after 9/11, Talibans became a synonym for terrorists, and this makes it a clear example of anaphoric reference in which the journalist takes for granted to be sharing the same previous knowledge of the reader. Moreover, peculiar is the use of *guest* here, with a metaphorical transfer of its meaning, as we do not usually find the word guest collocating with words such as fighter\*. Yet, it is used here as a synonym for *foreign* and, even if saying *guest fighters* in such a context is the same as saying foreign fighters, the use of guest gives it a completely different connotation: guest recalls the image of someone who has been hosted and accommodated by someone else – *Talibans* in the present case – rather than simply indicating someone coming from abroad. It is indeed a way of indicating a deeper tight and it is not implicitly seen as a positive fact here, as it is Talibans the article is talking about. In the rest of the article, it is then possible to find the use of words as *insurgents* and *militants*, as kind of synonyms for *fighters*, confirming what has been said above here about the fact that, at this point, the focus was rather on rebellions than it was on foreign fighters' activities. This trend is confirmed in text 2 (from *The Guardian*), where the only reference made is to veteran fighters, and in text 3, published in The New York Times. The latter's opening is interesting because it speaks of Syria's rebels and rebel fighters, contraposing them to Islamic extremists, as it is reported that the opposition movement in Lebanon is wondering whether to arm the rebels or not, since it is said that arming the rebels may

mean to also arm *Islamic extremists*. So, in this case, there started to be questions on whether it was a good idea to still support the rebels or not.

Similar discursive patterns were found in text 4, published in The Times, which is particularly interesting because it speaks about the start of the Syrian conflict, as it opens with "President Assad declared that Syria was at war last night". Then, let us take a look at the following extract:

Damascus was **once** firmly split into two camps – those who were solidly pro-government and those who sided with <u>the activists</u> and opposition seeking to end the 40-year rule of the Assad family. **Now** a **third force** has joined the fray: "<u>terrorist foreign fighters</u>" or al-Qaeda militants trying to exploit the chaos to turn Syria into a radical Islamic state. (*The Times*, 2012)

In this passage, the different factions fighting in Syria are described. In the first part, the activists are said to be those composing the faction opposing the government and who are described as those willing to end the 40-year rule of the Assad family. This claim appears to be rather evaluative indeed and to represent the activists as the 'good' part, because underlying that the same family has been ruling for 40 years cannot be read as a positive thing, even though they might have been good rulers, especially seen from the perspective of people living in a Western democracy. Then, the third faction is presented as being that of "terrorist foreign fighters" or al-Qaeda militants. Noticeably, thus, al-Qaeda militants is used here as another way for calling terrorist foreign fighters. Exactly as in text 1, here the anaphoric reference is clear: after 9/11, everyone — in the Western world especially, but not only — links al-Qaeda with terrorism, with the attacks carried out in the US and with what came later. Yet, it is a strong link to make, reinforced by terrorist collocating with foreign fighter. The picture is made even worse as the article claims that their main goal is to exploit the chaos to turn Syria into a radical Islamic state. Modality is expressed here through the use of the verb trying, meaning they may achieve the result. All in all,

here, we see clearly the distinction that was still being made at the time between the 'good' rebels and the 'bad' foreign fighters.

Indeed, things change if we move on to the analysis of texts from 2014, where we have more references to terrorism and terrorists. Indeed, text 5, published in *The Sydney* Morning Herald in 2014, introduces the figure of lone wolf\* – so, people who could carry out a terrorist attack without the support of a terrorist organization – saying that a terrorist attack on Australian soil – possibly initiated by a lone wolf – is now regarded as "likely" in the very first sentence of the article. The adverb likely, here, representing an expressive modality, is used by the author in order to exploit their authority in evaluating the probability of something happening – a terrorist attack in this case. The fact that *likely* is put between quotation marks is probably because it is a quotation from another source, which, here, is unspecified. Also, *lone wolves* can recall even more alarm, as, being they are not affiliated with any organization, it can be more difficult for authorities to keep them under control. Reading the article, it is also possible to find expressions as *jihadists*, terrorist, and would-be terrorists. The last sentence of the article, referring to foreign fighters, makes it understandable that, somehow, all of these expressions are linked and are different ways of referring to the same social actors. Taking a look at text 7, published in The New York Times in 2014, it speaks of battle-hardened combatants returning from Syria, used here as a way of referring to people who took part in the Syrian conflict and are coming back toughened by having fought, thus is a synonym for returning foreign fighter that stresses on the aspect of the war.

Of particular interest for the goal of the present study, however, are expressions used to address foreign fighters which highlight their provenience. Many of those can be found in text 8, published in *The Guardian* in 2014, where we find the following passage:

The English jihadist who beheaded the American journalist James Foley is believed to be the leader of a group of British fighters holding foreign hostages in Syria, sources have told the Guardian.

As an international manhunt got under way yesterday, the English-speaking militant was identified to the Guardian by one of his former hostages as the ringleader of three British jihadists thought to be the main guards of foreign nationals in Raqqa, a stronghold of Islamic State (Isis) rebels.

(The Guardian, 2014)

Here, the nationality of the *fighters/jihadists* is underlined several times and in different ways. Indeed, it was possible to notice both the use of the adjective British and the adjective English, collocating both with jihadists and with fighters. Noticeably, in the first sentence, the noun phrase the English jihadist is the subject of the relative clause in which it is said that they have beheaded the American journalist James Foley. It is interesting here to notice how the author stresses their nationalities, as both the perpetrator and the victim are said to be from a Western country. The choice of the adjective English over a more generic *foreign* seems to be a way of underlining that the same nature of foreign fighters is that of transcending what would be a clash between different cultures and worlds and, indeed, in this case, we find an American citizen beheaded by an English one, in a conflict which none of them belongs to. Another way in which the provenience is highlighted here is through the use of the adjective English-speaking. What is of particular interest here is that all of these expressions are not used to construct a national unity against a common enemy, but rather as a way of indicating where they come from, used in order to warn the public about the potential danger Britain is facing. Indeed, in the article, it is also possible to find the expressions UK-born militants and British-born jihadists, which emphasize even more this aspect. Similar ways of referring to foreign fighters – which would indicate a recurring discursive way of constructing foreign fighters by underlining their provenience – can be found in text 10 (again published on The Guardian, but in 2015), where they are referred to as British extremists and French veteran of the conflict in Syria. While this latter expression is a way to indicate that these French citizens travelled to Syria to take part in the conflict and came back to carry out an attack(the article says that they launched an antisemitic attack in Belgium), in 700 British extremists are thought to have travelled to Syria – with about half returning to the UK we are given the same type of information, but in a more extended way. However, both are ways of underlining the fact that people from Western – European in this case – countries are travelling to Syria and are coming back to their countries of origin in order to carry out attacks. Highlighting foreign fighters' nationalities is thus, as outlined previously, a way of stressing a discourse of alarm and warning. Indeed, the readers are here given an important piece of information about foreign fighters - their actual provenience – which would be missing with the use of a more generic *foreign*. Even the use of veteran, here, is a way of emphasizing that they went to Syria to join the conflict and that they came back. Veterans was also found in text 14, published in The New York Times in 2019, preceded by the adjective Arab and used, again, as a way to indicate people who went to fight a war abroad – in Afghanistan in this case – and came back. In text 9, published in *The Australian* in 2015, there are expressions such as *Islamic State* sympathizers, sympathizers and supporters of extremism, and potential terrorists, all used to refer to people who are in Australia and never left the country, but who are supporting Australian foreign fighters in Syria from abroad. The use of the expression potential terrorists is of particular interest here, as it addresses people who are considered to be capable of and likely to become terrorists. Yet, once again, it is possible to say that the authors of the article are using a type of language that contributes to feed discourses of alarm and warning. The adjective potential was also found in text 12, published in The Times in 2015, in the expression potential or actual foreign fighters, where a distinction

is being made between those who are likely to become foreign fighters and those who

already belong to the category. Also, it speaks of *future Islamists*, where the adjective *future* conveys a rather stronger meaning than *potential*, indicating people who will almost certainly become *Islamist*.

From a diachronic perspective it is however particularly interesting to notice that, especially in texts from 2019 on, foreign fighters were very often represented as going back to their home countries (that is something I already have focused on several times in the present chapter). Indeed, expressions such as returnees from jihad and returnees from the Islamic State were found in text 14, indicating people who came back after having joined terrorist organizations. This way of discursively constructing foreign fighters can be found also in text 15, with former fighters, claiming that they are not fighters anymore because they came back from the conflict. Thus, in these cases, the fact that people are coming back from a war – usually likely to be depicted as a positive thing - takes on a negative connotation, because it is used to refer to people believed to be potential terrorists. It is indeed an example of recontextualization of a type of discourse related to the language of conflicts that contributes to creating a new imaginary: fighters coming back from war are no longer seen as being a positive thing. Moreover, this new imaginary is highly context-oriented, as it only applies in a context where it is foreign fighters the social actors who are being talked about – so a type of fighter who comes back – may translate into terrorist attacks.

To conclude, it can be said that 'overwording' has been largely used here and that it is ideologically oriented: different ways of addressing foreign fighters translated into different discursive constructions of the same social actor. Furthermore, overwording was here influenced by the diachronic aspect of events, with certain ways of referring to fighters – such as rebels, insurgents, militants, and so on – being mostly used in the 2012 corpus, while, the more time passed, the more words that linked foreign fighters to

terrorism were used. This confirmed what was pointed out in section 5.3.1., where, through the analysis of concordance lines, it was highlighted that also the link between foreign fighters and terrorism was diachronically constructed from a discursive point of view.

### 5.4.3. The focus on foreign fighters' families in 2019 corpus

The analysis of keywords and concordances in the previous paragraphs showed an extraordinary occurrence of words such as *families*, *children*, and *wives* with *foreign fighter\**, which thus deserve a further investigation. Indeed, this has particular importance from a diachronic perspective, as they were only present in the 2019 corpus and indicate a change in the narrative, since from 2019 on the focus started to be prominently on returning foreign fighters (and on their families). This type of discourse was also found in three of the four 2019 articles selected here (amongst the sixteen randomly selected articles for the purpose of the present analysis) and it was interesting to see how foreign fighters' children have been discursively constructed similarly to returning foreign fighters. Indeed, the discourse here was mainly about security and on what to do with them, since ty were likely to have been trained as well. Yet, starting by looking at the following passage from text 14, an article published in *The Sydney Morning Herald* in 2019:

Most of the **children** of Islamic State members who are <u>over eight years</u> old <u>had already been indoctrinated and given military training</u> to become "cubs of the caliphate," according to the Kurdish authorities in Syria. The warning comes as Prime Minister Scott Morrison appeared to soften his stance in relation to the children of Australians living under IS, saying he is willing to allow the orphaned children of Australia's most infamous terrorist to return home.

(The Sydney Morning Herald, 2019)

This piece of text is the opening part of the article, which starts in a way that seems to express the author's opinion but that, instead, is simply the author reporting something that has been said by the Kurdish authorities. What emerges here is that the social actor of children of foreign fighters are discursively constructed similarly to foreign fighters themselves. Nevertheless, it stresses two aspects in particular: the fact that they – despite their young age – have undergone military training, and whether they should be allowed to go back to their home countries (Australia, in this case). Thus, again, there is a discourse of alarm, with the noun phrase the warning introducing a sentence where, rather implicitly, the journalist seems to evaluate (and criticize) the Prime Minister's attitude towards the matter. As a matter of fact, it is likely that the definition of Australia's most infamous terrorist describing one of the Australian Isis' members has been added here by the journalist themselves, willing to highlight the potential risk Australia would run if it allowed foreign fighters' children to go back. So, the warning coming from Kurdish authorities is here contrapose to the 'soft' opinions the Prime Minister seems to have towards the issue. It is also interesting to notice how the age of children has been underlined here and how, in the very beginning, it is said that most of the children have been trained, thus meaning that not all Isis members' children have been militarily trained. Another peculiar thing this piece of text seems to show and that actually was found elsewhere is that the adjectives and nouns indicating nationality are not used here in order to construct a national identity: on the contrary, the noun Australians occurring with living under Isis seems to convey a more negative connotation, indicating that there are also Australians amongst those who joined Isis, which cannot be seen as a positive thing.

Similar discursive patterns were found in text 16, an article published in 2019 in *The Guardian*, that, however, mainly focuses on Australia dealing with foreign fighters' returning families. Interestingly, after focusing on a picture – published in 2014 –

depicting the son of an Australian foreign terrorist fighter holding the head of a Syrian soldier, the article also emphasizes the type of education children received under the Islamic State:

Beyond the use of children as frontline soldiers and suicide bombers, sleek propaganda produced during the height of its power put religious violence at the centre of what it called its education system. Textbooks produced by the regime showed chemistry lessons detailing the different ways gases can be consumed, arithmetic was taught by counting bullets, and children played games of "hide and seek" in the ruins of buildings.

(The Guardian, 2019)

Education used to spread propagandistic ideas is described here as being particularly influential in Isis children's lives. Indeed, it seems to occupy a prominent place in the picture, even beyond the use of children as frontline soldiers and suicide bombers, particularly in an article where, before this part, it was only barely hinted at the story of the above-mentioned 2014 picture. Yet, children who were employed on the battlefield may be seen as something far away, not affecting our lives and, thus, not worthy of particular attention; on the contrary, children who have been receiving a certain type of education and are now willing to go back to their countries of origins are likely to be regarded to as being a potential threat for the security of those same countries.

Isis' propaganda is here said to be *sleek*, so we have an adjective that usually conveys a positive meaning instead with a negative connotation: the more the propaganda is efficient, the more people they reach and attract to join them. However, if on the one hand Isis' propagandistic education system is something that should be focused on by the author, on the other hand, the use of the expression *what it called its education system*, somehow delegitimizes it. It is also peculiar how it is underlined that at the *centre* of this system there was the *religious violence*, with religion once again emerging as the pillar of the entire organization.

Since it is children what is being talked about here, it is also interesting to notice how normal activities for pupils, such as the study of chemistry and arithmetic, are said to have been adapted in order to make them functional to Isis' actions. Also, there seems to be an attempt to create contact between the public and what is happening in Isis' territories: the images of school subjects and textbooks are a glimpse into our everyday lives as well. Thus, on the one hand, the social actors are here humanized – and their children are depicted as doing normal activities our children do – but, on the other, the deep description of the activities done by Isis' children makes it clear that they have been indoctrinated in order to learn how to carry out specific tasks. What emerges is the image of children who are used to any aspect of the conflict and trained as soldiers, which makes them potentially dangerous despite their age.

However, a substantial difference seems to exist between text 13 and text 16, i.e. the fact that, whilst in text 13 the author seemed to be worried that foreign fighters' children could threaten Australia as much as adult foreign fighters coming back, text 15 goes on not only by carrying specific examples and direct testimonies of people who lived under Isis and but also by focusing on what could be done in order to re-educate those children, and it does so by reporting a series of experts' opinions.

Discourses related to foreign fighters' families were also found – only partially though – in text 15, which mostly focuses on returning foreign fighters and on Western countries struggling to understand what to do with them. There, it is said that *Belgium is appealing a court order that it repatriate six children and their Islamic State mothers*, making it clear that the matter of foreign fighters' children and wives was something several countries were facing. Also, it underlines that Belgium is trying to do what it can in order not to repatriate six children and their *Islamic State mothers*: it is not clear the role these

mothers had in the Islamic State, nor why are they considered to be putting Belgium's security at risk.

All in all, it can be said that, as presumed in the analysis of keywords and concordances, the presence of discourses related to foreign fighters' families is here strongly linked to the diachronic aspect of the corpus: in 2019, following the weakening of Isis, countries started to wonder how to tackle the problem of returning foreign fighters. Making it even more complicated, there was the fact that these foreign fighters had families and children with them. From a discursive perspective, it was interesting to notice how children who lived under the Islamic State and who were likely to come back were discursively constructed as potentially dangerous as much as their parents. Indeed, both in text 13 and in text 16 there was a stress on the type of training they underwent and that seemed to be underlining that, despite their age and despite the fact that they were children, after all, they were also militarily trained and capable of carrying out cruel actions. However, it was also possible to notice how this discursive construction common to both the analysed articles has been conveyed through the use of different linguistic strategies: in the case of text 13, the author's opinion on the matter was rather clear and defined, with them also evaluating the Prime Minister's attitude towards the problem, while, in case of text 16, a humanization of the social actor of children has been made, communicated through the use of images of everyday school life.

## 5.4.4. Intertextuality vs journalists' opinions

An important aspect emerging from the analysis of the 16 articles is that of intertextuality, with several references – in the articles themselves – to other texts, amongst which the largest part is represented by indirect reported speech. While examining the articles, it

was evident that it was possible to find a variety of voices being reported and represented here; sometimes who those voices belonged to was specified, while, other times, it was not. It can be said that, by analysing the articles, it was possible to find three different ways of expressing an opinion.

The first one was through the reported – both direct and indirect – speech of a known source. These were cases where the name of the person who was speaking was told by the journalist and such instances could be found in almost all of the articles. In most cases, however, the sources were authorities, such as Prime Ministers, politicians, experts on terrorism, and so on. An example of this could be found in text 5, published in *The Sydney* Morning Herald in 2014, where words belonging to Australia's Prime Minister Tony Abbot were quoted through the use of quotation marks. In cases of direct reported speech, we should expect to find words that were not re-elaborated by the journalist. Thus, in these cases, we should be allowed to take for granted that what is being said is not the journalist's opinion: it is not the journalist giving us his view on the matter, they are simply reporting what other people said. Even though also the ways in which speeches are directly reported in the news and tied with the other parts of texts are not neutral and, as such, they must be examined (for instance, a journalist can deliberately decide to quote the speech of someone who detains some type of power or authority in order to reinforce their opinion), this type of intertextuality is not of primary importance for the purpose of the present study, as it does not tell us much about the way in which foreign fighters have been constructed in the news.

Another example of reported speech with a known source is that of indirect reported speech. In these cases, texts may be re-elaborated by the journalist, who, however, does not have the freedom to alter them completely. This type of reported speech was largely found in the sixteen analysed articles. An instance is the following piece of text, found in

text 2, published in *The Guardian* in 2012: Organisational affiliations are often unclear, but veteran fighters have brought deadly operational experience from Iraq, as Ghaith Abdul Ahad reported vividly. Ghaith Abdul Ahad is an Iraqi journalist, and here he is being quoted as an expert on the matter. So, the fact that veteran fighters brought deadly operational experience from Iraq can be attributed to Ghaith Abdul Ahad, while it is not clear who believes that organisational affiliations are often unclear, which could easily be something thought by the journalist. Yet, here it is possible to see how indirect reported speech more easily allows the journalist to intersect their opinion with that of other people and to re-elaborate what others have said.

The second way of expressing an opinion and of using intertextuality largely found in the sixteen articles is that of indirectly reported speeches where the sources are unknown. This is particularly interesting because, in such cases, it is not clear where the information comes from and, thus, it is not always easy to distinguish between the journalists' opinions and what other people said.

Instances of this practice are the use of expressions such as it is said, it is thought, it is believed, and so forth. An example of this was found in text 10, published in The Guardian in 2015, in the following sentence: there are fears of an upsurge in violence in Afghanistan as the US reduces its presence in the unstable state. In this case, it is not clear who is afraid of what we are being told, so it is uncertain whether we can consider it to be an opinion of the journalist or whether they are reporting what has been said elsewhere. This sentence is indeed an example of hedging, where the journalist uses ambiguity in order to be less accountable for what is being said. In the analysed articles, however, it was sometimes possible to find examples where some type of source was mentioned, but still, we were not told the names of those people. It was the case, for instance, of expressions such as officials said, authorities said, according to sources, and so on, being

used, as, for example, in this sentence from text 6 (The Washington Post, 2014), speaking of the likelihood that foreign fighters will go back to their home countries and become terrorists: intelligence officials are fearful they could return to their native countries and launch attacks. As outlined previously in this section, this way of communicating news related to terrorism may increase anxiety in the readers who are being told that officials are fearful, but are not given complete information about the issue. However, it must be underlined here that, in a few cases, it is likely that sources were not specified for security reasons: it is the case of former Isis' hostages or former combatants, who could be prosecuted by Isis itself, as in this sentence found in text 8, published on *The Guardian* in 2014, where we are being told that the three UK-born militants were referred to as "the Beatles" by fellow hostages because of their nationality, the former captive added. In the article, the former hostage's identity is not revealed, and it is more than probable that the reason for that is to be found in security measures put in place in order to protect them. Finally, there were also cases where the journalist expressed their opinion without the use of intertextuality. It is the case, for instance, of text 11, where the journalist highly criticizes the way in which Obama – who was the US President at the time – seems not to be worried about the threat posed by foreign fighters. Here, not only we find criticism towards politics, but also information about foreign fighters given without any source being quoted, as in this piece of text: thousands of foreign fighters have joined with Muslim extremists in Syria and Iraq, and their fanatical cause has inspired sympathizers across the globe. Indeed, we are told that thousands of foreign fighters have gone to Syria and Iraq, but we are not told where this number comes from: here, the social actor of foreign fighters is constructed through the use of assimilation - conveyed with an indefinite quantifier – and it is done deliberately by the journalist, who does not seem to be doing so to simply communicate a statistical data; on the contrary, the tone of the sentence makes it possible to think that the message here is a warning, rather than statistical information.

To sum up, it can be said that in the sixteen analysed articles, it was possible to find different ways of expressing opinions, some of which were conveyed through intertextual practices, such as direct and indirect reported speech. It was shown, however, that, often, reported speech is made functional to the journalist's opinion, as the way in which texts are incorporated and bound together is itself not neutral. Moreover, there were cases in which indirectly reported speeches had been re-elaborated by the journalists themselves and, in this sense, intertextuality is extremely important in news discourse, because it often helps journalists in 'passing the buck' of what is being said to other voices and relay on indirect reported speech in order to remain as much objective as possible.

#### 5.5. Conclusions

This chapter has examined the way in which foreign fighters have been discursively represented in the news in the decade between 2011 and 2021. It particularly tried to answer the second research question formulated in section 1.1.: What changes in the news discourse related to foreign fighters emerge from a diachronic study of the corpus?

In order to do so, as it was also explained in the methodological section – in Chapter 4 – the methodology of Modern Diachronic CADS has been used.

Thus, after having analysed keywords, concordance-keywords, and collocations, it moved to the analysis of concordances and to the critical discourse analysis of sixteen newspaper articles randomly selected amongst the four subcorpora on which the analysis has been basically based on – namely 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2019.

What emerged is that, in discursively constructing foreign fighters as a social actor, assimilation has been often used and it could be noticed how it was not only because of mere statistical reason, as it was rather ideologically oriented, especially when it was conveyed through the use of indefinite quantifiers. Indeed – while it was interesting, from a diachronic perspective, to notice how the precise numbers used as definite quantifiers changed and increased throughout the years –, quantifiers such as *number(s)*, *hundreds of*, *thousands of*, *several dozen*, and so on, were mostly used to indicate imprecise quantities of foreign fighters travelling to and from Syria. Also, they were frequently premodified by expressions such as rising, growing, and estimated, which contributed to underline the fact that the number of people travelling was huge, but, at the same time, unclear and unknown. It was also interesting to notice how a liquid metaphor was often used in this case, with expressions such as *the flow of*, *the influx*, and *the torrent of* used to quantify foreign fighters, discursively conveying the image of these great numbers of people who were not only able to travel easily, but they were also difficult to stop.

It has also been found that the discursive construction of foreign fighters was often linked to terrorism and security discourses and this type of pattern changed diachronically as well. Indeed, while in the 2012 subcorpus, foreign fighters were only partially discursively constructed as affiliated to terrorism and terrorist organizations – since they were quoted only in contexts where the focus was on terrorism and on its characteristics, but not as properly belonging to such organizations, thus showing how the border between foreign fighters and terrorists was still blurring at that stage of events – in 2014 and 2015 they are represented as *flocking to join the jihadist, joining extremists groups, planning attacks against, training to conduct terror attacks*, or represented as threats in contexts such as *the threat posed by foreign fighters*. This tendency of linking foreign fighters with terrorism, especially in those years when the Islamic State was at its peak, was also

confirmed in section 5.4.2., where it was examined how the strategy defined by Fairclough as overwording was largely used in the sixteen analysed articles. What appeared to be of particular interest was that, while in 2012 it was possible to find expressions as foreign insurgents – with insurgents being used as a synonym for fighters - things changed in 2014 and 2015, where foreign fighters were also referred to as lone wolf\*, jihadists, terrorists, Islamic State sympathizers, and so on, all indicating their affiliations with terrorist organizations. However, it was also possible to find here expressions as would-be terrorists, potential or actual foreign fighters, potential terrorists, and future Islamists, all indicating one of the peculiar aspects of foreign fighters: they are not terrorists simply because they travelled abroad in order to join a conflict, they, indeed, are terrorists only potentially. Still focusing on the ways in which they have been discursively constructed throughout the years, the analysis showed that, in 2019 subcorpus, the tendency was more to focus on the character of the returning foreign fighter, with returning being the third word to collocate more often with *foreign* fighter\*. Also, at all the stages of analysis, it was noticeable how, in 2019 subcorpus, the focus was not only on the returning foreign fighters but also on their families and children. This linguistic pattern indeed was especially interesting, for it made it possible to examine how fear discourse was even more used when dealing with foreign fighters' children, which were represented both as people who needed to be saved – peculiarly thanks to their being children – but also as people who, despite their young age and despite their willingness to, had been trained and indoctrinated. In this case, it was particularly remarkable to examine how the social actor of children foreign fighter\* was humanized through the use of use of images of everyday school life.

Finally, section 5.4.4. focused on whether the discursive representation of foreign fighters in the news was mainly attributable to the journalists or to other voices and it was possible

to notice how, in the sixteen analysed articles, there were different ways of expressing opinions, conveyed often through intertextual practices, such as direct and indirect reported speech. However, it was also observed that reported speech and the way in which it was incorporated in the texts were often made functional to the journalist's opinion.

To conclude, it can be argued that the events on the background of the ten-year period analysed here have influenced the way in which foreign fighters have been discursively constructed in the news, demonstrating that discourses are not neutral and that they both are influenced by, but also contribute to influencing the way in which society and its actors are shaped.

# 6. Women foreign fighters in news discourse

### 6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the media representation of women foreign fighters. It will start by describing the sub-corpus and outlining how it has been collected. Then, a collocate analysis and an analysis of concordance lines will be carried out. Indeed, it has been noticed that, contrary to the diachronic chapter, the analysis of keywords would not have been particularly useful for the analytical purposes of this section. That is why the starting point for the analysis, here, is the analysis of collocates. The collocates, as in the previous section, have been calculated after having obtained the concordance lines for each of the terms under analysis. To decide on what words it would have been better to focus on, concordance lines of terms that tended to represent foreign fighters from a gender point of view were calculated and checked. The first concordance lines calculated were thus those of female fighter\*, female foreign fighter\*, and foreign female fighter\*. However, the one offering the least fruitful results was that of *female fighter\**, with only eight lines of concordances, thus indicating that women FF were rarely depicted as such in the corpus. Moreover, mostly, those concordances were about women foreign fighters joining the YPG in Kurdistan, so they were not referred to as the main focus of the present study. However, this did not prevent the analysis from focusing on the gender aspect, because even the simple fact of not referring to female foreign fighters with this proper title tells something about the actual representation of women in such a context. Therefore, the concordance lines of the following words were calculated: female\*, woman\*, and girl\*.

### 6.2. Gender sub-corpus: collection and description

As mentioned in section 4.6. above, in this case, it has been necessary to extrapolate a sub-corpus from the main corpus under study. The sub-corpus has been collected by writing *woman*, *women*, *girl*, *girls*, and *female* in the search bar of the folders containing the articles composing the main corpus. The sub-corpus, thus, results as follows:

	The	The	The New	The	The	The	
	Guardian	Times	York	Washington	Australian	Sydney	
			Times	Post		Morning	
						Herald	тот.
2011	2	3	9	3	1	1	19
2012	25	5	15	4	5	/	54
2013	13	5	24	9	1	1	53
2014	27	27	36	20	24	11	145
2015	42	26	32	29	47	14	190
2016	24	13	27	8	17	6	95
2017	11	21	27	9	17	10	95
2018	9	9	18	4	5	6	51
2019	30	19	37	12	37	19	154
2020	16	6	10	6	2	3	43
2021	2	1	/	4	/	1	8
тот.	201	135	235	108	156	72	907

Table 10. Number of articles composing the sub-corpus based on gender, per newspaper, per year.

	The	The	The New	The	The	The	
	Guardian	Times	York	Washington	Australian	Sydney	
			Times	Post		Morning	
						Herald	тот.
2011	1,942	3,317	18,889	5,716	522	1,193	31,579
2012	40,881	3,855	28,020	5,114	4,244		82,144

2013	21,542	4,049	27,968	7,946	757	862	63,124
2014	31,514	32,382	54,976	21,236	23,854	10,425	174,387
2015	54,049	25,883	63,740	43,304	44,174	12,233	243,383
2016	37,592	10,384	58,022	10,465	18,333	19,236	154,032
2017	11,543	25,132	34,536	10,694	18,619	9,581	110,105
2018	10,014	8,213	22,610	5,412	3,603	11,246	61,098
2019	87,822	23,282	60,125	16,845	30,970	18,596	237,640
2020	44,208	6,704	12,315	6,260	1,395	1,728	72,610
2021	12,482	1,275		4,111		465	18,333
ТОТ.	353,589	144,476	278,268	131,469	118,598	85,565	1,248,405

Table 11. Number of tokens composing the articles in the sub-corpus based on gender, per newspaper, per year.

Table 10 above shows the number of articles composing the sub-corpus, divided per newspaper and year. Table 11, instead, describes the number of tokens composing the articles, divided per newspaper and year. What can be noticed by observing the two tables is that – as expected – being it a sub-corpus, it is made of a smaller number of articles and tokens. All in all, however, it is still rather representative, therefore it has been decided to analyse it by not keeping the division between years and newspapers, to have a bigger sample and to analyse it only from a gender perspective.

### 6.3. Analysis of collocates

As outlined previously, the analysis, in this section, will start with an analysis of the collocates occurring with the words under examination here. In the following tables, the first 40 collocates for each word will be displayed, together with their ranking position in each list and their total frequency. As already mentioned, the collocates were calculated from the concordance lines of each of the terms under analysis: *female\**, *woman\**, *girl\**,

wife\*, and bride\*. Of course, the tables will only show the non-grammatical words resulting in the collocate of each word.

## 6.3.1. Collocates of female\*

Female\* was the first analysed term and its collocates resulted as follows:

	female*					
Wor	d	Ranking (n)	Frequency (f)			
1 Islan	nic	10	19			
e Fight	ers	11	16			
3 Wom		12	15			
4 Isis		15	14			
5 Polic	e	16	13			
6 Forei	gn	18	12			
7 Suici	de	19	12			
8 State		22	11			
Fema	ıles	23	10			
10 two		28	9			
11 YPJ		31	9			
12 briga	de	32	8			
13 mem	bers	33	8			
14 One		38	7			
15 recru	its	39	7			
16 units		43	7			
17 male		45	7			
18 youn	g	51	5			
19 bomb	pers	52	5			
20 Syria		57	5			
21 frien		59	5			
22 frien	ds	61	4			
23 mora	lity	62	4			
24 Kurd	ish	64	4			
25 numl	per	66	4			
26 recer	atly	68	4			
27 Syria	n	69	4			
28 terro	rist	71	4			
29 some		73	4			
30 Joine		74	4			
31 jihad		75	4			
32 Britis		76	4			
	hansaa	78	4			
34 bomb		79	4			
35   colle	ague	80	4			

36	religious	83	3
36 37	white	85	3
38	jihadis	86	3
39	captives	87	3
40	safety	88	3

Table 12. The first 40 collocates occurring most often with female\*.

Looking at Table 12 above, it is possible to make some condiserations about how women foreign fighters have been represented in the news. First of all, it must be noticed how, contrary to what was found in the previous chapter, assimilation here seems to be almost completely absent, except for number (n=66/f=4). An aspect that seems to be underlined predominantly in this case is that of religion, with *Islamic* (f= 19) appearing among the first 10 words collocating with female\*. It is indeed also possible to find morality (n=62/f=4) and religious (n=83/f=3), both again linked to religion. There appear to be several words linking female foreign fighters to terrorism or terrorist activities, such as Isis (n=15/f=14), suicide (n=19/f=12), bombers (n=19/f=52), bomber (n=79/f=4), terrorist (n=71/f=4), jihadists (n=75/f=4), and jihadis (n=86/f=3). Related to that is probably the presence of *police* (n=16/f=13), underlining some sort of security discourse related to the presence of female foreign fighters. It does not come as a surprise that YPJ (n=31/f=9) and Kurdish (n=64/f=4) are present in this list, as YPJ are the Kurdish Women's Protection Units or Women's Defence Units, that have only women amongst their ranks, and they were helped by a rather high number of foreign fighters. Moreover, were involved both in the Syrian civil war and in the fight against Isis at the time. Indeed, also the word *units* (n=43/f=7) is likely to refer to such a coalition. Other words, such as brigade (n=32/f=8), members (n=33/f=8), and recruits (n=39/f=7) may instead have been used both in contexts of female foreign fighters joining YPJ, and of female foreign fighters joining terrorist organizations. Also, it is possible to find terms that have to do

with interpersonal relationships, such as *friend* (n=59/f=5), *friends* (n=61/f=4), and *colleague* (n=80/f=4).

As for adjectives indicating nationalities, other than *Kurdish*, there are *Syrian* (n=69/f=4) and *British* (n=76/f=4), while *foreign* (n=18/f=12) appears among the first 10 non-grammatical words to collocate with *female*\*.

Finally, there is also the adjective *young* (n=51/f=5) indicating the age range of the people involved.

### 6.3.2. Collocates of woman\*

	woman*		
	word	Ranking (n)	Frequency (f)
1	children	7	447
2	men	12	208
3	young	26	96
4	Australian	34	81
5	many	36	73
6	more	37	72
7	some	38	69
8	Islamic	40	65
9	two	41	63
10	Isis	44	63
11	state	45	62
12	foreign	51	57
13	girls	53	55
14	Syria	54	54
15	Yazidi	60	46
16	people	66	41
17	Muslim	68	41
18	camp	77	37
19	British	79	36
20	fighters	80	36
21	thousands	87	31
22	camps	88	30
23	three	94	29
24	Western	97	28
25	killed	98	27
26	families	101	26
27	number	107	23

28	joined	109	22
29	travelled	113	20
30	rights	114	20
31	four	117	19
32	married	118	19
33	Syrian	131	17
34	identified	135	17
35	man	137	17
36	city	143	16
37	enslaved	145	16
38	Iraq	148	16
39	home	150	16
40	group	153	16

Table 13. The first 40 collocates occurring most often with woman\*.

The first thing that can be noticed about Table 13 is that – compared to Table 12 which showed mostly terms related to terrorism and war – it appears to be more heterogenic, probably because *woman\** is a much more common term that can be found in several different contexts, even in a sub-corpus that deals with women foreign fighters.

It is particularly interesting to notice that the first two non-grammatical words to collocate more often with *woman\** are *children* (n=7/f=447) and *men* (n=12/f=208), indicating that, probably, women in the sub-corpus are often represented as being linked to these two other social actors. This is indeed a particularly peculiar aspect from a gender perspective, because it is rather common for women to be depicted as mothers or wives and it is even more interesting if we compare this result to what was found in section 5, where terms such as *children* and *family* were only found in the 2019 sub-corpus, concerning the repatriation of foreign fighters and their families. Related to this, table 13 also shows words such as *families* (n=101/f=26), *married* (n=118/f=19), and *man* (n=137/f=17) to occur with *woman\**, even though they appear to be less relevant than *children* and *men*. Moreover, here there are also more references to nationalities and/or provenience than in Table 10, with adjectives such as *Australian* (n=34/f=81), *Yazidi* (n=60/f=46) *British* 

(n=79/f=36), Western (n=97/f=28), and Syrian (n=131/f=17). As for countries, instead, we find Syria (n=54/f=54) and Iraq (n=148/f=16).

Also, it is possible to notice terms that indicate some sort of assimilation of the social actor, such as, for instance, many (n=36/f=73), more (n=37/f=72), some (n=38/f=69), thousands (n=87/f=31), number (n=107/f=23), and group (n=153/f=16).

As said previously, table 13 shows fewer references to terrorism and terrorist organizations, with just *Isis* (n=44/f=63) being present here. References to religion are present here though, with *Islamic* (n=40/f=65) and *Muslim* (n=68/f=41).

Finally, the presence of verbs such as *travelled* (n =109/f=22), and *joined* (n=113/f=20) is likely to indicate a focus on women who left their countries and who joined terrorist organizations.

### **6.3.3.** Collocates of *girl*\*

	girl*		
	word	Ranking (n)	Frequency (f)
1	women	9	57
2	young	13	36
3	teenage	22	27
4	girlfriend	28	20
5	British	33	18
6	little	34	18
7	Syria	36	15
8	Yazidi	37	15
9	school	48	12
10	London	49	11
11	believed	55	10
12	girl's	58	9
13	parents	63	7
14	children	64	7
15	married	66	7
16	Muslim	68	7
17	Aged	69	7

18	Raped	70	7
19	Bethnal	73	6
20	Green	76	6
21	Isis	82	6
22	Boys	83	6
23	selling	84	6
24	Slave	85	6
25	reports	87	6
26	became	91	6
27	police	94	5
28	years	95	5
29	Islamic	98	5
30	state	99	5
31	slavery	101	5
32	sold	102	5
33	held	104	5
34	girlfriends	105	5
35	age	107	5
36	sexual	109	5
37	news	110	5
38	group	111	5
39	daughter	112	5
40	death	113	5

Table 14. The first 40 collocates occurring most often with girl\*.

The collocates of *girl\** make it possible to draw other considerations. First of all, it is easily noticeable how there is a focus on the age range of social actors in this case, with *young* (n=13/f=36), *teenage* (n=22/f=27), *aged* (n=69/f=7), *age* (n=107/f=5) appearing amongst the non-grammatical words often occurring with *girl\**. Also, the presence of the word *school* (n=48/f=12) seems to underline that the age of the *girl\** is being talked about in the articles.

Furthermore, there seems to be particular attention paid to the personal ties of the social actors involved here, with words such as *girlfriend* (n=28/f=20), *parents* (n=63/f=7), *children* (n=64/f=7), *married* (n=66/f=7), *girlfriends* (n=105/f=5), and *daughter* (n=113/f=5) appearing to collocate prominently with *girl\**.

As for nationalities and places, here we have *British* (n=28/f=20), *Yazidi* (n=37/f=15) *Syria* (n=36/f=15), and *London* (n=49/f=11). Also, it is possible to find the words *Bethnal*  (n=73/f=6) and *Green* (n=76/f=6), probably used together to indicate an area in the East End of London, called Bethnal Green, which is the suburb where Shamina Begum used to live before she decided to join the Islamic State.

It is also possible to notice references to sexual crimes, with raped (n=70/f=7) and sexual (n=109/f=5), and to slavery, with terms such as slave (n=85/f=6), and slavery (n=101/f=5).

Discourses related to religion are present as well, as shown by the presence of *Muslim* (n=68/f=7) and *Islamic* (n=98/f=5), while the only term that refers to terrorism is *Isis* (n=82/f=6).

## 6.5. Concordance analysis

In this paragraph, the analysis of concordance lines will be carried out. The concordances have been calculated for the terms outlined above – and that have already been the object of the analysis of collocates – thus for *female\**, *woman\**, and *girl\**. The total number of lines of concordances resulted as follows: 200 lines for *female\**, 2,518 lines for *woman\**, and 470 lines for *girl\**. Differently from the diachronic section, where it was decided to focus only on 200 randomly selected lines of concordances, here – except the concordances of *woman\**, which were too many lines –, the concordances on which the analysis has been based have been selected manually, so that it was possible to focus on the lines that were actually referring to female foreign fighter. Indeed, since the terms under analysis here – *female\**, *woman\**, *girl\** –, contrary to *foreign fighter\** in chapter 5, are rather common, it was noted that, by selecting 200 random lines, there was a risk that too many of them had nothing to do with the social actors this analysis is focusing on, while lines that would have been relevant for the purpose of this study would have been cut off. As outlined previously, the only case where it was decided to focus on a smaller

sample of randomly selected concordance lines was that of *woman*\*, because the total number of lines was particularly high, compared to the other analysed terms and it would have been rather intricate to simply select them manually. So, 500 lines were randomly selected in this case and then, amongst them, the lines where *woman*\* was used in order to talk of foreign fighters' gender were manually sorted out.

After having obtained the concordance lines, they were analysed from a gender perspective, thus with the goal of examining how female foreign fighters were discursively constructed as a social actor in the news.

#### 6.5.1. Female\* foreign fighters

```
<u>Islamic State supporters</u> in Syria and Iraq, including 113 females.
                                                                     A further 84 had been killed, more
about 500 European women among the estimated 4,761 female foreign fighters who joined Isis and convicted
Tsis'
member was radicalised by a female Australian fighter in Syria. How to
is listed as a key figure in the Al Khanssa brigade, a female
                                                               brigade in Raqqa that enforces an
a girlfriend and didn't wanna come." Jones led a female
                                                           battalion of foreign fighters whose
              female
                       Isis brigade in an image posted on
is a a key figure in the al-Khanssaa brigade, a female
                                                         outfit established by Isis in Ragga to
e interpretation of Sharia law. In some places, a female police force is deployed to enforce
Bishop said. She said some women were joining "all-
                                                              groupings which impose Da'ish's sick and
for two months with the Khansaa Brigade, the all-
                                                              morality police of the Islamic State, veil
                                                     female
correctly; and a veil correctly; and a former member of Islamic state's all-
to Turkey
Eastern province of Deir ez-Zor, describes an all- female
                                                           police force formed by Isis in his city
government fears some have signed up to notorious all-
                                                                religious police units formed to
                                                        female
Those judged to have been members of isis's all-
                                                  female
                                                           religious police unit, the al-Khansaa
```

condoned it because "Islamically, that is allowed". Female foreign fighters want you to believe they lead in bringing home all its citizens, male and female, to face justice. Those involved in In the press these women are often referred to as" female fighters", but that is a misnomer, in public schools, is a grievance used to attract female jihadists. The French government, which State commits horrific abuse on women, yet attracts female recruits. The image of Islamic State the case of Tareena Shakil, the first British female IS supporter to be convicted, serves when you look at the comment that another British female jihadi, Umm Farriss, wrote recently getting worse. This week a riot broke out, driven by female IS hardliners who now appear to be armed Prospective wives are advised by female jihadis to "bring something nice to of foreign fighters arrived to support the cause. Female militants from other countries were me yesterday, which also heard how deradicalizing female Isis recruits would be key to avoiding further aid she was responsible for training all European female recruits in tactics including suicide rifle at her side, as she waited with her fellow female fighters to move forward from a staging Abu Mohammed notes that the killing of the first female activist -Iman al-Halabi -came in 2013. Jihadi conflicts. The average age was 25 and, for female recruits, it was 22. Almost one-fifth minutes later with two veiled muhajirat- Isis foreign females -and two children. "Here are two Iraqi forces who pulled 20 suspected foreign female fighters out of tunnels under the last marriage for the pleasure of fighters. Foreign females have not migrated to Islamic State Libya, Turkey and Canada. The status of foreign female survivors is especially complex: Isis days ago in which the <u>dust-covered bodies</u> of **four female Isis** suicide bombers, apparently killed In the midst of the hell, female foreigners poured in to Syria and Iraq to assist Islamic state soldiers providing material support. This is why high-profile female Islamic State recruiters and propagandists whose faces they know. Under Isis rule, however, female activists have found it easier to move has enslaved and brutalised women, and introduced female police to persecute their own sex. But the owner stopped me, and a woman from the Isis female security forces took me to their centre have been buried by Islamic State and discarded by I female volunteers from abroad. But their One in seven Islamic State recruits is now female, drawn to war zones not Just by hard because of everything I've been through now." Female fighters pose a particular challenge media outreach and recruitment drives. A number of female converts who have joined the Islamic recruits. By trawling the social media accounts of female IS members, the study's authors Arabic and released by al-Khansaa, an armed brigade of female morality police, the treatise endorses have been given a quasi-fighter role as members of female police brigades that enforce the existence of the caliphate, Fatima Sadiqi, an expert on female jihadists at the University of Fez in providing material support. This is why high-profile female Islamic State recruiters and

units set up by Islamic State, while

Some are going to fight, or serve with the all- female

Australian fighter in Syria. How to treat returning female fighters is vexing European widow, had become one of the group's most senior females, given the job of indoctrinating other also identifies increasing negativity among some IS members, which contradicts the IS jihadist brides who have escaped Isis have warned that female recruits are at risk of rape and are October 2014 issue of their publication Dabiq, said that Yazidis had been given to fighters female od Mahmood, who went to Syria in 2013 to join the al-Khanssaa brigade, is included on the female whim of the local Hisbah. The women regarded the female branch of Hisbah, the al-Khansaa This is not what life is like for muhajireen, the female -jihadists who have joined IS. It is fighting. "Perhaps the most important risk is that these female migrants [to Islamic State] can inspire Among the children could be at least 730 born to female foreign fighters during the existence witnesses have been emphatic that they saw at least two female militants, armed to the teeth and to consolidate its territorial gains. Never underestimate jihadis' devotion to terror and talent female sample were teenagers, of whom more than a third were female. The report, co-authored by security in repatriated foreign fighters, especially Western female foreign fighters, and having them tried London Bridge. Four burka-clad women and a white female Muslim convert were among those Renas had heard her commanders were withdrawing female fighters for their safety. "When I told arguing "there would have been no Islamic State without female recruits". Now, she argued, women Prospective recruits can identify with the chatty, young, female jihadists, many of whom post messages

Table 15. Concordances of female describing female foreign fighter\*.

The table above shows the concordance of *female* in cases where the term was used in order to characterize female FF. The first thing to notice is that we not always have the noun *fighter\** here, but other ways of referring to the same social actor are being used in this context. Indeed, they are referred to as *jihadists*, *jihadi*, *jihadis*, *recruits*, *activists*, *volunteers*, *militants*, *migrants*, and *Muslim*. All of these different terms are often preceded by the adjective *foreign*, which indicates that the discussion is about female foreign fighters or similar actors. Additionally, other expressions such as *female migrants* [to Islamic State] are used, making it clear that the text is referring to female individuals travelling abroad to join ISIS.

Even here it is possible to find some sort of assimilation, even though, compared to what was found in section 5, here it appears to be a less used way of constructing female foreign fighter\* as a social actor. However, in the very first line, 113 is used as a definite quantifiers referring to the number of females who are – probably – amongst the Isis' foreign recruiters. Also, we find 4,761, referring to the total estimated number of female foreign fighters who joined Isis. Amongst those, about 500 are said to be European women. So, similarly to what resulted from the analysis carried out in section 5, even when using definite quantifiers, they are often preceded by expressions that underline that the data are indeed uncertain. It also needs to be outlined that the use of the adjective European, here, highlights the provenience of a group of female foreign fighters. Once again, the numbers reported do not seem to be particularly high at first sight; however, again, it must be kept in mind that 500 European women who have joined Isis were seen as 500 people who could, potentially, carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries. Another way in which assimilation is used to discursively characterize female foreign fighters is found when we are told that one in seven Islamic State recruits is now female. It is interesting to notice here that gender is indeed a way of discursively constructing a specific type of Isis' recruit. It is also possible to find indefinite quantifiers here, with a number of – that was one of the most used indefinite ways of using assimilation – referring to female converts who have joined the Islamic. In this case, the readers are not given rather incomplete information, as they are not put in a position to understand how many people the article is talking about, and, therefore, assimilation conveys uncertainty even here.

Yet, another recurring pattern here is the one that describes women joining Isis as being doing so to become wives and mothers of the caliphate. Indeed, they are addressed as *prospective wives*, who are also told to be somehow advised by other *female jihadis*. In

another line, there is the expression *marriage for the pleasure of fighters*, which, again, outlines a different scenario from the one emerging above here: women joining Isis from abroad in order to become fighters' wives. Moreover, in this case, it is highlighted how these kinds of marriages are only pleasant for fighters, and women are described as being completely committed to their tasks. There also is a concordance line where it is said that *female foreign fighters* could have given birth to *at least 730 children*, thus underlining the other task attributed to women within the Islamic State, which is that of motherhood. Furthermore, 730 is a rather high number in this case, as what the author of the article may be implying is that these children born from foreign people who had joined ISIS may be considered as being citizens of the countries of origin of fighters. There is also one line in which we find *jihadist brides* warning new Isis *female recruits* about the risks of *being raped*: so, those who are described as women who joined Isis to marry Isis fighters and who somehow managed to escape are now warning other women about the risks they are running by joining Isis, contributing to building some sort of sisterhood and solidarity amongst women.

As for the tasks carried out by women within the caliphate, here they seem to play important roles also in the recruiting and radicalization of other females, as in was radicalised by a female Australian fighter in Syria, where is also underlined the provenience of the person who is considered to be responsible for the radicalization of another one. In another line, there is the statement she was responsible for training all European female recruits in tactics including suicide, where we are told two rather important things: the first is, as said previously, the fact that women were employed in training other women, while the second is that even women were trained to carry out terrorist attacks. Furthermore, it highlights the provenience of the women who have been trained, which indeed is a piece of information that could contribute to making European

citizens feel unsafe. Another instance of this way of representing female foreign fighters' tasks can be found in *given the job of indoctrinating other*.

Another pattern that seems to recur quite often is that of the *returning female fighter*, which is not surprising. What emerges from such a representation of female fighters is that Western governments seem to be trying to understand how they should tackle this issue, as in *female fighters pose a particular challenge*, and in *how to treat returning female fighters is vexing European*. Thus, similarly to what emerged in Chapter 5, also female foreign fighters returning home are discursively represented as being a *challenge* and as threatening their home countries' security. Indeed, we also understand that a country is leading *in bringing home all its citizens, male and female, to face justice*, where it seems to be highlighted that there should be no difference in treatment between male and female foreign fighters coming back. Also, the fact that female foreign fighters are seen to be a threat to their home countries is outlined as well by how their provenience is often underlined and by all the references to Western countries and governments that it is possible to find in the above-shown concordance lines.

From a gender perspective, there is a particularly remarkable line, where we are told that [Islamic] *State commits horrific abuse on women, yet attracts female recruits*. Indeed, Isis – especially at the time the articles analysed in the present work had been published – was committing horrible crimes towards many different categories of people and yet it was able to recruit thousands of militants amongst its ranks. Thus, what seems to be implied here is that women should step back from joining Isis in the name of some sort of women's solidarity, while, instead, brotherhood is not brought into play when referring to Isis' male recruits.

Interestingly, a few lines use the words *female migrants*, *muhajirat* (= migrating women), and *female muhajireen* (= migrant) to indicate female people joining ISIS from abroad

and, indeed, all of these expressions highlight the ability of fighters to move to other places.

It is also remarkable to notice that, in some lines, there are references to the veil – as in two veiled muhajir – and to the burqa – as in four burka-clad women and a White female Muslim convert. Here it is particularly interesting the use that is being made of the adjective white, used as a synonym for Western which not only highlights the provenience of the person, but it is also used in contraposition to the burka-clad women.

Moreover, by looking at the above-displayed concordance lines it can be noticed that even here there are examples of female foreign fighters being discursively constructed as young, as, for instance, in the average age was 25 and, for female recruits, it was 22 – where it is underlined that the average age of female is lower than that of men – or in the chatty, young, female jihadists, where young female jihadists are rather infantilized and represented as any other 'chatty' teenager who is posting messages on social networks. Finally, it can be noticed that several concordance lines refer to Isis' female brigades, Isis' female battalion, and Isis' female police. It is remarkable to notice, in many of these lines, the expression all-female used as a way of underlining the fact that these types of units were made by women only. Interestingly, this linguistic tendency is observed only when discussing female police officers. In contrast, chapter 5 did not include expressions such as "all-male battalion", as the male-dominated composition of military units appears to be taken for granted. Furthermore, in one of these lines, we are told that some are going to fight, which is remarkable because it seems to have become something that needs to be underlined. Furthermore, in another line, there is a reference to the female al-Khanssaa brigade, which was a female police unit operating within the Islamic State. In a few cases, it is said that this was an all-female religious police, underlining the religious aspect and this indeed contributes to providing the reader with a negative perception towards Islam

and Muslims.\_Female foreign fighters, in one case, are also referred to as female IS hardliners; again, as if it came as a surprise to the author of the article, we are told that they now appear to be armed. This pattern is also found in another concordance line, with the expression two female militants, armed to the teeth, which actually underlines that women were armed and were fighting. On two occasions they are told to be assisting Islamic State soldiers and to be providing material assistance, which indeed contributes to shaping the image of women as *caregivers* rather than fighters. Remarkably, in one line we are told – through a quotation – that it is someone's opinion that there would have been no Islamic State without female recruits, which highlights the importance of women for the organization; even though it is unclear whether this sentence refers to the importance of women in fighting or in becoming wives and mother, once again the importance of women in this context seems something that needs to be underlined. To conclude, by reading the concordance lines, it is possible to notice that female foreign fighters are either represented as terrorists or potential ones, or as mothers, wives, and caregivers of the caliphate, which is, indeed, a way of representing foreign fighters that is only present when referring to female fighters, while was completely absent in other parts of the present analysis where the focus was on male fighters.

#### 6.5.2. Woman\* foreign fighters

In this section, the concordances of *woman\** and *women\** were examined. As previously stated in this chapter, *woman\** is another rather common term, which is likely to be used in several different contexts – even in such a subcorpus of articles selected because their main topic is women foreign fighters. Indeed, the total number of concordance lines resulting from putting woman/women as a search term was 2,518, while the other words analysed here resulted in much smaller samples of concordances. That is the reason why it has been decided, in this case, to only focus on manually chosen lines of concordances

out of the other 500 randomly selected lines (all the 500 lines can be found in the appendix in section 9.2.1.). This resulted in the following displayed 81 lines of concordances:

attracted about 160 people, including at least 10 women and 15 children. One of the videos Tumblr and Ask.fm, the researchers monitor about 100 from 15 countries who they believe women the back of revelations on Friday that at least 12 some as young as 18, have travelled ISIS followers being held in Syria, including 12,000 and children. That number does not women are preparing for the possibility that some or all of the 20 and 47 children might find their way home effective: tells the story of a 20-year-old from Scotland who left home to marry woman after the and the led to and, home to about 60,000and children with links to Isis. women Shopping complex said they thought they heard a speaking English among the attackers woman . She passed a high school missing one of its teachers,  $\boldsymbol{\mathsf{a}}$ who left for Islamic State areas religious grounds (such as Hezbollah) have later allowed to become suicide bombers or to fight. Emmanuel Macron said that decisions on allowing and children to return from Iraq and BEIRUT, Lebanon-Two American and six children affiliated with the women portraying it as a jihadi utopia. Foreign fighters, and and girls who joined the terrorist group jihadists. "Australian youths, and many young men and women from Western countries, are being lured Islamic State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe who have either attempt the border to Iraq, where more than 17,000 men and have already been charged with terrorism the group from Europe. More than two dozen men and have been stopped by the F.B.I. and women example of female agency, says Havlicek. Men and women, Isis says, have an equal duty to help Syria is a significant one (, 24 July). Some 6,000 men and left the EU to travel to the conflict about this. There is a suspicion that some men and may have been schooled by IS in how to Mr Rouhani found it extraordinary that young men and were prepared to <u>leave the comfort</u> and women United States, Britain, Germany and France, men and women, who joined the Islamic State because of Of Mujaheddin. The caliphate's territory also attracted as "the perfect embodiment of Islamic and to recruit others, including young Australian and girls, to travel to Syria and Iraq caliphate. In a new development, up to 30 Australian have travelled to the war-torn region in women parents; others were born there, either to Australian who travelled to the Middle East as The Australian has been told that most of the Australian who have <u>travelled to Syria</u> are believed have left the West to join the group. An Australian Zehra Duman, left last week to marry a woman, foreign nationals from 53 countries including 18 British and their children. Meanwhile, the women Isis. With <a href="here">here</a> face covered by a niqab the British woman claimed that she had spent ten months Old Bailey in London. Wahabi, becomes the first British to be convicted of terror offences since as frontline but to take part as "jihadi brides" or "comfort for militants. For many recruits, Abu Sa'id al-Britani, has used social media to encourage and children to travel to Syria. The teenage "terror twins" from Britain- who encourage to migrate to the territory and avoid women

less threatening. There is a tendency to label foreign women and girls who travelled to Syria and for permission to visit al-Hawl camp, where 1,300 foreign women and children from Isis families have part by nationality. It soon became clear that foreign women had more freedom of movement, more in the city of Hit in western Iraq. A team of foreign who moved from Europe and throughout women. New Zealand and elsewhere." An estimated 115 French had joined or were supporting Islamic women the various reasons young Muslim men, and increasingly and families, are flocking to Syria. women With their 'cubs' who want a bigger role." Indonesian are increasingly drawn to Syria with and children are held -and have been displaced persons camps where tens of thousands of ISIS women my last hearing, I was taken from my room by three Isis women to another room where an old man was transfer was one of the few repatriations of ISIS-linked women or children from Syria to Western members it has deemed to be radicalized. While many women from around the world joined the as a pure Islamic society. Among them were many women, some who were brought by their husbands survivors is especially complex: Isis wives include many who never participated in combat, but women young boy. He is one of around 5,000 European men, and children believed to have travelled women who had left for Syria. The woman, who prosecutors argued in the first case against a Norwegian woman there is a large and apparently increasing number of women among the so-called foreign fighters who to leave the country, including increasing numbers of and younger men. Despite authorities' women points out that there is a long history of planning and executing terrorist attacks terrorist attack by a radicalised British man or who has returned, well-trained, from woman ware of this. Like other terrorist organisations, women play an important role in ISIS as radicalisation of young Australians, particularly women and girls, was a priority. "It seems in an ongoing swoop on suspected efforts to recruit women to go to Syria and Iraq to support re-examined if we are to correctly assess the threat such pose. Lydia Khalil is a research women that it hasn't." For the moment, however, it's clear that women are only cheerleaders of such murders. On Thursday night. But the long-term dangers for the and children are just as women Its report, published yesterday, also said that the Jihadists were younger than their male women government has maintained that at least some of the women joined the Islamic State willingly, and final fight in the rubble around Dajat al-Barga. And the women "muhajirat" among them died hardest of Turkey, mid-last year. The Australian understands the travelled to Syria in late 2015 with her she adds. Trawling through the online lives of the women who have joined the extremist group can and children home is due to a lack of that any reluctance by the government to bring these in their teens. According to a CNN report, these women and girls are lured to Isis-controlled the militants, about two-thirds of them men and a third women. About 55 are believed to have returned, agency. IS has changed the rule book when it comes to women. While it is a patriarchal and violently laws and uneven battlefield evidence. When it comes to women, whose roles in the group were fluid, --a larger proportion than any other to fight in Iraq and Syria in 2015, nearly a third were women vans with "Al-Khansaa" on the sides. There were women from across the world in the brigade: Hamilton writes). Unprecedented numbers of western women are heading to the so-called caliphate,

Why would an educated Western go to Syria to marry a man she has never College report estimates about 20 of the 550 Western in IS-territory are Australian. The women She is accused of persuading other young Western like the British schoolgirl Shamima . This is a glimpse of the true -Islamic State, where are banned from fighting and are term "Jihadi bride" was unhelpful in understanding why were lured to Join Isis. It said that women considering flying 150 people- all of whom are the wives, and children of French Isis fighters women move to Syria to become jihadist brides. Eleven young are known to have left Britain to marry cultural lens, it is difficult to comprehend why young who have been raised in the west and women to come and marry fighters. One of the young who appears to have followed his call

Table 16. Concordances of woman\* in the subcorpus of female foreign fighters.

The first thing that can be noticed by looking at the table is that assimilation is also used here to characterize women who joined Isis as a social actor. Compared to the results obtained from the analysis of the concordances of female\* it is possible to see how, here, assimilation occurs more often, both through definite and indefinite quantifiers; however, it still shows some differences with the way in which men foreign fighters were assimilated in section 5. First of all, with the only exception of 60,000, the numbers used as definite quantifiers are here all quite low. Furthermore, – as foretold by the analysis of collocates in section 6.3.2., where *children* (n=7/f=447) and *men* (n=12/f=208) were the two non-grammatical words to collocate more often with woman\* – assimilation is often conceived in noun phrases such as men and women or women and children, which is something that rarely happened for male foreign fighters. This not only makes it difficult to understand the real numbers of women involved but also seems to be underlining the marginal role of women in this framework – with them being often associated with other social actors, namely *men* and *children* – as if they were not perceived to be as dangerous as their male colleagues. Indeed, in the analysis carried out in section 5, where foreign fighter\* as a social actor were analysed more generically and not according to their gender, men and women was rather hard to find. Furthermore, finding so often the term

children occurring so often with woman\* – while, in section 5, it was found only in a specific context, namely that of returning foreign fighters' families – makes it possible to see how maternity plays a central role in the construction of women as a social actor, even in a context of war and terrorism like the one that is being analysed here. It is finally peculiar how, in this framework, children\* seems to be a social actor with higher decision-making power than it probably is in reality, such as in 20 women and 47 children might find their way home, 60,000 women and children with links to Isis, two American women and six children affiliated with, social media to encourage women and children to travel to Syria, repatriations of ISIS-linked women or children, and in women and children believed to have travelled.

As for assimilation conveyed through indefinite quantifiers, it is expressed in several ways, such as more than two dozen men and women, some men and women, tens of thousands of ISIS women and children, many women, an increasing number(s) of women, nearly a third were women, and unprecedented numbers of Western women. Also in the case of indefinite quantifiers, it is noticeable how women are here represented as (almost always) being related to other social actors, namely – again – men and children. The effect that is conceived here through assimilation – both with definite and indefinite quantifiers – appears to be rather different than what was found in section 5: while in that context assimilation seemed to be used as a warning and as a way of creating some sort of anxiety among the readers, here, since the quantity of women is often strictly related to that of men or children, they seem to simply be quoted for purposes of information or statistics. The word threat, which played a central role in the construction of foreign fighter\* in the previous chapter, is only found in one line of concordances here, where it is said the threat such women pose: even though this is a partial sample of the 2,518 lines of concordances

of *women\**, as also demonstrated by the collocates in table 4, women are seldom represented as being *threats*.

However, often, it is still highlighted that those men, women, and children travelled to Syria, as in left for Islamic State areas, and in left the EU to travel to the conflict; in some other cases, what is being underlined is the aspect of their link to terrorism, as in Isis followers, in been charged with terrorism, or in with link to Isis. We are also told that women are attracted by ISIS, for example in the caliphate's territory also attracted women, in women from Western countries are being lured to Islamic State, in these women and girls are lured to Isis-controlled, and in women were lured to join Isis, with the verb to lure that somehow seems to depict women as weak baits.

The provenience of these women is indeed something that occurs quite often in the concordances, as, other than the examples above, it is highlighted in several different lines: in some of them through the use of adjectives that pre-modify the keyword in context woman\*, such as American, Australian, British, European, French, Norwegian, and Western. A more generic foreign is used in some cases to indicate that these women came from abroad, such as in foreign women and girls who travelled to Syria, foreign women had more freedom of movement, and in a team of foreign women who moved from Europe. A discourse of 'us vs them' seems to emerge in some cases where the provenience of women is underlined, as in why would an educated Western woman go to Syria to marry a man.

Finally, it is interesting to notice that are often highlighted the roles played by women in the organization. Indeed, we see that they seem to be of fundamental importance in recruiting other women, for instance as in *to recruit others, including young Australian women and girls, to travel to Syria and Iraq*. Also, there are several references to *jihadi* or *Isis' brides*, such as in *move to Syria to become jihadist brides*. *Eleven young women* 

are known to have left Britain to marry, or in to take part as "jihadi brides" or "comfort women" for militants, where thus the role of women is rather relegated to that of partners of fighters, and this is similarly underlined in the sentence *Isis wives include many women* who never participated in combat. However, there are also lines where the fact that women actually took part in the fights or that, at least, their roles were similar to that of men is made clear, as for example men and women, Isis says, have an equal duty. Finally, there are several examples where age is one of how the social actor of woman\* is characterized – with young (n=26/f=96) indeed being the third non-grammatical word to collocate more often with woman\* - as expressed by 20-year-old woman from Scotland, some as young as 18 have travelled, young men and women, and so on. To sum up, the analysis of the concordance lines for the term women\* showed that their discursive construction often depends on that of men or is strictly linked to maternity, with the word *children* widely used here. Also, their role inside ISIS is often underrated, with them represented as joining the organizations as mere wives or "comfort women" for militants. However, there are still cases where the importance of women inside Isis is highlighted.

#### 6.5.3. Girl\* foreign fighters

in Islamic State-controlled territory. A 15-year-old girl from Kansas was repatriated from Syria, the British police are trying to track down a 15-year-old girl from Bristol who they believe travelled . It emerged this week that police took a 15-year-old girl off a plane taxiing at Heathrow airport fortnight, he had received news of a 15-year-old girl stopped by her family from travelling to young, have joined jihadists in Syria. A 15-year-old girl, who had said she was going to join the who they believe travelled to Istanbul with a 17-year-old girl from London with the intention of police appeal could be fruitful. Two 17-year-old girls were arrested at Heathrow in January en route to live in the Islamic State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe who have teens. According to a CNN report, these women and girls are lured to Isis-controlled territory academic who has given evidence in cases of women and girls involved in terrorism cases, told the to recruit others, including young Australian women and girls, to travel to Syria and Iraq to join the it is a jihadi utopia. Foreign fighters, and women and girls who joined the terrorist group from the . There is a tendency to label foreign women and girls who travelled to Syria and Iraq as mere that a lot of the converts going to the Islamic State are girls, girls with problems, girls who have might have been "radicalized." There Louisa Rolfe, said there were indications that the **Bristol** girl men were searching door-to-door for three British girls aged about 16 and checkpoints had been to non-Muslims. In the past week alone, three British girls are believed to have travelled to Syria of foreign passports, including those of the three British girls, as well as other foreign passports and As the terrorist group has gained more land, girls and women -they need to be under 26 citizenship. Ms Begum was one of three east London girls who went to Syria in 2015. The court the real drama occurs- like the 17-year-old Muslim in Melbourne whose claims to be girl religion. Related: 'It's up to us to stop these Muslim girls making the worst mistake of their lives' Islamist structure imposed by groups like Isis. Other girls have tried and failed to travel to Syria for to travel and marry a fighter, and warned other girls not to consider travelling out alone to garland their tweets with emojis, encourage other girls to come out to Syria and chastise men seems intent on using her position to persuade other girls to join her. She tells her followers police to find Begum, then 15, and two other girls, who slipped out of their homes in east police handling of the case of three east London school girls who joined Isis earlier this year, then she crossed the Turkish border, the former private school girl told her parents that she wanted to . As well as the young men, at least two teenage girls are also understood to have travelled tried and <u>failed to travel to Syria</u>- including two **teenage** girls from West Yorkshire and Surrey who were and Political Violence has traced four teenage girls from Portsmouth, London and Surrey who in Europe has focused on three missing teenage girls from London who were believed to be is <a href="Portsmouth">Portsmouth</a>. At least eight men and two **teenage girls** have travelled from the naval port to are thought to be as many as a dozen British teenage girls in the Islamist-held regions of northern exposed the grooming and funding of British teenage girls to move to Syria to become jihadist

```
in London said they were looking for three teenage
                                                     girls
                                                             who are suspected of traveling to Syria
                                                             who are believed to have entered Syria
video footage has emerged of three British teenage
                                                     girls
. Akunjee, who represents the families of three teenage
                                                                  who recently absconded to Syria. "They
families have said that they were now confident that the
                                                             girls
                                                                     fleeing Isis were not their daughters.
Investigation exposed a plot to provide cash for the
                                                               to travel to Syria. A white Muslim
Western Union from Isis sources to London, where the
                                                       girls
                                                               would use it to buy tickets to travel to
Islamic State (Isis) is offering cash incentives to
                                                              as young as 17 to marry fighters in
                                                             aged just nine and 12. A total of 14
were supporters of Islamic State and included two
Syria, believed to be married to fighters, and says young
                                                                    are travelling out unaccompanied to the
                                                            girls
at risk, as Foreign Minister Julie Bishop warned of young
                                                                    being radical-ised in Australia to act
                                                            girls
```

Table 17. Concordances of girl\* in the subcorpus.

As outlined previously, the concordance lines for *girl\** were manually selected out of the 470 total lines, to focus on those where the term was referring to girls who travelled to Syria and Iraq and/or who joined terrorist organizations.

The picture that emerges here is rather different than those analysed in the previous paragraphs.

First of all, it is interesting to notice that, while *woman\** was often found together with *men* or *children*, here *girl\** occurs several times with *women* (n=9/f=57), and there are lines displayed in table 17 that were also present in table 16. However, the noun phrase *women and girls* has a different meaning than *men and women* or than *women and children* above, because here the two social actors share the same gender and so are characterized in the same ways. Yet, we find sentences as *these women and girls lured to Isis-controlled territories*, *women and girls involved in terrorism cases*, *women and girls to travel to Syria and Iraq*, and *women and girls who joined the terrorist group*, where the information that is being shared is the gender of the people who left.

Another characteristic that is found only here is that, in most of the lines where the provenience of girls is somehow highlighted, there are references to the UK, such as, for

instance, a 15-year-old girl from Bristol, a 17-year-old girl from London, two 17-year-old girls were arrested at Heathrow, the Bristol girl, three British girls, three east London girls, dozen British teenage girls, and similar. Indeed, British (n=33/f=18) and London (n=49/f=12) were amongst the first ten non-grammatical words that collocated most often with girl\*, as shown in the collocate analysis above. The only exceptions to this trend are a 15-year-old girl from Kansas, young Australian women and girls to travel to Syria and Iraq, the 17-year-old Muslim girl in Melbourne, and young girls being radicalised in Australia. Another discourse that seems to be emerging in the construction of girls who became foreign fighters is that of their age, which, again, is largely underlined, not only by specifying how old they are, for instance as in a 15-year-old-girl, or by using the adjective young (n=13/f=36), but also through the use of expressions such as teenage girls or school girls, that suddenly makes it clear to the person who is reading that the girls being talked about must be between thirteen and nineteen years old.

Moreover, assimilation is almost absent here, with only a few exceptions, such as in 53 girls and women from Europe, and in as many as a dozen British teenage girls, and it is probably because the number of girls joining ISIS was likely to be rather low and irrelevant – even though the topic was quite largely covered by the news.

It is also interesting to notice that there are references to the life these girls had before travelling to Syria, with the expression *school girls*, but especially with the noun phrase *the former private school girl*, which not only underlines the age of the girl, but also the social class she used to belong to, and this seems to be a way of highlighting the huge change of habits the girl is going through because of her reckless decision. Moreover, there are lines where the writer seems to be trying to profile the type of girls who were able to make such a decision and, indeed, we are told that *the converts going to the Islamic State are girls with problems*, which is a peculiar sentence for two main reasons: first of

all, it seems to be an attempt to reassure the readers, by saying that we should not worry about every young girl, because only those with problems are more likely to convert and join a terrorist organizations; secondly, it is interesting because it contraposes two different types of girls, namely those with problems and those who, instead, live their life according to the widely accepted (Western) social conventions. This highlights a relationship of power between the writer and the girls whose lives are being judged and who are marked as being with problems. There is also another line where an evaluation by the author about the girls and their decision is being made through the sentence these Muslim girls making the worst mistake of their lives. Indeed, even though it is a reported speech, the person who pronounced it is evaluating other people's choices. Also, they are underlining the religious aspect by using the noun phrase Muslim girls, which strengthens an 'us vs them' narrative.

The role the girls' families play also seems to be central here, as they are quoted several times, such as in a 15-year-old girl stopped by her family from travelling, the families of three teenage girls who recently absconded to Syria, families have said that they were now confident that the girls fleeing Isis were not their daughters, and in the former private school girl told her parents that she wanted to. Thus, these girls' families and parents are here discursively constructed as being confidents of their daughters and, as such, as being those able to stop them if needed, but they are also depicted as being worrying and trying to understand whether their daughters joined Isis or not. The way in which families are represented here – and the sole fact they are represented – is also peculiar from a gender perspective, as the results obtained from the analysis carried out in section 5 only showed families being referred to when it came to returning foreign fighters' families.

Another aspect that is widely highlighted here is the fact that the main reason why these girls seem to be choosing to join ISIS is to marry fighters. Indeed, it is outlined in several lines, such as in to travel and marry a fighter, girls as young as 17 to marry fighters, and in believed to be married to fighters; there is also one line in which we are told that other girls to come out to Syria and chastise men. However, it is also possible to find lines with references to the possibility that these girls were indeed joining ISIS to fight or to carry out acts of terror, as in British teenage girls to move to Syria to become jihadist.

In a nutshell, what emerges from the analysis of the concordances of *girl\** is that most of them came from Britain and so, as a result, here much fewer countries and nationalities were quoted when underlining the provenience of the analysed social actor. Moreover, there were examples of relations of power enabling the writer (or the quoted speaker) to judge the choices and the lives of the girls being talked about, which, indeed, were often infantilized by a recurring stress on their young age.

#### **6.5.4.** Concordance analysis – conclusions

The findings analysed above clearly showed some peculiar aspects of how female foreign fighters have been discursively constructed in the news. In particular, a few discourses seem to emerge here. First of all, one of how female foreign fighters have been characterized is through their age: women joining ISIS are often described as *young* or as *teenagers* and, while on the one hand this can be attributed to the fact that, according to a study carried out by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, statistically, the average age of women joining Isis was believed to be 23.5, on the other hand, the analysis of concordances showed how the underlining of their age was often used as a way of infantilizing these women. Strictly linked to that, is the recurring narrative of foreign women joining Isis to become jihadi brides.

Therefore, the next paragraph, in which the critical discourse analysis of articles will be carried out, will mainly focus on the infantilization of female foreign fighters and on the representation of jihadi brides when discursively constructing the social actor of women foreign fighters.

## 6.6. The discursive construction of female foreign fighters in the news

In this paragraph, news articles will be analysed by using a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, as explained in the methodological section (Chapter 4). Here again – exactly as happened in Chapter 5 – the sub-corpus has been down-sampled, to focus on a more manageable number of articles. Indeed, as was specified also in Chapter 5, CDA, as a highly evaluative and qualitative approach, is a rather complex method for analysis and thus it cannot be carried out on hundreds of articles. Besides, analysing all of the 907 articles composing the corpus under examination here is not the main goal of the present study and that would go beyond it.

Furthermore, to analyse such a vast corpus, it was decided to use a methodology such as CADS, that allows the combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, to identify recurring discursive patterns by analysing more quantitative data, such as keywords, collocates, and concordances.

Thus, 12 articles have been randomly selected in order to be analysed in this section, two for each newspaper examined in the present work. The whole texts of these 12 articles can be found in the appendix in section 9.

# 6.6.1. The infantilization of women foreign fighters: young teenagers becoming jihadi brides

As outlined previously, according to what emerged from the analysis of concordances above, it seems like one of the main ways of characterizing women and girls who left their countries to join ISIS was by highlighting their age. Often, this leads to an

infantilization of the social actor of women foreign fighters, with their choices described as being mere acts of rebellion of young girls who wanted to challenge the authority of their parents and of the societal contexts they grew up in. This indeed is linked to the fact that, as shown in the concordance lines analysed above there are frequent references to the willingness of these women and girls to marry a fighter, as if, while men were leaving Western countries and joining ISIS for ideological reasons and to get trained and fight in a conflict, women were becoming foreign fighters simply to pursue a romantic dream.

The analysis of the 12 news articles randomly selected from the corpus showed some examples of this narrative surrounding female foreign fighters. Starting by looking at text 1, published in *The Guardian* in 2014, let us look at the following passage:

The challenge facing the UK is complex and is not just confined to young men hoping to take up arms against forces still loyal to Assad. A handful of young women have also travelled to Syria, apparently to marry English-speaking foreign fighters. The King's College London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence has traced four teenage girls from Portsmouth, London, and Surrey who are in Syria, believed to be married to fighters, and says young girls are travelling out unaccompanied to the area, something not seen before. In some cases information from family members has prevented people from travelling to Syria, suggesting that the police appeal could be fruitful. Two 17-year-old girls were arrested at Heathrow in January en route to Istanbul, and police suspect to Syria.

(The Guardian, 2014)

In this case, the wording referring to women is rather positive. There is a clear contraposition between *young men* and *young women*: while the first are said to be *hoping to take up arms*, the second are said to be *travelling to Syria to marry English-Speaking foreign fighters*. So, while men are going to Syria to take part in fighting, women are mainly leaving to get married, with patriarchal roles of men and women in society being

highly respected thanks to this division: men are waging war, and women are willing to help and support them through marriage. This concept is reinforced a few lines later, where we are told that four teenage girls are believed to be married to fighters. Another remarkable feature of this text concerning the contraposition of men and women is that it is underlined that young girls are travelling out unaccompanied to the area, as if it is something they would not do normally. Besides, the role of families, as also emerged from the analysis carried out in the previous paragraph, is underlined here as being determinant in preventing these girls from joining Isis and this contributes to strengthening both the idea that girls are not mature enough to take important decisions for their lives, and the narrative of the girl trying to rebel to her family, that plays the central role of keeping them under control. It is also said that women from Britain are going to marry English-speaking foreign fighters as if a community of English-speaking people was being created outside Western English-speaking countries and within the Islamic State. This may strengthen the public opinion's feeling that things are running out of control and that the number of people who fled to Syria from their – English-speaking in the present case – countries is rather high.

Furthermore, even though the King's College London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence is quoted as an institution that is keeping traces of foreign fighters' movements, the use of both the adverb apparently and of the passive form are believed to, makes us think that the information we have is rather uncertain. Also, it is not said who is the agent carrying out the action of believing. We can also notice how, in the passage above, the social actor of women is almost always activated, which highlights women's agency in choosing their paths. However, the meanings activation conveys here are rather different than those analysed in Chapter 5, where foreign fighters were mostly subject to verbs that were used to indicate the threat

they were posing to their home countries: here, on the contrary, women are used as subjects of verbs such as *to marry*, that thus tend to underline their harmlessness.

It is also possible to find a narrative of young women joining Isis also in text 5, an article published in The New York Times in 2015, with the following piece of text:

One of the three London schoolgirls who made headlines last year when they fled their homes to join the Islamic State extremist group in Syria is believed to have been killed by a Russian airstrike, a British television channel reported on Thursday. The ITV News channel also said that the girl, Kadiza Sultana, 17, had become ''disillusioned with life in the medieval terror state" and had been planning to return to Britain.

(The New York Times, 2019)

Here, we find a slightly different way of representing girls from what was found in text number 1 above. First of all, as already underlined in the concordance analysis above, schoolgirls is used here to highlight the young age of the social actors involved and it is an example of synonymy through which the social actors are depicted as being even more harmless. Indeed, the journalist here exploits the knowledge of the world they share with the readers and the images the noun schoolgirls is likely to evoke in the public's minds, which is probably everything but that of a female terrorist. So, even though, right after, we are told that they fled their homes to join the Islamic State extremist group in Syria, the use of the word schoolgirl seems to be dampening the feeling of fear and anxiety resulting from knowing that they joined a terrorist organization and that they now are potential terrorists. This schoolgirls' image is reinforced towards the end of the article, where they are said to be straight-A students: underlining their successful school life, the author seems to imply that, until that moment, they had always been good girls and so nobody would have ever imagined them to flee to Syria. There also seems to emerge a discourse that is typical of neoliberal capitalist societies and that tends to measure the

value of people based on their school or work careers and it is what makes it possible for the author to use *straight-A students* as a synonym for *untroubled girls*.

Furthermore, while in the passage from text 1 there was an emphasis on young women going to Syria to get married to fighters, here we are only told that they joined ISIS, but we are not given any information about their life in the organization itself. Remarkably, we have a switch from activation to passivation of the social actor; while an active verb is used to indicate that they left their home countries to go to Syria, the passive is believed to have been killed is used right after to claim that one of the girls is likely to be dead following a Russian airstrike. Also, this piece of text appears to be interesting because it gives us an insight into the depiction of female foreign fighters who died while abroad: a sense of pity and compassion is likely to be generated here in the readers when they come to know that, before dying, the 17-year-old girl was planning to go back home, as she was disillusioned with life in the medieval terror state. Thus, in this case, female foreign fighters are depicted as victims of their own choices, and the public is called on to empathize with female foreign fighters. Another part of text in this article strengthens the idea that, all in all, girls joining ISIS were often represented more as being naïve rather than dangerous, such as Kadiza and her companions, Amira Abase and Shamima Begum, who were both 15 when they joined the Islamic State in February 2015, became symbols of the organization's ability to lure foreign women to its militant jihadist cause, where it is underlined the age they were when they joined ISIS and the fact that they have been lured, with young girls emerging as ingenuous actors attracted by the role they would have played within an organization such as ISIS. Finally, it is noticeable that – here – the girls are called by their names, which is something that was rarely found elsewhere in the corpus. Indeed, while the results of the analysis carried out in section 5 showed that

foreign fighters were often assimilated and, thus, small (or no) space was given to their profiles, when writing about female foreign fighters we have them called by name.

It is also possible to find young girls joining ISIS described as beg troubled in text 2, with the quoted sentence "I am deeply pessimistic about the fate of this apparently troubled young woman, but I am thankful that she left her children in the safety of Australia and did not put them in mortal danger, as others have": here we are simply told that they are troubled, reinforcing the idea that joining Isis is a decision being taken by some burdensome female teenager, rather than focusing on other social, cultural, economic, and political factors that may lead to making such a choice.

Schoolgirls are also referred to in text 9, an article published in *The New York Times* in 2015, where we are told that Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain said Saturday that the country's authorities would do everything they could to help three British schoolgirls who were believed to be traveling to Syria to join the Islamic State militant group. Here, again, the young age of female foreign fighters is underlined by addressing them as being schoolgirls. It is again interesting to look at the wording used, with a vocabulary that is not negative but, on the contrary, expresses concerns and worries. Yet, it is outstanding that, in this case, the anguish is said to be for these girls' destinies, while, elsewhere in this analysis, anxiety was caused mainly by knowing that people had travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State and that they could have become terrorists. Later in the article, the girls are again being called by their names: Mr. Cameron said that the latest case, which involves three teenagers from London – Kadiza Sultana, 16; Shamima Begum, 15; and an unnamed 15-year-old girl – was ''deeply concerning," and he called on community and religious groups to do more to stop the radicalization of young British Muslims. In this case, the social actors are again described by highlighting their young age – through the adjective teenage and through the proper numbers indicating their age – and Mr Cameron, the British Prime Minister, is said to be *deeply concerning* about them. Again, however, the main worry here seems to be about the girls' safety, rather than about the consequences that their joining Isis could have had on their home country if they had come back. Another interesting thing about this piece of language is that Mr Cameron addresses directly the community and religious groups, seen as responsible for not doing enough to *stop the radicalization of young British Muslims*. So, again, a discourse of religion seems to emerge here, with young British Muslims being radicalized on the one hand, and with their religious communities blamed for not preventing them from doing so on the other.

Amongst the randomly selected articles, the one offering the best example of infantilization of a social actor is text number 6, published in *The Times* in 2014. For instance, consider the following piece of text:

In a bedroom in Birmingham, a <u>well-educated 15-year-old girl logs on to her computer and leaves</u> another hopeful message for Omar Yilmaz: "You have beautiful eyes," this one reads. "I just want to be with you."

Compared with the boys she knows at home, Yilmaz – a soldier in the Dutch army not long ago, now living in Syria – is a man of action and strong moral character. The girl is drawn by his fervour, his notoriety, his astonishing good looks and the pictures he often posts on the internet of stray kittens nestled in the crook of his machine gun. She has read – and disregarded – the reports of mass rapes and sex slavery perpetrated by jihadis against Christian women in Syria.

(The Times, 2014)

The tone of this text is so uncommon in such a context that it almost seems to be a parody. The image described by the journalist recalls that of a simple teenage girl who is infatuated with a famous boy and who tries to reach him by using social networks. First of all, the girl is described as being *a well-educated 15-year-old*, where, again, education is used as a way to measure a person's value. The words that this teenager is said to be writing to Omar Yilmaz are those that could be writing any young girl to the boy she

would like to be with. Also, the author makes an evaluation by saying that compared with the boys she knows at home, Yilmaz – a soldier in the Dutch army not long ago, now living in Syria – is a man of action and strong moral character and they articulate their thoughts as if they possess an understanding of the girl's opinion on this particular boy and on the other boys she has encountered in her life. The setting of the story, designated as the girls' bedroom in Birmingham, plays a significant role in shaping an image that would immediately evoke that of a typical teenager in the reader's mind. However, this image of a typical teenage girl who sends messages to a boy she likes is juxtaposed with the reminder that this boy is affiliated with Isis. Indeed, we are told that, amongst the things she likes about him, there are the pictures he often posts on the internet of stray kittens nestled in the crook of his machine gun: on one hand, we have stray kittens, which, in the public imaginary, might bring to mind a typical teenage girl falling for pictures of kittens posted online. On the other hand, the image of a kitten nestled in the crook of a machine gun evokes more unsettling and cruel associations. Furthermore, similarly to what emerged from the analysis of some of the concordance lines above, the journalist, by saying that the girl disregarded what she read about mass rapes and sex slavery perpetrated by jihadis against Christian women in Syria, seems to be implying that there should be some sort of solidarity and sisterhood amongst women and that this should prevent them from running after foreign fighters. The concept of sisterhood as a tool that should be useful in order to prevent women from joining foreign fighters is also found in text 2, an article published in The Australian in 2014, where we are told that up to 40 Australian women are fighting with or supporting Islamic State in Iraq and Syria despite the terrorist group's cruelty towards its female prisoners. What is being underlined here is that women should refrain from joining ISIS mainly because of the way in which this organization treats other women. It is noteworthy, however, that ISIS was notorious for

torturing its male prisoners as well, but solidarity was not found elsewhere in this study as a factor that should have prevented men from joining the organization.

Moreover, the use of the term *Christian* in the context of text 6 is quite noteworthy, considering that ISIS targeted not only Christian women but also Muslim ones. The author thus appears to be implying that the young woman should empathize with the other girls not only because of their shared gender but also, and perhaps more significantly, because of their shared *Christian faith*. Moreover, in this context, *Christian* may also be used to imply *Western*, contributing to the portrayal of a clash between two distinct worlds. In text 6, there are other significant passages though, such as the following:

When news broke that another girl – 19-year-old "Aicha", a Catholic – had met Yilmaz online, converted, then run off to Syria to marry him, she felt, frankly, jealous. In some ways it's not so shocking: a sheltered teenage girl's infatuation with a famous bad boy. She comes from a strict family. Her parents are convinced she will go to medical school and become a doctor. All she thinks about is running away from England to become a jihadi bride.

(The Times, 2014)

Once again, we can notice the infantilization of the social actor, as evidenced by the portrayal of a sheltered teenage girl's infatuation with a famous bad boy, which reinforces the familiar image of a girl infatuated with a bad boy. What is particularly noteworthy however is the clear connection between the infantilization of female foreign fighters and their frequent relegation to the role of jihadi brides. Discursively, young women are told to be willing to travel to Syria and join ISIS to rebel against their families and to pursue their romantic dream of marrying foreign fighters. Besides, this is highlighted also by the following sentences, which describe the girl's family as being strict and as imagining their daughter to be willing to go to medical school and become a doctor, while all she thinks about is running away from England to become a jihadi bride. Again, in this passage, we can notice some irony that makes the whole text sound like a parody.

In text 12, published in The Guardian in 2014, it is possible to find a narrative that is similar to what we found in text 6:

A <u>young woman cheerfully tweets two British friends</u>, "I'm making pancakes, and there's Nutella, come up in a bit". Her friends tease each other in response: "come b4 I finish dem mwhaha:p"; "oi . . . . you have my back I snake it". Punctuated with emojis and slang, it's hardly a sinister exchange, until it becomes clear that all three have joined the Islamic State (Isis) – and are using their social media accounts to encourage other women to join them in Syria.

(The Guardian, 2014)

Here, again, the image that this piece of text recalls is that of a young woman carrying out typical teenage activities, such as eating junk food and using social networks. The tweets quoted are a way to reinforce the idea of normal teenagers being represented, as they also show the use of emojis and slang, such as *b4* standing for *before*, and so on. After having presented the main characters the article is about being average teenagers, the journalist switches the tone by saying *until it becomes clear that all three have joined the Islamic State (Isis)*. Furthermore, another passage of the article contributes to the infantilization of women joining Isis,

For the moment, however, <u>it's clear that women are only cheerleaders of such murders.</u> Female members may tweet about practising shooting or post photos of their guns, but experts say there is no evidence they are allowed to fight. Instead, they are expected to marry, keep house and bring up a new generation – and strengthen the narrative that this is not a terrorist group, but a state all Muslims must join.

(The Guardian, 2014)

After having written about the role of women in recruiting other women, the journalist downsizes the role of women within the organization to *cheerleaders of such murders*. Also, we are said that, despite what is being posted on social media – namely, pictures of women posing with weapons – experts believe that women are more than unlikely to be taking part in the conflict actively. Even though the identity of the experts remaining

hidden, we are told that the main reason why women are joining Isis is to marry, keep house and bring up a new generation. So, on the one hand, we have women told to be pretending to fight in order to recruit other women who want to change their lives and rebel against social conventions, while, on the other, the image of women as respecting their roles as wives and mothers is said to be used as a way of convincing people that Isis is more a Muslim-friendly state, rather than a terrorist organization. Remarkably, the author attributes this dichotomy to the images of women in Isis propaganda. A similar discursive pattern can be found in text 11, an article published in *The Washington Post* in 2015, where we are told that a team of foreign women, who moved from Europe and throughout the Arab world to join the Islamic State, work in communal kitchens to cook the fighters' dinners. There, it is highlighted that the women are foreign and that they moved to join the Islamic State, which seems likely to be an implicit way of saying that, while they thought they would have joined a terrorist organization in Syria in order to fight, they found themselves cooking and serving meals instead.

Even in text 10, which was published in *The Times* in 2015, it was possible to find references to the role played by women, both in recruiting other women and as jihadi brides. Women, indeed, are there described as being working as *recruiting sergeants* and as being *showing their commitment to the cause by getting pregnant*.

Another aspect that was found both in the concordance lines and in the articles analysed here is that of women as caregivers. Indeed, let us take the following passage, found in text 1, as an instance of this type of discourse:

Counter-terrorism officers, fearful that some of those fighting in Syria will return to Britain radicalised with the ability to carry out violent acts on British soil, hope that female family members will curb the numbers of people intent on taking up arms against the Assad regime. Deputy assistant commissioner Helen Ball, senior national coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said: "We want to ensure that people, particularly women, who are concerned about their loved ones are given

enough information about what they can do to prevent this from happening. We want to increase their confidence in the police and partners to encourage them to come forward so that we can intervene and help. This is not about criminalising people. It is about preventing tragedies."

(The Guardian, 2014)

In this case, the focus is not on the role women are playing as foreign fighters, but on what they could do to prevent their family members from traveling to Syria to fight. The sentence hope that female family members will curb the numbers of people intent on taking up arms against the Assad regime stresses the stereotype of women being the 'angels of the home', asked to take care of their families. As such, women should not only help the community by trying to convince their relatives not to take part in the fight, but they also should cooperate with officials to stop their loved ones from joining ISIS. Such a narrative is even reinforced in the article, with a quotation that says women are agents of change, particularly mums in the home. They are the ones who can nurture and safeguard their children, and that is interesting because it represents women as being agents of change when they are mums in the home. So, again, women's role becomes crucial but only if they are confined to the traditional role of motherhood, taking care of the next generation, and this, remarkably, is the same type of image related to women that text 12 used to attribute to Isis' propagandistic use of women. Also, it is interesting to notice a difference of tone here from the passages analysed before: women switch from being infantilized and being represented as naïve young girls infatuated with ISIS' bad boys, to being depicted as playing a vital role in contrasting foreign fighters' phenomenon. What is remarkable about this change in the narrative is that infantilization occurs when dealing with women travelling to Syria, while praises of them are being sung when they stay at home mothering, following traditional gender norms. Therefore, it is noticeable

how a patriarchal vision of women's roles emerges and is being reinforced through language here.

This type of discourse contributes to placing significant responsibility on women and on the stereotypical role they play as caregivers – both in their families and in the social communities they live in – rather than focusing on the broader social and political factors leading individuals to be involved in such conflicts.

Finally, it must be said that texts 7 and 8 were mainly talking about women in statistics about foreign fighters and that, thus, despite having been analysed as well, they were not properly useful to the purpose of the present study.

To sum up, the analysis of the samples above showed that the representation of young female foreign fighters in the news often involves a process of infantilization, where they are portrayed as misguided, naïve girls who are easily seduced by the idea of becoming jihadi brides. From a gender perspective, the discursive construction of young female foreign fighters as passive victims and jihadi brides serves to reinforce gender stereotypes and disempower these women, obscuring the complex factors that may have led them to make certain choices.

## **6.6.2.** Intertextuality

An important aspect that emerged from the analysis of the 12 articles is that of intertextuality. Indeed, in the articles themselves, it was possible to find several references to other texts, integrated especially in the form of indirect reported speech. While analysing the articles it was thus possible to find a variety of voices being represented, while it was not always specified who those voices belonged to.

In particular, the ways of evaluating and discursively constructing female foreign fighters were not all to be attributed to the journalists. As it was noticed also in section 5, there

were examples of expressions that implied that the information did not come from the journalists themselves, but rather from other sources, which, however, were often not quoted.

There is wide use of hedging – typical of news discourse – with several examples of expressions such as believed, thought, or emerged used without specifying the agent – and, thus, the source of the information – for the journalist not to be held accountable for what is being written. We can find instances of this in sentences such as believed to be married to fighters, extremist group in Syria is believed to have been killed in Ragga, it was believed all three had wed foreign recruits, British schoolgirls who were believed to be travelling to Syria, and so on; all of these examples clearly show how the use of the past participle of believe is used to give a piece of information which is attributed to someone other than the author, who is not mentioned though. In such cases, nobody can be held accountable for the information that is being given and, thus, for the discursive construction that is being made of the social actor neither. Also *thought* is used similarly, as in sentences like several British women who are now thought to form a police force in Ragga, and are thought to be travelling to Syria. Moreover, the word officials is often used to give pieces of information attributed to generic officials, without really telling who said what is being reported. An example of this can be found in text 9, where we are told that European officials say they are increasingly concerned by reports about Western Muslims who have shown an interest in joining radical Islamic groups in Syria and Iraq, including young women who want to either fight for groups like Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, or become the wives of jihadists and this is particularly remarkable here because the thoughts being attributed to European officials indeed contribute to the construction of women foreign fighters as willing to join ISIS to – in some cases – become fighter's wives. Moreover, by reading this sample, we can understand who is worried about Western Muslims who want to travel to Syria and Iraq, while it is less clear whether the passage telling us about the reasons behind young women joining Isis is still attributable to officials' opinion or not.

What is important about indirectly reported speech where the source is not quoted is that, as it was also underlined in section 5.4.4., it gives the journalist the chance to reformulate and shape someone else's words and to make them functional to their opinions.

In the analysed 12 articles, however, it was also possible to find examples of direct reported speech. Concerning this, what appears to be remarkable here, is that we find more than one example in which the messages women and girls who joined Isis exchanged with their friends are being reported through direct reported speech, contributing, as emerged in the previous paragraphs, to representing them as average teenagers. It was possible to find an example of this type of reported speech in text 6, where there are instances of messages that some girls sent to foreign fighters, such as 'You're so attractive. Will you marry me if I come to Syria?', that reinforces the idea of female foreign fighters being mainly teenagers who want to travel to Syria to follow what they believe to be a romantic dream. Other similar examples were found in text 12, where a series of exchanges found in social networks were used to emphasize the representation of teenagers who chose to join Isis as being normal adolescents. Indeed, such reported speech, through the use of teenage jargon and emoji, contributed to reinforcing the stereotypical discourse surrounding young female foreign fighters.

Nevertheless, it is also possible to find several instances of direct reported speech where the source is specified as often being an authority. As already outlined here, particularly interesting from this perspective are the quotations found in text 1, where it is highlighted the important role women play in taking care of their relatives and in preventing them from radicalizing, and where reported speeches by authorities, such as the senior national

coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, contribute to reinforcing the concept of women as being fundamental in contrasting terrorism. This is also the case with a quotation from a speech delivered by Ms. Bishop, Australian Foreign Minister, found in text 2, where she says "I am deeply pessimistic about the fate of this apparently troubled young woman", again contributing to feeding a narrative that sees female foreign fighters as troubled young women, instead of properly addressing the causes that brought them to make such a decision.

All in all, the analysis of the 12 articles showed diverse ways of expressing opinions, some of which were conveyed through intertextual practices such as direct and indirect quotations. For the purpose of the present study, it was however important to notice how, in most cases, intertextuality was used as a tool to reinforce the journalist's opinion or to help in shaping a certain – often biased – narrative of women foreign fighters. Indeed, as also highlighted in section 5.4.4., the way in which texts interconnect with each other is not neutral itself, as it is a task of the author of a given text to combine them with parts of other texts.

## 6.6. Conclusions

This Chapter analysed the representation of female foreign fighters in the news. What emerged from the analysis is that most of the articles composing this particular sub-corpus – selected, as outlined previously in this work., by writing *woman*, *women*, *girl*, *girls*, and *female* in the search bar of the folders containing the articles composing the main corpus – did not focus on women fighting but rather on their role as wives of foreign fighters, terrorists or jihadists. By triangulating the obtained results with a feminist CDA perspective, it was thus possible to highlight a discrepancy between how male and female

FF were depicted, even though, according to the report of the Global Terrorism Index released in 2019, of the over 50,000 foreign fighters who joined Isis since 2013, 6,902 – or the 13% – were women and they did not have the mere role of wives. Moreover, both the analysis of the concordance lines of *woman\** and *girl\** showed stress on marriage as a main motivation for these women to join Isis. Also, great attention was paid to the age of the women involved, often represented as being *young* or *teenagers*. Indeed, by analysing the term *girl\** and how it has been used in the corpus, it was possible to notice an infantilization not only of the women but also of their choices: even though men deciding to leave their home countries in order to join Isis were mostly young, in the case of girls and young women it was often possible to notice that their decisions were seen as mere typical teenage acts of rebellion.

All in all, by discursively constructing women foreign fighters as mere young females whose only goal is to rebel against their families and to join Isis to get married and live a romantic dream, the fighting aspect is put aside and this contributes to shaping a less terrific image of female foreign fighters than it was shown for male foreign fighters in other sections of the present thesis.

# 7. Representing foreign fighters in three different English-speaking countries: a cross-cultural perspective

## 7.1. Introduction.

This section will be dedicated to the analysis of how the foreign fighters phenomenon has been represented in the three different English-speaking countries under examination. Thus, here, the corpus will be analysed by maintaining the division between newspapers and countries. The analysis will start with a comparison of the collocates of *foreign fighter\** in each sub-corpus. Then, after having identified the main discourses around which the discursive construction of foreign fighters in the news has been carried out in the three countries under examination, the concordance lines of *foreign fighter\** will be analysed. After that, finally, a critical discourse analysis of a number of articles will be carried out.

# 7.2. Description of the subcorpus

As mentioned in Chapter 4, also for the analysis carried out in the present section it has been necessary to divide the subcorpus differently from the two other analytical chapters. However, while in Chapter 6 it has been necessary to collect a specific sub-corpus, here the articles contained in the main corpus have simply been grouped in a way that reflected a cross-cultural perspective. Thus, in this case, the corpus has been divided into three different sub-corpora, one for each of the English-speaking countries under analysis. The three different sub-corpora resulted composed by the following amounts of articles:

• UK sub-corpus  $\rightarrow$  1236 articles (752 and 484)

• USA sub-corpus  $\rightarrow$  1301 articles (810 and 491)

• Australia sub-corpus  $\rightarrow$  1086 articles (752 and 334)

As for the tokens composing each sub-corpus, they resulted as follows:

• UK sub-corpus → 1,796,243

• USA sub-corpus  $\rightarrow$  2,198,560

• Australia sub-corpus → 956,536

It can be noticed that the number of articles published in the three different countries is rather consistent, while the number of tokens composing the corpora is much higher in the USA sub-corpus than in the other two. Indeed, tables number 1 and 2, in section 4, showed homogeneity in the number of articles published in each of the analysed years and for each of the analysed newspapers.

## 7.3. Analysis of the collocates.

As a starting point for the analysis, in this section, collocates were examined. To do so, at first, a series of concordance lines was obtained, by using *foreign fighter\** as a search term for each sub-corpus. After that, a list of collocates was created, again one for each sub-corpus analysed. Then, as suggested by Taylor (2018), *Excel* was used to compare the lists of collocates and to look both for differences and similarities. Indeed, Excel allows us to compare two different tables and highlight what items are present in both tables and what are not. Thus, the collocate lists have been compared as follows:

AUS vs UK

UK vs USA

AUS vs USA

In this scheme of comparisons, AUS stands for the sub-corpus composed by the articles of the Australian corpus, UK for the sub-corpus composed by articles of the UK corpus, and USA the sub-corpus composed by articles of the USA corpus.

## 7.2.1. Looking for similarities: shared collocates.

The following tables show the collocates shared between the three corpora, compared as outlined in the previous paragraph – thus by using Excel – and here grouped for semantic themes. Grammatical words have been excluded from the analysis. For a matter of space, the tables do not contain quantitative data, as the frequency and the ranking each word occupies in the collocate lists. However, such data can be found in the Appendix.

Δ	211	VS	II	K	

1100 V5 C11.	
quantification	number, numbers, many, thousands, groups, group, hundreds
movement	returning, return, returned, flow, travelled
discussion	threat, stop, issue, suspected, terrorism, legislation, joined
people	children, terrorist
places	Syria, Iraq, Australia, Turkey, Europe
nationality	Australian, Western, citizenship, government, country, home
religion	Islamic
war	conflict
miscellaneous	families, body

Table 18. Collocates shared by the Australian and the British sub-corpora.

UK	VS	US	A
----	----	----	---

quantification	number, many, thousands, hundreds, group, ranks
movement	flow, returning, return, influx

discussion	threat, captured, suspected,
people	children, militants
places	Syria, Iraq, Australia, Turkey
nationality	Australian, Western, European, Syrian, border, government,
	country, state, home
religion	Islamic
organizations	Isis
war	conflict
miscellaneous	families, presence

Table 19. Collocates shared by the British and American sub-corpora.

USA vs AUS		
quantification	number, thousands, many, group,	
movement	flow, returning, return, join, recruit	
discussion	threat, suspected, stop	
people	-	
places	Syria, Iraq, Europe, Turkey	
nationality	Western, country, government, home	
religion	Islamic	
war	conflict, attacks	
miscellaneous	families, source	

Table 20. Colllocates shared by the American and the Australian sub-corpora.

The first noticeable thing about the three tables above is that the last one shows the least number of items, thus indicating that the Australian and the American sub-corpora shared

fewer collocates than the other two. From a point of view of similarities in the corpus, this tells us that, probably, the social actors of FF have been discursively constructed in a slightly different way in the two corpora; however, the analysis of differences in the collocates, later, will tell something more about this.

For what concerns the most recurring themes, instead, several things can be said by examining Tables 18, 19, and 20 above. First, there seems to be a rather homogeneity in the use of certain terms. Unsurprisingly, indeed, a great number of quantifiers are used and, indeed, already section 5 showed that one of how FF were most often represented in the corpus was through the use of assimilation. The most used here are *number(s)*, *group(s)*, *many*, *thousands*, and *hundreds*, and they all seem to indicate a rather big amount of people.

Another interesting aspect to notice is that great relevance seems to be attributed to the representation of one of the main features of FF: their tendency to move and travel. In particular, this characteristic is highlighted through the use of words such as *flow*, *influx*, and *travel* (in various forms and tenses). Amongst the verbs indicating a movement *return* seems to be the one that is used the most as a collocate of FF, which is rather emblematic because it means that this facet was the one being underlined the most in the three analysed countries and corpora: the fact that they were returning implies that they left to join Isis in the first place, that they have been trained, and, probably, have fought in the conflict as well. Indeed, *join* and *recruit* were put amongst the collocates indicating movement because, in order to be recruited by or to join an organization FF necessarily had to move from one place to another, as also suggested by the adjective *foreign*. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to find *join* and *recruit* amongst the words that mostly collocated with FF both in the American and in the Australian corpora, as it means that,

in both cases, a certain degree of importance was given to the reasons why they were travelling.

As for the general discussion surrounding FF, in all of the three sub-corpora, they are represented as *threat*, as being *suspected*, and as something to *stop*. In both the Australian and the British sub-corpora, we also find *issue*, *legislation*, and *terrorism*. While the first two were put amongst the words indicating some sort of discussion on the matter, the latter indicates the main theme that was probably related to FF by the public opinion when discussing about them, as terrorism is basically what made them an issue that governments had to deal with. Shared only by the American and by the British sub-corpora, there is *captured*, which is likely to have been used when reporting about their arrests in the news.

With regards to the way of referring to people, it is interesting to notice that nothing was found to be shared by the Australian and by the American sub-corpora. From the other comparisons, instead, emerged that *children* is quite often collocating with FF. Also, there are *terrorist* and *militants*.

The collocates referring to places do not show any surprising results, as they were all rather expected to be found here. However, they can be divided into two different groups: on the one hand, there are the places that refer to the countries where they went to join Isis or to fight, as *Syria*, *Iraq*, and *Turkey*, which, even though it was not a place interested by the conflict, it borders with both Syria and Iraq and, thus, was crossed in order to get there; on the other hand, we have places where FF were likely to return to, such as *Australia* and *Europe*.

Under the term *nationality*, have been grouped all of those words indicating not only nationalities – or provenience – in a literal sense, but also all of those terms meaning things or processes that have to do with being citizens of a country. Thus, as for

nationalities and proveniences, we can find *Syrian*, *Australian*, *Western*, and *European*; then, we can find *country*, *state*, *government*, *citizenship*, *home*, and *border*, which are all words that create a sense of national identity. Also, interestingly, here Islam is the only religion being cited, with the term *Islamic* appearing as a collocate of FF in all of the three sub-corpora.

Also, war and military jargon have an unsurprising importance in the corpora, with the words *conflict* appearing in all of the three. Moreover, shared by the US and the AUS corpora, there is also the word *attacks*, which is likely to have been used when reporting news of terrorist attacks. Indeed, the British and the American sub-corpora also show *Isis* among the collocates, while it is surprisingly absent in the Australian corpora.

Finally, as for the miscellaneous words, thus those words that did not enter any of the other chosen semantic categories, it is noticeable that the only one that appears in all of the three corpora is *families*. This has probably to do, as for *children*, with the fact that many FF created their own families while they were under Isis. Also, as it has been analysed in section 6, families had an important role in trying to prevent younger people from joining Isis and, also, in trying to bring them back. Then, still amongst the miscellaneous words, we have *body* in table 1, *presence* in table 2, and *source* in table 3.

## 7.2.2. Looking for differences in collocates that are not shared.

After having analysed the collocates that were shared between the three different sub-corpora, it is useful to also look for differences in the corpora – in order to have the most complete vision possible – by looking at those collocates that were not shared amongst the sub-corpora.

#### **AUSTRALIAN SUB-CORPUS**

quantification increasing,

movement travel, travelling, going, joining, passed, back, through

discussion counter, security, problem, prevent, against, danger, risk, role, believed,

intelligence, laws, terrors

people terrorists, people

places Indonesia, region

nationality Australians, government's, nations

religion -

war -

miscellaneous becoming, attracted

Table 21. Collocates recurring most often only in the Australian sub-corpus.

#### **BRITISH SUB-CORPORA**

quantification most, some, growing, significant, more, large, 2,000,

movement recruitment

discussion minister

people members, jihadist

places Britian

nationality British, international

religion -

war/military fight, armed, training

miscellaneous including, called, plots

Table 22. Collocates recurring most often only in the British sub-corpus.

#### AMERICAN SUB-CORPORA.

Quantification	largest, 30,000, 1,000, 20,000, narrowed
movement	across, recruited, cross, came
discussion	-
people	officials, forces, Iraqis, rebels, extremist, extremists
places	local, Afghanistan, Libya, point, city
nationality	language, Taliban, Turkish, American
religion	Islamist
war/military	weapons, trained, arms, supplies,
miscellaneous	terms, helping, used, allowing, united, trying,

Table 23. Collocates recurring most often only in the American sub-corpus.

Even by analysing the differences that emerge from the collocations in the sub-corpora is possible to draw some interesting considerations.

The first important thing to notice is that some of the semantic categories are missing in some of the sub-corpora: there are no collocations indicating religion in both the Australian and the British sub-corpora, the Australian one does not have war or military words either, and the American one was lacking any word attributable to the *discussion* semantic group. So, it can be said that, in these cases, the way of representing certain features was unvarying and shared amongst the different countries.

Quantifiers are the first feature that seems to differ quite a lot from one country to another. Indeed, the Australian sub-corpus only has *increasing* as a term it does not share with the other two corpora; Instead, in the British corpus, we find *most*, *some*, *growing*, *significant*, *more*, *large*, and *2,000*, while, in the American one, *largest*, *30,000*, *1,000*, *20,000*, *narrowed*. The British and the American sub-corpora thus seem to be representing foreign fighters more from a quantitative point of view, using a series of different expressions as

collocates. Moreover, it is interesting to notice the presence of proper numbers among the collocates of *foreign fighter\**, indicating that, probably, those ciphers were recurring quite often in the corpus. As has been already outlined many times in the previous sections of this work, using quantifiers may be due to the willingness to communicate data to the public, but it can also have the potential to make the reader feel uncomfortable and scared by the fact that – in this case – thousands of potentially dangerous people are travelling back to their home countries.

As for the discussion semantic group, it offers some remarkable starting points for reflection. Indeed, the Australian sub-corpus shows that the discussion about FF was mainly focused on what the government could do to stop them and, more generically, on security discourses, with words such as *counter*, *security*, *laws*, *intelligence*, *prevent*, and so on. Quite representative of this are also words such as *risk*, *danger*, and *terrors*. In the British sub-corpus, instead, the only word we find that was not shared with the other two is *minister*, which, however, again shows that there were probably attempts – at a governmental level – to handle the issue.

The collocates that were grouped under the semantic section of *people* are also remarkable, as they are more numerous than those shared by the different sub-corpora. In the British sub-corpus there are *members* and *jihadists*, both rather interesting: the first one, because it is likely to indicate the fact that FF were Isis' members, while, the latter, because of the (mis)use that is done of the word *jihadist* as a sort of synonym for *terrorist*. Interestingly, the American sub-corpus shows, as collocates under *people*, terms such as *officials*, which indicates the efforts being done in contrasting the FF problem. Also, however, we find there words that evidently refer to ways of representing FF, as *forces*, *rebels*, *extremist*, *extremists*, and *Iraqi*. The different uses of the terms *rebels*, *extremist*, and *extremist* on the one hand and of *foreign fighter\** on the other, have been abundantly

examined in section 5, thus it is not surprising to find them here, as words mostly collocating with *foreign fighter*\*.

Under the semantic group of *places*, is possible to notice differences that are rather expected to be found in a cross-cultural analysis, as they underline geographical features. Indeed, in the Australian corpus, there is *Indonesia* – which is probably there as a country that is rather near to Australia and from where, according to the Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency, at least 1,276 nationals joined Isis – and *region*. The British sub-corpora – rather unsurprisingly – shows *Britain*. The American one, instead, has *Afghanistan* and *Libya*, together with *local*, *point*, and *city*.

A collocate referring to religion was only found in the American sub-corpus, with *Islamist*. Then, in the British and the American sub-corpora, several different words are related to a war or military jargon: *fight*, *armed*, and *training* in the first, *weapons*, *trained*, *arms*, and *supplies* in the latter. Thus, in both cases, a certain degree of attention is being paid to the fact that FF were getting trained, even though the verb *to train* appears here to be a collocate in different forms.

As for the miscellaneous sub-group of words, it is interesting to find *attracted* and *becoming*, in the Australian corpus, as collocates of *foreign fighter\**, which highlights the attraction provoked by Isis in people who wanted to become FF. Worth noticing are also *help* and *allowing* in the American sub-corpus.

To sum up, it can be said that, from this collocates analysis, it emerges that the way in which foreign fighters have been discursively constructed amongst the three different English-speaking countries under examination is rather homogeneous and this makes it possible to make some considerations. Indeed – even though the tendency in this type of comparative linguistic studies is usually to investigate differences and to find out that the differences are almost inexistent may be daunting at first – noticing that the media of

three of the most influent countries belonging to the Western world used the same linguistic strategies to construct a social actor can lead to thinking that foreign fighters were probably seen as a common enemy and as an important issue the Western countries were dealing with. Also, it is important to bear in mind that, often, articles such as those under examination in this work are written out of press releases which are spread all over the world, so not only the information shared are the same, but also the sources and, thus, the language that is being used. Finally, as for the identified discursive pattern, it is possible to notice that the most recurring are those that deal with the *returning* foreign fighter\* and those related to security discourses, thus they will be further investigated in the following paragraphs.

## 7.3. Concordance analysis

As outlined above, the concordance analysis will focus mainly on the representation of returning foreign fighters and on discourses related to security. By using *foreign fighter\** as a search term in each of the three sub-corpora, the concordances resulted as follows: 1,517 concordance lines for the Australian sub-corpus, 1,505 lines for the British sub-corpus, and 1,658 for the USA sub-corpus. Thus, in order to make them more manageable, each of the concordance lists has been downsized to 200 randomly selected 200 lines, by following the procedure Edit  $\Rightarrow$  delete  $\Rightarrow$  reduce to N, on *WordSmith*. Then, the lines were manually selected based on the discourses I was interested in focusing on at this stage. The total lines of concordance can be found in the Appendix.

## 7.3.1. The returning foreign fighter\*

As it has been outlined several times in this work, one of the main characteristics of foreign fighters and, also, what made them an important issue Western countries found themselves to deal with is the fact that they not only went abroad in order to join a terrorist organization and to fight in a war that did not include their home countries, but they were

also thought to be likely to go back and to carry out terrorist attacks. Thus, it is not surprising to see the verb *to return*, declined in various forms, as often collocating with *foreign fighter\** in all of the three sub-corpora.

fresh wave of international jihadists, as well	as	returning	foreign fighters,	facilitating transnational
bloodshed in Paris highlight the dangers posed	by	returning	foreign fighters,	The Australian understands security
them and prevent any foreign fighters	from	returning	home.	This should be the Australian
approach to stop Islamic State	foreign fighters	returning	home	and carrying out attacks such as the
promised to toughen laws to stop	foreign fighters	returning	to	Australia, while escalating his attacks
operational alignment on complex issues	like	returning	foreign fighters	and a more strategic
the <b>terror threat</b> , one that could see dozens	of	returning	foreign fighters	back in their communities
terrorism resources to tackle the issues	of	returning	foreign fighters,	rising terrorist activity in
ability to arrest, monitor, investigate and	prosecute	returning	foreign fighters,	prevent extremists
the evolving <b>threat</b> of international	terrorism,	returning	foreign fighters,	the relationship between
fighting in Syria and Iraq. While the threat	that	returning	foreign fighters	pose to communities has
in terms of engagement, the real challenge	that	returning	foreign fighters	will present for us". That is
that can neutralise the inspirational effect of	these	returning	foreign fighters,	then the most effective
terror attacks, on many fronts, in addition	to	returning	foreign fighters,	terrorist sleeper cells and
is under increasing pressure to deal	with	returning	foreign fighters	and their families. The

Table 24. Concordances of *returning* in the Australian sub-corpus.

developing "cumulative charges"	against	returning	jihadist	foreign fighters with genocide
have worried about the <b>threat</b> posed	by	returning	foreign fighters,	with about 350 thought to
4,000 inmates in western Europe who are	either	returning	foreign fighters,	convicted terrorists,
practices on dealing with so-called	"foreign fighters"	returning	from	Syria and other conflicts with skills
next week to tackle the problem of	foreign fighters	returning	from	Syria and Iraq. The package includes
across Europe. The <b>flow</b> of	foreign fighters	returning	from	Syria has extended the EU database
to Europe and the United States by	foreign fighters	returning	home	from Iraq and Syria, the alliance
or preventing dangerous foreign fighters	from	returning,	or	the strategy for <b>countering violent</b>
around Syria and Iraq to prevent	foreign fighters	returning	undetected,	by bolstering their capability to
terrorist organizations and the influence	of	returning	foreign fighters	from <b>conflict zones</b> .
this information could assist prosecution	of	returning	foreign fighters.	The foreign minister, Julie

has been heated debate about the fate	of	returning	foreign fighters	- not least those who may
ago that we needed new powers to	prosecute	returning	foreign fighters,	and the parliament duly
with the ideology of the Islamic State.	The	returning	foreign fighters,	when added to the names
"This criminality, the <b>terrorists</b> and and	the	returning	foreign fighters	are clearly a daily part of

Table 25. Table 7. Concordances of *returning* in the British sub-corpus.

known as ISIS or ISIL, about one in every	12	returning	foreign fighters	had <b>plotted attacks</b> at
wary of threats from lone actors	and	returning	foreign fighters	- was developing additional
trafficking, and foreign fighters who	are	returning	to	Europe from Syria and the Middle East
It is impossible to rule out <b>new attacks</b>	by	returning	foreign fighters,	but we believe these
focus of <b>inquiries</b> was likely to be on	foreign fighters	returning	from	Syria and subject to prosecution under
in Kurdistan. And rising concerns about	foreign fighters	returning	home	from Syria and Iraq may also have
Putin has <b>legitimate concerns</b> about	foreign fighters	returning	home	to Russia from Syria, but his new
state, the threat of hundreds of	foreign fighters	returning,	home	and of the expansion of its virtual
operatives planning attacks, track	foreign fighters	returning	to	their home countries and improve law
steady flow of jihadists to ISIS? Will	foreign fighters	returning	to	their home countries. The number of
prevent radicalized foreign fighters	from	returning	to	Australia." He said there would be
, he said. But warnings of a "tsunami"	of	returning	foreign fighters	are <b>exaggerated</b> , he said
is working to <b>strengthen law</b> to	prosecute	returning	foreign fighters.	In recent days, Mr
threat of radicalized foreign fighters in	Syria	returning	home	to carry out attacks. Prosecutors said

Table 26. Concordances of returning in the American sub-corpus.

The first thing that can be said by comparing the three tables is that *returning* appears to concord differently with *foreign fighter\**. Indeed, in Tables 24 and Table 25, *returning* is mostly used as a pre-modifier of *foreign fighter\**, while, in Table 26, foreign fighters are described as those carrying out the action of *returning*.

Generally, it can be said that the *returning foreign fighter\** is represented with a rather high degree of homogeneity, with the leitmotiv here being that of a problem that needs to be solved. Indeed, in all of the three tables, we find words such as *threat*, *problem*, *issue*, *danger*, *concerns*, and *challenge* occurring quite often. In particular, expressions such as

danger(s) posed, threat posed, tackle the issues, tackle the problem, rising concerns, and legitimate concerns are repeatedly used here, making it clear that there was a general worry about the possibility of foreign fighters coming back to their home countries. Even the verb to prevent is used often, in contexts such as prevent any foreign fighters from returning home, prevent extremists, preventing dangerous foreign fighters from returning, and prevent radicalized foreign fighters from returning, thus indicating the urgency for governments to try to stop them. Indeed, stop is another verb used here, as in stop Islamic State foreign fighters returning home, or in toughen laws to stop foreign fighters returning. Quite a lot of attention is also given to law here, seen as the only usable tool to tackle the problem, such as to toughen laws, improve law, and strengthen law. However, it is possible to notice a link between law and security discourses in other expressions, such as in ability to arrest, monitor, investigate and prosecute, developing "cumulative charges", prosecution of returning foreign fighters, we need new powers to prosecute returning foreign fighters, and in focus on inquiries was likely to be on foreign fighters returning from Syria and subject to prosecution. Thus, in the three analysed countries, the general feeling was that their laws were not strong enough to deal with such a complex issue, with high stress being put on the need to improve and reinforce the laws in order to better being able to prosecute them.

Another recurring discourse – rather unsurprisingly – is that of terrorism, as what made foreign fighters so fearsome was indeed the possibility that, after having been trained by a terrorist organization and after having fought in the conflict, they would have been able to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries. Furthermore, in Table 24 we find the sentence to stop Islamic State foreign fighters from returning home and carrying out attacks, where it seems to be taken for granted that their return home would rather automatically result in terrorist attacks carried out. Similarly, always in Table 24, we find

the sentence the terror threat, one that could see dozens of returning foreign fighters back in their communities, which, again, directly links the returning of foreign fighters to terrorism and terrorist attacks likely to be carried out. Another instance of this type of correlation between the returning foreign fighter\* and the possibilities of terrorist attacks is given by the sentence threat of radicalized foreign fighters in Syria returning home to carry out attacks, in Table 26: slightly differently from the previous two, here carrying out attacks seems to be the reason why they are coming back. However, terrorism is quoted in different ways in all of the three Tables, with expressions such as terror threat, terrorist activity, terror attacks, terrorist organizations, and so on recurring quite often. Moreover, it is interesting to notice words such as flow and wave recurring in the context of returning foreign fighter\* as well. Worth noticing is also the expression "tsunami" of returning foreign fighters, in Table 26, where, nevertheless, it is said that these warnings (referred to as the tsunami of returning foreign fighters) are exaggerated. Indeed, it is the only case in the three tables where this feeling of being threatened by the possible returning foreign fighters is said to be overestimated.

What is also rather remarkable here is that the same nature of foreign fighters, thus that of being people that joined a terrorist organization in order to fight in a conflict that did not involve their home countries, poses them in a rather unique 'otherness' position: they are still represented as 'the bad other', however, often, they are also fellow citizens of the people who are writing.

After the analysis of concordances, a few stretches of texts will be analysed further, in order to better exemplified what has been outlined so far.

(1) Despite <u>strengthened laws</u>, not all **returning foreign fighters** will face prosecution. The <u>challenges of collecting admissible evidence</u> in places such as Syria and Iraq mean authorities

will have to rely on other means, such as <u>control orders</u>, <u>to manage returnees in the community</u>.

(*The Australian*, 2016)

In this stretch of text, published in *The Australian* in 2016, the focus is on laws and foreign fighters' prosecution. However, it begins by saying despite strengthened laws – thus by already making the reader understand that having strengthened the laws has not been enough – and then outlines that not all returning foreign fighters will face prosecution. Admitting such a thing, in 2016, when Western countries were indeed facing a period of several terrorist attacks following one-another, might mean to make the reader feel uncomfortable and scared for their own security. The article then goes on by saying that this is due to the difficulties faced by governments in collecting admissible evidence in places such as Syria and Iraq, however, it does not explain why is it difficult to do so. Also, the expression places such as Syria and Iraq is not clear: is it war that makes it difficult to find evidence or something else? Moreover, it seems not only to be highlighting the fragilities faced by those countries, but it is also an example of representing otherness rather negatively, even without using a proper evaluative sentence. Nevertheless, it is then said that, because of this, authorities will have to rely on other means to manage returnees in community, rather implying that they may probably be less incisive. Finally, the source is not specified here, so we may assume that these are the journalist's thoughts and opinions on the matter.

(2) It's more conventional to want to see criminals put behind bars, which is precisely why the government told us only a few months ago that we needed new powers to prosecute returning foreign fighters, and the parliament duly obliged. Under the revised foreign fighters regime, the government was going to be stopping the bad guys at airports and dispatching them promptly to the jail house. Now we no longer aim to prosecute them, apparently. We don't want them back. (The Guardian, 2015)

In stretch number 2, the first thing that can be underlined is that the register used is not as formal as one would expect, and it is rather colloquial actually. Also, it is clear that the tone is kind of quarrelsome and the journalist – from the very beginning – is understood to be blaming the government for something, which is told to us while we go on reading. Indeed, they start by saying that *it's more conventional to want to see criminals put behind bars*, which is a rather engaging way to begin an article in which terrorism and foreign fighters are the main topics. Remarkably, there is a contraposition between 'us' and 'them', where the 'us' is represented by the citizens, while the 'them' by the government, which is basically said to not have kept their word. Also, it is interesting to notice that FF are referred to as *the bad guys*. Moreover, what the author seems to be blaming is the decision the government took of not prosecuting foreign fighters and they do so by saying *we no longer aim to prosecute them, apparently*, and by adding *we don't want them back*. Remarkably, there is a switch here, since the pronoun *we* is no longer used to indicate the people and the citizens, but the nation. Thus, there is no more contraposition between the people and the government.

(3) At a time when European challenges of security, migration and humanitarian crises are increasing, there is one key player that can help Europe in controlling the flow of migrants: Turkey. It is the crossing point of choice for radicalised EU citizens who join the war zones in Syria and Iraq. It is also through Turkey that foreign fighters go when returning to Europe to consider or commit terrorist attacks. Better cooperation with Turkey to strengthen border controls and to exchange information is therefore crucial. (The Times, 2016)

Stretch number 3, published on *The Times*, is remarkable in its bringing up migration as something that is challenging the security of European countries. Moreover, here, it is highlighted the role of Turkey, seen as a possible ally *in controlling the flow of migrants*. It is worth noticing how *flow of* is used here to refer to migrants, rather than to foreign fighters: the same linguistic choices seem to be used for describing different issues that

Europe was facing at the time. For its geographic position, Turkey is seen as a necessary step for foreign fighters returning to Europe to consider or commit terrorist attacks: once again, it is being said that foreign fighters' goal is only that of carrying out or planning to carry out terrorist attacks. It is beyond interesting to notice that such statements are made in a piece of article that started by saying that Turkey could help Europe in managing the migrant crisis, thus seeming to imply that, among the migrants forced to cross Turkey in order to leave war places – such as Iraq and Syria – there were also foreign fighters willing to commit terrorist attacks.

(4) Despite early talk of <u>using the new powers to deport suspected terrorists</u>, the government accepts <u>it will be difficult to target people living in Australia</u> and the <u>greatest benefit will come from preventing</u> **foreign fighters returning home**.

The Australian has been told the new regime will be used -"judiciously" on domestic suspects who support terrorism, because of the clear risk of rendering them *stateless* when other countries refuse to accept them. (*The Australian*, 2015)

Similarly to stretch number 2, also stretch number 4 highlights a change in the government's tactics: at first, they thought of using *new powers to deport suspected terrorists*, while, now, they think that *the greatest benefit will come from preventing* them from returning home. However, here, the linguistic register is different, as it does not express anger, nor blame towards the government. What is being highlighted here is that strengthening counter-terrorism laws in order to find suspected terrorists inside Australia and to deport them would be problematic, because it would mean running the risk of rendering them *stateless*.

(5) The Islamic State has lost about half of the territory it seized in Iraq and Syria in 2014. But as ISIS loses ground in its physical caliphate, or religious state, the threat of hundreds of foreign fighters returning home and of the expansion of its virtual caliphate through social media is

certain to accelerate, American and European officials say. <u>That raises fears of more terrorist</u> <u>attacks in cities outside the Middle East</u>. (*The New York Times*, 2016)

Stretch number 5 has been published in *The New York Times* in 2016. The focus, here, is once again related to the dangers brought to Western countries by returning foreign fighters. In particular, it is brought up the fact that Isis had lost many territories in 2014 and that could have led to hundreds of foreign fighter returning home. Worth noticing is, once again, the assimilation realized through an indefinite quantifier, as they are talking about the possibility that hundreds of foreign fighters go back to their home countries, but we are not given a precise number. Also, it is not clear if the threat that is being talked about is concrete or not. Moreover, the physical and the virtual caliphate are contraposed, with the first losing territories and the latter gaining more and more followers on the web. All this information is attributed to American and European officials, who are not quoted indeed, so we do not get to know their identities. The last sentence is also remarkable in its outlining fears about the chances of increasing numbers of terrorist attacks likely to be carried out in cities outside the Middle East. This last sentence, in particular, is rather peculiar in its normalizing terrorist attacks in Middle Eastern cities: underlining outside the Middle East makes terrorist attacks in the West the exception to the Middle Eastern rule. What is more is that the Middle East, here, is probably brought up as something that is rather far away from the Western (in this case, American) reader, while fears of attacks being carried out in nearby places can make people feel uncomfortable and afraid about the consequences of what is going on in the world.

To sum up and conclude this paragraph, it can be said that the *returning foreign fighter\** has been discursively constructed in a rather homogeneous way in the three analysed countries and in the six analysed newspapers. Indeed, in all the analysed concordances and passages of texts there are references to the other two countries, which makes it

possible to assume that all of the Western countries were trying to cooperate and face this issue together. Even Turkey, as seen in stretch number 3 above, was quoted as an important ally in the counter-terrorism operations. However, there are also references to the migrant crisis, seen as something that could help foreign fighters to return home without being caught by authorities. Related to this, there is also the fact that all the pieces of language analysed so far seemed to be representing foreign fighters as coming back in order to carry out attacks: none of the articles seems to state that there could be other reasons for them to go back to their home countries.

Indeed, it is rather remarkable to notice such homogeneity in constructing a discourse that saw foreign fighters as hiding among migrants – during what has usually been referred to as a *migrant crisis* – and willing to carry out attacks in Western countries, because it is quite obvious how this may have affected how media (but also politicians) have represented the *migrant crisis* itself.

## 7.4. A threat to Western security

As shown both by the analysis of collocates and by the analysis carried out in section 7.3., another discourse that has been mostly related to that of FF in the three analysed countries are that of security being threatened by the possible return of FF to their home countries. Also, in section 7.3 it was evident that this feature of FF was represented rather similarly in the three different countries, which, indeed, often seemed to solidarize somehow with each other. This aspect of security being threatened by the eventual return of FF is going to be examined further here, starting with an analysis of concordances lines.

. There is **more to be done**, especially to address foreign fighters returning to our region. The the threat part of our comprehensive response to combating threat  $\mathbf{of}$ foreign fighters, the government is the , or assisting terrorist groups in the Middle East. "The threat  $\mathbf{of}$ foreign fighters going to Iraq and Syria is "border protection", with "national security" and the foreign fighters has blended perfectly with threat of the Australian government was taking to address the threat  $\mathbf{of}$ returning foreign fighters. Senator Johnston "only one plank" of what we can do" to **neutralise** threat. foreign fighters who tried to return home the of Iraqi. The government is especially concerned at by foreign fighters, with about 30 threat the posed spend in Southeast Asia gathering intelligence on the threat by returning foreign fighters to Indonesia posed are needed. Australia already has laws to meet threat posed by foreign fighters. Indeed, the government

forum with other regional partners to help counter	the	threat	posed	by returning foreign fighters as the
is planning to assemble a new unit to manage	the	threat	posed	by returning foreign fighters. The
Islamic State crisis across Iraq and Syria,	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters returning from the
Sovereign Borders, but against terrorism and	the	threat	that	foreign fighters present to Australia
are thought to be <b>fighting</b> in Syria and Iraq. While	the	threat	that	returning foreign fighters pose to
Prime Minister said foreign fighters posed a	unique	threat	to	Australia and any attempt on their behalf

Table 27. Concordances of *threat* in the Australian sub-corpus.

anti-extremism programmes." All of us face	a	threat	from	foreign fighters and from increasing
across Turkish soil."Foreign fighters are	a	threat	to	the <b>countries</b> that they are coming from or for
increasing the national understanding of the	evolving	threat	posed	by foreign fighters, identifying
dimensions of the conflict, including the	extremist	threat.	Foreign fighters	are in action on both sides,
that Turkey had recently begun taking the	potential	threat	of	foreign fighters near the border seriously
convictions in courts of law, and that the	rising	threat	of	foreign fighters "requires a modern form of
about finding ways to tackle the national	security	threat	from	foreign fighters. "But I raise reservations
Monday. He said foreign fighters "pose a	significant	threat	to	Australia and our way of life". The prime
measures have been incorporated to reduce	the	threat	from	foreign fighters". Cage has recently
counter-terrorism work — dealing with	the	threat	from	foreign fighters and investigating
third gunman was on French security list.	The	threat	of	returned foreign fighters is much less in
some of our people". "We have to deal with	the	threat	of	foreign fighters planning attacks against
needed to work even more closely together on	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters and other issues
British governments have worried about	the	threat	posed	by returning foreign fighters, with
in <b>combating</b> and <b>defeating terrorism</b> , including	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters joining extremist

Table 28. Concordances of *threat* in the British sub-corpus.

States and its allies to tackle the	growing	threat	of	<b>foreign fighters</b> in Syria. Travel to Syria by
evaluating it, including reviewing the	potential	threat	from	foreign fighters. Since 2008, she said
ISIS' cadre of foreign fighters are a	rising	threat	not	just in the region, but anywhere they could
other Americans to join the fight. Comey said	the	threat	associated	with foreign fighters in Syria is of
text. With much of the day's <b>focus</b> on	the	threat	from	foreign fighters, Mr Obama took pains
and its allies for failing to do more to combat	the	threat	from	foreign fighters. "Foreign partners are
Parliament, stated, "we have to deal with	the	threat	of	foreign fighters planning attacks against
in its physical caliphate, or religious state,	the	threat	of	hundreds of foreign fighters returning
governments are increasingly alarmed about	the	threat	of	radicalized foreign fighters in Syria
of extremism, the surge in foreign fighters,	the	threat	of	<b>new terrorism</b> – only an end to the war in
, which is why we have always focused on	the	threat	of	foreign fighters." The highly coordinated
for international action in response to	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters, and it requires
among European allies for help with	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters. The summit could
over a meeting of the Security Council on	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters who sign up with
plans for a nationwide exercise to determine	the	threat	posed	by foreign fighters and U.S. citizens

Table 29. Concordances of *threat* in the American corpus.

By looking at tables 27, 28, and 29, it is possible to make some considerations at first glance. First of all, table 28 is the one showing the highest number of semantic words as a pre-modifier, while, in the other two, the word mostly used as a pre-modifier is the definite article *the*.

It is interesting to note the verbs often used before *threat*, particularly in table 27, where we can find: *to combat*, *to neutralise*, *to counter*, *to address*, and *to face*. In table 28, where threat was pre-modified especially by semantic words, there are less verbs, but still they indicate the efforts made to manage the problem: there, we find verbs such as *to tackle*, to *deal with*, and *to face*. Similarly to the previous two, in table 29 verbs such as *to tackle*, *to combat*, and *to deal with* are used. However, in all of three tables, we also find verbs whose meaning is less strong than those listed above, such as *to manage*, and *to focus on*. Moreover, there are few interesting expressions, as *laws to meet the threat* (in table 27), European *allies for help with the threat*, and *to determine the threat* (both in table 28).

Remarkable is here also the presence of the verb *to pose*, used in various forms. In particular, it is often employed as a post-modifier of *threat*, almost always followed by *by foreign fighters*, who become those who carry out the action of posing the threat. In these cases, foreign fighters are always activated, as they are the agent of a passive verb. There are also examples of to pose used as a verb in sentences where *foreign fighters* is the subject, as in *foreign fighters posed a unique threat to Australia*.

Generally, great attention seems to be paid to the need to raise the alert level. In particular, in Table 27, there are two references to borders, with the expressions *border protection* and *sovereign borders*, both indicating the crucial role played by borders and by their control in the return of foreign fighters and, indeed, also *national security* is quoted here as something to be protected. Also, it is said that *the government is especially concerned at the threat posed by foreign fighters*, with foreign fighters becoming the agent that pose the threat and, thus, those who make the government worry. The image of the State that needs to protect its citizens and of the needed national unity to face what is framed as being a common enemy is even reinforced on the right side, where it is said that FF are

returning to our region, and that they tried to return home. The use of the possessive adjective our and of the noun home appear to be indeed particularly relevant in constructing a sense of national identity, contraposed to the threat posed by the enemy. Linked to this, there are also several explicit references to terrorism, such as against terrorism.

The themes found in Table 28 are similar to the discursive patterns that emerge from Table 29, even though the linguistic choices are slightly different. In this case, for example, the only border that is cited is the Turkish one, as it is said that Turkey is trying to manage the issue of foreign fighters trying to cross its borders in order to get to Europe. However, the tone used here seems to blame Turkey for not having done it before, by saying that *Turkey had recently begun taking the potential threat of foreign fighters near the border* seriously, implying that, until that moment, Turkey had not done enough to prevent FF from entering its borders. Moreover, the use of the adjective potential is rather outstanding here, because, while blaming Turkey for not having properly dealt with the problem, the author underlines that what they were facing were only potential FF. Nevertheless, even without the use of the word border, the sense of national identity to contrapose to the enemy is created also here, through references to national security, and, in general, with the use of the adjective national in other situations. Also the possessive adjective our is employed here, in expressions such as our way of life - said to be threatened – and our people. It is also said that foreign fighters are a threat to the countries that they are coming from, thus highlighting that the enemy, in this case, is not a total foreigner. Indeed, there are also here references to terrorism, with expressions such as combating and defeating terrorism, counter-terrorism work, and foreign fighters planning attacks. Moreover, here there is a use of extremism as a synonym for terrorism, as in antiextremism programmes, and in foreign fighters joining extremist.

Finally, table 29, in which there are the concordances of *threat* in the American corpus, shows a slightly different way of representing the *threat* of foreign fighters. Actually, in this case, there are no direct references to national identity, with no examples of the adjective *national* – nor of the possessive adjective *our* – being used. However, it still shows a sense of danger coming from the *threat posed by foreign fighters*. Indeed, it is said that *governments are increasingly alarmed about the threat of radicalized foreign fighters*. It is interesting to notice the use of the plural *governments*, without specifying which *governments* and, thus, highlighting an alarm affecting governments and people worldwide. Nevertheless, there is also a reference to the need for *international action in response to the threat posed by foreign fighters*. Contraposed to this, the last line speaks of a *nationwide exercise to determine the threat posed by foreign fighters*. Yet, also in Table 29 is possible to notice references to terrorism, as, for instance, in *foreign fighters planning attacks*, *radicalized foreign fighters*, and *new terrorism*.

To sum up, what can be said about the discursive representation of the *threat of foreign fighters*, in the three analysed corpora, is that – as it was for the representation of the returning *foreign fighter\** – it is rather homogeneous, even though the linguistic choices, as shown above, can vary a little from one corpus to the other. The only remarkable difference has been proven to be the absence of a proper discourse related to national identity in the American corpus, which instead highlights the fact that the FF issue was something that any other country in the world was dealing with. Nevertheless, by looking at the concordances, emerged that in all of the three corpora was underlined the need for implementing security measures in order to better face the problem. Related to this, in all of the three corpora, it was also highlighted the link between foreign fighters and terrorism.

After the analysis of concordances, a few stretches of texts will be analysed further, in order to better exemplified what has been outlined so far.

(6) ISIS has its origins in what was once known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, which has over a decade of experience in extremist violence. The group has amassed a hardened fighting force of committed jihadists with global ambitions, exploiting the conflict in Syria and sectarian tensions in Iraq. Its leaders have repeatedly threatened the United States, and in May an ISIS-associated terrorist shot and killed three people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. (A fourth victim died 13 days later.) ISIS' cadre of foreign fighters are a rising threat not just in the region, but anywhere they could manage to travel undetected -- including to America. (*The New York Times*, 2014).

This stretch of text - published in *The New York Times* - is interesting because it highlights that Isis was risen from the ashes of Al Qaeda. Quoting Al-Qaeda, here, immediately makes it a rather serious issue to deal with, especially in an American newspaper, as Al-Qaeda was the terrorist group behind the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 9/11. Indeed, the article goes on by saying that Al-Qaeda has over a decade of experience in extremist violence, underlining they were dealing with an expert enemy. Also, it is remarked Isis' ability to recruit committed jihadists with global ambitions, thus highlighting the fact that Isis was willing to extend the jihadist fight to the rest of the world, and, in fact, it is said that even the US had been threatened by them. Then, after having alluded to terrorist attacks carried out by Isis in Brussels, the author says that Isis foreign fighters are a rising threat and that they are so not just in the region, but anywhere they could manage to travel undetected – including to America. Directly linking the terrorist attacks in Brussels with the fact that FF are seen to be a threat for any country they could easily travel to - so, basically, any country they are citizens of - is rather remarkable in its likelihood to create a sense of fear in the reader. Furthermore, it is outstanding here the use of the term Isis' cadre, which is an indefinite way of assimilating Isis foreign fighters that had never been found elsewhere in the corpus. Also, it has to be underlined that this passage from the article does not contain any quotation, so these evaluations on the FF issues and the threat they are posing to the US are being made by the journalist themselves. Moreover, no data are given: there are no references to the real numbers of FF that travelled from the US to reach Syria and to join Isis.

(7) The **second threat is that of foreign fighters**, people who travel from our societies to join terrorist groups overseas. The pace and scale of foreign fighter flows into Syria, and now Islamic State, have been unprecedented, 10 to 12 times the size of anything we saw during the Iraq war. And many of these people are "cleanskins", people with Western passports, Western faces and no known previous connection with violent radicalism. (*The Australian*, 2014)

The piece of text number 7 is another interesting example of how *threat* has been used in the context of news about foreign fighters. There is a specification of a *second threat* represented by foreign fighters. Indeed, there was a previous part of the article – that was mainly about terrorism and about possible ways to address it – where the journalist said there was a need to start with a *threat analysis*<sup>1</sup>. This stretch of article, however, is remarkable for its defining foreign fighters by saying that they are *people who travel from our societies to join terrorist groups overseas*. By simply saying *from our societies*, the author of the article is deliberately omitting that they actually travel from a country they are citizens of, which is indeed the characteristic that made it easy for them to travel from one place to another. Moreover, the use of *from our societies*, here, seems to be underlining the differences between Western and Eastern societies: the implied meaning

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoting literally: "In short, what we've been doing has failed: we need a complete rethink. That rethink, I would suggest, needs to start with a threat analysis. What exactly is the threat we're facing and how can we address it in ways that are cheap enough, effective enough and non-intrusive enough to be sustainable across the long term, without undermining the openness, democracy and prosperity that make our societies worth defending in the first place? IN my view there are four distinct (but related) threats to consider. In order of priority these are domestic radicalisation, foreign fighters, the effect of Islamic State on regional and global jihadist groups, and the destabilising effect of conflict in the Middle East." (*The Australian*, 2014).

of this expression could be that FF were not satisfied with the way of life typical of Western societies, so that they decided to join Isis. Nevertheless, the adjective *our* seems to be highlighting the contraposition between 'us' and 'them', with *our societies* being also threatened by the different societal archetypes of the 'Eastern world'. However, this is not the only interesting aspect of this stretch of text, which goes on by outlining that the number of FF travelling to Syria to join the conflict and Isis has been *unprecedented*. Nonetheless, highly remarkable is the following part, where it seems to describe the typical identity of FF, by saying that they are usually *cleanskins* – thus people who had never been charged with criminal offenses – but also people with *Western faces*, as if the physical characteristics could be a criterion for determining whether a person is likely to become a foreign fighter or not. Moreover, it highlights that they also have *Western passports* and *have no previous connection with violent radicalism*. The use of the adjective Western, here, similarly to the use of the adjective our above, seems to be reinforcing the idea of a contraposition between 'us' and 'them', where the Western 'us' happens to be the good character of the story.

(8) <u>Australian jihadists disillusioned with life in Syria</u> can expect arrest, prosecution and jail if they return to Australia, <u>not a warm welcome</u>, Tony Abbott has said. The Prime Minister said **foreign fighters posed a unique threat** to Australia and any attempt on their behalf <u>to return to the communities they have abandoned</u> must be treated warily. (*The Australian*, 2015).

Also the passage above comes from The Australian, but it was published in 2015. Instead of talking about Australian foreign fighters, the article refers to them with the expression Australian jihadists, which, indeed, has a rather different meaning: the term jihadist has often been misused as a sort of synonym for terrorist and thus, from the point of view of the reader, it reminds to a different and somehow more dangerous scenario. Also, the expression disillusioned with life in Syria seems to be kind of ironic, and, also, peculiar:

since the article goes on by indirectly quoting the Prime Minister and saying that FF posed a *unique threat to Australia*, there is probably something more behind their willing of going back to Australia, rather than simple disillusionment. The irony comes back right after, with the expression not a warm welcome following all of the repressive measures they would face if they went back to Australia. While in stretch 7 there were references to the society, here is the *community* to be brought up, with the expression *the community they have abandoned*, which also sounds as a way of blaming them for having turned their backs to their own communities.

(9) Successive <u>British governments have worried</u> about the threat posed by returning foreign fighters, with <u>about 350 thought to be in the UK</u>. Senior legal figures said yesterday that the <u>UK's capacity to prosecute Britons suspected of fighting in Iraq and Syria was limited</u>, and that high-profile trials in British courts risked political controversy. (*The Times*, 2017).

Finally, here, the *threat* of FF is said to be worrying British governments. Interestingly, it is said that about 350 FF are thought to be in the UK: here we have again an assimilation through a definite quantifier, 350, which is, however, preceded by about, which indicates that the number is actually not completely reliable. Moreover, it is said that they are in the UK, so they probably have already come back from Syria. The source of this information is not quoted at all and we do not get to know where this data comes from. After that, it is underlined that, according to senior legal figures, the UK did not have enough legal capacity to prosecute suspected foreign fighters. Thus, after having spoken of a serious threat at the beginning, the last few lines tell the readers that the UK is indeed legally unprepared to deal with such a threat, and this, again, is a way of stressing on people's fears. Also, it is said that the information comes from senior legal figures, without specifying their names.

## 7.5. Conclusion

The first step of the analysis, in this chapter, focused on the comparison of the three collocates lists, in order to see whether there were any differences or similarities. Actually, the results of this first analytical part showed that there was a tendency to collocate the same type of words to foreign fighter\* in the three sub-corpora. This contributed to the decision to focus on similarities while analysing the concordances and the stretches of text. What emerged since the beginning of this chapter was that, in all of the three countries under examination, there was a tendency to focus on two particular aspects of foreign fighters: the figure of the returning foreign fighter\* and the discourse related to the security of the Western countries and societies. Both types of representations, however, rather intersect with each other, being the two faces of the same coin: what makes foreign fighter a threat to security is indeed their ability to travel back from Syria and Iraq, after having joined a terrorist organization, having received training and after having fought on the battlefield. Thus, what made them dangerous was the possibility that they would go back and carry out attacks in their home (Western) countries. Actually, both in section 7.3. and in section 7.4., it was highlighted that the dominant narrative saw a contraposition between Western societies and the societal model imposed by the Islamic State in the territories it controlled: the sense of community is, in this case, built around the representation of the negative aspect of the 'enemies', as underlined by the use of expressions such as our region, home, and our way of life. Yet, the use of the possessive article our is particularly peculiar in this framework, as it expresses the contraposition between the 'us' and 'them'. It is also significant that it is used in all of the three subcorpora, highlighting that there is a tendency to use it in order to refer to the Western world in general. Indeed, the almost total absence of substantial differences amongst the representation of foreign fighters in the three different sub-corpora underlines a tendency

to depict them in the same way in all of the three analysed countries, which are three of the most influential countries in the so-called 'Western world'. Yet, this makes it possible to conclude that, apart from slight differences linked to events that happened only in one of the three countries, or to specific political facts or people, the Western representation of foreign fighters was rather homogeneous, indicating that they were seen as a common threat to face together.

#### 8. Conclusion

#### 8.1. Summary of the thesis

The present study contributes to enriching the body of works in which discourse studies have been used to investigate the representation of terrorism and terrorists in news discourse. The decision to focus particular attention on foreign fighters joining ISIS was motivated by many different factors. First of all, by the fact that foreign fighters were a phenomenon on everyone's lips in the ten years under analysis here and they are still influent in the public debate surrounding terrorism (for instance, while I was working on this thesis, the Court of Appeal ruled that Shamima Begum, one of the female foreign fighters who left Britain to join Isis when she was 15, will not be given her British citizenship back after it was revoked in 2019 on grounds of national security). Moreover, the participation of foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict, as outlined previously in this work, has been unprecedented in most recent times and conflicts and it contributed to undermining Western countries' idea of 'integration' as most of the foreign fighters joining Isis were second or third generation migrants. In this framework, the present study tried to investigate the way in which foreign fighters joining terrorist organizations were represented in news discourse from 2011 to 2021, with a particular focus on Englishspeaking countries.

Thus, here, to recapitulate briefly the outline of this thesis, in the first chapters, it was given an overview of the main theoretical framework, approaches, and methodologies that would have been used in this work. In particular, Chapter One introduced the topic, the research questions, and the outline of the thesis. After that, Chapter Two described the available literature on Discourse Studies. In particular, it focused on how Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies have been applied to the study of media discourse. Chapter Three, then, described the background of this thesis, by recalling the main events of the Arab Springs

and the Syrian Civil War. It even defined foreign fighters and jihadism, by also trying to disambiguate the use that has been done of the latter term in most of the Western – non-Islamic – countries. Chapter Four, instead, outlined the methodological framework through which the analysis of the corpus has been carried out. Indeed, it started by describing how the corpus has been collected and the data regarding the corpus. Then, it focused on depicting the way in which the synergy of Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis would have been used while carrying out the proper analysis. Chapter Five, then, was the first analytical chapter of this work and focused on the diachronic representation of foreign fighters in the corpus. By starting from an analysis of the keywords through the ten years under analysis, this section focused on the different ways in which the phenomenon of foreign fighters has been addressed while the Syrian conflict was escalating and while the Islamic State was gaining more and more power. In order to do so, an analysis of concordance-keywords was also carried out, making it possible to compare the different years under examination and to highlight differences and similarities through the years. After that, the concordances were analysed, followed by a Critical Discourse Analysis of a few texts. Chapter Six, instead, focused on the representation of female foreign fighters, in a sub-corpus collected by selecting articles coming from the main corpus and dealing with women foreign fighters. This section offered the chance to triangulate Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies with Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, in order to provide an analysis of how the gender aspect influenced the representation of female foreign fighters. Finally, the last analytical section - Chapter Seven - examined the corpus from a cross-cultural perspective, thus by focusing on similarities and differences in the representation of foreign fighters in the three different English-speaking countries under analysis. Here, the analysis started by an examination of the collocates of foreign fighter\* in each of the three sub-corpora. Then, after having decided what discourses were mostly related to foreign fighters, the concordance lines were analysed, by focusing on the discursive construction of the returning *foreign fighter\** and on the discourses related to security in Western countries. Finally, a critical discourse analysis of a few texts was carried out.

# 8.2. Answers to the research questions and discussion about the findings

The research questions this study sought to address, as described in section 1.1., were the following:

- ➤ How is the social actor of *foreign fighters* discursively constructed by the press in the given corpus? What types of discourses are mostly related to *foreign fighters* in the corpus?
- ➤ What changes in the news discourse related to *foreign fighters* emerge from a diachronic study of the corpus?
- Assuming gender is constructed discursively, how are female foreign fighters represented in the corpus?
- ➤ By investigating the corpus from a cross-cultural perspective, how have foreign fighters been discursively created in the three different countries? Being them all Western countries, are there more similarities or differences in representation?

The first research question was more generic and thus has been addressed in each of the three analytical sections. The first way of discursively constructing foreign fighters was through assimilation, which was a characteristic that could be found in all of the three analytical sections. In particular, there were two main ways of assimilating them. The first one was through definite quantifiers – usually numbers – while the second one was through indefinite quantifiers, such as *dozen*, *hundreds*, flow, *group(s)*, *number*, *wave*,

and so on. In both cases, however, the terms used mostly referred to huge quantities of people, rather than to small groups and a few considerations may be done about this way of representing foreign fighter as a big whole, instead of individualizing them. First of all, it must be said that there are for sure cases in which the intention of the author was to simply tell something about the numbers of foreign fighters governments were dealing with. Nevertheless, this type of construction of the social actor under analysis recurs quite often in all the analytical sections of the corpus, thus highlighting that it was something worth focusing on. Actually, the fact that it is repeatedly underlined that foreign fighters are a huge number of people can be seen as an attempt of trying to outline that they are a danger and a threat to the security of their home countries. Moreover, both when their assimilation is conveyed through a definite and an indefinite quantifier, it is generally accompanied by verbal expressions such as are believed to be, are said to be, or are estimated to be – often with no reference to the source of the data – and this can contribute to increasing anxiety and fear in the readers. Also, in some cases, it was reported that these high numbers of FF were holding an European passport, a characteristic that highlights their ability to travel quite easily from a place to another. In addition, when assimilated through an indefinite quantifier, it was possible to find other expressions – in the concordance lines or in the stretches of text under analysis – that were used in order to underline the extent of the phenomenon, as in, for instance, unprecedented numbers, growing number, several hundreds, etc. Furthermore, their assimilation was often also accompanied by expressions that underlined their danger, as, for example, in the sentence with fear mounting thousands of foreign fighters could return home to Europe.

Moreover, according to what emerged in the analytical parts of the corpus, foreign fighters are frequently activated and rarely passivated as subject. This, indeed, contributes to constructing a vision of them being rather strong in their actions, contraposed to the

people living in countries that feel threatened by the possibility of foreign fighters returning home.

Indeed, another characteristic of foreign fighters that has often been underlined and used in the construction of them as a social actor, is that of the danger and the threat. In this case, the first thing that needs to be said is that this way of depicting them was less present in Chapter 6 – the one examining the corpus from a gender perspective. However, this feature will be analysed below, when the findings of Chapter Six will be discussed further. It was rather expected that discourses surrounding the threat to the security of the countries foreign fighters came from would have been largely recurring in this corpus and in this study, because it indeed is one of the characteristics intrinsic to the phenomenon and what made them an important issue Western countries needed to deal with. However, from the point of view of power relations embedded in news discourse, discursively constructing them as a danger contributed to increasing a sense of fear and anxiety in places where it was already widely spread due to the numerous terrorist attacks being carried out by Isis members in Western Countries at the time. Still from the point of view of maintaining power relations through language, the threat discourse related to foreign fighters also might have contributed to the rise of a negative sentiment towards migrations, in a period when Europe was facing the so-called 'migratory crisis', worsened by the Syrian conflict itself. Indeed, it was possible to find references to the possibilities that foreign fighters would hide amongst refugees in order to get to Europe (and other Western areas of the world) more easily, such as, for example, in section 5.3.1., the expressions the worst refugee crisis since Rwanda, and the exodus that could have been used by foreign fighters in order to commit terror attacks in Europe.

Finally, related to that, it is also possible to find security discourse quite often, in an attempt to call for an implementation of security in order to deal with the threat of

terrorism. This particular type of discourse is however rather remarkable in its putting aside quite totally any debate about the personal freedom of citizens. Indeed, it brings up reflections on the border between the right to personal freedom and the need to protect citizens.

Research question number two, instead, was addressed in Chapter number 5, where the corpus was analysed from a diachronic perspective. In this Chapter, the analysis started with an analysis of keywords, in order to examine the evolution and changes of discourses surrounding foreign fighters throughout the decade under investigation here. After having analysed keywords, concordance-keywords, and collocations, this section moved to the analysis of concordances and to the analysis of sixteen randomly selected newspaper articles. Firstly, it emerged that assimilation played a rather important role in the discursive construction of foreign fighters as a social actor, and that it has not been used because of mere statistical reasons, but it was rather ideologically oriented, especially when conveyed through the use of indefinite quantifiers. It has also been found that the discursive construction of foreign fighter was often linked to terrorism and security discourses and this type of pattern changed diachronically as well. Indeed, while in the 2012 sub-corpus foreign fighters were only partially discursively constructed as affiliated to terrorism and terrorist organizations – since they were quoted only in contexts where the focus was on terrorism and on its characteristics, but not as properly belonging to such organizations, thus showing how the border between foreign fighters and terrorists was still blurring at that stage of events – in 2014 and 2015 they are represented as *flocking to* join the jihadist, joining extremists groups, planning attacks against, training to conduct terror attacks, or represented as threats in contexts such as the threat posed by foreign fighters. Still focusing on the ways in which they have been discursively constructed throughout the years, the analysis showed that, in 2019 sub-corpus, the tendency was more to focus on the character of the returning foreign fighter, with *returning* being the third word to collocate more often with *foreign fighter\**. This linguistic pattern indeed was especially interesting, for it made it possible to examine how fear discourse was even more used when dealing with foreign fighters' children, which were represented both as people who needed to be saved – peculiarly thanks to their being children – but also as people who, despite their young age and despite their willingness to, had been trained and indoctrinated. In this case, it was particularly remarkable to examine how the social actor of *children foreign fighter\** was humanized through the use of use of images of everyday school life. Thus, it can be argued that the events on the background of the ten-year period analysed here have influenced the way in which foreign fighters have been discursively constructed in the news, demonstrating that discourses are not neutral and that they both are influenced by, but also contribute to influencing the way in which society and its actors are shaped.

The third research question was instead answered to through Chapter Six, in which the corpus was examined from a gender perspective. Gender – as any other social construct dominated by strong power relations – is also constructed through language and discourse. Even in this thesis, indeed, it was possible to analyse examples of ways in which language is used to build and maintain a certain image of women. Yet, even though there was evidence of women fighting, they were mostly depicted as 'jihadi brides'. This, indeed, has to do with the fact that women, being those who give life, at a socio-cultural level, are not often retained to be capable of committing acts of violence, such as terrorist attacks or killing someone on a battlefield. Indeed, what emerged from the analysis carried out in this section is that, when talking of women joining Isis, the focus was on who they were going to marry, rather than on the possibilities of getting trained to fight or to carry out attacks. Another aspect that was often underlined here was that of the age

of the women, who were often very young: the act of leaving their countries and their families to join the Islamic State was here frequently represented as a way of manifesting a teenage rebellion. Indeed, they were often infantilized and depicted as young girls who were not aware of what they were doing. In this way, however, they were not only represented as less evil and less able to carry out violent actions, but they were also somehow relieved of their responsibilities, because going to Syria to simply marry a man is differently perceived by public opinion than going there to join a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, they seem to be represented as victims of the decisions they took and in need of salvation. The only situation in which they were represented as playing an important role is when the authors refer to the 'moral police', where it was highlighted that they actually had a role of responsibility inside the organization. However, even in this case, it was often expressed some kind of disappointment because women were punishing other women instead of helping them. Also, in several occasions It was highlighted that women were joining Isis even though they knew the type of treatment it reserved to other women. All of this aspects of the representation of female foreign fighters are even reinforced if the findings in Chapter Six are compared with those in the other two chapters, were there is no gender distinction. Indeed, while in sections 5 and 7 we find several references to the fact that foreign fighters could get trained while under the Islamic State, in the women sub-corpus there were only a few mentions of this possibility. Another type of discourse that emerged frequently is that of the contraposition between 'us' and 'them'. Often, indeed, there were references to the fact that women were leaving a society that defines itself as rather equal in order to join an organization were women had little (if none) rights. This type of representation actually gives the chance of reflecting on power relations and the way in which they are perpetrated through language: by depicting other cultures and situations as extremely underdeveloped from the point of view of gender equality, and by contraposing this image to the one of a Western world where women can count on equality, is an example of how the 'good us' is built by the negative representation of otherness. All in all, by discursively constructing women foreign fighters as mere young females whose only goal is to rebel against their families and to join Isis to get married and live a romantic dream, the fighting aspect is put aside, and this contributes to shaping a less terrific image of female foreign fighters than it was shown for male foreign fighters in other sections of the present thesis.

Finally, the fourth and last research question was addressed in Chapter number 7, which was dedicated to the analysis of the corpus from a cross-cultural perspective. In this case, the focus was on the differences and similarities in the representation of foreign fighters in the three different sub-corpora, thus divided per the English-speaking countries under analysis. What emerged from the very beginning of the analysis was that there was a tendency of using highly similar words as collocates to foreign fighter\*. Thus, all of the analysis focused on the analysis of similarities rather than on differences. Indeed, the only differences that were found were related to the fact that, being three different countries, they also had different politicians, different numbers of foreign fighters leaving the respective countries, and also different histories and experiences linked to terrorist attacks. Apart from that, it was shown that the representation of foreign fighters was rather homogeneous in the three analysed corpora. This, indeed, should not be seen as a hole in the water. On the contrary, some considerations can be made starting from the fact that the representation of foreign fighters in the three countries was so unvarying. First of all, both in the paragraph where it was in-depth analysed the discursive construction of the returning foreign fighter\*, and in the one dealing with the security discourse, there was a high presence of expressions contraposing 'us' to them'. This type of discourse, as highlighted above, emerged also in section 6, where the corpus was analysed from a

gender perspective. In both cases, it was shown a tendency of constructing a sense of (Western) community and unity by discursively constructing the enemy as 'evil'. However, there were differences between section 6 and section 7 in the fact that, while the first highlighted the 'good' things about the Western 'us' and the 'bad' things about 'them' by using the condition of women in the different types of society as a yardstick, in Chapter Seven this narrative was built in a more generic way, by simply talking of our society, our way of life, and so on. Another remarkable finding of this analytical section was the fact that from the analysis of the discursive construction of the returning foreign fighter\* emerged an homogeneity in representing foreign fighters as likely to be hidden amongst migrants, in order to more easily travel to Western countries and carry out attacks. As already outlined here, those were the years of the so-called *migrant crisis* and, also, the years of violent terrorist attacks carried out by Isis in all of the Western countries: highlighting the threat posed by returning foreign fighters to the West by, at the same time, depicting them as possibly hiding amongst migrants, may have influenced importantly the way in which the public opinion perceived the arrival of refugees in their countries. Finally, it can thus be said that what emerged from the cross-cultural analysis of the corpus, the representation of foreign fighters in the three different English-speaking countries under examination has been rather homogeneous. The fact that these countries are also all belonging to the so-called 'Western world', together with the fact that they are also the most powerful and influential countries in the abovementioned 'West', makes it possible to conclude that, since all Western countries were facing the same dangers and the same threats were posed to them by these potential terrorist, they also discursively constructed foreign fighters as social actors in similar ways. Indeed, in a nutshell, this homogeneity is what contributed to feed the narrative of the 'clash of civilization' – a contraposition of the 'West' and the 'East' of the world, where the former builds its own positive image by highlighting the negative characteristics of the 'other' (see section 2.3.1.).

#### 8.3. Limitations and suggestions for further studies.

To conclude, it is necessary to recognize the limitations of this study and to make suggestions for further possible investigation.

One potential criticism to the present study is the division of the corpus into different subcorpora, according to the necessity of each analytical section. However, this decision was taken in order not to analyse the same data over and over again, but to rather examine the main corpus from different perspectives, by still trying to maintain the number of analysed articles as representative as possible.

Moreover, section 2.2.4.2. highlighted the critics that have been moved towards Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodology. In particular, Widdowson (1995) outlined that Critical Discourse Analysis is more an exercise in interpretation and, thus, invalid as an analysis. However, of course, the analysis carried out here offered one way of interpreting data that could be interpreted in many other ways. As it was also demonstrated by Marchi and Taylor (2009), different researchers are likely to address the same research question in different ways. Nevertheless, even by presupposing that could exist a different way of addressing the issue and a different way of analysing the corpus, it does reduce the validity of the present study. Also, as outlined in the reviews of the literature, combining Critical Discourse Analysis with more quantitative studies — thus by following a CADS methodology — offers the chance of reducing researcher's bias and ideological presuppositions.

Another criticism that can be moved toward the present study is that it only partially analyses parts of the corpus. Indeed, this was another reason why it was decided to combine CADS and CDA: CADS gives the chance of analysing the corpus in a deeper

way, by only focusing on quantitative data. Then, CDA was used to give a more qualitative example of analysis. However, it is the highly qualitative nature of CDA that makes it impossible to analyse every text composing big corpora.

Finally, the cross-cultural analytical section showed some weaknesses originating from the decision to focus only on English-speaking and Western countries. Yet, having an overview of how similar discourses are in three different countries can contribute to understanding the importance of discourse in shaping and maintaining a Western gaze on the rest of the world and on the events that may affect us.

Concerning potential further studies, one noteworthy aspect that was unexplored in this work is that of comparing the corpus with a country whose main language is not English, in order to examine whether or not the homogeneity in the way of representing foreign fighters would be present as well. Another possibility would be that of comparing the way in which foreign fighters have been represented in the news with a corpus of institutional and political claims on the matter, to see whether they correspond and, so, if the representation found in the news actually comes from what has been said at an institutional and political level. Finally, it would be interesting to analyse the way in which foreign fighters who travelled to Syria to join other, non-terrorist, organizations — as, for instance, the several Western people that joined the YPG in Kurdistan — have been represented in the same ways in news discourse. In particular, it would be remarkable to investigate the way in which female foreign fighters have been represented in the two different cases, since the YPG saw a high mobilization of women who decided to join the Women's Protection Units (YPJ).

## 9. Bibliography

- Al Jalahma D.S., Gomaa Y.A., (2023). *Understanding the Prophetic Hadith. Issues Related to the Translation of Mishkāt ul-Maṣābih.* London and New York. Routledge.
- Altheide, D. L. (2006). *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*. Lanham, USA. AltaMira Press.
- Altheide, D.L. (2007). The mass media and terrorism. *In Discourse & Communication*, Vol. 1(3): 287-308. Los Angeles, London, New Dehli. Sage Publications.
- Angermuller J., Maingueneau D., Wodak R., (2014). *The Discourse Studies Reader.*Main currents in theory and analysis. Amsterdam/Philadelphia. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Austin J. L., (1962). *How to do things with words*. London. Oxford University Press.
- Baker P., (2006). *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis*. London. Continuum.
- Baker P., McEnery T., (2015). Corpora and Discourse Studies. Integrating Discourse and Corpora. Basingstoke, UK. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Baker-Beall C., (2016). *The European Union's fight against terrorism*. Manchester, UK. Manchester University Press.
- Bates, T. R., (1975). Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony. In *Journal of the History* of *Ideas*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr. Jun., 1975), pp. 351-366. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bell A., Garrett, P., (1998). Approaches to media discourse. 6<sup>th</sup> Ed. (2005). Oxford,
   UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

- Benmelech E., Klor E. F. (2016). What explains the flow of foreign fighters to Isis?, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 32:7. 1458-1481. Taylor & Francis.
- Biber D., (2015). Corpus-Based and Corpus-Driven Analyses of Language Variation and Use. In Heine B., Narrog H., (2015). *The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis*. Second Edition. Oxford, Uk. Oxford University Press.
- Boas F., (1940). Race, Language and Culture. New York. Macmillan Company.
- Caldas-Coulthard C.R., (2003). Cross-Cultural Representation of 'Otherness' in Media Discourse. In Weiss G., Wodak R., (2003). Critical Discourse Analysis.
   Theory and Interdisciplinarity. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Castells M., (2013). *Communication Power*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press.
- Cook D., (2005). *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California.
   University of California Press.
- de Saussure F., (1959). *Course in general Linguistics*. Edited by Bally, C. and Sechehaye, A. Translated by Baskin, W. New York. Philosophical Library.
- Esposito E., (2023). Discourse, intersectionality, critique: theory, methods and practice. In *Critical Discourse Studies*, Taylor and Francis.
- Eurostat. Asylum in the EU Member States. Released on the 4<sup>th</sup> March 2016. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6">https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6</a>. Last seen on the 5<sup>th</sup> August 2023.
- Fairclough N., (1989). Language and Power. New York. Longman.

- Fairclough N., (1992a). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge. Polity Press.
- Fairclough N., (1992b). Discourse and text: linguistic and intertextual analysis within discourse analysis. In *Discourse & Society*, April 1992 3 (2): 193-217. London, Newbury Park and New Delhi. Sage.
- Fairclough N., (1995). Media Discourse. London. Arnold.
- Fairclough N., (1996). A reply to Henry Widdowson's 'Discourse analysis: a critical view". In *Language and Literature*, 1996 5 (1), pp. 49-56. London. Longman.
- Fairclough N., (2001). *Language and Power*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. New York. Taylor and Francis.
- Fairclough N., (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for social research*. London. Routledge.
- Fairclough N., (2010). *Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. London and New York. Routledge.
- Foucault M., (1980). Edited by Gordon C. *Power/Knowledge*. *Selected interviews* and other writings.1972-1977. New York. Pantheon Books.
- Foucault M., (1981). The Order of Discourse. *In Untying the text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*. Edited by Young R., (1981). Pp 48-78. Boston. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Fowler R.G., Kress G.R., Trew A.A., Hodge R.I.V., (1979). Language and Control. Ed. 2019. New York. Routledge.

- Gee J. P., (2011). *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis. Theory and method*. 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. New York. Routledge.
- Gillings M., Mautner G., Baker P., (2023). *Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies*. Cambridge. Cambridge Elements, Cambridge University Press.
- Gray H., Franck A. K., (2019). Refugees as/at risk: The gendered and racialized underpinnings of securitization in British media narratives. In *Security Dialogue*, 2019, Vol. 50(3), 275-291. Sage.
- Grishakova M., (2018). Structuralism and Semiotics. In Richter, D.H. A companion to Literary Theory, (2018):48-60. Hoboken, New Jersey. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Gulmohamad Z. K., (2014). The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) ISIS. In *Global Security Studies*, Spring 2014, Volume 5, Issue 1.
- Halliday M.A.K., (1978). Language as social semiotic. The Social interpretation of language and meaning. London. Edward Arnold.
- Halliday M.A.K., (2004). *An Introduction to functional grammar*. 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. London. Hodder Arnold.
- Hammersley M., (1997). On The foundations of Critical Discourse Analysis. In *Language & Communication*, Vol. 17, No , pp. 237-248, 1997. Oxford, UK. Pergamon.
- Harris Z., (1952). Discourse Analysis. In *Language*. Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan. Mar., 1952), pp. 1-30. Linguistic Society of America.

- Herrington L., (2022). *Understanding Islamist Terrorism in Europe. Drugs, Jihad,* and the pursuit of martyrdom. New York. Routledge.
- Hunston S., (2002). Corpora in Applied Linguistics. Cambridge. Cambridge
   University Press.
- Kassimeris G., Jackson L., (2011). The West, the rest and the 'war on terror': representation of Muslims in neoconservative media discourse. In *Contemporary Politics*. Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2011, pp. 19-33.
- Khadduri M., (1955). *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Richmond, Virginia, USA. The John Hopkins Press.
- Kress G., (1993). Against Arbitrariness: The Social Production of the Sign as a Foundational Issue in Critical Discourse Analysis. In *Discourse & Society*, 4(2), pp. 169–191.
- Kress G., van Leeuwen T., (2006). *Reading images: the grammar of visual design*.

  2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. London and New York. Routledge.
- Kristeva J., (1986). Word, dialogue and novel. In Moi T. (ed.), (1986). *The Kristeva Reader*. New York. Columbia University Press.
- Laclau E., Mouffe C., (2001). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democtratic Policy. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. London, New York. Verso.
- Lang J., (2004). *Losing my religion. A call for help*. Beltsville, USA. Amana Publications.
- Lazar M.M., (2005). Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis. Gender, Power and Ideology in Discourse. New York, USA. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Leech G., (2000). Grammars of Spoken English: New Outcomes of Corpus-Oriented Research. In *Language Learning* 50(4), December 2000, pp. 675-724.

- Lischinsky A., (2018). Overlooked text types. From fictional texts to real-world discourses. In Taylor C., Marchi A., (2018). Corpus Approaches to Discourse. A Critical Review. Pp. 60-82. London. Routledge.
- Louw B., (1993). Irony in the text or insincerity in the writer? The diagnostic potential of semantic prosodies. In Baker M., Francis G. and Tognini-Bonelli T. (eds), *Text and Technology: In Honour of John Sinclair*. Pp 157.176. Amsterdam. John Benjamins Publishing.
- McEnery T., Wilson A., (2001). Corpus Linguistics. An Introduction. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition.
   Edinburgh, UK. Edinburgh University Press.
- Meyer C. F., (2002). English Corpus Linguistics. An introduction. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (2004).
   Cambridge, Uk. Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer C. F., (2008). Pre Electronic Corpora. In Lüdeling A., Kytö M., (2008). Corpus Linguistics. An International Handbook, Vol. 1.
- Partington A., (2004). "Utterly content in each other's company": Semantic prosody and semantic preference. In *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 9(1):131-156. Joh Benjamin Publishing Company.
- Partington A., (2010). Modern Diachronic Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies
   (MD-CADS) on UK newspapers: an overview of the project. In *Corpora*. Vol 5
   (2): 83 108. Edinburgh University Press.
- Partington A., Duguid A., Taylor C., (2013). Patterns and Meanings in Discourse.

  Theory and practice in corpus-assisted discourse studies. Amsterdam. John Benjamins Publishing Company. Cham, Switzerland. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Pokalova E., (2020). Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters. Threats and Challenges to the West.
- Rabinovich I., Valensi C., (2021). Syrian Requiem. The Civil War and Its Aftermath. Princeton & Oxford. Princeton University Press.
- Richardson J.E., (2004). (Mis)Representing Islam: The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers. John Benjamins Publishing Co. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
- Rocha I. M., Mendoza H. M. T., (2019). Jihadism, Foreign Fighters and Radicalization in the EU. Legal, functional and psychosocial responses. New York. Routledge.
- Roy O., (2004). *Globalized Islam. The search for a New Ummah.* New York. Columbia University Press.
- Schmid A.P., (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation:

  A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. In *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism The Hague* 4, no. 2 (2013).
- Sinclair J., (1991). Corpus, Concordance, Collocation. Oxford, UK. Oxford
   University Press.
- Sinclair J., (1999). A way with common words. In Hasselgård H., Oksefjell S.,
   (1999). Out of Corpora: Studies in Honour of Stig Johnasson. Amsterdam.
   Rodopi.
- Sinclair J., (2003). *Reading Concordances. An Introduction*. London. Pearson Education Limited.

- Sjoberg L., Gentry C.E., (2007). *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics*. London and New York. Zed Books.
- Stubbs M., (2001). Words and phrases. Corpus studies of lexical semantics. Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing.
- Töngür A., Kara H. B., (2016). Critical discourse analysis on the news about terrorism: An analytical study on Turkish media. In *International Journal of Human Sciences*, 13(1). Pp 1629-1643.
- Trombetta L., (2014). *Siria. Dagli ottomani agli* Asad. E oltre. Milano. Mondadori Università.
- United Nations Security Council (2014). *Resolution 2178*. 24 September 2014. S/RES/2178 (2014).
- van Dijk T.A., (1988b). *News as discourse*. Hillsdale, New Jersey. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.
- van Dijk T.A., (2008). Discourse and Power. New York. Palgrave McMillan.
- Van Dijk, T. A., (2011). Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction. London.
   SAGE Publications
- Van Dijk, T.A. (1997). Opinions and Ideologies in the Press. In Bell A., Garrett, P.,
   (1998). Approaches to media discourse. 6<sup>th</sup> Ed. (2005). Oxford, UK. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- van Dijk, T.A., (1988a). News Analysis. Case studies on international and national news in the press. Hillsdale, New Jersey. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.

- van Dijk, T.A., (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. In *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 4:249, April 2004, pp 249-283.
- van Dijk, T.A., (1997). Discourse as Structure and Process. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction. Volume 1. London. Sage.
- van Dijk, T.A., (1998). *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach*. London. Sage Publications.
- van Dijk, T.A., (2018). Socio-cognitive discourse studies. In *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies*. Edited by Flowerdew J., Richardson J.E.
   Pp 26-43. New York. Routledge.
- Van Leeuwen T., (1993). Genre and field in critical discourse analysis: a synopsis.
   In *Discourse & Society*. Vol. 4(2): 193-223. London, Newbury Park and New Delhi. Sage.
- Van Leeuwen T., (1996). The representation of social actors. In Caldas-Coulthard
   C.R., Coulthard M., (eds.), (1996). Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical
   Discourse Analysis. Pp. 32-70. London and New York. Routledge.
- Vidino L., Carenzi S., (2018). Terrorist Attacks. Youngsters and Jihadism in Europe. In the *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2018*. <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/terrorist-attacks-youngsters-and-jihadism-in-europe/">https://www.iemed.org/publication/terrorist-attacks-youngsters-and-jihadism-in-europe/</a>. Last seen on the 5<sup>th</sup> August 2023.
- Warren R., (2019). Terrorist Movements and the Recruitment of Arab Foreign Fighters. A history from 1980s Afghanistan to ISIS. London, UK. I.B. TAURIS.
- Widdowson H. G., (1995). Discourse Analysis: a critical view. In *Language and Literature*, 1995 4 (3), pp. 157-172. London. Longman.

- Wittgenstein L., (1986). Philosophical Investigations. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Oxford, UK. Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- Wodak R., (2004). Critical Discourse Analysis. In *Qualitative Research Practice*.
   Edited by Seale C., Gobo G., Gubrium J. F., Silverman D., (2004), pp 185-203.
   London. Sage Publications.
- Wodak R., (2018). *Discourse and European Integration*. (KFG Working Paper Series, 86). Berlin: Freie Universität. Berlin, FB Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe".

## **Appendix**

## **Diachronic perspective**

## Keywords

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Al	463	1.909,03	1923,40	5,55
2	fighters	250	1.115,80	1.130,17	6,22
3	forces	302	1.042,06	1.056,44	4,61
4	military	308	986,04	1.000,41	4,29
5	Qaeda	201	953,79	968,16	6,90
6	rebels	201	877,18	891,55	6,05
7	Afghanistan	202	837,68	852,05	5,66
8	Iraq	188	800,82	815,19	5,86
9	Libya	163	699,56	713,93	5,94
10	Somalia	122	610,26	624,63	7,88
11	Libyan	132	609,54	623,91	6,67
12	Gaddafi	130	591,26	605,63	6,52
13	rebel	132	580,52	594,89	6,19
14	foreign	218	548,70	563,07	3,54
15	taliban	125	519,56	533,94	5,75
16	troops	141	512,34	526,71	4,92
17	Afghan	103	474,87	489,25	6,73
18	Qaddafi	85	462,00	476,37	115,72
19	Nato	107	425,82	440,19	5,48
20	Tripoli	90	413,55	427,92	6,74

Table xxx. 2011's List of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Al	957	3.591,87	3.606,28	5,86
2	Syria	839	3.178,23	3.192,64	5,95
3	Syrian	771	3.096,40	3.110,64	6,60
4	fighters	441	1.721,65	1.736,06	6,30
5	Assad	319	1.248,38	1.262,79	6,37
6	Aleppo	274	1.192,92	1.207,33	8,32
7	foreign	428	1.071,52	1.085,94	3,78
8	regime	299	997,74	1.012,15	5,07
9	rebels	257	932,52	946,93	5,67
10	rebel	213	811,99	826,41	6,15
11	military	335	811,70	826,12	3,68
12	forces	309	799,60	814,01	3,91
13	army	307	765,69	780,11	3,78
14	Qaeda	200	762,75	777,16	6,16
15	Iraq	207	708,37	722,78	5,27
16	Syria's	147	671,48	685,90	115,77
17	Turkey	209	671,15	685,56	4,88
18	border	216	666,73	681,15	4,67
19	Damascus	168	646,13	660,54	6,29
20	fighting	202	543,70	558,11	4,08

Table xxxii. 2012's List of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Al	1.424	5.160,28	5.174,71	6,15
2	Syria	1.071	3.830,11	3.844,55	6,02
3	Syrian	795	2.926,46	2.940,89	6,36
4	fighters	686	2.580,88	2.595,32	6,66
5	Assad	463	1.732,67	1.747,10	6,62
6	foreign	598	1.512,09	1.526,52	3,97
7	Qaeda	376	1.420,94	1.435,37	6,79
8	Iraq	367	1.274,85	1.289,28	5,81
9	rebels	361	1.262,58	1.277,01	5,87
10	rebel	337	1.248,32	1.262,75	6,52
11	forces	434	1.132,81	1.147,25	4,11
12	military	424	999,10	1.013, 53	3,74
13	Islamic	325	912,45	926,89	3,64
14	groups	397	906,07	920,51	7,70
15	Nusra	218	858,58	873,01	4,69
16	Weapons	290	853,09	867,53	3,23
17	war	414	820,81	835,25	3,86
18	opposition	332	807,08	821,51	4,29
19	fighting	284	768,55	782,98	4,51
20	conflict	262	742,47	756,90	3,88

Table xxxii. 2013's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	$Log\_L$	Log_R
1	Syria	3.699	8.020,54	8.035,20	6,14
2	Iraq	2.713	6.161,43	6.176,08	7,03
3	Islamic	2.637	5.571,19	5.585,85	5,80
4	fighter	2.105	4.684,54	4.699,20	6,60
5	Al	2.180	4.299,21	4.313,87	5,10
6	Isis	1.598	3.453,15	3.467,80	6,12
7	foreign	1.962	3.257,21	3.271,87	4,02
8	State	2.763	2.701,03	2.715,69	2,45
9	Syrian	1.259	2.547,27	2.561,93	5,35
10	security	1.647	2.235,44	2.250,10	3,25
11	terrorist	1.064	2.094,04	2.108,70	5,11
12	terrorism	1.021	2.088,86	2.103,52	5,48
13	forces	1.176	1.888,24	1.902,90	3,88
14	military	1.170	1.721,64	1.736,30	3,53
15	Turkey	807	1.539,14	1.553,80	4,88
16	Intelligence	839	1.522,78	1.537,44	4,53
17	Iraqi	646	1.420,50	1.435,16	6,51
18	Qaeda	633	1.344,01	1.348,67	5,87
19	section	840	1.316,42	1.331,07	3,79
20	threat	585	1.315,40	1.330,06	7,00

Table xxxiii. 2014's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Islamic	4.363	8.351,02	8.365,75	6,19
2	Syria	3.291	6.051,24	6.065, 24	5,64
3	State	4.359	4.487,02	4.487,02	2,78
4	Iraq	2.308	4.479,51	4.479,51	6,46
5	fighter	2.113	4.057,85	4.057,85	6,28
6	Isis	1.765	3.313,36	3.313,36	5,94
7	foreign	2.163	3.069,33	3.069,33	3,83
8	terrorism	1.454	2.669,14	2.669,14	5,66
9	terrorist	1.470	2.597,58	2.597,58	5,25
10	Al	1.647	2.589,68	2.589,68	4,36
11	security	1.866	2.161,46	2.161,46	3,11
12	Syrian	1.125	1.898,16	1.898,16	4,86
13	forces	1.357	1.888,24	1.888,24	3,76
14	attack	1.304	1.561,26	1.561,26	3,21
15	Turkey	867	1.418,30	1.418,30	4,65
16	citizenship	685	1.332,00	1.332,00	6,66
17	Paris	880	1.313,12	1.313,12	4,10
18	Intelligence	857	1.310,84	1.310,84	4,24
19	Abbott	620	1.297,34	1.297,34	10,21
20	military	650	1.280,30	1.280,30	6,96
	111111ta1 y		1.200,50	1.200,50	0,50

Table xxxiv. 2015's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Islamic	2.589	6.332,92	6.347,52	6,11
2	Syria	1.874	4.276,26	4.290,85	5,48
3	Iraq	1.260	3.106,70	3.121,30	6,26
4	fighters	1.239	3.037,94	3.052,54	6,18
5	State	2.526	3.013,40	3.028,00	2,66
6	Isis	1.189	2.885,39	2.899,98	6,04
7	terrorist	976	2.216,95	2.231,54	5,32
8	attacks	1.189	2.063,48	2.087,07	3,75
9	Turkey	845	1.908,33	1.922,92	5,28
10	Al	977	1.899,82	1.918,38	4,28
11	foreign	1.145	1.881,73	1.914,41	3,58
12	terrorism	815	1.765,71	1.896,32	5,49
13	forces	972	1.683,36	1.780,30	3,94
14	Syrian	773	1.339,83	1.697,95	4,99
15	intelligence	660	1.269,95	1.354,42	4,53
16	military	820	1.269,48	1.284,08	3,36
17	security	985	1.040,48	1.055,07	2,85
18	Brussels	482	1.015,72	1.030,32	4,96
19	Iraqi	417	976,43	991,03	6,22
20	war	775	966,76	981,35	2,80

Table xxxv. 2016's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	$Log\_L$	Log_R
1	Islamic	2.121	6.207,09	6.221,61	6,32
2	fighters	1.107	3.275,12	3.289,64	6,52
3	Syria	1.145	3.035,75	3.050,27	5,29
4	state	2.008	2.921,79	2.936,31	2,83
5	Iraq	869	2.516,55	2.531,06	6,22
6	Isis	806	2.287,86	2.302,38	5,98
7	forces	886	2.010,87	2.025,39	4,31
8	foreign	915	1.826,32	1.840,84	3,76
9	terrorism	656	1.809,38	1.823,90	5,68
10	terrorist	595	1.535,67	1.550,19	5,11
11	militants	515	1.505,55	1.520,07	6,41
12	Raqqa	429	1.381,85	1.396,37	9,26
13	Iraqi	424	1.262,79	1.277,31	6,74
14	Syrian	489	1.209,32	1.223,84	4,83
15	military	648	1.204,30	1.218,82	3,52
16	al	567	1.195,82	1.210,34	3,99
17	security	665	1.046,36	973,64	2,78
18	Mosul	304	959,13	952,82	6,54
19	Islam	369	938,30	905,01	5,20
20	document	360	890,50	904,39	4,61

Table xxxvi.2017's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Islamic	872	3.096,17	3.110,60	5,90
2	Syria	837	2.905,91	2.920,34	5,69
3	fighters	661	2.498,07	2.512,50	6,63
4	Isis	473	1.701,40	1.715,83	6,06
5	Kurdish	379	1.607,98	1.622,42	10,53
6	State	893	1.297,73	1.302,17	2,52
7	Iraq	333	1.147,92	1.162,35	5,70
8	forces	422	1.102,87	1.117,30	2,52
9	Syrian	341	1.096,13	1.110,56	5,70
10	foreign	469	1.082,43	1.096,86	4,10
11	terrorism	297	984,35	998,78	5,16
12	military	396	916,26	930,69	3,65
13	terrorist	293	907,72	922,15	5,39
14	Australian	367	905,65	920,08	3,66
15	Turkey	280	881,03	895,46	4,95
16	Al	292	718,68	733,11	3,89
17	Turkish	196	687,30	701,73	5,93
18	Kurds	141	586,61	601,04	10,10
19	security	336	513,19	527,62	2,66
20	fighting	206	497,02	511,45	3,85

Table xxxvii. 2018's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Syria	1.606	4.307,05	4.321,59	5,67
2	Islamic	1.398	3.726,79	3.741,33	5,62
3	fighter	1.107	3.146,73	3.161,26	6,41
4	Isis	974	2.751,31	2,729,84	6,15
5	Al	803	1.797,18	1.811,71	4,39
6	foreign	927	1.759,24	1.773,78	3,67
7	Kurdish	533	1.675,29	1.689,82	10,06
8	Iraq	622	1.653,48	1.668,01	5,64
9	state	1.453	1.527,66	1.542,19	2,26
10	forces	738	1.499,05	1.513,58	3,94
11	Syrian	556	1.351,89	1.366,42	4,91
12	Turkey	511	1.249,07	1.263,60	5,86
13	security	824	1.242,47	1.257,01	6,36
14	terrorist	473	1.107,13	1.121,67	1,74
15	terrorism	413	1.000,33	1.014,86	6,36
16	Turkish	364	982,45	996,98	3,48
17	Morrison	328	918,74	933,28	4,00
18	government	1.245	890,08	904,61	7,70
19	Australians	309	865,10	879,63	9,89
20	Trump	474	843,37	857,91	5,07

Table xxxviii. Table viii. 2019's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	freque ncy	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Syria	455	1,652,26	1.666,66	5,30
2	fighters	308	1.221,94	1.236,34	6,01
3	Islamic	294	977,94	991,87	4,81
4	Taliban	216	854,38	868,77	4,81
5	Isis	225	831,53	845,93	5,48
6	foreign	282	638,40	652,79	3,40
7	Iraq	166	582,31	596,71	5,17
8	terrorism	164	560,18	574,58	5,02
9	Syrian	165	519,54	533,93	4,60
10	Australia	245	505,17	519,57	3,17
11	terrorist	158	490,17	504,57	4,54
12	Turkey	132	398,51	412,91	4,44
13	security	239	382,89	397,28	2,65
14	war	218	380,23	394,63	2,82
15	Hifter	76	361,78	376,18	115,05
16	Begum	80	350,12	364,52	7,77
17	Kurdish	75	342,05	353,03	8,67
18	counterterrorism	67	317,23	331,63	114,86
19	Trump	145	312,91	312,91	3,21
20	State	115	226,28	226,28	4,72

Table xxxix. 2020's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

	word	frequency	keyness	Log_L	Log_R
1	Biden	66	478,30	492,63	11,51
2	Hifter	50	366,72	381,05	116,46
3	Syria	73	286,05	300,39	4,68
4	fighters	53	246,36	260,69	5,49
5	Libya's	32	229,54	243,87	115,82
6	Afghanistan	48	203,54	217,88	5,10
7	country's	23	160,95	175,28	115,34
8	militias	25	157,26	171,59	8,52
9	Laming	22	153,33	167,66	115,28
10	Tripoli	28	148,42	162,75	6,57
11	Libyans	21	132,21	146,54	8,86
12	Russia	47	131,14	145,48	3,73
13	Hifter's	18	122,84	137,18	114,99
14	Iranian	23	118,64	132,97	6,53
15	Covid	16	107,60	121,94	114,82
16	Syrian	32	103,01	117,34	4,26
17	mercenaries	22	102,32	116,65	5,92
18	Kabul	17	91,87	106,20	7,23
19	talks	37	85,24	99,57	3,66
20	Trump	38	85,09	99,42	3,30

Table xl. 2021's list of the first 20 keywords, showing their frequency, keyness, Log\_L, and Log\_R.

### **Concordance lines**

## **Concordance lines from 2012 corpus**

1 2	Foreign fighters, including Australians, are Foreign fighters are playing an increasing
3	extremism, estimated that there were 1,200-1,500 foreign fighters across Syria. The
4 Nawaz,	extremism, estimated that there were 1,200-1,500 foreign fighters across Syria. Maajid
5	rship. Rebel leaders inside Syria say about 15-20 foreign fighters have been crossing each day
6	e rebel leadership. Rebel leaders say about 15-20 foreign fighters have been crossing each day
7	day evening it was under the control of about 150 foreign fighters who described themselves
as 8	and, before that, Afghanistan. During the 1980s, foreign fighters flocked to Afghanistan to
9	Syrian border town, said a jihadist group of 200 foreign fighters had grabbed control of that
10	reate a caliphate in the Horn of Africa. By 2009, foreign fighters, including Pakistanis, Arabs
11	a, an Amisom spokesman, believes an estimated 250 foreign fighters -from Britain, America,
12 M::	rotest movement and to claim that there are 5,000 foreign fighters in the country. Although
Mr. 13	d that its troops are up against as many as 5,000 foreign fighters. The armed opposition,
14	d that its troops are up against as many as 5,000 foreign fighters. The armed opposition,

erlemans, who were held for more than a week in a foreign fighters' camp, were freed last ghting on the front lines, I would consider him a foreign fighter," Aaron Y. Zelin, a fellow at reviously told The Times they are happy to accept foreign fighters as individuals as long as struggle with Syria's President Bashar al-Assad, foreign fighters have been pouring into Syria safety reasons to use more than one name. Not all foreign fighters are jihadists, either. One treets. It's also true that Islamic militants and foreign fighters are playing an increasing, hich have cited the roles played by Islamists and foreign fighters as a reason not to arm the ting "terrorism in Syria with money, weapons and foreign fighters." In one of his more ment said Mr. Haqqani "helps lead insurgents and foreign fighters in attacks against targets in pporting "terrorism" by funneling arms, money and foreign fighters to rebels seeking to topple ater claimed this was a tactic used by rebels and foreign fighters to put blame on his forces. der, where large numbers of Pakistani, Afghan and foreign fighters train and plot attacks torage, improvised-explosive-device factories and foreign fighter training." Their schooling plaints by the Tuareg people and isolate the Arab foreign fighters from the Qaeda franchise. door are especially vocal. "We are sure there are foreign fighters here, all the extremists and door are especially vocal. "We are sure there are foreign fighters here, all the extremists and he says. Saudi Arabian maybe, Chechnya. There are foreign fighters over there, no doubt led by jihadist groups dominated by heavily armed foreign fighters. Television pictures on Syria Army and residents who have taken up arms. Foreign fighters are trickling into battle Syria Army and residents who have taken up arms. Foreign fighters are trickling into battle s, which had also acted as a conduit for arriving foreign fighters. A former adviser to the s, which had also acted as a conduit for arriving foreign fighters. A former adviser to senior putting him among the jihadists who are known as" foreign fighters." Answering my questions resistance from former regime members as well as foreign fighters who entered the country to resistance from former regime members as well as foreign fighters who entered the country to down from his post. Libyan officials have blamed foreign fighters for the Benghazi assault. militants have established training camps led by foreign fighters in the surrounding forests mon descriptions that their uprising is driven by foreign fighters, or hosts groups linked to Al fghanistan. To reach the wars in those countries, foreign fighters had to cross borders with the uprising. Damascus has said it would display foreign fighters captured in Syria, including

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 inside 27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

On 41

42

43

44

about

45 l, the organization's ranks include several dozen foreign fighters, some with United States 46 their weapons and warned of a countdown to evict foreign fighters from the country, The ir weapons and warned that the countdown to evict foreign fighters has begun. The texts 47 appeared 48 fied. It is a collection of hard-core extremists, foreign fighters and Somali nationalists. 49 eah. Definitely." Mallah says he encountered few foreign fighters in his travels, save for one 50 : RUTH POLLARD Body SYRIA has become a magnet for foreign fighters, with al-Qaedaaligned aybe northern Mali could become a destination for foreign fighters from the wider region and 51 52 a border post on Wednesday night and spotted four foreign fighters with guns and rough Arabic 53 rs accused him of ordering killings and harboring foreign fighters, and they demanded to know itories. There are believed to be several hundred foreign fighters in Somalia, The Associated 54 55 Tanzania. Observers say there are several hundred foreign fighters in Somalia, mainly in m in June. Since then, the militants, who include foreign fighters as well as Somalis and who 56 57 e- Amisom. Since then, the militants, who include foreign fighters as well as Somalis and who 58 fficers fled their posts and militants, including foreign fighters, established a presence. The 59 fficers fled their posts and militants, including foreign fighters, established a presence. The g to the new president. The militants-- including foreign fighters, local officials said 60 d," he said. Antigovernment fighters-- including foreign fighters --were arriving or were 61 o make up about a quarter of the 200 or so of its foreign fighters, according to the Royal 62 63 f Libya's newly elected national Congress b lamed foreign fighters from Algeria or Mali with 64 ordination Committee asked Turkey to stop letting foreign fighters enter Syria. In February, the 65 ria-- Mr Stevens called it a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters" when he visited in 2008. 66 ria- Mr Stevens called it a "wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters" when he visited in 2008. 67 Bureau. He told reporters that there were so many foreign fighters and other external actors Bureau. He told reporters that there were so many foreign fighters and other external actors 68 69 can talk about," he said. It is unclear how many" foreign fighters" have joined the Syrian 70 volution, but then he said he was one of the many foreign fighters who had flocked to Iraq to 71 back in part with a collective-punishment model. Foreign fighters began to trickle in, stalking 72 situation in the south, and possibly draw in more foreign fighters. "I think it is going to be 73 positions or resupply their ammunition or if more foreign fighters infiltrated the country. 74 rian Army, the main armed opposition group. "Most foreign fighters go abroad to defend their 75 rian Army, the main armed opposition group. "Most foreign fighters go abroad to defend their

76 ns, Druse, Palestinians, Kurds and Turkmens. Most foreign fighters joining the conflict are 77 e or form, represent the views of the Muhajireen [ foreign fighters] in Somalia," it said in a e or form, represent the views of the Muhajireen( foreign fighters) in Somalia," it said in a 78 79 pe or form, represent the views of the Mujahidin foreign fighters in Somalia," it tweeted. 80 ising. But the attacks on Friday suggest that now foreign fighters may indeed be jumping into 81 olunteer from al-Bab. Asked about the presence of foreign fighters, a long-predicted and often 82 nning to emerge now as people query the number of foreign fighters among the insurgents. 83 sterday published a report describing the role of foreign fighters and the now "overtly 84 ing it unsustainable. He opposed the detention of foreign fighters and terrorists at Guantanamo, ternet consistently describe far lower numbers of foreign fighters and Islamist militants, and 85 86 slim brethren from being slaughtered. Portions of foreign fighters are not fighting to help 87 are exposed to new ideas. "Therefore, portions of foreign fighters are not fighting to help 88 1 Mood would only say that he had seen reports of foreign fighters assisting the FSA but no 89 lay a central role in the fighting. The number of foreign fighters entering the fray has also 90 lay a central role in the fighting. The number of foreign fighters entering the fray has also 91 wing problem. Scores and perhaps even hundreds of foreign fighters --from Libya, Algeria, Iraq, om Britain. Responding to the growing presence of foreign fighters in Syria, the US national 92 93 enya. The case has drawn attention to the role of foreign fighters in the militant group, which 94 astern Libya, which was already a major source of foreign fighters in U.S.-occupied Iraq, nor in 95 . Last month a UN panel warned that the number of foreign fighters in the conflict was growing 96 execution. Responding to the growing presence of foreign fighters in Syria, the US national 97 . Last month a UN panel warned that the number of foreign fighters in the conflict was growing viduals come, no problem." The rising numbers of foreign fighters in Syria comes at a 98 moment of 99 id of Mr. Hitto. Mr. Zelin keeps a rough tally of foreign fighters in Syria based on news 100 ividuals come, no problem." The rising numbers of foreign fighters in Syria comes at a moment of 101 'ida in Iraq. Accurate estimates of the number of foreign fighters in the country are difficult 102 ground there is no information on the presence of foreign fighters." In hard-pressed Deir Ezzor 103 al-Shura, which appears to have lured a number of foreign fighters, including Britons, to 104 ns. The Syrian government facilitated the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq for many years, and 105 nough for Abu Omar al-Chechen. His ragtag band of foreign fighters, known as "muhajiroun

106 ged, at the inaction by the West. The presence of foreign fighters like Abu Abdullah, and the 107 pposition. There has been a rise in the number of foreign fighters, many of them Islamist 108 opposition movement, which has seen thousands of foreign fighters pour across Syria's northern, 109 number has reportedly been swelled due to the of foreign fighters, recruitment of economically 110 to make a big thing recently about the influx of foreign fighters," said one western diplomat. 111 tias, who are reportedly being joined by bands of foreign fighters. Saying that she had received 112 hat it was impossible to rule out the presence of foreign fighters. "The main point is that the 113 ers in the network are Syrian, with the number of foreign fighters varying between 1200-1500 114 ating in Lebanon and Iraq. Aware of the number of foreign fighters who have entered the country, 115 city serves as a base for some of the hundreds of foreign fighters who have answered the call to 116 r university student is among a growing number of foreign fighters whose involvement in Syria's 117 foreign fighters in the assault. A keen focus on foreign fighters has been a hallmark of the 118 -Shabaab training camp that is still operational. Foreign fighters from Britain, the US, Asia 119 roups, and that others had used child soldiers or foreign fighters, accusations that could not 120 d look into the jihadist life of Amriki and other foreign fighters, as well as the militia's 121 ing us to wage jihad." In Marka, Amriki and other foreign fighters attended the local mosque, 122 There have been many reports of jihadis or other foreign fighters flowing into Syria, as if it 123 ef and wariness Over the summer, Amriki and other foreign fighters left Marka, and African Union 124 megrown militants or, more recently, inde pendent foreign fighters enlisting in rebel brigades. 125 posed by Salafi extremists or al-Qaida- the same" foreign fighters" the mukhabarat used to help 126 s immaculately groomed. Beside him stood a second foreign fighter, a thin vulpine figure with 127 s immaculately groomed. Beside him stood a second foreign fighter, a thin vulpine figure with 128 ce of the growing involvement of sectarian-driven foreign fighters on both sides of Syria's 129 ptured members of the government forces, shabiha, foreign fighters, supporters of the 130 aying a central role in the Iraq war by shuttling foreign fighters allied with al-Qaeda into the ught to comprise about a quarter of the 200 or so foreign fighters operating for the al-Shabab 131 132 and leader. He also acknowledged the role of some foreign fighters in the assault. A keen focus 133 future, analysts and security officials say. Some foreign fighters are already leaving Somalia, 134 Now a third force has joined the fray: "terrorist foreign fighters" or al-Qaeda militants trying 135 at the fighting has been made worse by "terrorist" foreign fighters" or al-Qaeda militants re constructive politics". It is surprising "that foreign fighters and jihadis, for now, have 136

137 the city of Jaar. Residents in the area say that foreign fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan 138 ster, Hoshyar Zebari, said earlier this week that foreign fighters had crossed from Anbar into 139 nto a magnet for jihadists, but they believe that foreign fighters still make up only a small 140 es." Rebel fighters in Idlib province denied that foreign fighters were a significant factor in 141 the parties to seek a peaceful transition". The foreign fighters are responding to fatwas 142 moving. "Who gave you permission to be here?" the foreign fighter bawled, apparently incensed by 143 moving. Who gave you permission to be here?" the foreign fighter bawled, apparently incensed by 144 from Persian Gulf countries. But, he added of the foreign fighters: "Don't get the false 145 destroyed the Arab world." Boasts If some of the foreign fighters in Aleppo were callow, others 146 tant to speak about the militia, particularly the foreign fighters. There have been recent 147 the FSA seems to be fighting for democracy, these foreign fighters don't want anything more than 148 the FSA seems to be fighting for democracy, these foreign fighters don't want anything more than 149 the ethnic balance. "We do not want to see these foreign fighters in our town, we have no 150 ational intervention fade, people's resistance to foreign fighters is gradually subsiding. And 151 udanese officials have accused the South of using foreign fighters in Heglig and supporting 152 aid the arrests proved that South Sudan was using foreign fighters, The Associated Press 153 bout the uprising being a foreign plot. One warns foreign fighters that they will be abandoned 154 bout the uprising being a foreign plot. One warns foreign fighters that they will be abandoned 155 n the site said those who died at the bakery were foreign fighters and "terrorists," a word the 156 d by Imroz, and in which the government said were foreign fighters. Their families identified 157 d by Imroz, and in which the government said were foreign fighters. Their families identified 158 in Afghanistan during the mid to late-1980s when foreign fighters poured into the country to 159 ndignity of the claim and the consequences. While foreign fighters and weapons from Libya and Syria riven with sectarian violence, teeming with foreign fighters and with no strong leader to 160 161 ws media insist that rebel ranks are swollen with foreign fighters. In a report from Aleppo on 162 unforgettable. On the left stood an enraged young foreign fighter from Jabhat al-Nusra, the 163 unforgettable. On the left stood an enraged young foreign fighter from Jabhat al-Nusra, the

#### Concordance lines from 2014 corpus

- d that about 60 Australians were among the 10,000 foreign fighters who have joined the
- the United Nations security council, some 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries have

3	in Iraq and Syria are now estimated to have 3000 foreign fighters. Many are from Britain and
1	ege London, which has assembled a database of 450 foreign fighters over the past 18 months,
5 vith	Terrorism Information Centre, there are 6000-7000 foreign fighters in Syria, overwhelmingly
with 6	telligence services estimate that more than 7,000 foreign fighters from 50 countries have
7	ntelligence services estimate that more than 7000 foreign fighters from 50 countries, including
3	fighting for the terrorist group on October 3. A foreign fighter believed to have been part of
)	ister of Australia, that is, what can we do about foreign fighters, what can we do together?
10	untries; coordinated international action against foreign fighters and militant funding sources;
11	ge of urgent federal legislation directed against foreign fighters and journalists, and granting
12	nder the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment( Foreign Fighters) bill introduced last
week by 13	ased the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment( Foreign Fighters) Bill, which will create
new 14	At least 60 Australians are believed to be among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and some
15	e most influential English-speaking clerics among foreign fighters in Syria, used a verse from
16 17	of Arab studies who blogs about Syria's jihad and foreign fighters.  nded with airstrikes that killed 40 militants and foreign fighters and caused thousands of
18	ling citizens of the self-declared caliphate, and foreign fighters flocking to join the jihadist
19	unched airstrikes targeting Taliban militants and foreign fighters in North Waziristan, near the
20	order is the only way to smuggle oil, weapons and foreign fighters into (Iraq and Syria)," said
21	m and try to starve terrorist groups of funds and foreign fighters. Mr Abbott told the special
22 23	tar and Turkey to help cut off flows of money and foreign fighters to Isis. ikes on the Syrian border town of Kobane, another foreign fighter has claimed. Just days after
24	ortune Ah yes. Indeed. Of course. All these armed foreign fighters, Jihadis, are sloshing
around 25 oroduce	former Iraqi officers from Saddam Hussein's army, foreign fighters and savvy media
26	hat chaos." He said the group was able to attract foreign fighters "who believed in their
27	rticular reference to the role of Australian-born foreign fighters in beheadings and terror.
28	ious decrees and military commands. Only the best foreign fighters take on a high public
29	d police on how best to address potential British foreign fighters. Even a cursory sweep across
30	ational action in response to the threat posed by foreign fighters, and it requires countries to
31	get worse: An Al Qaeda affiliate group, aided by foreign fighters, battles with seven different
32	Iraq will have produced a failed state overrun by foreign fighters eager to strike targets far
33	efeating terrorism, including the threat posed by foreign fighters joining extremist groups," it

34	efeating terrorism, including the threat posed by foreign fighters joining extremist groups," it
35	imself marginalized, excluded from his country by foreign fighters. When his father died
36	ng of the Security Council on the threat posed by foreign fighters who sign up with the Islamic
37	n Syrian artillery landed in my fields. Then came foreign fighters, Sunnis, many of them,
38	h officials have enacted new safeguards to detain foreign fighters trying to get into Syria and
39	also being established in Britain to help disrupt foreign fighters heading to Syria and Iraq. Dr
40	ers, \$32.7m to investigate, prosecute and disrupt foreign fighters and \$11.8m for the federal
41 grievous 42	world. And, by training, blooding and emboldening foreign fighters, they are creating a
	ogging site by two thirds of all English-speaking foreign fighters in Syria. Research by the
43	applying to have a control order placed on every foreign fighter who returns from Syria to
44	efully vetted. "I fully support the idea that ex- foreign fighters have got a contribution to
45 which	he plan also mentions the importance of expelling foreign fighters from Syria, an issue on
46	in the 1980s. Asian intelligence chiefs also fear foreign fighters are getting much more direct
47	raged from 1815 until 2005, at least 70 featured foreign fighters. Among the more recent
48	Africa to the south with weapons and fighters." Foreign fighters coming out of Syria are a
49	from ground they had used as a rallying point for foreign fighters and for a successful push
50	and Syria, the Shabab are no longer a magnet for foreign fighters. But clearly, the Shabab are
51	last stronghold of al-Qaida and a focal point for foreign fighters coming to wage jihad against
52	e described Syria as the most powerful magnet for foreign fighters hoping to wage jihad, with
53	o al-Qaeda's origins: providing accommodation for foreign fighters in Pakistan and
Afghani 54	ol of the Syrian horror. The overall estimate for foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria is 15,000
55	l terrorism landscape. "They've been a magnet for foreign fighters in a way that no other
56	ani Taliban, the region has also been a haven for foreign fighters including Uzbeks, Chinese
57	e sprung up that provided travel arrangements for foreign fighters, the officials said. Last
58	ee most influential preachers online. One in four foreign fighters in the Middle East followed
59	. With much of the day's focus on the threat from foreign fighters, Mr. Obama took pains to
60 61	ighteen foreign fighters from the Islamic State group, f fully protecting civilians, and it has taken in foreign fighters from neighboring Syria and
62	hree-year-long conflict. The rebels, who included foreign fighters, demanded to trade soldiers
63	t ISIS has about 20,000 men under arms, including foreign fighters and veterans of the Syrian

64 Daghari said. At least seven militants, including foreign fighters, had guarded Mr. Somers and 65 yshi had addressed scores of followers, including foreign fighters, some weeks earlier. One 66 added: "Some of those plots are likely to involve foreign fighters who have travelled there from She said some of the plots were likely to involve foreign fighters who had travelled to the 67 68 lans. "Some of these plots are likely to involve foreign fighters who have traveled there from 69 lar, had developed expertise in vetting irregular foreign fighters over the past decade. Before 70 with which the Abbott government is pushing its" foreign fighters" bill through the Parliament. n authorities assembled a detailed profile of its foreign-fighter population earlier this year 71 72 ave been stopped from travelling overseas to join foreign fighters by eagle-eyed members of he Assad regime and at least 30 have been killed. Foreign fighters in Syria come from all over 73 74 the time they'll do a parade. They'll get a male foreign fighter in a room and the girls will 75 the time they'll do a parade. They'll get a male foreign fighter in a room and the girls will 76 hen I started we had a database of about 515 male foreign fighters which we researched through amass more resources, more arms, to attract more foreign fighters ...over time that could be a 77 78 . But in Denmark, a country that has spawned more foreign fighters per capita than almost 79 reater the confidence ISIS will have and the more foreign fighters will join them." Mr Cale e and Shia-dominated regime. The influx of mostly foreign fighters helped to boost the rebels' 80 are far more disturbed about what happened next. Foreign fighters soon arrived, and with 81 them and Iraq. It is the single largest contributor of foreign fighters. A sophisticated and 83 l content- has attracted unprecedented numbers of foreign fighters. An awful lot of that is down 84 bbott's leadership in responding to the threat of foreign fighters and in rallying a strong 85 and indeed Britain can do to stop this scourge of foreign fighters and defeat this ideology of ls will say only that they believe "thousands" of foreign fighters are in Afghanistan and that 86 87 fourth victim died 13 days later.) ISIS' cadre of foreign fighters are a rising threat not just 88 ries agreed to staunch Isis funding and influx of foreign fighters, critical priorities for 89 , Saudi Arabia and Jordan as the major sources of foreign fighters for the genocidal army. 90 y said, field commanders returned with stories of foreign fighters. "Foreign fighters are 91 t the body would work to ensure the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the country and end .S. intelligence and its allies are the number of foreign fighters from Western countries who 92 93 fact these terrorists include a growing number of foreign fighters from Europe is cause for Steven J. Sotloff. And it is drawing hundreds of foreign fighters from Western Europe and 94

even

95 that	g's College London, which maintains a database of foreign fighters from the west in Syria,
96	ls at the time as an effort to stanch the flow of foreign fighters from Syria. The underlying
97	to be seen. The debate over stemming the flow of foreign fighters has opened up new legal
98	ng inside Syria is also key to the recruitment of foreign fighters, he says, as is the overt
99	oup, wherever it was operating. While the flow of foreign fighters heading for Syria and Iraq
100	es of the conflict. The long-lasting influence of foreign fighters, however, remains to be seen.
101	we have gathered that there are a good number of foreign fighters, hundreds if not thousands
of 102	obligation to the passage across their borders of foreign fighters". "If all the nations of the
103	social media seems to be working. The numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq already
104	terrorist acts globally. More than 60 per cent of foreign fighters in Syria have Joined ISIL,
105	ts allies to take to tackle the growing threat of foreign fighters in Syria. Travel to Syria by
106	25, in July. Experts in tracking the movements of foreign fighters in wartorn Syria said Roshid
107	ugged border areas have played host to a range of foreign fighters including Uzbeks and
ethnic 108	said the organization has attracted thousands of foreign fighters, including Western passport
109	The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq poses a threat for
110 111	drafted by the United States, to stem the flow of foreign fighters into banned terrorist eli forces anticipated. First is the influence of foreign fighters. Iranian advisers throughout
112 113	. The one thing that might change the attitude of foreign fighters is the United States' intelligence agencies are monitoring the flow of foreign fighters, many of whom are British,
114 115	countries share data to detect the recruitment of foreign fighters, monitor online had recently begun taking the potential threat of foreign fighters near the border seriously
116	lls in Idlib and Aleppo. It is heavily made up of foreign fighters, particularly from north
117	wrote. Denmark, with the second-highest number of foreign fighters per capita, has gone in
the 118	ent, stated, "we have to deal with the threat of foreign fighters planning attacks against our
119	powers curb their arms supplies and the inflow of foreign fighters. Rather than trying to
120 121	ng the conflicts in Iraq and Syria; the threat of foreign fighters returning from Iraq and r claimed in The Times yesterday that the bulk of foreign fighters that join ISIS come from
122	State (Isis) has begun emphasizing the torrent of foreign fighters the group has attracted from
123	ress the threat posed to Britain by the return of foreign fighters. The measures included
124	rking with neighbouring countries on the issue of foreign fighters". The US has conducted air
125	ghanistan gave al-Qaeda. Second was the return of foreign fighters to their homelands,
includin 126	New York to discuss how to combat the problem of foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and

that 

Syria.

127 had	unnamed Syrian activist saying 100 executions of foreign fighters trying to leave the group
128	rned that the mullah had brought in "hundreds of foreign fighters." Two soldiers died during
129	aneously, its ranks swelled by a steady influx of foreign fighters. Unable to take Fallujah,
130 131	ress the threat posed to Britain by the return of foreign fighters, warning that the Sunni tration wants Turkey to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters who have used the country
as 132	ation to do more to halt the flow of thousands of foreign fighters who have swarmed into the
133 of	d States needs Turkey to help control the flow of foreign fighters who have swelled the ranks
134	onesia Indonesians have joined the thousands of foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria
to 135	attending the global foreign ministers summit on foreign fighters and Iraq and Syria in New
136	n backed Australia's position and went further on foreign fighters himself. Cameron told the
137	errorist groups, including Al Qaeda; and calls on foreign fighters, including members of
138	outreach to Syrian authorities for information on foreign fighters. Joudeh, of Building the
139	onth for a special UN Security Council meeting on foreign fighters, to be chaired by Barack
140	c State, it is a lower level than the Newspoll on foreign fighters two weeks ago, which showed
141	of the dead were believed to be Uzbeks and other foreign fighters, including members of the
142	rterrorism officials say. Like thousands of other foreign fighters, many have been drawn on
143	overnment fighters had also died. Iraqi and other foreign fighters, most of them Shiite
Muslims	s, Reyaad Khan, 20, wrote of enlisting with other foreign fighters "to do martyrdom ops".
Jaffar 145	now precisely, but the more Australians and other foreign fighters who join these groups the
146	tions in Iraq ("Australia, US to join forces over foreign fighters in Iraq", August 13). It will
147	ich even countries that manage to track their own foreign fighters have addressed only a
portion 148	ensed that Biden had accused Turkey of permitting foreign fighters to enter Syria or by the
149 Ebola.	le updating me about her week's three priorities- foreign fighters, UN peacekeeping and
150 U.S.	concern are thousands of increasingly radicalized foreign fighters, including many carrying
151	s impossible to rule out new attacks by returning foreign fighters, but we believe these fears
152	ent of foreign militants. "The issue of returning foreign fighters is really a matter of concern
153 154 fuming	ism organisation, said that one in nine returning foreign fighters posed a threat to their e and prosecute domestic extremists and returning foreign fighters". With premiers still
fuming 155	year ago and now works in the hotel. "I have seen foreign fighters for [ISIL] and foreign aid
156	been." He estimated that up to 10,000 so-called" foreign fighters" had been drawn to the
Syrian 157	d-country terrorism suspects, including so-called foreign fighters, in Germany are legitimate

had 

158 follower	porters say the men were regime spies). A Spanish foreign fighter who had promised his
159	ble with any reverse onus of proof to charge such foreign fighters. Abbott needs to use this
160	el to New York to attend a UN meeting on tackling foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, said
161	"Even the Turks." FSA fighter Samir is angry that foreign fighters in Syria put themselves in
162	rity agencies have gained the authority under the Foreign Fighters Act to detain terrorist
163	f the foreign press there is propaganda as if the foreign fighters are passing through Turkey
164 Lt.	s are commanding Afghan Taliban fighters, and the foreign fighters are well equipped," said
165	f the foreign press there is propaganda as if the foreign fighters are passing through Turkey.
166	everal de-radicalisation programs," he said. The Foreign Fighters Bill before the Senate would
167	aid the government would accept 36 changes to the foreign fighters bill called for by the
168 the	. The Opposition Leader said he was confident the Foreign Fighters Bill would be enacted by
169	s to remove the references to "news items" in the foreign fighters bill so that journalists
170	eement had been secured before Labor had seen the foreign fighters bill. "It would be
negligen 171	he regime was gone, he said, people would see the foreign fighters for what they were:
172	nterlands. It also remains to be seen whether the foreign fighters from neighboring Sudan and
173 town."	numbered. "They have seen a window of hope as the foreign fighters have begun to leave
174	ter-terrorism adviser. While "the more remote the foreign fighter's home country, the better"
175	y they are patriots," Mr. Kucherenko said of the foreign fighters. "I don't think there are
176 177	deed seeking to recruit, or be recruited into the foreign fighters in Syria, as well as the nto the foreign fighters in Syria, as well as the foreign fighters in Syria itself". "Some of
178	ity". Again, the tweets rolled on: Talking on the foreign fighters' laws with lawyer Lydia
179	weapons and -antiquities, and taxation scams. The foreign-fighter phenomenon was
unpreceo 180	razen presence of Australian citizens amongst the foreign fighters telegraphs the need for
181	countries disrupt the networks that -recruit the foreign fighters these groups rely upon," she
182 Islamic	inst the United States and Europe comes from the" foreign fighters" who have joined the
183	on social media. What we discovered was that the foreign fighters who started to join the
184 185	or homegrown terrorists. It also means that these foreign fighter jihadists, while highly 3, from San Diego in California, was one of three foreign fighters who died on the battlefield,
186	and at the UN to impede Islamic State's access to foreign fighters, and an expeditionary force
187	lamic State targets, as well as measures to track foreign fighters, stop their movements,
188 189	sites as part of an effort to identify and track foreign fighters. It took days for U.S. ups in Syria have set up bases in Turkey to train foreign fighters for terrorist attacks on the

ict in Syria have begun setting up camps to train foreign fighters to launch terrorist attacks

Pg. 15 Length: 82 words Body A Jihadist training foreign fighters in Syria has claimed that

p, an al-Qa'ida-aligned group devoted to training foreign fighters to conduct terror attacks in

se the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have triggered foreign fighters to join extremist groups in

r based in Syria will appear on the site. Wannabe foreign fighters can go to them and ask

ongtime center of operations in North Waziristan. Foreign fighters, including Uzbeks and

en this way in northern Syria since mid-2012 when foreign fighters from around the world

unlike what has been seen in northern Iraq, where foreign fighters have fought beside Iraqis,

answer for you. There is a real need to deal with foreign fighters and the counter-terrorism

passports and national identity cards of would-be foreign fighters for six months. The German

is is one reason why we try never to send wounded foreign fighters to Turkey -most of them

# **Concordance lines from 2015 corpus**

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

are

come

come

come 5

7

State

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

started

n once thought. Interpol estimates there are 1200 foreign fighters from Southeast Asia in the . Jambon, a Flemish nationalist, said that of 130 foreign fighters who were known to have . Jambon, a Flemish nationalist, said that of 130 foreign fighters who were known to have . Jambon, a Flemish nationalist, said that of 130 foreign fighters who were known to have experts estimate that there are more than 18,000 foreign fighters involved in the conflict. rs to the kinetic battlefield. The roughly 20,000 foreign fighters it has recruited is about its colours several months later. By early 2013, foreign fighters from around the world were are not shown because they are off the map 21,475 foreign fighters who have joined Islamic ng Isis's enemies. The group has more than 30,000 foreign fighters and many more local tial assessment that concludes that nearly 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Iraq and first time the remains of an Australian deemed a" foreign fighter" has been repatriated. Under t jihadist network mapping unit". There is also a foreign fighters taskforce at the Australian tside she would be abducted and forced to marry a foreign fighter. "They cut the Internet, but commanders in the Iraqi Army. His concerns about foreign fighters were shared by the State he "Syrian list"- regarded as potential or actual foreign fighters -in Brussels alone. Mr Michel ter wants a blanket hardline approach, seeing all foreign fighters as terrorists. Tony Abbott

17	Turkey, blamed by many in the region for allowing foreign fighters to cross its borders into
18	ies. The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment( Foreign Fighters) Act, which came into
19	o push the successful link between the terror and foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria and pointed
20	ightly controlled and defended by both Syrian and foreign fighters. Its religious police patrol
21	and question any Australian for up to a week and foreign fighter legislation aiming to restrain
22	ture also means that fighting radicalisation and" foreign fighter" networks should not entail
23 from	onsists mostly of disenchanted former Taliban and foreign fighters pushed into Afghanistan
24	ture, health and social care, "earn or learn" and foreign fighters returning to the UK from
25 Syria	national agreements to curb the flow of money and foreign fighters to extremist groups in
26	rn Syria to cut off supply lines of resources and foreign fighters to Isis -at the same time
27	urity in Libya to prevent the flow of weapons and foreign fighters who come into Egypt and
28 Shaheed	rhi, and chatted to friends in Australia. Another foreign fighter, known only as Ahmed
29	was from Iran, and unabashed about being another foreign fighter in Syria's civil war. "I came
30	s manfully rising to them. If the Turks apprehend foreign fighters of Australian origin, we will
31 32	the next fortnight to strip dual citizens who are foreign fighters of their Australian fore will allow half of those Australians who are foreign fighters to retain citizenship. As
33	ps in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as foreign fighters, including from the Russian
34	te. The terrorism threat is evolving, he said, as foreign fighters or domestic "lone wolves"
35	although this could be illegal under Australia's foreign-fighter laws. Last month, Foreign
36 delivered	ough new citizenship measures aimed at Australian foreign fighters. In a speech to be
37	ey will make it easier for intercepted Australian foreign fighters looking to join Islamic State
38	stanbul could still be at risk, while Australian" foreign fighters" may use Anzac Day as cover
39	gees. "One of the problems is that there might be foreign fighters, there might be terrorists,
40	s to lessen the chances of those at risk becoming foreign fighters or domestic terrorists.
41 42	Only Syrians should defend Syria. There have been foreign fighters on the regime side n fighters for an Islamic State, while they bring foreign fighters for a Kurdish project," said
43	to make a living helping the Islamic State bring foreign fighters into Syria say that it is
44	committed offshore in ungoverned space. Bringing foreign fighters back to face trial in
45	o Syria from Iraq, Turkey and Iran. "ISIS brings foreign fighters for an Islamic State, while
46	were tortured and military classes were taught by foreign fighters, according to Kaorkian, who
47	even more closely together on the threat posed by foreign fighters and other issues related to

, the last stop in the long journey undertaken by foreign fighters bound for Syria. Thanks to
eckpoints in and around the city are often run by foreign fighters, including militants from
nt is especially concerned at the threat posed by foreign fighters, with about 30 thought to
urope and where the largest numbers of per capita foreign fighters come from, it is those
rs of war, Winter says. And laws that criminalise foreign fighters who turn their backs on the
n citizenship, and the need for -action to defeat foreign fighters and Islamic State has been a
ion has said "counter-messaging" and discouraging foreign fighters are key elements of its
ato ally, whose porous borders continue to enable foreign fighters to swell the ranks of ted into the Taliban's chain of command. In fact, foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda
Lions of Rojava page features tributes to fallen foreign fighters, including the two dead
errorist group. Jordan has been a way station for foreign fighters attempting to enter Syria,
anon and opened a post in Turkey, the gateway for foreign fighters looking to participate in the
rities believe was an attempt to source money for foreign fighters. One prison source has
ically significant city has become a key site for foreign fighters to collect and train. Foreign
the UN has estimated that less than 15% of former foreign fighters are later involved in
d been killed in the conflict and about 30 former foreign fighters had returned home. "They
in April. He was also tied to Reda Hame, a French foreign fighter arrested in August who told
ly familiar plots. In August, Reda Hame, a French foreign fighter, was arrested in France after
oposition- that citizenship also be stripped from foreign fighters who had the potential to
a range of offences included in the government's" foreign fighters" legislation, which was
tate. "From these guys' perspective they have had foreign fighters in their lands, their sons
fighters while it is unacceptable for us to have foreign fighters to defend us? Foreign well-established routes by which they had helped foreign fighters reach Syria for at least
rying out attacks. "A blanket attempt to imprison foreign fighters (such as in France, which
rritorial gains than in global jihad; it sucks in foreign fighters by the thousand, but its er pro-IS profiles, including those of Indonesian foreign fighters documenting their battles in
to stem the Islamic State's ability to infiltrate foreign fighters and supplies into Syria. from travelling to the conflict and investigating foreign fighters, Brian McDonald, warns the
of the highest concentration in Europe of jihadi foreign fighters going to fight in Syria and
L, plays on that ambiguity, appealing to not just foreign fighters but also women, families,
sk his life by using a smuggler. And indeed, many foreign fighters already have European
EXCLUSIVE MANY foreign fighters, including Australians, lured

80 nge posed by the Islamic State, which fields many foreign fighters who are often unfamiliar with ly of brides and sex for fighters. When a married foreign fighter and his children arrive in the 81 82 join Isis in December. They are expected to marry foreign fighters. Their families have said 83 concerns to rush in the system to help to monitor foreign fighters returning from Syria. Theresa 84 in Beirut contributed to this report. Read more: Foreign fighters flow to Syria U.S. allies in 85 rism co-ordinator, has said Belgium produces more foreign fighters for Syria per head than any behind the plot. Belgium reportedly supplies more foreign fighters to Syria than any other EU 86 r Australians by the Abbott government. Under new foreign fighters laws, a person who enters 87 or 88 No foreign fighters had welfare payments 89 as already taken important steps to halt flows of foreign fighters and combat ISIL's messaging." 90 dnesday ended with agreement to "stem the flow of foreign fighters and secure Turkey's border pledged at last year's UNGA, to stem the flow of foreign fighters, and to respond to Isis's 91 92 aware that the MPs were carrying out a review of foreign fighters and was "therefore surprised 93 played "a significant role" among the hundreds of foreign fighters and families in Syria. He 94 Islamic State on the ground say certain groups of foreign fighters appear to move like shock 95 led by USA Today and other outlets. The number of foreign fighters assisting the Kurds is 96 ted". "I'm even more troubled by the phenomena of foreign fighters, because of the way that they hat country may help explain the large numbers of foreign fighters. But were the United States 97 98 n, to do more to control their end of the flow of foreign fighters crossing Turkey to reach 99 eign Ministry source conceded that recruitment of foreign fighters, estimated at 20,000, was 100 ed to starve this terrorist organisation Daesh of foreign fighters from Australia and elsewhere, 101 ghts and train journeys to hamper the movement of foreign fighters from Europe to Syria. But 102 ross Libya, its ranks bolstered by the arrival of foreign fighters from across the Middle East, 103 hich is an important step to stemming the flow of foreign fighters". He also spoke of efforts to 104 . Tunisia is already the largest single source of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, but 105 stitute also has exposed the depraved misogyny of foreign fighters in Islamic State. Online 106 Islamic State franchise is clearly the legions of foreign fighters, including those from 107 offensive, buoyed by an unusually high influx of foreign fighters, including Uzbeks and Chinese 108 rogress, but not enough" in stemming the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria. Mr. 109 oor Huda Ismail Body For most of us, the issue of foreign fighters is very foreign indeed, 110 plundered antiquities and attracted thousands of foreign fighters. Its brutality and deft use

111	is currently no comprehensive global database of foreign fighter names," it says. "Instead,
112	al Taliban fighters left him alone, the influx of foreign fighters over the past year or two
113	litical Violence, Belgium has the highest rate of foreign fighters per capita of all Europe.
114	emphasis persist. Cameron stressed the problem of foreign fighters returning to Europe. At last
115 116	Except for religious schools for the children of foreign fighters, schools are generally State's recruitment efforts, saying the scores of foreign fighters streaming into Iraq and Syria
117 118	out into the world that way I took the IDs of foreign fighters that I met at Istanbul gton "even more troubled" by the rising threat of foreign fighters. The Foreign Minister's
119	strongholds would have much impact on the flow of foreign fighters. "They began arriving
before 120 block	ad given him commitments to help stop the flow of foreign fighters to Islamic State and to
121	utting into its financing and slowing the flow of foreign fighters to the group. Even so, some
122	effort to cut off funding and the supply line of foreign fighters to Isis, but he rejected any
123 the	posed of 30 countries working to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Syria. He said some of
124	ter Michael Keenan warned last night. The flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq was
125	id. The unprecedented threat posed by the flow of foreign fighters to the Islamic State terror
126 127	tralia, is trying to stem the substantial flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. The s flow of finance, we have to cut off the flow of foreign fighters, we've got to tackle the
128 129	s said they began the offensive after hundreds of foreign fighters were deployed as tegy include finding ways of stemming the flow of foreign fighters, who have joined Isis from
130 131	ent's plan to strip the Australian citizenship of foreign fighters with dual nationality. t interpretation of Sharia and a steady stream of foreign fighters. Witnesses said that youths
132	sing these indicators," she said. "My research on foreign fighters and lone actors suggests that
133	funding, and produced 79 intelligence reports on foreign fighters and counter-terrorism for
134	he Guardian, adding that the regime's reliance on foreign fighters and Iranian support in
Aleppo 135	ies," said Marion van San, a senior researcher on foreign fighters at an institute affiliated
136	Day to press Turkish authorities to clamp down on foreign fighters crossing through the
country 137	Associated Press EUROPE Nations to unify laws on foreign fighters European governments
agreed 138	e said the focus of inquiries was likely to be on foreign fighters returning from Syria and
139	ng for tighter citizenship rules to crack down on foreign fighters, said he would not comment
on 140	im leaving. That pattern is consistent with other foreign fighters who have entered Turkey to
141	m members allegedly identified him as a potential foreign fighter three days after Christmas,
142	Kataib al-Muhajireen, a faction of predominantly foreign fighters allied to the al-Qaeda

on Muslim communities and more action to prevent foreign fighters from -returning to their c State terror group- shows how hard prosecuting" foreign fighters" will be. University of owers of self-rule. A commitment was made to pull foreign fighters from Ukrainian territory, luding at least 37 in English aimed at recruiting foreign fighters. The videos "are based and hat they won't find a wife- local families reject foreign fighters' marriage proposals -and that rticularly in the struggle to constrain returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. In a regional security likely to get worse. "Returning foreign fighters, prisoner releases and the nformation could assist prosecutions of returning foreign fighters. The foreign minister, Julie e the main driver of the conflict," Hokayem said. Foreign fighters flow to Syria U.S. allies in are prominent as operational leaders and snipers. Foreign fighters return to their countries o share good practices on dealing with so-called" foreign fighters" returning to their home y last year have accepted marriage offers by some foreign fighters as they prove to be most de guerre for his contacts' safety. Islamic State foreign fighters, known as muhajireen, g Londoners swelling the ranks of Islamic State's foreign fighter brigades. Northwest London's e. "His death contributes to our efforts to stop foreign fighter recruitment," she said. (In inister Peter Dutton said that, although stopping foreign fighters was the teams' primary task, and public security threats, including suspected foreign fighters and 60,000 alerts for missing red. There is no ministerial discretion to target foreign fighters, even though Immigration East- the latest in the growing trend of teenage" foreign fighters". The young man was stopped kidnapping near Ghazni have raised concerns that foreign fighters may be importing this h, while Syrian jihadists had begun to whine that foreign fighters were getting cushier Middle East in recent times but did so before the Foreign Fighters Act took effect, making it listed by the foreign affairs minister under the Foreign Fighters Act. She said the same act d spies, the leadership insulates itself from the foreign fighters and the regular Syrian and ond." The report, The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters' Bosnian Contingent, cases -quoted by Stewart and Maley, the path the foreign fighter chose was based on poor rried out by Islamic State militants. Many of the foreign fighters in Isis ranks have entered n in Sydney depended on the new provisions of the Foreign Fighters Laws. The men allegedly ir actions in light of existing provisions in the foreign fighters legislation," she said. "It of relevant -offences, which formed part of the" foreign fighters" legislation introduced last Syria and Iraq. "The sheer scale and reach of the foreign fighter networks poses a massive

143

144

145 and 146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

found

NSW

et close to them." Though widely known within the foreign fighter ranks, few within Isis knew e security force. We were very close to them [the foreign fighters], taking care of them. We 28, from Wisconsin, said that almost half of the foreign fighters that have joined the People's nduz, is taking place under the leadership of the foreign fighters. They want to be linked to force," he said. "We were very close to them [the foreign fighters]. We didn't interfere in c State. "Yet more women are either joining their foreign fighter husbands or are apparently g number of young female-s" meeting up with their foreign fighter husbands or seeking to find and Europe. Without ties to native Syrians, these foreign fighters were likely to remain loyal. the French interior minister. Terrorist threats, foreign fighters and violent extremism were nesian archipelago, from former conflict areas to foreign fighters and individuals radicalised a real and significant challenge with relation to foreign fighters," he said. "Executive ants program and \$50.7m for measures relating to" foreign fighters", including a community k when the government takes a tougher approach to foreign fighters. On the slaughter of cattle teams of agents abroad who specialize in tracking foreign fighters. The secretary of homeland l debate to be had about how the law should treat foreign fighters." There is legislation, the tiny of the common route to Syria through Turkey, foreign fighters from Western countries ustralian foreign fighters in Syria are being trained to do. The Islamist militias appear to be welcoming foreign fighters into their ranks and there angers in Syrian-run cafes or in hotels welcoming foreign fighters. They did not tell friends eration has also flushed hundreds of well-trained foreign fighters into Afghanistan, bolstering an said that most of the first-time husbands were foreign fighters from Arabic-speaking ic State at the end of Ramadan last year in which foreign fighters urge Muslims everywhere to Muslim Britons to the question of sympathies with foreign fighters, with Mahmood pointing TONY Abbott has issued a warning to would-be foreign fighters after two teenage brothers tion's history, the reality is that most would-be foreign fighters still turn up at the airport and access to welfare payments. But last year's" foreign fighters" bill already gave the a lower evidentiary requirement than last year's foreign fighters' laws, which were in part

# Concordance lines from 2019 corpus

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189 have 190

191

192

193

194

195

196

out:

197

198

199

200

r internment camps. Among the detainees are 1,000 foreign fighters and 9,000 of their wives and across northeastern Syria, along with about 1,000 foreign fighters and at least 60,000 Syrians

sm -offences. The government has also stripped 12 foreign fighters of their citizenship under In the village of Bashund in Wardoj District, 120 foreign fighters still lived in houses they In the village of Bashund in Wardoj District, 120 foreign fighters still lived in houses they s, supporters and families, including about 2,000 foreign fighters, are held under Kurdish 9,000 local Syrians and Iraqis, as well as 2,000 foreign fighters —including scores from usand fighters, but there are a little over 2,000 foreign fighters, many of which come from stimates are slightly lower, counting about 2,200 foreign fighters among 11,000 prisoners. The d me in July that these prisons are holding 2,500 foreign fighters, including about 1,000 raqi radical Islamists, this group included 2,500 foreign fighters, Mazloum said, with about e new law- as well as others, such as in the 2014 foreign fighters bill -would be preferable. 8,000 members in Iraq and Syria, including 3,000" foreign fighters". It had "solidified its o introduce the TEO legislation, it's reported 40 foreign fighters have returned to Australia. rs are our honour," the poster says, depicting 40 foreign fighters, ,who was killed in March say. The Islamic State recruited more than 40,000 foreign fighters and their families from 80 say. The Islamic State recruited more than 40,000 foreign fighters and their families from 80 d to Syria to support Islamic State. Maybe 40,000 foreign fighters went to Syria. Maybe half e commander in Badakhshan, said that at least 400 foreign fighters had joined the Taliban, Al ander in Badakhshan, said there were at least 400 foreign fighters in the province who had and last year- 13 per cent of the total of 41,490 foreign fighters. According to a report last ppine intelligence service, says that at least 44 foreign fighters continue to operate in the regrets for her support for Isis. More than 5,000 foreign fighters had already returned by the be Isis relatives and do not include more than 50 foreign fighters captured in the same period. upported Syrian Democratic Forces was holding 800 foreign fighters from 50-plus countries. take responsibility for them. There are about 800 foreign fighters in Kurdish custody, along s held in special camps, as well as more than 800 foreign fighters. "That number will increase has not previously been publicly identified as a foreign fighter, Australian security agencies Minister Peter Dutton introduced to Parliament a" foreign fighters" bill seeking to ban foreign ght years of civil war; Moscow is concerned about foreign fighters from its neighbors in ese laws and the government's strategy to address foreign fighters actually keep Australians f origin. "We need a sustainable solution for all foreign fighters. Nobody can wash their hands

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

of 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

27

28

29

30

32

Central 31

The 26

guard

33	ins unclear: Does he really plan to send back all foreign fighters to Europe? Or is he opening
34	l weeks, gave instructions to the families of all foreign fighters to make their own choices as
35 of	ebate over whether Western countries should allow foreign fighters and the children and wives
36	support anti-regime militias, which also allowed foreign fighters to slip across to join the
37	ences to the discussion. I was the first American foreign fighter for Al Qaeda after Sept. 11. I
38	the organisation's most prominent commanders and foreign fighters. Whatever else he may
have 39	sing that a majority of those who surrendered are foreign fighters. The Islamic State, as it
40	sing that a majority of those who surrendered are foreign fighters. The Islamic State, as it
41 42 43 44	d Malaysians traveled to Iraq and Syria to act as define Malaysians traveled to Iraq and Syria to act as foreign fighters for the Islamic State, for the Islamic State, for the Islamic State, iri men from both sides of the border, as well as foreign fighters, trained and armed by related conduct but without convictions- such as foreign fighters -will also be backdated from
45	rse, it makes them look important if they attract foreign fighters," Barton says. At Tuesday's
46	d ISIS-Y. Both Sunni Muslim groups have attracted foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
47	rst raised the issue four years ago of Australian foreign fighters coming back home. "I don't
48	uled out government help for returning Australian foreign fighters fleeing the remnants of
49 50 agencies	tateless by the fall of Islamic State. Australian foreign fighters living in Syrian refugee ng temporary exclu-sion orders on Australian-born foreign fighters would help security
51 52	e group, Washington has urged allies to take back foreign fighters to their respective clude citizens because it is believed they may be foreign fighters creates a slippery slope to
53 convicte	e study of 173 Australians alleged to have become foreign fighters or who have been ed of
54	undertaking acts of terrorism or travel to become foreign fighters, or as an effective risk
55 56	eritage who have either been charged here or been foreign fightersIt's something the lso important to note that those accused of being foreign fighters in Syria are unlikely to be
57	stioned the effectiveness of legislation to block foreign fighters from returning home, saying
58 be	Pg. 2 Length: 359 words Byline: Lucy Fisher Body Foreign fighters abandoned in Syria must
59	bourhood of Baghuz village near the Iraqi border. Foreign fighters and families have featured
60 61 62	the new laws, but it is believed to include both foreign fighters still in Syria as well as the new laws, but it is believed to include both foreign fighters still in Syria as well as ring. To understand the serious -dilemma posed by foreign fighters, we need to drill further
63	urkey would now be responsible for those captured foreign fighters and their family members
held 64	f around? Rosters of people from other countries. Foreign fighters. Does he have all of that on
65	ded money, weapons and, at a slightly later date, foreign fighters; these could come only from
66	said. Turkey has stated that it intends to deport foreign fighters fleeing Syria, and indicated

l for temporary exclusion orders for dual-citizen foreign fighters faces parliamentary debate. Syrian Democratic Forces, said he was among eight foreign fighters who were apprehended Syrian Democratic Forces, said he was among eight foreign fighters who were apprehended the group in disappointment last year. His fellow foreign fighters were settling down and it because "Islamically, that is allowed". Female foreign fighters want you to believe they took is's ranks. The SDF announced the capture of five foreign fighters as it advanced into alprospect of action to help the families of former foreign fighters in northern Syria, where 20 the war of words last week over the government's foreign fighters bill, which passed both ome from war zones. Labor backed the government's foreign fighters bill in the Senate on ntrol over the complex network of Taliban groups, foreign fighters and narco-traffickers in terpart to correct him: "It is true that you have foreign fighters coming from Europe, but this rom Iraq and the region. It is true that you have foreign fighters coming from Europe, but this he foreign fighters bill passed with undue haste, acious insurgent force bolstered by a few hundred foreign fighters from Pakistan, Tajikistan, the region, the world and indeed to Australia if foreign fighters are left there in Syria." re legitimate concerns as to what would happen if foreign fighters were allowed to return. uz. As many as 500 senior Isis members, including foreign fighters, are trying to negotiate -Hawl in northern Syria, populated by former Isis foreign fighters and their families. Last area near the Turkish border where numerous ISIS foreign fighters have most likely traversed, oxy to fight Isis in Syria. But the issue of Isis foreign fighters, most of them European, has n countries," she added. She said 800 to 900 Isis foreign fighters were currently held in prison Force and the US for Australia to repatriate its foreign fighters from former battlefields in reach a compromis-e with the government over its foreign fighter legislation, which is aimed or dozens of their nationals who became jihadist" foreign fighters" over the past five years and allow Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton to keep foreign fighters out of Australia. While arkness of IS rule, there are more than 1000 male foreign fighters and enthusiasts who've been ds to help the Syrian Kurdish government try male foreign fighters either in their jurisdiction and mothers innocent of brutality. They lie. Many foreign fighters demanding a right of return er UK law because she is not a dual citizen. Many foreign fighters from Western countries are News Corp papers over the weekend about how many foreign fighters had already returned to

67

68

this 69

this 70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84 week

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

Labor

Would

Shaafa

News Corp papers over the weekend about how many foreign fighters had already returned to

98	, or Guardians of Religion, is known to have many foreign fighters. It split from the biggest
99	s 2011 "Jasmine Revolution" the country sent more foreign fighters to Isis per capita than any
100	ct in Syria to an armed one. No Australian Muslim foreign fighter that I am aware of was of
101	ying a pretty significant role They don't need foreign fighters to build up their strength
102	yaf separatists who began their fight in 1991. No foreign fighters are hiding in the jungles,
103	Militants can leave it, but neither the Turks nor foreign fighters nor radical ones can enter
104	eople dead, including Mr. Hapilon and a legion of foreign fighters. Ahmad El-Muhammady, a
105	en in captivity here, including a large number of foreign fighters, all of them captured at
106	nables the government both to delay the return of foreign fighters and their families, and to
107	nables the government both to delay the return of foreign fighters and their families, and to
108	no in north-east Syria, with tens of thousands of foreign fighters and families in cramped
109	led. Isis has lost its territory and thousands of foreign fighters and their families have fled,
110	rists to radicalise the vulnerable, the return of foreign fighters and growing attempts by
111	lia would make considerations for the children of foreign fighters. "Anyone attempting to
112	mselves over, including the wives and children of foreign fighters, are bitterly complaining
113	cutive, Paul Ronalds, said Australian children of foreign fighters are the victims of horrific
114	, particularly those passed since the problem of- foreign fighters arose in 2014. It was clear
115	as it incompetence or apathy towards the risks of foreign fighters by minister Dutton that saw
116 117 118	sday, where he is expected to discuss the fate of foreign fighters caught in Isis ranks. A e north-east of the country, to which partners of foreign fighters have fled or been he president has publicly endorsed the torture of foreign fighters. He has argued for the
119	nk he's right. "If there are a large number of foreign fighters in captivity in Syria who
120 121	overn-ments, is the issue of tens of thousands of foreign fighters, including thousands at risk is reduced. The plight of the children of foreign fighters is causing concern across
122 123	an Secret -Intelligence Service investigations of foreign fighters seeking to -return to ps interconnected and transregional: "The flow of foreign fighters, the flow of resources and
124	ed for new parole powers to manage the -return of foreign fighters. The proposed laws would
set 125	, and four for being an IS member. The ability of foreign fighters to radicalise other prisoners
126	State "caliphate" galvanized tens of thousands of foreign fighters to flood into Syria. His
127	ing its role in the operation and the presence of foreign fighters. "U.S. forces partnered with
128	published-time 3.11am BST On whether children of foreign fighters who may have been
forced to 129	e senior leaders and the remnants of the ranks of foreign fighters who flooded into Syria and

117 

set 

remains unclear, especially the many hundreds of foreign fighters whose home countries side Syria that are strengthened by the return of foreign fighters with hardened combat rites David Crowe. The rush to impose new laws on foreign fighters achieved everything the t know where foreign fighters ended up: enltr. on foreign fighter laws: There are many ways in ministry also said the process for deporting one foreign fighter from Britain and seven from ay administration has been marked enough that one foreign fighter with the group, Khatab amid. The militia said it had also detained other foreign fighters, including citizens of re he had journeyed along with thousands of other foreign fighters to join the Islamic State's al to take back these women and hundreds of other foreign fighters who joined the Islamic aking responsibility from the SDF to "watch over" foreign fighters. This is, of course, just ates victims, including the children of their own foreign fighters," Mr. Longden says in the s to impose temporary-exclusion orders to prevent foreign fighters from returning to Australia, namely the temporary exclusion orders to prevent foreign fighters returning, is more is known about what has happened to the remaining foreign fighters and their families. The policy to address the challenge of the remaining foreign fighters in Syria. And Turkey will total defeat. As a result, many of the remaining foreign fighters who travelled to the ation of the complexities involved in repatriated foreign fighters, especially Western female an states had shown little interest in retrieving foreign fighters, but have been exploring how as been heated debate about the fate of returning foreign fighters -not least those who may "We have a very significant issue with returning foreign fighters to our country," Mr Dutton Responding to his calls, a No 10 spokesman said:" Foreign fighters should be brought to b that they are so capable of doing."No 10 said:" Foreign fighters should be brought to justice illed In Kunjak, Afghan special forces killed six foreign fighters in a night raid against Abdul insisted they want to keep Australian so-called" foreign fighters" at a distance, including by on. He will also face charges under the so-called foreign fighter legislation designed to stop ish prisoners, according to a U.S. official. Some foreign fighters have been questioned by FBI fellow at the who has studied the Islamic State's foreign fighters. The potential dangers and g in a joint effort with Turkish agencies to stop foreign fighters using the country and its t may be inspired by the return of these stranded foreign fighters. Our liberal democratic en so, the need to turn away, detain or supervise foreign fighters should not be in doubt. The ence and logistics role in repatriating suspected foreign fighters, put the issue on the back Trump said that European countries "have to take [foreign fighters] back or I'm going to set

130

131 132

133

134

135

136

137

138

State 139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

have 149

150

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

justice 151

refuse

there was no evidence to support the belief that foreign fighters had been victim-ised in the l security legislation monitor's observation that foreign fighters left in Afghanistan in the or journalists to protect government sources; the Foreign Fighters Act, which potentially e wanes, so will the Kurds' ability to detain the foreign fighters and their families. On a menu e was the guy who could build bridges between the foreign fighters and local Iraqis," said nd. Put crudely, there is no good solution to the foreign fighters and their families. If we he death of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The foreign fighters are considered the most with Jacqui and Peter Dutton today to discuss the foreign fighters bill and that is because we ier this year. The Labor caucus will consider the foreign fighters' bill this morning after the with Jacqui and Peter Dutton today to discuss the foreign fighters bill and that is because we has also been briefed by security agencies on the foreign fighters bill and will be briefed d be protected by Turkish forces, noting that the foreign fighters had initially entered Syria shed business from the previous term, such as the foreign fighters legislation and Ensuring Whether it is section 35p of the Asio Act, or the foreign fighters legislation, the Data m into the arms of a reinvigorated al-Qa'ida. The foreign fighters meanwhile are truly stranded. y members," a senior Iraqi official said. "On the foreign fighters, we would like to see their something waiting for me like that so most of the foreign fighters when ...you do talk to them ise the international nature of the struggle, the foreign fighters who have died during the head. The remaining three are the children of the foreign fighter Yasin Rizvic and his wife, is under 10. Three others are the children of the foreign fighter Yasin Rizvic and his wife, as an alternative to countries taking back their foreign fighters for prosecution -a previous e changed our lives, can be role models for these foreign fighters. The United States can serve e changed our lives, can be role models for these foreign fighters. The United States can serve child, Begum is asking to return to the UK. Those foreign fighters from Western countries urn," Mr Lewis said. Asked to clarify where those foreign fighters had dispersed to, an ASIO ramping up pressure on Australia to accept those foreign fighters who travelled more than d European nations to repatriate and put on trial foreign fighters who left their countries to for the creation of an international court to try foreign fighters, but the idea has garnered he would be received when she returned to the UK. Foreign fighters inhabited grey legal n, when Isis was on the rise. It was he who urged foreign fighters to join up and he gave them

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

who 186

187

188

189

190

terrain. 191

horities the power to turn away citizens who were foreign fighters. Dutton could have added ront the question of what to do with the Western" foreign fighters," I thought I could add my can be a viable pathway forward for those Western foreign fighters who do not have "blood on s with detailed knowledge, it was the place where foreign fighters close to Baghdadi's inner of the reasons the government doesn't know where foreign fighters ended up: enltr. on foreign of the reasons the government doesn't know where foreign fighters ended up: Just noting that p as the government grapples with what to do with foreign fighters and their families being e importance of the digital economy, dealing with foreign fighters and regional co-operation roadway that bisects the village. For four years, foreign fighters who did not speak the local

# Texts used in CDA

#### Text 1

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

held

199 on 200

#### The Australian, 2012

FOREIGN insurgents are leaving the tribal areas of Pakistan, some to join the Syrian rebels, as US drone strikes and dwindling funds make life increasingly uncomfortable for the Taliban's ``guest" fighters. About 250 militants, mainly from Arab nations, have left in the past few months alone, insurgent and tribal sources say. A security official in Islamabad confirmed the trend. Some have left their families and promised to return, but others have sold all their possessions and left for good. So many have sold their weapons that the price for an automatic rifle is said to have halved in Waziristan. The departure of Arab fighters to join the Syrian conflict comes after previous outward waves to Libya and Egypt, but a militant commander insisted that the trend would have no large impact on insurgent operations. "We have a lot of fighters with us and in fact we are happy that they are going back to help our brothers in Arab countries," he said in a telephone interview from North Waziristan. Most of the Arabs were allied to the Haqqani Network, which is estimated to have about 2000 fighters and directs most of its efforts against NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency is aware of the insurgent departures, but said there was no information about their destination. Those with legal travel documents are leaving via Peshawar, while the rest are travelling by the mountainous border areas, crossing the Baluchistan desert and either into Iran by land or across the Gulf by sea. For locals in Pakistan's self-administered tribal areas, the departures have brought benefits. "They have shifted their families to the houses of local sympathisers while others have been selling their stuff at very low prices or giving away burners, gas cylinders and utensils to their friends," said a resident of Miranshah, in North Waziristan. In Wana, in South Waziristan, a local said that until recently 300 Arab families lived in and around the main administrative centre, but now few are to be seen. Their departure is depressing the second-hand price of weapons. "A gun which usually costs 90,000 rupees is being purchased at a rate of 40,000 rupees," a Taliban source said. The spending power of Arab militants that once enabled them to rent large compounds and to drive off-road vehicles has dwindled in recent years, and the constant threat of US drone strikes is limiting their movements. A Pakistani militant said: "They used to buy a lot of fruit and meat, but over the last year or so they have been living hand to mouth. I think they have been facing severe problems to get financial support from Arab countries these days." Haq Nawaz Khan, a security analyst in Peshawar, said the dependence of the Pakistani Taliban on Arab militants had reduced sharply since 2004.

### Text 2

#### The Guardian, 2012

The role of of jihadist groups is attracting increasing scrutiny in media coverage and analysis of the Syrian uprising - giving the experts who thrived in the years after 9/11 a new lease of life. Most prominent amongst these outfits is the mysterious Jabhat al-Nusra (The front for the protection of the people of the Levant), which has claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Damascus and Aleppo. It appears sympathetic to, if not formally affilated with, al-Qaida, though Ayman al-Zawahiri, the AQ leader, issued a rallying cry to

jihadists in Syria in February this year. It publishes regular describing its operations and mourning its martyrs. Its language is unashamedly sectarian. Organisational affiliations are often unclear, but veteran fighters have brought deadly operational experience from Iraq, as Ghaith Abdul Ahad reported vividly. Western intelligence officials admit that they are concerned but still know little about al-Nusra and likeminded Sunni groups.

Now a new by an unusually well-placed expert predicts that their role will become more important. Noman Benotman is at the Quilliam Foundation in London, where he is a sort of poacher-turned-gamekeeper. Benotman was a founder member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which was formed in the mid-1990's to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi and fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Benotman knew Osama bin Laden but he other LIFG members such as Abdel-Hakim Belhadj denied being part of al-Qaida and its global struggle. Many also fought in Iraq. Under the auspices of the reformist Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, LIFG members participated in official de-radicalisation programmes, renounced violence and were freed from prison. Belhadj's former deputy in Tripoli, the Libyan-Irish Mahdi al-Harati, is now in Syria leading the brigade.

"The increasing evidence of jihadist activism in Syria in recent months indicates that the uprising is moving towards a new and more radical phase," Benotman writes. Proportion and precision are important in the light of Syrian government propaganda, which emphasises the jihadi character of the "armed terrorist groups" - language it started using in the first months of the uprising when the protests were still largely peaceful. Assad supporters at home and abroad tend to highlight the role of jihadi and Salafi groups, sometimes claiming that they are working with Nato - as the Libyan rebels indeed did last year. Financial support is said to come from Saudi Arabia and Qatar and elsewhere in the Gulf, though the lines are blurred between governments, religious foundations and individual donors.

The presence of these groups, formed into a loose network, is now unquestionable. "The overwhelming majority of fighters in the network are Syrian, with the number of foreign fighters varying between 1200-1500 members," Benotman says. He adds: "In most conflicts of which they are a part, jihadist groups represent a small percentage of combatants - this holds true in the Syrian case, where they represent less than 10% of all fighters. For these groups, militant uprising is seen as an opportunity to exercise their influence in Syria; particularly as the peaceful revolutions of the Arab Spring rendered their role irrelevant in the nations' fight for freedom."

### Text 3

# The New York Times, 2012

BEIRUT, Lebanon -- Just days before a major international meeting on how to aid Syria's rebels, the country's fractious opposition movement continued to bicker, most notably about a crucial question to be considered at the gathering: whether to provide arms to the rebel fighters.

Those who favour international weapons shipments have been scrambling in recent days to convince the United States and other countries that the rebels can address their main concerns: keeping weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic extremists and from fuelling sectarian violence.

Saudi Arabia, which will have representatives at the Friends of Syria meeting in Istanbul, has been a proponent of arming the rebels, and on Friday The Wall Street Journal reported that the kingdom was pressing Jordan, and offering it aid, to open its borders to allow rebel-bound weapons deliveries.

Jordan has denied the report, but it has added to the anxiety over the issue ahead of the gathering of Western and Arab countries in Istanbul on Sunday. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, on her way to the meeting, discussed Syria with Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in Riyadh on Friday.

Any shipments, especially from Saudi Arabia, would raise regional tensions and risk spreading the conflict, since Syria's main backer is Iran, Saudi Arabia's regional rival. Such a move would also play into the Syrian government's argument that the uprising is fueled by foreign powers.

Opponents and proponents of foreign arms shipments to the rebels agree on the same set of intractable problems, mainly that the armed opposition is decentralized, with groups of army defectors and volunteers largely fending for themselves to obtain weapons.

But backers say that despite such issues, there is an urgent need to establish a centralized supply line to the rebels because Islamist groups like the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood are already arming some factions, and are gaining disproportionate influence.

"The longer we delay, the more chaos we will face," said Ammar Qurabi, a prominent opposition figure who broke with the main exile opposition group, the Syrian National Council, in part over its inability to get international military support for the opposition.

Akil Hashem, a former senior officer in the Syrian armed forces, quit his role as military adviser to the council over his frustration with its inability to bring armed groups under its control.

He said in a recent interview that Muslim Brotherhood members on the council were obstructing efforts to centralize financing for the opposition because they wanted to directly control the Free Syrian Army, which is currently more of a loose coalition of armed opposition groups than a unified force.

"They're working for the future, hoping that the Tunisia and Egypt scenario repeats itself in Syria," Mr. Hashem added, referring to postrevolt elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood offshoots in those countries emerged as the most powerful political forces.

On Friday, Mr. Hashem said he still supported arming the opposition and direct foreign military intervention. He said he understood the fears that arms could fall into the hands of Al Qaeda or other extremist groups but said that diplomacy was failing as both President Bashar al-Assad and his opposition refused to back down.

Mr. Hashem added that the rebel groups would make serious efforts to control the arms, perhaps by registering each weapon to fighters according to their Syrian identification numbers and giving arms only to those who belong to a disciplined unit.

But sceptics say that such assurances are unrealistic. Haitham al-Manna, a Paris-based leader of an opposition group with members inside and outside Syria, said that adding more weapons would be "very dangerous" and that decentralized rebel groups could not be expected to control weapons given to them.

"If what we hear is true, this is an irresponsible attitude from the Saudis," said Mr. Manna, who opposes the use of force by the opposition and is staying away from the Istanbul meeting. He said some rebel groups were led by extremist Salafi groups, and that others had used child soldiers or foreign fighters, accusations that could not be independently verified.

The opposition has already made attempts at coordination.

In a video shown on Al Arabiya satellite television on Friday, a man identified as a Syrian Army defector with the rank of colonel said that the armed opposition had formed military councils in cities across Syria that would work with the Free Syrian Army leadership abroad.

But some prominent opposition leaders questioned whether the military councils truly represented the entire spectrum of the opposition.

Haitham al-Maleh, a respected lawyer who also left the Syrian National Council, said in an essay published this week in City A.M., a London business newspaper, that the plan to centralize coordination was carried out in secrecy.

"The recent announcement of an S.N.C. military bureau to coordinate the rebels was made without consultation with the Free Syrian Army, the main armed group," he said.

Mr. Maleh, who said the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed disproportionate influence on the council, said he was also concerned because he wanted all ethnic and religious groups to feel included in planning Syria's future.

In the video shown on Al Arabiya, the defecting colonel said that military councils had been formed in the cities of Homs and Hama, as well as in Idlib, Damascus and Deir al-Zour. Those areas of the country exclude many of the areas where Alawite and Druse minorities predominate.

The majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims while the government is dominated by Mr. Assad's Alawite sect, and both the government and the rebels accuse each other of sectarian motives in the fighting.

# Text 4

### The Times, 2012

President Assad declared that Syria was at war last night as government forces confronted rebels on the outskirts of Damascus in the heaviest day of fighting around the capital since the start of the uprising.

The clashes in the suburbs, once the bastion of support for the regime, broke out near bases of the Republican Guard in Qudsiya and al-Hama, five miles from the centre of the city. The force, which is led by Mr Assad's younger brother, Maher, has so far managed to retain firm control of the capital. Rarely before has the fighting reached so close to posts controlled by the Republican Guard.

President Assad made a rare public appearance, urging his reshuffled government to fight on. "We live in a real state of war from all angles," he told the Cabinet. "When we are in a war, all policies and all sides and

all sectors need to be directed at winning this war." Mr Assad dismissed Western calls for his resignation, saying the West "takes and never gives and this has been proven at every stage".

In Damascus, Abu Omar, a spokesman for local activists, said that regime forces had "stormed the areas with tanks". The official Sana news agency said that government forces had had to respond to "armed terrorist groups" in al-Hama and that weapons and ammunition had been seized.

Government troops backed by armoured cars stormed the Barzeh neighbourhood, the site of a large military hospital. According to staff, about a hundred soldiers a week are brought in. On Saturday, 50 soldiers were given a full military funeral in Barzeh.

Bodies were loaded from stretchers into wooden coffins, nailed closed and wrapped in Syrian flags. "This is just one funeral on one day," said one mother whose son was killed by an improvised explosive device. "How many more are going to die?" The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that 86 people were killed across the country yesterday, including 50 civilians, 32 soldiers and four rebels. The death toll in and around the capital was said to be 28. The new level of violence suggests that the opposition has become increasingly emboldened and that the war is taking a new turn.

Damascus was once firmly split into two camps - those who were solidly pro-government and those who sided with the activists and opposition seeking to end the 40-year rule of the Assad family. Now a third force has joined the fray: "terrorist foreign fighters" or al-Qaeda militants trying to exploit the chaos to turn Syria into a radical Islamic state. In Barzeh, a 30-year-old major who lost his left leg and half his arm in a battle near Homs last month, said that he had seen Yemeni, Libyan and Lebanese fighters.

In Homs, the besieged city which has become the symbol for the suffering of civilians, the fighting is worsening. Government soldiers manning checkpoints have painted over anti-Assad graffiti. "The atmosphere here is even more tense," said an aid worker. "You feel it growing and growing."

Smoke curled around destroyed buildings; entire streets were deserted. Houses were shuttered and left abandoned. "We do not want to see ourselves going down the road that the Lebanese did," said a grandmother, adding that the children had not been outside for several months for fear of the shelling and the sniper at the end of their street.

In Damascus, even the minority Alawite and Christian communities, who traditionally back Mr Assad, are feeling the pain. In the suburb of Mezzeh, which is home to many wealthy Syrians of mixed ethnic backgrounds, residents spoke with a sense of foreboding. "I love my country so much, and I tried to pretend this could not happen here," one businesswoman said. "But it looks as if we are descending into a kind of craziness. Embassies are leaving, airlines are not flying unless planes are full. And those who have the money to go are leaving for Lebanon, Paris or somewhere else."

Four days after Syria shot down a Turkish fighter jet, Turkey's Prime Minister warned yesterday that his country would respond with force to any future threat. "The rules of engagement of the Turkish Armed Forces have changed," Recep Tayyip Erdogan said. "Any military element that approaches the Turkish border from Syria and poses a security risk and danger will be regarded as a threat and treated as a military target."

An emergency meeting of Nato condemned Syria's destruction of the Turkish F4 Phantom over international waters.

#### Text 5

#### Sydney Morning Herald, 2014

A terrorist attack on Australian soil - possibly initiated by a lone wolf - is now regarded as "likely", prompting ASIO and the Australian Federal Police to shift the official risk assessment from "medium" to "high".

It comes as Australia prepares to enter a new war in Iraq and Syria and as senior intelligence sources revealed the number of counterterrorism investigations under way in Australia has increased by 600 per cent in the past 12 months.

NSW Police Commissioner Andrew Scipione said Sydney was more at risk than other capitals because of its size and "iconic infrastructure". He asked the public to be vigilant, saying: "The greatest tool that a terrorist has is a complacent community and what we want is people not to be complacent."

Security may be beefed up in places of mass gathering, such as football finals, on public transport and around "softer" targets such as large shopping centres, he said.

"This shouldn't affect anyone in their daily lives. But of course, you will see extra activity."

Australia's state of attack readiness now sits just one level below "extreme", which applies only when an attack is thought to be imminent.

At "high", Australia's threat level is higher than at any time since the rating system was introduced in 2003 - a period which has included the uncovering of a plot to set off bombs in Melbourne and which was thwarted by Operation Pendennis.

Authorities are worried that the bloody jihadist war being waged in northern Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State (also known as ISIL) has become a rallying point for disaffected youth, although the government denies that Australian participation itself will increase the risk of attack.

There has also been a dramatic increase in the number of passports cancelled as authorities deemed that certain people were looking to leave the country with intent to join the conflict.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the elevated level flanked by the ASIO head, David Irvine, Attorney-General George Brandis, and AFP acting Commissioner Andrew Colvin.

"I want to stress at this time as I always do that nothing that I have said today or nothing that I ever say about national security threats has anything to do with religion. This is about crime, potential crime, and combating crime. That's what it's about," Mr Abbott said.

He was also keen to reassure Australians that no "specific" threat had been identified. Australians are, however, being warned to expect slower progress through air and sea ports, and in gaining entry to large public events such as football finals, due to increased security measures and a greater police presence.

Mr Irvine officially moved agencies onto the new footing on Thursday evening, acting on what Mr Abbott described as "an accumulation of indicators".

The new level reflects an increase in "chatter" among possible jihadists with authorities now certain of a clear increase in the level of intent to enact terrorist attacks within Australia.

Of specific concern is the growing danger posed by so-called "lone wolf" fanatics acting either on specific instructions from Islamic State or like-minded groups, or unilaterally.

"There are I regret to say people who would do us harm and some of them are Australian citizens," Mr Abbott said.

Mr Abbott made the public announcement from Melbourne before chairing a special meeting of the National Security Committee of cabinet.

Earlier he had held a telephone hook-up with state premiers and chief ministers and communicated the change to the federal opposition.

Authorities concerns recognise that the gap between intent to do harm and the capability has shrunk as social media and the internet have become effective tools for radicalising and instructing would-be terrorists.

Opposition Leader Bill Shorten said the decision to raise the threat level was "most serious" but Australians would remain "smart and resilient".

"The PM and I are partners when it comes to matters of national security. We are in this together," he said. Mr Shorten also dismissed the suggestion that Australia's involvement in any US military action in Iraq and Syria had deepened the terrorist risk.

"Australia would still be a target regardless of what we did in that region. Our way of life, our tolerant, diverse society, makes other people jealous and threatened by our very actions," he said.

Mr Abbott said it was not the government's decision to raise the threat level, "it's the experts' decision".

Agencies confirmed the new alert level would mean slower progress and an increased security presence at big events, but said the extra level would not affect the planning of the G20 summit in Brisbane in November, because that had been planned on the assumption of an increased threat level.

There are some 60 Australians engaged in the conflict in Iraq and Syria among about 8000 foreign fighters.

### Text 6

### The Washington Post, 2014

As President Obama prepared to explain his reasons for taking military action against the terrorist group known as the Islamic State, top U.S. intelligence officials told Congress on Wednesday that the organization does not pose an immediate threat to the country.

The Department of Homeland Security is "unaware of any specific credible threat to the U.S. homeland" from the Islamic State, said Francis X. Taylor, the undersecretary for intelligence and analysis.

However, Taylor cautioned that the group "constitutes an active and serious threat within the region and could attempt attacks on U.S. targets overseas with little or no warning."

Taylor's comments to the Senate Homeland Security Committee follows growing concern that the Islamic State could one day attack the United States if it consolidates its gains in Syria and Iraq.

In January, the group's leader publicly threatened a "direct confrontation" with the United States, and militants later beheaded two American journalists after the United States began bombing Islamic State forces in Iraq.

Of primary concern to U.S. intelligence and its allies are the number of foreign fighters from Western countries who have flowed into Syria. Intelligence officials are fearful they could return to their native countries and launch attacks.

In May, a French national who fought with the Islamic State killed four people at a Jewish museum in Belgium. French authorities arrested a man with ties to the militant group earlier this year after he was found with explosive devices.

In his written comments to the committee, Nicholas Rasmussen, the deputy director of the National Counterterrorism Center, estimated the number of foreign fighters from Europe to be about 2,000. The bulk of them, he wrote, come from Britain, France and Germany.

Rasmussen said more than 100 people had travelled from the United States to Syria or attempted to go there. He said the figure included those who had been killed in fighting and those who have returned to the United States.

According to a U.S. counterterrorism official, the FBI is monitoring about a dozen people who went to Syria and came back to the United States. It is unclear what they did in Syria.

Abusalha had gone to Syria, where he trained, and then returned to Florida without the FBI's knowledge before heading back to the Middle East.

The FBI has arrested more than a half-dozen people trying to travel to Syria to support the Islamic State.

On Wednesday, a 19-year-old Colorado woman pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. The Justice Department said Shannon Conley became engaged to a member of the Islamic State whom she had met on the Internet. She then trained in the United States to fight in Syria. Conley was arrested in April in Denver as she tried to board a flight to Turkey.

About a dozen people from the United States are believed to have joined the Islamic State.

In comments made last week at the Brookings Institution, Matthew Olsen, the National Counterterrorism Center's director, said the United States is also concerned that an Islamic State sympathizer - "perhaps motivated by online propaganda - could conduct a limited, self-directed attack here at home with no warning."

But he added, "In our view, any threat to the U.S. homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale."

#### Text 7

# The New York Times, 2014

The European Union estimates that 2,000 European citizens have joined jihadist groups fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Other estimates put the number closer to 5,000. Most are Muslim youths who have fallen prey to recruiters and a romantic vision of the conflict as a holy war. European Union officials and governments are right to be concerned about the long-term security threat posed by battle-hardened combatants returning from Syria. But stemming the flow of would-be jihadists to Syria and dealing with their return will not be easy.

Britain is particularly alarmed. The 2005 terrorist attack in London's transit system served as a warning of the dangerous potential of radicalized young people. The nation was shocked by a video posted online last month of a British suicide bomber in Syria. Home Secretary Theresa May has argued that Britons fighting alongside jihadists in Syria should be stripped of their citizenship. The minister for immigration and security, James Brokenshire, has said that citizens involved in terrorism-related activities should be brought to justice.

France's interior minister, Manuel Valls, has called the eventual return of combatants "a ticking time bomb." An estimated 700 French nationals, some quite young, have joined jihadists in Syria. A 15-year-old girl, who had said she was going to join the fighting, telephoned her family in Avignon from the Turkey-Syria border. Dozens of Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish and other European citizens are also fighting in

Syria. Some may be drawn by Islamist proselytizing on the Internet and through social media, as well as by some imams in mosques. But widespread feelings of social marginalization are a big factor.

Europeans are trying hard to deal with the crisis. In January, 180 experts and representatives gathered in The Hague for the Cities Conference on Foreign Fighters to Syria. Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain and President François Hollande of France have discussed ways to collaborate more closely.

Police and intelligence agencies cannot solve this problem. As Europe's Radicalization Awareness Network, a European Commission umbrella group, points out, any solution will need a broad reach, engaging families and communities. Trust is critical to any effort to reach young people and offer alternatives to violence. As Europeans are all too aware, the conflict in Syria, in addition to its other horrors, has left its mark on a generation.

#### Text 8

### The Guardian, 2014

The English jihadist who beheaded the American journalist James Foley is believed to be the leader of a group of British fighters holding foreign hostages in Syria, sources have told the Guardian.

As an international manhunt got under way yesterday, the English-speaking militant was identified to the Guardian by one of his former hostages as the ringleader of three British jihadists thought to be the main guards of foreign nationals in Raqqa, a stronghold of Islamic State (Isis) rebels.

The militant who appeared on the Foley video, who called himself John and is believed to be from London, was said to be the main rebel negotiator during talks earlier this year to release 11 Isis hostages - who were eventually handed to Turkish officials after ransom demands were met.

The FBI, MI5 and Scotland Yard's counter-terrorism command were all last night racing to identify the militant who fronted the propaganda video that showed the brutal murder of Foley, the journalist who had been missing in Syria since 2012.

Sources in Syria recognised the man as a pointman for hostage negotiations in Raqqa, where he is said to have held discussions with several families of jailed foreign nationals over the internet.

One former hostage, held for a year in Raqqa, told the Guardian the Briton was intelligent, educated and a devout believer in radical Islamic teachings. The three UK-born militants were referred to as "the Beatles" by fellow hostages because of their nationality, the former captive added. Experts in the counter-terrorism and linguistics fields said the man appeared to be one of up to 500 British-born jihadists "brutalised" by Isis after leaving the UK to fight in Syria and Iraq.

Security services in the UK and US were yesterday analysing the propaganda footage, with forensic phonetics experts among those thought to be involved in trying to identify the masked militant from his accent.

Prof Paul Kerswill, a linguistics expert at the University of York, said he believed the man spoke in "multicultural London English" most commonly found in the East End of the capital.

"He probably has a foreign language background but it sounds like multicultural London English, which is people from all kinds of backgrounds who mix in the East End - a new kind of cockney," he said.

Dr Claire Hardaker, a linguistics expert at Lancaster University, studied the clip and said the man's vowels marked him out as likely from the south-east of England, but most likely from London.

"We're definitely looking at a British accent, from the south, and probably from London, Kent or Essex." The involvement of Scotland Yard in the international manhunt was seen as significant by counter-terrorism sources, who indicated that the man was likely to already be on the police radar, either through previous criminal behaviour or because he is known to be waging jihad overseas.

Prof Peter Neumann, director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, at King's College London, said an English-speaking militant was chosen deliberately to front the video to cause maximum impact in the west.

"This is significant because it signifies a turn towards threatening the west. They are saying we're going to come after you if you bomb us."

Neumann said British fighters had been carrying out "horrific acts" like beheadings, torture and executions for a year and a half, but this appeared to be the first with a western victim. He added: "It's not significant that British fighters have been beheading and torturing because that's been happening for a year and a half. The significant thing is that this was an American and was connected to a direct message that 'we are targeting you'." Britain's security services have warned for months about the sheer number of homegrown

terrorists leaving cities across the UK to fight in Syria or Iraq, with an estimated 500 Britons, joining up to 700 French and 500 Belgians on the frontlines.

Dr Afzal Ashraf, of the Royal United Services Institute, said the video was the latest in a propaganda war waged by Isis, intended to strike terror in the US and UK and act as a recruitment tool for western extremists. "There will be a minor effect on recruitment. It will affect a certain kind of psychopathic individual but it's a very minority sport, fortunately. There will be far more people put off by these guys but there is a market for this sort of thing.

"The message that really motivates people is it's a way of hitting back at what they perceive to be the US bullying and domination of the Muslim world. They feel impotent when they see the awesome US air and land power and they see this as a way of hitting back and that's the principle motivation."

Rafaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the RUSI, said: "This video shows us that people are going out there and being really brutalised by this conflict. They're not just participating in some campaign against (Syrian president Bashar) al-Assad, they're involved in hideous actions against people they've taken hostage. We've known it's been going in this direction but this video is an affirmation of it."

#### Text 9

### The Australian, 2015

The growing threat of terrorism at home and abroad has catapulted national security and defence into a first order budget priority with new money being lavished across a range of areas.

This budget reeks of deep concern about the unfolding terror threat and what can be done to counter it.

The potency of Islamic State in Iraq and the vulnerability of young Australians to its toxic and violent ideology has led the government to invest in a wide mix of measures to help weaken its influence and safeguard Australians at home.

It is an effort that now ranges across ever larger swaths of government including the military, intelligence, law enforcement and technology.

Overseas the government is committing hundreds of millions of dollars in fresh funding to support Australia's contribution to weakening ISIS. Its four-year funding commitment for Australian troops to train their Iraqi counterparts speaks volumes about Australia's belief that this is a long-term war.

Its substantial boost to the funding of the overseas spy agency ASIS points to an enlarged and sustained intelligence presence in the Middle East against ISIS.

The beefing up of the ASIS presence in the Middle East comes as other agencies, including ASIO and the Australian Federal Police also rapidly build up their representation in the region. More than 100 Australians are fighting for extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, with more than 20 killed so far. These are supported by around 160 Islamic State sympathisers in Australia believed to be helping to spread its extremist message. The government offered a bleak assessment of this trend in its budget overview. "The number of Australian foreign fighters is increasing, the number of sympathisers and supporters of extremism is rising, and the number of potential terrorists, including in Australia, is growing," it said.

At home, the government is preparing for a long-term struggle against home-grown extremism, committing around \$1.2 billion in new and old money to thwart attacks and to undermine the potency of the Islamic State message to young Muslims in Australia. With 22 people arrested on terror offences in Australia since September, including two narrowly thwarted alleged plots in Melbourne in the past three weeks, there is likely to be broad public support for these spending measures despite cutbacks in other portfolios.

This budget steps up the battle for the hearts of minds of young Muslim Australians by injecting \$22 million in to the effort to undermine ISIS propaganda and challenge its online recruitment.

It also offers new money to help telcos fund the retention of metadata for two years under new terror laws that security agencies insist will play a central role in their ability to prevent terror attacks in the future. The war against Islamic State at home and abroad cannot be won by merely throwing money at it, but this budget is a step in the right direction to ensure that Australians are as safe as they can hope to be against a fast moving and unpredictable threat.

### Text 10

### The Guardian, 2015

More than half the countries in the world are currently generating Islamist extremist fighters for groups such as al-Qaida and Islamic State, the UN has said.

A report by the UN security council says there are more than 25,000 "foreign terrorist fighters" currently involved in jihadi conflicts and they are "travelling from more than 100 member states".

The number of fighters may have increased by more than 70% worldwide in the past nine months or so, the report says, adding that they "pose an "immediate and long-term [terrorist] threat".

The sudden rise, though possibly explained by better data, will raise concern about the apparently growing appeal of extremism. The geographic spread of states touched by the phenomenon has expanded, too.

The report notes continuing problems with understanding the processes of radicalisation, but says, despite a concentration on the internet, social networks in conflict zones and western cities play a key role.

"Those who eat together and bond together can bomb together," the report says.

The report is the first from the UN to take a global view of the problem of "foreign terrorist fighters", and includes those in Afghanistan, Africa and other theatres as well as Syria and Iraq.

Officials described the estimate of numbers as conservative and said the true total may be more than 30,000. "The rate of flow is higher than ever and mainly focused on movement into the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, with a growing problem also evident in Libya," the report says.

The security council is meeting on Friday to discuss the problem of foreign terrorist fighters and potential measures to combat the threat.

The report comes amid a fierce debate over western strategies to counter Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In recent days, Isis has made significant advances in both countries despite months of air strikes, leading to criticism of the US president, Barack Obama, and decision-makers in the region.

The US senator John McCain attacked the president on Sunday for citing climate change as a threat to national security, suggesting that the Obama administration's focus on environmental issues was detracting from the fight against Isis.

Last week, the militant group seized the city of Ramadi, the capital of the predominantly Sunni Anbar province, its greatest victory in Iraq since its conquest of Mosul last summer and its declaration of a caliphate spanning swaths of Iraq and Syria.

The group also took control of the historic Syrian city of Palmyra and strategic gas fields nearby after a week-long siege that routed forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad. The victory has triggered a humanitarian crisis, due to the flight of thousands of residents.

A series of public statements by senior officials in Washington and the Middle East have highlighted disagreements between the US, Iraq and Iran.

Earlier this year, General James Clapper, the director of US national intelligence, told Congress that officials now believed that 3,400 citizens from western nations, including 150 from the US, had travelled to Iraq and Syria to join violent militant groups.

More than 700 British extremists are thought to have travelled to Syria - with about half returning to the LIK

The new report describes Iraq, Syria and Libya as a "veritable finishing school" for terrorists and mentions Tunisia, Morocco, France and the Russian federation as particularly vulnerable to future attacks due to the number of fighters from there.

"Those that have returned or will return to their states of origin or to third countries may pose a continuing threat to national and international security," the report said.

"Many may reintegrate, abandoning violence. Some have already gone on to organise further terrorist attacks and others will do so in the future."

In May 2014, a French veteran of the conflict in Syria launched an attack on a Jewish museum in Belgium. The killer of four people in a Jewish supermarket in Paris in January claimed to be from Islamic State though he was not a veteran of the conflict there. His wife had fled to Syria days before the attack.

Isis has repeatedly called on Muslims living in the west to mount "freelance" or "lone wolf" operations.

Alexander Evans, lead UN expert on al-Qaida and Isis, said there was a danger that the international community was becoming too focused on Syria, Iraq and Libya.

"The risk of people going and people returning is wider," Evans said.

Afghan security forces estimated in March 2015 that about 6,500 foreign terrorist fighters were active in Afghanistan, the report notes. Most were from groups based in neighbouring Pakistan, though 200 were with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and 150 with the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement which operates in south-west China.

There are fears of an upsurge in violence in Afghanistan as the US reduces its presence in the unstable state. Volunteers have travelled to conflict zones where Islamic militants are active from countries including Chile, Finland and the Maldives.

"We have spent a lot of time worrying about the countries which have generated hundreds or even thousands of fighters but [there are] countries which may have never faced a terrorist threat of this nature and which have law enforcement and security authorities which are grappling with what is a new problem for them," Evans said.

### Text 11

### The Washington Post, 2015

In 1938, Winston Churchill published "While England Slept," about Britain's failure to prepare for the Nazi threat.

Let's hope that, when the history of this moment is written, the 2015 State of the Union address will not be retold under the title "While America Slept."

Not since before the 2001 terrorist attacks has there been such a disconnect between the nation's focus and the condition of the world. As threats multiply in the Middle East and Europe, President Obama delivered on Tuesday night an annual message to Congress that was determinedly domestic. And his inward-looking gaze is shared by lawmakers and the public.

Thousands of foreign fighters have joined with Muslim extremists in Syria and Iraq, and their fanatical cause has inspired sympathizers across the globe: 17 killed by terrorists in Paris; terrorism raids and a shootout in Belgium; a hunt for sleeper cells across Europe; a gunman attacking the Canadian Parliament; an Ohio man arrested after buying guns and ammunition, allegedly with plans to attack the Capitol. Even Australia has raised its terrorist threat level.

And yet, when it comes to countering the terror threat in America, the State of the Union is nonchalant. "We are 15 years into this new century, 15 years that dawned with terror touching our shores," Obama said at the start of his speech. "It has been, and still is, a hard time for many. But tonight, we turn the page."

Obama, full of swagger, turned the page - several pages - from the start of his address, when he assured Americans that "the shadow of crisis has passed," before arriving at his discussion of national security.

He went 32 minutes, more than halfway through his speech, before mentioning the "challenges beyond our shores." He said that "we stand united with people around the world who've been targeted by terrorists, from a school in Pakistan to the streets of Paris." But he dwelled on the topic only long enough to say he'd "continue to hunt down terrorists and dismantle their networks" and "keep our country safe while strengthening privacy."

The proposals were decidedly domestic: Increasing the capital-gains tax, boosting cybersecurity, encouraging paid family and sick leave, reviving free-trade deals, and expanding access to broadband and community college. The guests seated in the first lady's box for the speech underscored the domestic emphasis.

The response to Obama's address, delivered by new Sen. Joni Ernst (R- Iowa), gave terrorism no more prominence than Obama did. Indeed, the new Republican Congress has been just as domestic in its emphasis. The House on Tuesday was passing a purely symbolic resolution condemning the attacks in Paris and was then preparing to move on to an anti-abortion bill, the "Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act." The Senate was working on passage of the Keystone XL pipeline, a priority for the new majority even though it has been made largely irrelevant for now by low oil prices.

Meanwhile, Republicans in both chambers are preparing for a showdown with Obama next month - and a possible shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security - as they attempt to de-fund his executive orders on immigration.

With national leaders averting their gaze from terrorism, only 2 percent of the American public says terrorism is the top problem facing the nation, according to a Gallup poll this month. That compares with 46 percent in October 2001, 19 percent in 2004, 8 percent in 2010 and 4 percent last year. Only 1 percent said the Islamic State is the top problem, and 2 percent cited national security generally - vs. 3 in 10 who cited economic issues.

At the same time, the administration's secrecy and misinformation regarding the National Security Agency's electronic eavesdropping methods have left the public skeptical about programs that will be vital to disrupting terrorism in the United States. A new NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that a small plurality of Americans thought such programs would go too far; until the past couple of years, Americans were more concerned such efforts wouldn't go far enough.

The fight against terrorism got its mention, and Obama called on Congress to authorize continuing military strikes against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. But both had small roles in the speech.

Obama was livelier, and downright cocky, in the domestic portion of his address, speaking conversationally as he recited gains in the economy and health care and departing from his prepared text to proclaim, "This is good news, people." Later, he broke from the text again to taunt Republicans by reminding them of the outcome of his presidential campaigns: "I won both."

If - God forbid - terrorists do here what they did in Paris and attempted in Brussels, the State of the Union in 2015 will be remembered as complacent.

#### Text 12

### The Times, 2015

Jihadists returning from Syria or Iraq will be automatically imprisoned and converts to radical Islam will be electronically tagged if identified as a security threat, under anti-terrorism measures tabled in Belgium yesterday. Charles Michel, the prime minister, announced a far-reaching response to the Paris attacks after a week when the role of Belgian jihadists in organising the massacres has been revealed.

"The law must be clear. For returning jihadists, their place is in prison," he told the Belgian parliament. "For other people identified as a threat by the services, they will wear an electronic tag to ensure public security."

Ushering in a new era of surveillance and restrictions, Mr Michel proposed an 18-point anti-terrorist programme that would make Belgium the toughest European country on Islamists.

"The risk before us is the collapse of the entire European project if we don't take our responsibilities," he said. "This is a new page in the history of Europe that is now turning."

As he was speaking to MPs, police carried out raids across Brussels, arresting seven people said to be connected to one of the suicide bombers or suspected of involvement in the attacks.

The new laws could lead to hundreds of Islamists being jailed or forced to wear electronic bracelets that monitor and restrict their movements. Belgium has produced more than 500 jihadists who have gone to fight in Syria, more than any other European country, both in terms of the absolute number or as relative figure measured per capita of the population.

New figures showed that there were 500 people on the "Syrian list" - regarded as potential or actual foreign fighters - in Brussels alone.

Mr Michel hopes that the measures will catch future Islamists before they conspire to carry out attacks.

Abdelhamid Abaaoud and his fellow Paris attackers, Bilal Hadfi and the Abdeslam brothers, were all known to the police or were on the Syrian list before the attacks. Under the proposed legislation they could have been tagged or imprisoned. Other new measures include a ban on the anonymous sale of prepaid mobile phone SIM cards and restrictions on preaching at mosques by radical imams.

A constitutional law that prevents the police from carrying out raids between 9pm and 5am will be repealed and the detention period without charge for terrorist suspects will be extended from 24 hours to 72 hours. To carry out the new measures, police will be given additional funding of (EURO)400 million (£280 million). Mr Michel praised Belgium's state security services for their part in breaking up the "Franco-Belgian cells". According to officials it was Belgian security services that provided telephone intercepts to France on Wednesday night confirming that Abaaoud was in the Paris flat where he was later killed.

#### Text 13

### The Sydney Morning Herald, 2019

Most of the children of Islamic State members who are over eight years old had already been indoctrinated and given military training to become "cubs of the caliphate," according to the Kurdish authorities in Syria. The warning comes as Prime Minister Scott Morrison appeared to soften his stance in relation to the children of Australians living under IS, saying he is willing to allow the orphaned children of Australia's most infamous terrorist to return home. "Where there are Australians who are caught up in this situation particularly as innocent children, we will do what I think Australians would expect us to do on their behalf," he said yesterday.

The head of foreign affairs for the Kurdish administration, Abdulkarim Omar, told the Herald from Syria this week that his group was "doing our best to encourage the international community to take responsibility" for the thousands of children of foreign IS fighters.

"If we don't rehabilitate those kids, they will become time bombs and will go back to their countries as terrorists who carry out attacks," he said.

Mr Omar's warning highlights the high stakes for the Morrison government as it works on a solution to the plight of the Australian children trapped in Syria because of the actions of their parents.

Hoda Sharrouf, the 16-year-old daughter of infamous terrorist Khaled Sharrouf, has begged that she and her siblings be allowed to return home, saying she is worried about the health of her pregnant sister. Two other young Australian women, both with children and also pregnant, have made similar calls.

Mr Morrison reiterated that, "I'm not going to put any Australian life at risk to extract people from these conflict zones. But where there are Australians who are caught up in this situation particularly as innocent children, we will do what I think Australians would expect us to do on their behalf."

The Prime Minister offered few details of what that would mean, but said the Red Cross was working to get the children into a position where they could return. He said "normal assessments" would have to be done, including formal identification and checking citizenship.

It's understood the process to formally identify and repatriate the women and children could take from a few days to several weeks.

Australian Red Cross chief executive Judy Slatyer did not confirm they were working with the government on a plan to repatriate children, but said her organisation held "grave concerns" for children in camps inside Syria. "We can confirm that the International Committee of Red Cross has access to the al-Hawl camp in Syria and provides information on the humanitarian situation there," she said.

But Mr Omar suggested that they could only return children "when the Australian government contacts us". Speaking from her tent at the edge of the al-Hawl camp, the 16-year-old Hoda Sharrouf said this week she just wanted her pregnant, depressed and injured 17-year-old sister Zaynab and her eight-year-old brother Hamzeh to be safe.

"I want to see my brother grow up as a normal kid," Hoda said.

Shayma Assaad, from the NSW Central Coast, the wife of IS member Mohammed Noor Masri, and Kirsty Rosse-Emile from Melbourne, who are both pregnant, also pleaded with the Morrison government to bring their families home. All are Australian citizens.

# Text 14 The New York Times, 2019

Four years ago, a sympathizer of the Islamic State told me that the group's caliphate was hardier than believed and would survive near-total loss of territorial control. "So long as there is one street in one village where the caliph carries out Islamic law," he told me, "the dawla will be legitimate." ("Dawla" means state in Arabic.) All Muslims would remain obliged to travel there, he said. (It would be one very crowded street.) No rival caliph could challenge Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State's leader, as long as he ruled this alley and did it according to Islam.

Last week, the caliphate finally dwindled down to that one alley, and on Saturday it vanished entirely.

The Syrian Democratic Forces sacked the Islamic State's last minuscule barrio in the town of Baghuz, in eastern Syria, after a weekslong siege. "One street in one village" may overstate the size of that last patch. In recent video attributed to the Islamic State, apparently from just days ago, the area looked like a small junkyard defended by vagrants. Several years back, the Islamic State circulated videos of its fighters living among swimming pools and well-stocked shops. In the junkyard videos, it looked as if no one had bathed for weeks. Many of the inhabitants hobbled around on crutches, and some of the few working vehicles were wheelchairs.

To see the Islamic State reduced to these indignities is a pleasure worth savoring. Now that we've savored it, though, it is time to confront the threat that remains -- which is not merely, as President Trump claimed this weekend, "losers" who will "resurface" "on occasion." It is a systemic threat.

More than 40,000 foreigners are thought to have traveled to territory controlled by the Islamic State, and most are missing. David Malet, a political scientist at American University who studies foreign fighters, told me recently that when such combatants have traveled to war zones in the past, they have died at a rate of about one-third. Even if we assume that, say, half of the Islamic State's foreigner fighters are dead -- after all, many joined the group to die -- that leaves about 20,000 alive.

We have little idea where they are and seriously undercounted them in Baghuz. In recent weeks, Islamic State fighters and civilians have emerged from the town as if from a clown car, disgorged in ever more

unbelievable numbers. The most astonishing sight over the past week may have been a video showing fighters who had surrendered, preferring captivity to martyrdom, in a line stretching more than 250 men long. Yet many more fighters may be hiding in the countryside than have turned themselves over or died in Baghuz.

The Islamic State has had years to prepare for this moment and for some time had signaled that it was resigned to eventually losing some or all of its territory. By May 2016, its spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, was telling followers abroad not to bother traveling to Syria.

"If one of you wishes and strives to reach the lands of the Islamic State, then each of us wishes to be in your place to make examples of the crusaders, day and night, scaring them and terrorizing them, until every neighbour fears his neighbour," he said in an audio message. Since then, some sympathizers had stayed in the shrinking caliphate, while others stayed abroad or slunk out of the doomed territory to perpetuate the group's ideals and re-spawn it elsewhere.

To see how slinking is done right, they needed only look to their forefathers. The founders of the Islamic State consisted of Qaeda veterans who escaped destruction by the American military and Sunni tribes in Iraq. Tactical retreat served them well, and the Islamic State has not lost the institutional wisdom that allowed those men to survive and then recapture territory, first slowly, then in 2014 all at once. They succeeded by positioning themselves as guardians of Sunnis who did not trust the Shiite-led government in Baghdad or the Alawite-led one in Damascus. Neither Iraq nor Syria has restored Sunnis' trust.

Of the more than 40,000 foreigners who joined the Islamic State, several thousand have returned to their home countries -- not always to face prosecution. Some pessimists worry that these returnees constitute a fifth column, outwardly rehabilitated but secretly ready to attack on command. History suggests that our concerns should not be so narrow.

The danger comes not just from plotters but also from their ideas. The spread of Islamic State ideology long predated the declaration of a caliphate, and it happened quietly, through the efforts of remarkably few individuals. Returnees from jihad do not always fight again, but their passion can infect others. Arab veterans of the Afghan war in the 1980s influenced the generation that fought in Iraq. The number of returnees from the Islamic State now may dwarf them.

In a few years, even some of those convicted of terrorist offenses will be free again. (Remember, Europeans tend not to lock up people for as long as Americans do.) Consider John Walker Lindh, the American who fought for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and was sentenced to 20 years in federal prison in 2002. He is scheduled for release in May and appears to have remained a devout extremist. Such ideas do not reliably dissolve with time. They sometimes become more concentrated. Prepare for a new wave of true believers, recruited by the old.

The Islamic State is like herpes: It can be managed but never cured. Syria is scabbing over, and it might begin to heal. Elsewhere, though, the condition is dormant at best. It will break out again.

# Text 15 The Times, 2019

Western countries are scrambling to figure out what to do with thousands of their citizens who joined the Islamic State, as the militant group loses the last of its territory in Syria and a U.S. military pullout puts pressure on the camps where many have been living.

In public, many countries appear to be doing their best to avoid taking back former fighters and their families. Although President Trump has insisted Europe repatriate its fighters, the United States is contesting the citizenship of a New Jersey-born woman who wants to return home. Britain said it was stripping the citizenship of a 19-year-old from London who fled four years ago to become an "ISIS bride." Belgium is appealing a court order that it repatriate six children and their Islamic State mothers.

But some governments have begun quietly exploring what would be involved in retrieving their nationals. Even when the political will is there, officials are confronting a thorn-studded array of diplomatic and practical issues. Here are a few.

The problem of negotiating with the Kurds. Many of the former Islamic State sympathizers are in prison or refugee camps in northeastern Syria operated by Syrian Democratic Forces, a militia dominated by Kurds. But the militia isn't an internationally recognized authority. And negotiating with the Kurds is a sure way to anger Turkey, which fears Kurdish separatism inside its borders and doesn't like other countries giving Kurds legitimacy. So countries have to keep their discussions with Kurdish forces inside Syria quiet.

The problem of transit through Turkey Because Turkey doesn't like the Kurds and doesn't recognize Kurdish authorities, governments can't bring their citizens directly into Turkey from Kurdish-controlled Syria. Even with foreign military or diplomats serving as escorts, Turkey would resist. It's still possible for people to be smuggled into Turkey. But national governments can't contract with smugglers. And there would need to be an extradition process from Turkey to the fighters' home countries. Could enough money be channeled toward Ankara to solve the problem? Sometimes money can lubricate diplomacy - but then European and U.S. leaders would face the politically unpalatable prospect of paying significant sums to bring back their citizens.

The problem of transit through Iraq. The other obvious route out of northeastern Syria would be through Iraq. That's the route Russia has opted for, organizing flights to Chechnya for women and children from the Islamic State. The repatriations were initiated by Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov - and have drawn praise from human rights advocates who typically criticize Kadyrov for his violent approach to political opponents, gays and lesbians, journalists and others who don't fit with his vision for the autonomous Chechen Republic in Russia. "Russia has actually been proactive about approaching Iraqi authorities," said Gina Vale of the London-based International Center for the Study of Radicalization.

But European officials say transporting their nationals through Iraq would raise a whole set of issues. They say Kurdish authorities in Syria and Kurdish authorities in Iraq don't work very well with each other, so there would be practical challenges. Additionally, while the Iraqi government may have been okay with a couple dozen Russian citizens, it is not super enthusiastic about thousands of people who are potentially still radicalized coming over the border. A further issue for European countries is that Iraq has the death penalty, and the European Union, which bans the practice, has strict rules about exposing its citizens to charges in foreign countries where capital punishment is a possible penalty.

The problem of talking to Assad Some governments are contemplating discussions with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, according to officials familiar with the conversations. That would be a little awkward, since Assad is on the other side of the fight and Western nations blame him for an eight-year conflict that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions. Still, he has declared himself an opponent of the Islamic State, and it's possible that he would allow the former caliphate residents out of Syria - for a price.

But how do Western countries, most of whom have cut off diplomatic relations with Syria, even carry out a conversation with Assad? How can they guarantee the safety of their citizens in and out of the conflict zone? Journalists and aid workers have been able to get in and out of the camps in the Kurdish-controlled northeast of Syria, but official delegations face diplomatic barriers, and trickier consequences, when they cross frontiers without permissions.

The problem of holding people accountable One of the greatest fears among European leaders is that they will repatriate people who pose a security threat, only to find that prosecutors don't have enough evidence to convict and imprison them. Distinguishing who fought for the Islamic State and who was merely a bystander may be difficult in many cases.

Kurdish officials have said they don't have the resources to conduct trials in their camps. Some European leaders favor establishing an international tribunal on the ground in Syria or Iraq. Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel has called for such a court and plans to discuss it with fellow heads of state this weekend at a summit of E.U. and African leaders in Egypt. Belgian officials suggested that the U.S. decision publicized Thursday to leave a skeleton force of troops in northeastern Syria might help support international trials. But whose law would apply? U.S. penalties for membership in the Islamic State, for instance, are far steeper than in Belgium, which imposes only a five-year prison sentence.

Some Belgian officials are privately skeptical of the idea of a tribunal, saying it might be more of a delaying tactic on the part of their leadership than a realistic proposal. And there would still be the question of where people would go once they were convicted or released.

### Text 16

### The Guardian, 2019

When the Australian terrorist Khaled Sharrouf proudly posted a photo of his young son holding the severed head of a murdered Syrian solider in 2014, it seemed to confirm the world's worst fears about the children of Islamic State.

Along with the caption "That's my boy!", Sharrouf's photo demonstrated - in the most shocking way possible - how children living with Isis were being exposed to a world of almost unimaginable barbarity.

That world has largely crumbled. Isis has lost its territory and thousands of foreign fighters and their families have fled, landing in displacement camps run by Kurdish authorities. Governments of these nationals are scrambling to deal with them - how to get them home, if they even should, and what to do about them when it happens.

The picture of Sharrouf's son was part of an image the regime cultivated. Beyond the use of children as frontline soldiers and suicide bombers, sleek propaganda produced during the height of its power put religious violence at the centre of what it called its education system.

Textbooks produced by the regime showed chemistry lessons detailing the different ways gases can be consumed, arithmetic was taught by counting bullets, and children played games of "hide and seek" in the ruins of buildings.

"This was a cult, in our view," Robert Van Aalst, a lawyer and friend of the Sharrouf children's maternal grandmother, Karen Nettleton, tells Guardian Australia. "And this cult was very adept at convincing people to join them on religious grounds."

The extent to which the regime operated a functioning education system has been called into question. In 2017 Foreign Affairs magazine interviewed dozens of teachers from former Isis-controlled territories.

According to FA, the textbooks produced online for global consumption were, in reality, much harder to get hold of. School infrastructure was viewed as a low priority by the regime, and class attendance was low. Still, though, the crude ways in which children were exposed by to fundamentalist Islam and extreme violence has created a perplexing problem since the regime crumbled: what to do with those children now? It's estimated Australia has at least 50 young citizens living in camps like al-Hawl in northern Syria, populated by former Isis foreign fighters and their families. Last week the Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, announced that a group of Australian children caught up in the Syrian war after their parents joined Isis have been spirited out of the country.

This cult was very adept at convincing people to join them on religious grounds.

Robert Van Aalst, Karen Nettleton's lawyer

The group includes six members of Sharrouf's family: his 17-year-old daughter, Zaynab, her three children - including a baby born just days ago - her younger teenage sister, Hoda, and their brother, Hamzeh - who is under 10.

Three others are the children of the foreign fighter Yasin Rizvic and his wife, Fauzia Khamal Bacha, who joined Isis in 2014.

It is the first instance of Australian children of foreign fighters being rescued from the northern Syrian camps, and Morrison said the decision to repatriate the children had not been made "lightly".

"As I have said repeatedly, my government would not allow any Australian to be put at risk," he said. "The fact that parents put their children into harm's way by taking them into a war zone was a despicable act. However, children should not be punished for the crimes of their parents."

But the question of how to reintegrate the children of Isis fighters into mainstream society will loom large upon their return, possibly as early as next week.

Over the last decade, deradicalisation programs have become a stable part of counter-terrorism measures in western countries. But identifying and dealing with potential radicalisation - particularly for young people who may have been exposed to extreme trauma - is challenging.

The federal MP and counter-terrorism expert Anne Aly says deradicalisation is mishandled in the way it is discussed, as though it is a "magical pill" to re-educate someone - when really it is helping someone reintegrate into society, helping kids to be kids again.

"Things like getting them schooling, psychological counselling for the trauma of being taken over there, doing PTSD assessments," she says. "Think of all the things children learn from zero to 13 years old. It's not just your ABCs and your maths. They also learn how to be. They learn how to love, how to have relationships."

The materials produced by IS portrayed it as a heavenly state run by sharia law... the reality was it was brutal and nasty.

Aly says Australia will have to bring together a range of experts in different fields to assess and support the children. "The fact is we haven't really been tested on this."

Prof Geoff Dean, a criminologist who focuses on terrorism and extremism from Griffith University in Queensland, says part of the challenge is unpicking to what extent children may have bought into a radical ideology. "You're trying to assess the extent to which those ideas have been indoctrinated," he says.

"Because all the propaganda, the materials produced by IS portrayed it as a heavenly state run by sharia law where everything was thing wonderful and blah, blah, blah.

"We know that was just rubbish - the reality was it was brutal and nasty. It doesn't take much for a relatively normal child to see that what the propaganda says and what the reality is, is very different."

Dr Clarke Jones, a criminologist from the Australian National University's school of psychology, says while re-educating children returning from conflict zones is necessary it has to be delivered in a "nurturing" environment.

"The deradicalisation path can actually contribute to or compound issues for kids who might be already down that path if it isn't delivered intelligently," he says. Jones says the better option is to use normal support services placed within a circle of care that is nurturing, which is sensitive and is delivered with religious and cultural sensitivities in mind.

According to Van Aalst, the worry about deradicalizing families returning from former Isis territory is "blown out of proportion".

The primary concern for the children and their mothers will be post-traumatic stress disorder counselling, he says. In the case of the Sharrouf children, he says, none of them have ever expressed anything to suggest they've been radicalised.

"A lot of these kids had no choice in this," he tells Guardian Australia. "Their father was radical. But people have to understand how [the radicals] operated. Sharrouf and his cohort would never include the women in what they discussed."

After the five years he has spent helping Nettleton get her family home, Van Aalst suggests the women who travelled with their husbands to Isis territories are victims almost as much as the children.

"They were brought over with a view to having children," he says. "A prime example is poor Zaynab, brought over there and pregnant by the age of 13. When her husband was killed her father found a new husband for her and she became pregnant to that person.

"I don't necessarily expect the young women to realise this until they're home and have counselling - that it is not the norm what those young women have gone through."

# Gender perspective

# Concordance lines

# Female concordances

- 1 State supporters in Syria and Iraq, including 113 females. A further 84 had been killed, more
- 2 ted into the 70,000 strong SDF, which is also 35% female, and politicians claim that there is
- 3 bout 500 European women among the estimated 4,761 female foreign fighters who joined Isis
- 4 r and convicted Isis member, was radicalised by a female Australian fighter in Syria. How to
- 5 a girlfriend and didn't wanna come." Jones led a female battalion of foreign fighters whose

6 istedas a key figure in the Al Khanssa brigade, a female brigade in Raqqa that enforces an 7 red in an IED attack that killed his driver and a female colleague, Asiya Jeelani. Two years red in an IED attack that killed his driver and a female colleague, Asiya Jeelani. Two years 8 ack in the UK. When he visited Rojava, Dirk met a female commander who told him that Anna slamic State's dictates are routinely murdered. A female doctor who participated in a strike 10 11 le. In a WhatsApp message in August, Nahin told a female friend, "I have like 10 days guardin, n t monthprevious spread: magnum photosMembers of a female Isis brigade in an image posted 12 on itled Becoming Mulan (a reference to a tweet by a female Isis supporter) found that rather 13 14 ou purposely choose to make your central figure a female journalist, Anna Rosen, to balance out Life under Daesh is a nightmare each day," said a female math teacher who lives in Mosul, 15 using 16 rit one-third of what a man can? Why is it that a female Muslim's testimony in court is worth t, the way we are raised in America -- to injure a female or injure a child or in the worse case, 17 18 le or injure a child or in the worse case, kill a female or kill a child." They could not 19 e is a a key figure in the al-Khanssaa brigade, a female outfit established by Isis in Ragga to under the name Charisse Redouane lists her as a" female personal assistant" with 18 years' 20 21 e interpretation of Sharia law. In some places, a female police force is deployed to enforce 22 fied him as the gunman in the fatal shooting of a female police officer in a Paris suburb on 23 A female suicide bomber attacked a police 24 ises of support from readers. The post inspired a female supporter to ask: "What essentials, and 25 lers dispatched their victims at Charlie Hebdo. A female survivor told how one killer told her 26 lers dispatched their victims at Charlie Hebdo. A female survivor told how one killer told her 27 stly from ethnic minority backgrounds. One told a female ticket inspector: "All white women are three days." Video of the Tuesday raid captured a female voice pleading, "I want to leave" and 28 29 supportive attitudes- whether to violence against females or males -than young women, and that 30 . Jones, a former singer and guitarist in an all-female 1990s punk band called Krunch, was born dish people's protection units (YPG) and its all- female affiliate the YPJ. Turkey launched its 31 32 Kurdish Women's Protection Units (YPJ)- the all- female affiliate army of the People's 33 punk scene she sang and played guitar in an all- female band called Krunch. A video of her as attached to YPJ International, a separate all- female battalion of foreign fighters. "Anna 34 35 our head with my shoes" if a doctor was late. All female dentists were prohibited from treating e was particularly attracted to the YPJ, the all- female fighting force that is the sister group 36

shop said. She said some women were joining "all- female groupings which impose Da'ish's a handful of British women fighting with the all- female Kurdish women's protection units for two months with the Khansaa Brigade, the all- female morality police of the Islamic State, two months with the Al-Khansaa Brigade, the all- female morality police of Islamic State, ctly; and a former member of Islamic state's all- female police. Both escaped to turkeyIsis astern province of Deir ez-Zor, describes an all- female police force formed by Isis in his nment fears some have signed up to notorious all- female religious police units formed to Those judged to have been members of isis's all- female religious police unit, the al-Khansaa errorist attack on the Brit-ish Museum by an all-female terrorist cell was foiled in 2017, and . Some are going to fight, or serve with the all- female units set up by Islamic State, while and had been Kurdish women from the YPJ, the all- female units fighting as part of the SDF. h Ms Taylor is now known in the ranks of the all- female YPJ (Kurdish Women's Protection ndoned it because "Islamically, that is allowed". Female foreign fighters want you to believe the woman behind a Twitter account popular among female Islamic State supporters across oratory religious identity, mostly observed among female and younger age groups who want es of Abdullah on Facebook show him with male and female friends. In one photograph from rust in defence. There are more than 170 male and female officers at the rank of general across men are obligated to wear full Islamic dress, and female students from age 10 must cover their lead in bringing home all its citizens, male and female, to face justice. Those involved in articularly visible in the country's male YPG and female YPJ militias, key components of the logical attributes such as, 'you are gay, you are female, you are male, you are this that and Saeed saw a small group of what she described as" female captives", Yazidi and Kurdish n the press these women are often referred to as" female fighters", but that is a misnomer, n the press these women are often referred to as" female fighters", but that is a misnomer, in public schools, is a grievance used to attract female jihadists. The French government, ate commits horrific abuse on women, yet attracts female recruits The image of Islamic State en made to feel like that; there should have been female officers there to deal with her. t on a Facebook page for a private group. "Being female and uncovered is a problem that I ed, the case of Tareena Shakil, the first British female IS supporter to be convicted, serves as when you look at the comment that another British female jihadi, Umm Farriss, wrote recently

37

38 (YPJ)

39

40

42

43

44

45

46

47

48 Unit), 49

50

the

51 the

52 last

53

54

55

56

57

58 women

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66 on

which

"One

when 41

sick

when you look at the comment that another British female jihadi, Umm Farriss, wrote recently 67 on de vest attacks in the past few days have been by females," he added. At another nearby 68 trauma de vest attacks in the past few days have been by females," he added. At another nearby 69 trauma ting worse. This week a riot broke out, driven by female IS hardliners who now appear to be 70 ill choose one." Prospective wives are advised by female jihadis to "bring something nice to 71 72 ill choose one." Prospective wives are advised by female jihadis to "bring something nice to 73 of foreign fighters arrived to support the cause. Female militants from other countries were 74 me yesterday, which also heard how deradicalising female Isis recruits would be key to avoiding le to cope with the unusual situation, especially female doctors and nurses who had to wear a 75 76 aid she was responsible for training all European female recruits in tactics including suicide 77 ecifically about Ms. Muthana and Ms. Begum, every female friend replied that both women should ted anti-radicalisation programs and had excluded female teachers from participating in some 78 79 eir feelings about extremist groups, might expect female visitors to cover their hair. One 80 rifle at her side, as she waited with her fellow female fighters to move forward from a staging Abu Mohammed notes that the killing of the first female activist -Iman al-Halabi -came in 81 2013. her husband in Syria has become Australia's first female fatality in the deadly conflict, after 82 83 her husband in Syria has become Australia's first female fatality in the deadly conflict, after 84 he triggered her suicide vest, becoming the first female suicide bomber in western Europe. She 85 uring the raid Wednesday, becoming Europe's first female suicide bomber. She did not talk to 86 on the ISIS ideology is [an] empowering role for females," the report says. The report also 87 jihadi conflicts. The average age was 25 and, for female recruits, it was 22. Almost one-fifth 88 tes later with two veiled muhajirat- Isis foreign females -and two children. "Here are two 89 sul. Iraqi forces who pulled 20 suspected foreign female fighters out of tunnels under the last 90 s before she volunteered to be one of two foreign female fighters to defend Afrin. Asmin, her ry marriage for the pleasure of fighters. Foreign females have not migrated to Islamic State 91 92 , Libya, Turkey and Canada. The status of foreign female survivors is especially complex: Isis 93 orted by allegations from two of Burston's former female staffers. Burston told Guardian days ago in which the dust-covered bodies of four female Isis suicide bombers, apparently 94 killed 95 Koran as justification. In the midst of the hell, female foreigners poured in to Syria and Iraq viding material support. This is why high-profile female Islamic State recruiters and 96

Isis hisbah (religious police) in a room with his female colleague correcting students' final s notes. The penalty was that he had to marry his female colleague or get 30 lashes. The ce will allege Mr Atai was the "procurer" and his female friend, who cannot be named, was their flights. Nahin was still asking one of his female online friends. "Do u know anyone who whose faces they know. Under Isis rule, however, female activists have found it easier to 025. Merkel, perhaps the globe's most influential female leader, also announced that she auds a medieval-style system of institutionalised female slavery under the caliphate: "We will has enslaved and brutalised women, and introduced female police to persecute their own sex. o France. "Tooba Gondal is a very notorious ISIS female recruiter, but until recently she to France. "Tooba Gondal is a very notorious ISIS female recruiter, but until recently she t the owner stopped me, and a woman from the Isis female security forces took me to their despite the terrorist group's cruelty towards its female prisoners. Foreign Minister Julie luding several women, have joined the YPG and its female wing since 2014. Eight have been s bodyguards introduced me, saying, 'The Japanese female journalist is here', he would joke: e trying to expose the harms of honour killings, - female genital mutilation and forced marriage r. At 11 am on Wednesday, not long after the last female suicide bomber had walked up the ittle issues like anti-Semitism, forced marriage, female circumcision, honour killings and bout whether gender and the party's push for more female talent will be a factor in the contest, bout whether gender and the party's push for more female talent will be a factor in the contest, that women are only cheerleaders of such murders. Female members may tweet about practising y couldn't forgive the male fighters and asked my female Syrian friends about Ms. Muthana, ered by Anna are based on the reminiscences of my female colleagues. We are not like that en buried by Islamic State and discarded by naive female volunteers from abroad. But their d, but the woman could not be searched because no female security guard was present, the alysis One in seven Islamic State recruits is now female, drawn to war zones not Just by ard because of everything I've been through now." Female fighters pose a particular challenge c" life, is repackaged as the ultimate example of female agency, says Havlicek. Men and women, es. By accepting institutionalised persecution of females by Islamic State, the feminist Washington, has compiled a list of 1,074 names of female captives reported by their relatives edia outreach and recruitment drives. A number of female converts who have joined the

97

98

99

the 100

101 move 102

would 103

104

Why 105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

114

115

116

117

Ms.

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

Islamic

to 126

steps, 113

127 called Dangerous Woman. It includes an anthem of female empowerment, albeit one that celebrates 128 ecruits. By trawling the social media accounts of female IS members, the study's authors 129 radicalisation. They also point to the potency of female-specific IS propaganda, which takes the 130 nts. They also recommended boosting the number of female mentors and caseworkers assisting c and released by al-Khansaa, an armed brigade of female morality police, the treatise 131 endorses 132 ne takes kindly to it. Each team has a handful of female officers on hand to examine the phones 133 ave been given a quasi-fighter role as members of female police brigades that enforce the 134 an government was expected to release a number of female prisoners as demanded by the rebels in 135 s about their lives. Instead, the model is one of female subservience and virtual imprisonment 136 n the Old City on June 22, involving two waves of female suicide attackers hidden among escaping 137 was told there was no such fatwa. A few of my old female patients were begging me to examine nce of the caliphate, Fatima Sadiqi, an expert on female jihadists at the University of Fez in 138 139 he said. He became determined to escape when one female prisoner died after being raped. Female 140 m, but I apologised. I can't forget when the only female anaesthetist in the hospital quit her 141 hin the reach of our law, whether they're male or female, they will face the full severity of 142 women, noting that there is a lack of persuasive female voices reaching these women. Read more: when one female prisoner died after being raped. Female members of his family were, he 143 said, 144 stralian fighter in Syria. How to treat returning female fighters is vexing European 145 widow, had become one of the group's most senior females, given the job of indoctrinating other 146 also identifies increasing negativity among some female IS members, which contradicts the IS 147 erged that members of Britain's biggest suspected female terrorist cell are among up to 80 148 shment. Western governments show little sympathy. Female suicide bombers are hardly a rarity. shment. Western governments show little sympathy. Female suicide bombers are hardly a 149 rarity. 150 es accompanied by their mothers. About 900 Syrian female relatives and children of Islamic State 151 es accompanied by their mothers. About 900 Syrian female relatives and children of Islamic State 152 carry out violent acts on British soil, hope that female family members will curb the numbers of ing to marry jihadists, and in Iraq, decreed that female genital mutilation should be performed 153 154 ist brides who have escaped Isis have warned that female recruits are at risk of rape and are 155 2014 issue of their publication Dabiq, said that female Yazidis had been given to fighters 156 od Mahmood, who went to Syria in 2013 to join the female al-Khanssaa brigade, is included

on the

157	whim of the local Hisbah. The women regarded the female branch of Hisbah, the al-Khansaa
158	GMT Labor's second set of questions is about the female facilities and water safety stream
159 describii	who was identified as Umm Basir al-Muhajirah (the Female Immigrant), was quoted as
160	This is not what life is like for muhajireen, the female -jihadists who have joined IS †It is
161	"Read full article 'Hell is never far away': the female medic risking her life for Aleppo 2
162	efector who used the pseudonym 'Abu Nasir'. "The[ female morality police] are in charge of
163	I could hear them cheering in the corridor." The female prisoners submitted to being raped
164	: "It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn't reached puberty if she
165	s' school, which has yet to recruit even half the female staff it needs to open. Eight in ten
166 167	s' school, which has yet to recruit even half the female staff it needs to open. Military d for her fighting skills. One of the reasons the female terrorist phenomenon is so confusing is
168	g. "Perhaps the most important risk is that these female migrants [to Islamic State] can inspire
169	ammunition from a cache, and give orders to these female suicide bombers. "Everyone was
going 170	d Zoroastrian temples to pray in, there are three female vice-presidents in the government, the
171 sometim 172	as before." Graphic ANTHONY LOYD FOR THE TIMESThe female YPJ units are ness the first  Among the children could be at least 730 born to female foreign fighters during the existence
173 the	g it was oversubscribed. Colbeck then moved on to female facilities and water safety -noting
174	s followers carried out mass crucifixions, turned female captives into sex slaves and gleefully
175 woman's	this," she said, pointing disapprovingly at two female aid workers wearing pants. The
woman's 176 woman's	e this," she said, pointing disapprovingly at two female aid workers wearing pants. The
177	ses have been emphatic that they saw at least two female militants, armed to the teeth and
178	lidate its territorial gains. Never underestimate female jihadis' devotion to terror and talent
179	the suspended Twitter account of an unidentified female friend and associate of Layth's reads:
180	the suspended Twitter account of an unidentified female friend and associate of Layth's reads:
181	e fighters are permitted to come to the unmarried females' hostel, meet the women and ask
them 182	ed as carefully, the Islamic State has been using female suicide bombers. Three members of a
CTS 183	ed as carefully, the Islamic State has been using female suicide bombers. Three members of a
CTS 184	n of Arab women. El Saadawi has opposed the veil, female genital mutilation and has been an
185	office, where Danish journalists and two visiting female Syrian activists were staying, the men
186	le were teenagers, of whom more than a third were, female. The report, co-authored by security

repatriated foreign fighters, especially Western female foreign fighters, and having them tried ith multiple murders, riots and no-go areas where female members from al-Hisbah, Islamic London Bridge. Four burka-clad women and a white female Muslim convert were among London Bridge. Four burka-clad women and a white female Muslim convert were among g around or with children. Nahin's messaging with female friends sounds like flirtatious nt to Syria last October, allegedly to fight with female Kurdish militants against Islamic terrorism would be Israel, which has to deal with female suicide bombers," the source said.

Renas had heard her commanders were withdrawing female fighters for their safety. "When I g "there would have been no Islamic State without female recruits". Now, she argued, women hingtonThe writer, co-author of "Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars," is an he is dead," Bashir said. So is Nurta, the young female assassin. Her involvement with the ms to be why it was her concert and (mostly young female) fans that were targeted, rather ive recruits can identify with the chatty, young, female jihadists, many of whom post messages authorities about "an increasi-ng number of young female-s" meeting up with their foreign

# Woman\* concordances

N

187

188

State's 189

those 190

those 191

192

193

194

told 195

196

197

198

than, 199

200

rently providing humanitarian assistance to 1,300 women and children from around 20 2 attracted about 160 people, including at least 10 women and 15 children. One of the videos 3 re being held. He said he had seen as many as 100 women and children who had been taken into blr and Ask.fm, the researchers monitor about 100 women from 15 countries who they believe are s, leaving at least 200 Tunisian children and 100 women marooned in Syria and Libya, according he back of revelations on Friday that at least 12 women, some as young as 18, have travelled 7 S followers being held in Syria, including 12,000 women and children. That number does not ng for the possibility that some or all of the 20 women and 47 children might find their way 8 been effective: tells the story of a 20-year-old woman from Scotland who left home to marry In January last year Anna Campbell, a 26-year-old woman from East Sussex, confided in her 10 diary surveillance of Hasna Aitboulahcen, a 26-year-old woman linked to Abaaoud who would 11 eventually independent commissioners claimed at least 3,200 women and children were still being held 12 by 13 present, or how many votes they got. There are 30 women among the winners. Sana reported earlier 14 back their citizens. Russia repatriated about 35 women and children, and Indonesia took back

15	n dance costumes. Yazidis have reported that 3500 women and girls are being held captive by
16 and	performed on women between the ages of 11 and 46. Women and girls from minority ethnic
17	those joining the Al-Khansaa Brigade. Roughly 50 women took the 15-day weapons course at
once; 18	gn fighters and migrants, including more than 550 women. The disappearance of the girls,
19	fter the and the led to and, home to about 60,000 women and children with links to Isis.
20 Symian	number of IS detainees is about 800 fighters, 600 women and 1200 children, according to
Syrian 21 whom	r, the camp was flooded with an unexpected 64,000 women and children, the vast majority of
22 23	n to emerge. One of the victims was a 65-year-old woman from Neuss, a city in North uld end up escaping. It also has more than 70,000 women and children held in camps in the
24	s are being held in prisons, along with about 700 women and 1,500 children in camps for
25 what	nce from," Agent Hart told the court. "Often is a woman allowed to pluck her eyebrows? To
26 27	A woman and her children were retrieved from a tried to force him to fight, she dressed him as a woman and fled, but Kurdish forces arrested
28	fixion of 17 young men, the stoning to death of a woman and the execution of 13 teenage boys
in 29 could be	d it was inappropriate to suggest the murder of a woman and her children by her husband
30	disclose if he had been questioned or detained. A woman at his home address in Slough said
that 31 that	disclose if he had been questioned or detained. A woman at his home address in Slough said
32 the	repeatedly lauded Mr Johnston since his death. A woman called Kader Kandandir, who runs
33	ly thought she was a suicide bomber." Last week a woman carrying a baby blew herself up
among 34	re allowed to return to their homes. On Friday, a woman deported by Turkey was detained
upon 35	re allowed to return to their homes. On Friday, a woman deported by Turkey was detained
upon 36 and	only name as Dave, had converted after marrying a woman from the United Arab Emirates,
37	d out of the shop but the owner stopped me, and a woman from the Isis female security forces
38 member	s' Graphic PhotograPhs Lorenzo MeloniFrom left: a woman from raqqa who was tortured by
39	jail for failing to prevent the mob killing of a woman in Kabul who was accused of burning a
40	the information minister, said. Graphic PHOTO: A woman in South Kordofan. Fleeing air
attacks 41	ome a jihadi bride. In another room, in London, a woman is watching the girl. She's on her
own 42	is evidence that both men were in contact with a woman known as Kader Kandandir, a
recruiter 43	would-be migrants. Salma, for instance, advised a woman on Ask.fm that she should marry as
soon 44	ed by the SDF. "They said it wasn't my place as a woman," she said. "So I said to them, to
their 45	s born& lived all my life there, couldnt coz am a woman," she said on Twitter, as videos from

46 attackers	e shopping complex said they thought they heard a woman speaking English among the
anackers 47 wake	slim I would choose you," one said, pointing at a woman, the same witness recalled. In the
wake 48 Lewthwa	December 2011 or January 2012, the police found a woman they believed to be Ms.
49	e that had poked fun at Islamic fundamentalism. A woman trainee police officer was shot dead
in 50	y by disaffected young Europeans. Seven men and a woman were detained in the aftermath of
51	ssed a high school missing one of its teachers, a woman who left for Islamic State areas. In a
52 declined	
53 groups,	nst the Islamic State. After Facebook-friending a woman who has links to Kurdish rebel
54	Daesh would just go and kill him on the spot." A woman who lives in the Iraqi city of Mosul,
55 MRA	along is the Australia Day honour bestowed upon a woman who has continually pushed an
56 well as	oup of 23 remain: two Americans, Mr. Kassig and a woman who has not been identified, as
57 said	e in among civilian residents, the locals said. A woman who arrived at Dibaga Camp recently
58	osts in the city and rallied in the hinterland. A woman whose house was set alight on 11 March
59 foreign	to take away their lands. She won a divorce for a woman whose father had sold her to a
60 made a	several curt questions, then ordered the accused woman from the room. A prosecutor then
made a 61 and	ving social media, wanted more action and admired women suicide bombers in Palestine, Iraq
62 viewed	ge because of the positive security bias afforded women. Women, particularly mothers, are
63 his	eir parents. "The mujahideen looked for an Afghan woman for me. A radio operator gave me
64	t the Manchester bombing was a hate crime against women. Especially against women and
girls who 65	to be identified only by his first name. Algerian women in the group of hostages were released
66	Islamic law on the city, enforcing veils for all women, banning music and cigarettes, and
67	us grounds (such as Hezbollah) have later allowed women to become suicide bombers or to
fight. 68	t Emmanuel Macron said that decisions on allowing women and children to return from Iraq
and 69	BEIRUT, Lebanon Two American women and six children affiliated with the
70	stern hostages still alive, including an American women. Yet the group's savagery will not
abate 71	te, served as "a call for noncombatants, men and women alike, to build a nation-state
alongsid 72 - £	rsion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer
of 73 Women	nsure the safety of these Australian children and women, and those remaining in al-Hawl."
74	ying it as a jihadi utopia. Foreign fighters, and women and girls who joined the terrorist group
75	nds- and then lives- of many young Sydney men and women, but after watching the bitter

comments

70	s and biviws. Photographs like these, of girls and women engaging in weapons training and
77	the Australian Defence Force Academy, the men and women from Vietnam who have through
their 78 lured	dists. "Australian youths, and many young men and women from Western countries, are being
79	State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe who have either
attempte	
80 terrorisn	he border to Iraq, where more than 17,000 men and women have already been charged with
81 and	he group from Europe. More than two dozen men and women have been stopped by the F.B.I.
82 are	ts at Iraq's military headquarters. "Our men and women in uniform, who are serving in Iraq,
83 help	example of female agency, says Havlicek. Men and women, Isis says, have an equal duty to
84	n order to repatriate the Australian children and women languishing in camps in northeast
85	reated crisis after crisis. The desperate men and women leaving for Europe want a better life
86	a significant one(, 24 July). Some 6,000 men and women left the EU to travel to the conflict
87 how to	bout this. There is a suspicion that some men and women may have been schooled by IS in
88	try, to honour our values, to support the men and women or our armed forces, is to attend an
89 in	carried a sack of grain away on his shoulder, and women rushed back and forth piling up food
90	up, the Air Task Group or one of the many men and women supporting and enabling these
91 that	hington has authorised up to 3,100 servicemen and women to deploy to Iraq. The MPs said
92	combat radicalisation of vulnerable young men and women, to counter the hateful propaganda
93 walking	men were being radicalised. As he spoke, men and women walked by, pushing prams and
94 sang	ntire world. The nation's most courageous men and women were killed while they danced and
95 comfort	Rouhani found it extraordinary that young men and women were prepared to leave the and
96 because	ited States, Britain, Germany and France, men and women, who joined the Islamic State
97 republic	sted, any real equivalence with the young men and women who fought and died for the
98 with	meone have?" It's always possible that behind any woman blogging on behalf of Isis is a man
99	meone have?" It's always possible that behind any woman blogging on behalf of Islamic State
is a 100	on": adultery, homosexuality, theft and apostasy. Women must remain hidden, veiled and
101 Amman	ng the Arab world surfaced last week when an Arab woman complained during a talk in
102	ng the Arab world surfaced last week when an Arab woman complained during a talk in
Amman 103	j, Kurdish officials allowed us to interview Arab women held there but refused to let us
104 under	assembly," said Amina al-Hassan, 30, a Sunni Arab woman, who had lived for three years
105	he threat from these 80 varies. The fact some are women, or teenagers, is no reason for

106	and car-boots. Homs even boasts a number of armed women in uniform who have volunteered
for a 107 down	ering at executions, as an old man was beaten, as women and children were forced to kneel
108 homes it	urity upgrades and safety planning. "We can't ask women and children to leave dangerous
109	aheddin. The caliphate's territory also attracted women as "the perfect embodiment of Islamic
110	and to recruit others, including young Australian women and girls, to travel to Syria and Iraq
111	nt was concerned for the welfare of 64 Australian women and children in a camp in Syria,
among 112	erned about the danger to more than 60 Australian women and children held in Kurdish camps
now 113	comments follow a public plea from an Australian woman, believed to be Zehra Duman, 24,
from 114	iphate. In a new development, up to 30 Australian women have travelled to the war-torn
region in	y, whose daughter Mariam is one of the Australian women in the al-Hawl camp, said the
priority 116	ons that have also claimed the life of Australian woman Shadi Jabar, the sister of Parramatta
117	: 476 words Byline: Patrick Hatch Body Australian women travelling to Islamic State-
controlle 118	nts; others were born there, either to Australian women who travelled to the Middle East as
119	tralian has been told that most of the Australian women who have travelled to Syria are
believed 120	ve left the West to join the group. An Australian woman, Zehra Duman, left last week to marry
a 121	he rights of women and minorities. Efforts to ban women from wearing jeans in public would
122	ative publicity" that would be created by barring women and children leaving the heavily
bombed 123	defeated things will not be as they were before: women have not gone through so much at the
124	n Jadu to support the rights of her fellow Berber women. The group asked the rebels not to
show 125	ething tragic and dignified about this thin blond woman, recently retired from the military.
126	er with names, and the crew- two or three brigade women, an interpreter and a driver -would
127	nationals from 53 countries including 18 British women and their children. Meanwhile, the
128	sis. With her face covered by a niqab the British woman claimed that she had spent ten months
129	nd let her go." She is not only the first British woman killed fighting alongside Kurdish forces
130	n who joined? In Syria, I spent time with British woman Shamima Begum &US/Canadian
Kimberl 131	y iley in London. Wahabi, becomes the first British woman to be convicted of terror offences
since 132	l parts of the story but claimed that the British woman was now being held against her will.
133	ne: Anthony Loyd Body The body of a young British woman who was killed fighting in Syria
lies 134	ooks to stamina. But this is a man who has called women pigs, slobs and dogs, and someone
who 135 FROM S	learnt from his -mistake." AUSSIES IN SYRIA CAMPS WOMEN AND CHILDREN (40) SYDNEY Zaynab

136 in the Old City. Yet she described these captive women as no longer behaving as prisoners, but By 2010, Mr. Shah said, "everything had changed." Women who had used shawls to cover 137 their hair to the jihadists' ideology. A 22-year-old Chechen woman who identified herself only as Um 138 Aisha 139 s the indiscriminate killings of Muslim children, women and men in Syria. The use by President ful plans to kill and injure Australian children, women and men going about their everyday 140 141 his commanders had brought in a British civilian woman into an American brigade. I found him 142 ralding the apocalypse. Islamic State has coerced women into "sexual jihad", a form of temporary e but to take part as "jihadi brides" or "comfort women" for militants. For many recruits, the 143 144 n reinforcing, the views of some men who consider women nothing more than domestic slaves or udi tyrants" and atheistic Western contamination. Women are entreated to commit themselves 145 to 146 d-century queen. She was an independent, cultured woman who challenged the power of Rome and a scrape in the sand used as a latrine. The dead woman, an Iraqi, had taken a bullet to the 147 148 gainst self-incrimination, diagrams of where dead women and children were found, and pictures 149 t warfare. The soldiers showed me parts of a dead woman stuck to the side of their Humvee. She 150 t warfare. The soldiers showed me parts of a dead woman stuck to the side of their Humvee. She at rejects progress in all its forms, dehumanises women, exults in death and recognises no 151 152 TV when it landed b) He wore a T-shirt depicting women wearing latex c) He had a tattoo drawn in charge. Now they have gone you want to deprive women again of their rights?' The men 153 hung 154 ? Islamic State published a recruitment document, Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case 155 from Australia, including Janai Safar and Duman, women who are with their children in a refugee 156 ey return after the defeat of Isis in Raqqa, each woman I spoke to from the city said that the 157 efforts to communicate with his wife, an Egyptian woman who spoke little English, while Mr. Pugh 158 ave more freedom in Islamic State: they see eight women living in a house in Ragga who all get 159 id al-Britani, has used social media to encourage women and children to travel to Syria. Shortly 160 eenage "terror twins" from Britain- who encourage women to migrate to the territory and avoid 161 uthors identified six key factors that encouraged women to join: The report's authors, from the 162 group had murdered opponents, raped and enslaved women and intimidated and subjugated the militia also operates the brothels where enslaved women and girls are raped by -jihadists. 163 164 a US convoy in Iraq, becoming the first European woman to launch a suicide attack. Others 165 a US convoy in Iraq, becoming the first European woman to launch a suicide attack. Others

166	have been brutalising others. Without exception, women in the camp wear the Saudi-style full
167	insufficiently pious. Islamic State has executed women for refusing to marry jihadists, and in
168	was targeted by a drone strike. She is the first woman I know of who's been specifically
169 Syria in	p of nine British-Sudanese medical students- five women and four men -who travelled to
170 begun	nd a high standard of education, particularly for women. However, the protest had hardly
171 172	untry that earns its living providing beaches for women in bikinis to sunbathe on, and l-covering gown that is practically mandatory for women in Yemen. Tiny and frail, she has a
173	and we never heard of her again." Only roles for women In the Islamic State's ideology, a
174	er sorrow." In Islamic State propaganda, life for women in the self-declared caliphate is filled
175 Samra	ies, but returning home will not be an option for women. Take Sabina Selimovic, 15, and
176 Abu	any have turned bad. They come for the money, for women. They destroyed the revolution."
177	They kill children. They enslave, rape and force women into marriage. They threatened a
178	t al-Nusra as it enforces bans on smoking, forces women to wear the veil, carries out public
179 Xelil,	s and Iraqis, the Syria camps hold 12,000 foreign women and children, according to Redur
180	threatening. There is a tendency to label foreign women and girls who travelled to Syria and
181	ission to visit al-Hawl camp, where 1,300 foreign women and children from Isis families have
182	by nationality. It soon became clear that foreign women had more freedom of movement,
more 183	ationality. It soon became clear that the foreign women had more freedom of movement, more
184 the	t group's rampage, only a small number of foreign women have received any concession "In
185	itants have reportedly sexually assaulted foreign women in Libya, they didn't force girls and
186 througho	he city of Hit in western Iraq. A team of foreign women, who moved from Europe and
imought 187 men and	y women such as Begum as victims. Foreign-fighter women receive shorter sentences than
188	when a French television crew met one of the four women set to be deported, she said she
189 were led	heavily armed officers during the raid while four women wearing burkas and headscarves
were red 190 Sharrout	the -Islamic State's black flag.In January, four women who were reportedly enslaved by
Snarroui 191 Islamic	w Zealand and elsewhere." An estimated 115 French women had joined or were supporting
192	explained. She added that men were separated from women and executed shortly after Mosul
was 193	e Iraqi authorities to separate men and boys from women, children and the elderly, among
those 194 195	ar, in Raqqa, laid out his vision for the future: women must cover their hair, but are not , but anyone can make a mistake," said the German woman, a dark blue head scarf around her
pale 196	varience in the Middle Fact. The death of German, woman, Ivana Hoffman, a member of a

197 ighters. Throughout history and across the globe, women have wielded swords, fired guns, donned 198 place in a garbage pile, the three brothers heard women screaming until the voices became weak people in the back of their heads, who have held women and children hostage, who are 199 torturing 200 spread out toward the brown crags of the horizon. Women are cloistered behind flimsy screens. 201 ndoWestmount, Quebec, Canada Fickle fashion hurts women I love my Guardian Weekly, but read with 202 here were 70 foreign fighters in Syria, including women and "a lot" of Britons. "They feel 203 iolent Extremism in Sydney. "This means including women and children in the whole process -in arious reasons young Muslim men, and increasingly women and families, are flocking to 204 Syria. 205 ountries as diverse as Afghanistan and Indonesia. Women such as Hana Assafiri, well known in their 'cubs' who want a bigger role." Indonesian women are increasingly drawn to Syria with 206 207 tation of the Koran. After marrying an Indonesian woman, Maute returned to The Philippines and decapitation, burnings and the murder of innocent women, children and adults." "We do not 208 want 209 said it would adhere to principles to not involve women in war. Marking the fourth anniversary 210 ties with Damascus. These would probably involve women and children being transferred via the s" evening included a mildly racy dance involving women flipping up their skirts. The guests 211 212 I than that presided over by the mullahs in Iran. Women drive in Iran, do a broader range of 213 her had forced her to join Isis. While some Iraqi women, and large numbers of men, have been 214 n too." In the same court a day earlier, an Iraqi woman had been cleared of all charges and 215 om there he went to Turkey, where he met an Iraqi woman he said helped him to travel to Mosul. 216 ere God has placed us," said Iman Abbas, an Iraqi woman in her fifties whose surviving family 217 t saying: "An Garda Síochána is aware of an Irish woman who left Ireland three or four years ago 218 ced persons camps where tens of thousands of ISIS women and children are held -and have been 219 t hearing, I was taken from my room by three Isis women to another room where an old man was 220 his might mean \$88m a year to monitor the 11 ISIS women who've made that offer. Legal costs r was one of the few repatriations of ISIS-linked women or children from Syria to Western 221 222 lim inheritance is part of the problem. Why is it women can only inherit one-third of what a man 223 p in a world where schoolgirls are not kidnapped, women are not raped in conflict and families 224 p in a world where schoolgirls are not kidnapped, women are not raped in conflict and families 225 te are treated as suspect. An 18-year-old Kurdish woman from London who went to Syria last 226 tea stands outside in the bitter cold. A Lebanese woman, Stephanie Deek, was there with her

227	the wives of foreign fighters, radicalised local women, and impoverished recruits who joined
228 from all	them children born inside the "caliphate". Local women had sons and daughters with men
229	's main squares to watch the stoning of two local women, supposedly for adultery. Dua refused
to 230	d a handicraft business to provide jobs for local women whom the small hotel could not
support.	s found a miserable international tableau of lost women and children. Along muddy, trash-
strewn 232	of mounds with strips of paper identifying a man, woman or child and the approximate age to
be 233	cted, officials said, because there were too many women and children inside, the same reason
234	just how unusual this is in a country where many women are married off by age 13 and most
235	mbers it has deemed to be radicalized. While many women from around the world joined the
236	d as a pure Islamic society. Among them were many women, some who were brought by their
husband 237	ranks. "I think," says Smith, "that's why so many women took up the call over the summer.
238	nflict are cited as the motivating factor by many women who have travelled to Syria, says
Smith. 239	rs is especially complex: Isis wives include many women who never participated in combat,
but 240	rs of two girls, ages 6 and 9. A pregnant married woman, 19, told investigators that she was
241	border- of razing Machar's home town, massacring women and children as they fled. The
242	aqqa. They shared the house with former Melbourne woman Zehra Duman and an American
widow, a 243	Ford Body Britain is on a "cliff edge" with men, women and children preparing to flee to join
244	eam of observers, said. Innocent civilians men, women and children are being killed every
245	Alawites, carried out ferocious massacres of men, women and children. The majority of
victims 246	oung boy. He is one of around 5,000 European men, women and children believed to have
traveled 247	hould not result in greater risk to civilian men, women and children." Since taking charge last
248	ht from one of its strongholds. At least 217 men, women and children have been beheaded. As
249	people have suffered for too long. Too many men, women &children have died as a result of
the 250	"Increasing within IS propaganda is this message: women are valued, not as sexual objects,
but 251	enemies and make sex slaves out of some minority women but also severe shortages of the
basics 252	ress suggest that the compound contained far more women and children than the Seals
expected 253	change for widening the coalition to include more women, more members of Assad's Alawite
254	she became a traditional healer, treating mostly women, and found that their already limited
255	g in limbo in camps. About 70 Australians, mostly women and children, remain in detention or
256	the last four days, at least 800 people mostly women, children and the elderlyhave been

257 Salamiyeh, he said, he saw 35 dead bodies, mostly women, children and elderly people, some shot, 258 taken back tiny numbers of their citizens, mostly women, children and orphans. But most of the 259 to evacuate thousands of Russia citizens, mostly women wed to Syrians who had studied at 260 accordance with sayings of the prophet Muhammad. Women were told to wear black niqabs or veils interview. Hey, yeah, why you go rape and murder women and children? You just executed a 261 262 urity agencies arresting and interrogating Muslim women, according to the SITE monitoring group, 263 h between western democracy and Islam, and Muslim women do not need to be liberated from their ys. Media discussions of issues to do with Muslim women have not helped, "In the last year, 264 the 265 took to wearing a niqab- a garment worn by Muslim women to cover all but their eyes. She also Islamists also arrested or kidnapped young Muslim women to be forced into marriage or to be 266 used aughter. "You don't ever expect- not as a man nor woman -to see anything like that. Yet we 267 were tors argued in the first case against a Norwegian woman who had left for Syria. The woman, 268 who 269 re is a large and apparently increasing number of women among the so-called foreign fighters who 270 te fighters. Open slave markets selling dozens of women and girls are frequented by jihadists 271 eave the country, including increasing numbers of women and younger men. Despite authorities' 272 ven the failure to prepare for the huge number of women and children who managed to leave Baghuz as previously said he would "examine the needs of women and children" when considering 273 whether n international leader in advancing the rights of women and girls, strengthening governance 274 and 275 so includes provisions guaranteeing the rights of women and minorities. Efforts to ban women 276 e appears to be a policy of the state." Scores of women and children at Houla were stabbed to 277 s her favourite hadiths in capitals: "THE BEST OF WOMEN ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT SEE THE MEN AND WHO 278 an offence. Within the period, a record number of women arrested for such offences was recorded first need to move beyond stereotypical images of women as victims. We have to recognise 279 their 280 rnment officials are talking to a small number of women, believed to be the -dependants of mprehensive windows to date into the treatment of women by the Islamic State. It says that 281 women 282 o weeks for negotiations that failed. Hundreds of women, children and injured men have fled. 283 the use of Salafi speakers and the subjugation of women contained in their teachings, and given d suicide bombers. They also pioneered the use of women for this task. They pioneered the 284 use of 285 a focus, premier, nationally about the rights of women... how does forcing a heavily pregnant 286 Islam, sadly, is being fought over the bodies of women: how they should dress, whether they

287 their Islam." Her view is that the oppression of women in some Islamic countries is due to 288 up for removing hers. There have been reports of women murdered and of IS wives acting as the tment, points out that there is a long history of women planning and executing terrorist 289 290 ootage Huda had shot. "I want to use the voice of women. This is something we have been ignoring 291 im." He smoked, went clubbing, dated a string of women, took and sold drugs, went on binges for 292 and holding Kalashnikovs. One morning, dozens of women waved militia flags on the town's main 293 wed Syrians to enter the country easily. An older woman who came from a village in Raqqa 294 een a dangerous, godless combination." Attacks on women and girls have been a hideous hallmark 295 g violence against men and children as men are on women and children, and that men are victims 296 the drone strike on Sunday, calling the attack on women and children against all international 297 fear, suffering and trauma these thugs impose on women and children." In comments that echo 298 y want to pursue in the talks, including a ban on women appearing in public in jeans or without 299 To date, British government policy has focused on women exclusively as tools to prevent men 300 ted people. Nine News reported Laming accused one woman, Alix Russo, of misappropriating charity 301 ian police estimate 38 Indonesians, including one woman, have been involved in the Marawi 302 to gain Internet reception," the report says. One woman reported having a miscarriage in a 303 ssy's phone. "This is not what we deserve," one woman said in a voice message sent from 304 te photos of captured Yazidi women and girls. One woman told investigators she had been sold 15 305 boarded a flight from RAF Brize Norton, the only woman among 200 soldiers, and headed into the boarded a flight from RAF Brize Norton, the only woman among 200 soldiers, and headed 306 into the 307 terrorist attack by a radicalised British man or woman who has returned, well-trained, from 308 rom mingling unless they were related and ordered women to cover themselves from head to toe. ware of this. Like other terrorist organisations, women play an important role in ISIS as 309 310 northeastern Syria, along with thousands of other women and children. (Four other 311 us, we will give those kids to them and any other women and kids that they request," said ed Nations and the United States. (Only one other woman, from Britain, made the lists.) Ms. 312 313 if they are married- or put in a house with other women, if they are single. Their day, says 314 blog. She was very much making contact with other women out there and posting photos of them 315 d the security of our children, our homes and our women," said Sheikh Hmeidi Daham al-Jarba, 316 'we are conservative and not against covering our women'," she said of her interviewees. "What radicalisation of young Australians, particularly women and girls, was a priority. "It seems 317

318 -	minded strangers on Facebook, including a Queens woman, Noelle Velentzas, who was
	s, now complain of being targeted by radicalised women. Through their families they have
had	s, ac we companie of coming image of the action of the act
	Some women deemed apostates by more radicalized women have reported beatings and
	Some women deemed apostates by more radicalized women have reported beatings and
mutilation 322	n. an ongoing swoop on suspected efforts to recruit women to go to Syria and Iraq to support
323 al-Hawl	Kosovo, Sweden and Germany have recently removed women and children from al-Roj and
	ooking at ways to take advantage of to repatriate women and children. Whether Britain is
	comment drew derision from lawyers representing women who are being held in camps in
	by the head of ASIO Duncan Lewis, Ms Bishop said women and families could also be the
	from Syria, Iraq and Australia, Ms Bishop says. Women are believed to account for nearly
328 s Germany,	security forces detained her this year. A second woman was released after landing in
329 o	ordered shrouded so that passers-by could not see women inside their houses. Clothing ors to Parliament House. It is more common to see women with the niqab, which is a veil that
331 d	list billboards, face veils and cafes segregating women and banning them from smoking water
332 " wing	About 100 British volunteers, including several women, have joined the YPG and its female
	cosmopolitan Damascus, but especially for single women. Rima, a former political prisoner
	at once, as you can only be with one. "The slave women have different rules in terms of
335 a face is	all groups of middle-aged men mill about smoking, women bustle past in hijabs, one whose
	? you know dismantle I- IED's and booby traps so women and children and families can
	ody of the Islamic State. On Saturday, 100 or so women joined the list, turning up crammed
	ved to defensive military -positions. Unlike some women and children, no adult Australian
	made, to justify leaving your home behind." Some women have been given a quasi-fighter
	raq. Already, there are signs that at least some women have suicide vests prepared in their
341 n	may have to rename the Canberra organisation Some Women In Media. #swim #teamaustralia
342 ,	which is home to Hezbollah, a Syrian ally. Some women were recently released, but it was
343 h which	nere in Australia," Ms Bishop said. She said some women were joining "all-female groupings
344 .	"Some of the victims were from one family. Some women who rushed to see the fate of their
345 n	ned if we are to correctly assess the threat such women pose. Lydia Khalil is a research fellow
346 ir involveme	ve documents obtained by The Post. The surviving woman, in her 40s, discussed her ent
	foreign fighters were in demand. "Lots of Syrian women want to marry them," he said. He

348	ish. All three belonged to a generation of Syrian women who were leading more independent
lives 349	er is indeed an example of specifically targeting women, this is a frightening development,
350	the relationship between Salafism and terrorism." Women from the same mosque have raised a
351	y Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop says that women and families need to be more
included 352	w that they are not hiding a bomb. Believing that women are less likely to be screened as
353	hasn't." For the moment, however, it's clear that women are only cheerleaders of such
murders 354	the Swedish newspaper Metro on Monday showed that women had been airbrushed out of
otherwis 355 356	radicalization process, she said, by offering the women a safe and secure environment. nothing unusual about this rendezvous. One of the women, Abaaoud's cousin, jumped into his
arms,	occurred. Afghan officials said they believed the women and children were relatives of the
358	urity risks of holding seasoned jihadists and the women and children who lived with them in a
359	ons that U.S. forces have helped guard, while the women and children are housed in tents in
360	Australians currently being held in Syria are the women and children in the al-Hawl camp,
well 361	ndre Seebregts, a lawyer representing most of the women and children in the Dutch case. 'We
have 362	give up their lives for the cause. Not all of the women and girls are satisfied with this, says
363 364	Thursday night. But the long-term dangers for the women and children are just as ng when they were detained. The identities of the women, and some of the specifics of their
365	y would not put other lives in danger to save the women and children. "Parents, mothers and
366	Australian aid agency Save the Children said the women and children in Al-Hawl should be
367	errorism program for Human Rights Watch, said the women and children were stuck in a
"legal 368	urity risks of holding seasoned jihadists and the women and children who lived with them in a
369	provided water, medical attention and toys to the women and children, leading some -fresh
from 370	e with the children of Isis rapists. A few of the women are happy to hand over the children
they 371	stead, the security services tried to recruit the woman as a spy. "They had no regard for her
372	idn't work out.' It's a sense of bravado that the women don't have," says Smith. Take Sabina
373 all.	e said. Within hours, word spread that one of the women had not been involved with a man at
374	cases." A source told the Irish Times that as the woman had not contacted the Irish
governn 375	least nurtured their zealot spouses. Handling the women has become a puzzle as they lie on a
376	ho have been resettled as refugees in Europe. The women have offered graphic descriptions of
the 377	he was angrily accused of trying to humiliate the women he had interviewed. "I could not use
it. 378	culmination of months of discussions between the woman, her family and Australian
governn	

rrendered to the Kurds weeks before, implored the women holding the children to hand them that there are legal mechanisms to deal with the women, if necessary, after they return home. k down and watched as the other officers took the women into a back room to be whipped. When of foreign fighters in Syria,." In the book, the woman is identified by the name "Emira." s report, published yesterday, also said that the women Jihadists were younger than their male vernment has maintained that at least some of the women joined the Islamic State willingly, the Home Office, hoping they could learn from the woman more about the radicalisation process. ight in the rubble around Dajat al-Barga. And the women "muhajirat" among them died hardest of children in the camps. "We would suggest that the women need to be made safe in the first place, nds turned out for his funeral, Inzamam said. The women of the village showered his corpse ast year, Australian officials were satisfied the woman posed no threat to national security and ld use any pretext to detain women: "They use the women prisoners for wives for the foreign returned, and only two have been prosecuted. "The woman remains a security concern," he reme interpretation of Islam all their lives. The women responding now, she says, "are going convert, the women say. "They beg us," one of the women said. "They promise us everything. They ose, and after a while, I noticed that one of the women seemed to be hogging it. The others were le, are under strict orders not to intimidate the women. Still, most analysts of radicalism le, are under strict orders not to intimidate the women. Still, most analysts of radicalism st cause. Prohibited from engaging in combat, the women support the group's goal of building eenager, all know how to fire a weapon. So do the women. The family keeps armed guards on iliating. It is also not safe, especially for the women. "There is a great deal of stress, study terrorism warn of the risks of leaving the women to potentially escape the camp amid ed similar figures. Preparation to repatriate the woman to Norway began in October, according a year, police had been secretly encouraging the women to contact their brother, who had gone ed that one woman spoke with an Irish accent. The woman told ITV: "The people don't have food. with them," he said. "They deserve no mercy. The women too." In the same court a day earlier, with them," he said. "They deserve no mercy. The women too." In the same court a day earlier, ey, mid-last year. The Australian understands the woman travelled to Syria in late 2015 with ing the owner would not recognise me with all the women wearing the veil. I walked out of at it was really a lack of political will. If the women were accused of crimes, they could be

379

over

380

381

382

383

384

and

385

386

387

388

with 389

390

391

392

for 393

394

395

396

397

398

the 399

400

the 401

to 402

403

404

405

406

her

407 the 408

409	s by the day. As always in war, it is perhaps the women who suffer most. Al-Nusra fighters see
410	he adds. Trawling through the online lives of the women who have joined the extremist group
411	y chose evil over us; let them marinate in it The women who left Australia for Islamic State
are 412	potentially permanently splitting her family. The woman, who held Australian and Lebanese
413	r of harrowing and disturbing statements from the women, who have been resettled as
refugees 414	countries, European or other, to extradite their women and children." But many European
415	ilitary would come and kill their families, their women and their children." They fought
416	Some men are being killed or are told that their women and children will be killed if they
417 should b	Kurds that have been persecuted by ISIS and their women and children raped? Somebody
418 Kurdish	e affiliated with the Islamic State— most of them women and children who had —and pro-
419	she was one of a group of a hundred, most of them women and children, who slipped past an
420	killed during the battle, more than half of them women and children. It estimates that Isis
421 themselv	ith about a hundred other civilians, most of them women. "They know how to disguise
422 of	t any reluctance by the government to bring these women and children home is due to a lack
423	in their teens. According to a CNN report, these women and girls are lured to Isis-controlled
424	the caliphate seeks to resurrect itself. If these women are still a sec-urity risk they must be
425 their	liphate. "The advice in relation to some of these women is far from being dragged there by
426	a lack of persuasive female voices reaching these women. Read more: In a propaganda war
against 427 dark	into Isis territory they travelled. Few of these women waste any time, and hurl away their
428	usands of women mobilized for ISIS. Most of these women will not meet the international
legal 429	sick, the toilets are overflowing. And then these women will burn your tent and beat your
430	it-ants, about two-thirds of them men and a third women. About 55 are believed to have
returned 431	them and hanging around them. And he called this woman "Miss Piggy." Then he called her
432	own as Da'ish. It is understood a number of those women have taken their children with them,
433	e of Palmyra, Islamic State commanders threatened women with flogging for disobeying
Islamic 434	nd several civilians were killed, including three women and two children; several houses also
435	st peer nations, having taken back six men, three women and nine children as of November,
436	errorist attacks. But the city in which the three women came to adulthood used to be quite
437	ame from Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, and that three women from Bradford had taken their
nine 438	of Syria. Little Syria The Turkish city the three women now live in sits on a dry grass plain,

439	hat was left of Syria. The Turkish city the three women now live in sits on a dry grass plain,
440	ood's Tumblr page, for instance, offers advice to women thinking of making the journey. This
441 violently	cy. IS has changed the rule book when it comes to women. While it is a patriarchal and
442 fluid,	and uneven battlefield evidence. When it comes to women, whose roles in the group were
443	se issues" including the need for respect towards women. Equally, our courts, our police, our
444 governm	mmonplace. Among the residents are 25 Trinidadian women and 71 children whom the
445 A	ombians, Japanese and Australians- and a Tunisian woman who was a cleaner at the museum.
446 been	hat federal Liberal MP Andrew Laming harassed two women. Albanese said he should have
447	zai later said the dead included 10 children, two women and two men. The conflicting
accounts 448	was recently ordered by a court to repatriate two women and six children. In Britain this week,
449	sis monitor denied him access for being male. Two women died that night. I know a professor
at 450	though, Shahla had her mother to herself. The two women shared a particularly close bond
after 451	ation to be whipped. The police had hauled in two women she had known since childhood, a
mother 452	it hard to gather the remains. Mr. Trump said two women were found there wearing suicide
vests 453	it hard to gather the remains. Mr. Trump said two women were found there wearing suicide
vests 454	"Allahu must b shaking up haha. I wna b da 1st UK woman 2 kill a UK or US terorrist!" The
list 455	that the decision to bring back the unidentified woman, now 29, had been a humanitarian one:
456 have	his is an Islamist who shakes hands with unveiled women and opines that Christians often
457 which	id the Islamic State inevitably would start using women as suicide bombers, as al-Qaeda,
458	A Virginia woman who was charged after a federal sting
459 Lamia	alties here can cross sectarian lines. As weeping women leaned on tombstones, two others,
460	ht in Iraq and Syria in 2015, nearly a third were womena larger proportion than any other
461	rry disaster." Of the 128 confirmed dead, 57 were women, and 44 children. Another 69 are still
462 brigade:	y vans with "Al-Khansaa" on the sides. There were women from across the world in the
463	f whether any of the heavily armed militants were women. Kenyan officials initially asserted
464	amilton writes). Unprecedented numbers of western women are heading to the so-called
caliphate	Why would an educated Western woman go to Syria to marry a man she has
never 466	s with deeply ingrained hostility towards Western women. In Britain, sex-trafficking rings
467	lege report estimates about 20 of the 550 Western women in IS-territory are Australian. The
468 Shamim	She is accused of persuading other young Western women, like the British schoolgirl

- Kurdish officials did not let us ask the Western women their names. Some said their husbands
- 470 rsty and confusing: why would an educated Western woman want to travel to Syria, marry a man she
- 471 qis, including a 76-year-old man in a wheelchair, women and children, some just toddlers.
- 472 is is a glimpse of the true -Islamic State, where women are banned from fighting and are
- freedom of movement and an income in a city where women had been stripped of self-determination.
- 474 t one of the attackers who was killed was a white woman. Reuters said this was "likely to fuel
- 475 "Jihadi bride" was unhelpful in understanding why women were lured to Join Isis. It said that
- a walk through the camp, we spoke informally with women from France, Germany, Denmark, Holland
- onal Moroccan robe. He stopped shaking hands with women. When his aunts visited, he refused to
- ing flying 150 people- all of whom are the wives, women and children of French Isis fighters -
- w hoping to create the same thing, but for women- women that we know of who have gone to live in
- ar al Bahr, an SDF fighter, said he found wounded women and crying children amid the destruction
- ren being killed. Treated as chattel, many Yazidi women and girls are locked in homes to perform
- 482 ally true for those fighters that enslaved Yazidi women and girls." Classification Language:
- enslaved by Isis, also reported a missing Yazidi woman as recently killed in al-Hawl. Although
- and Elomar have been linked to the sale of Yazidi women as slaves during their time in Syria and
- oungest, just six months. All were born to Yazidi women enslaved and raped by Islamic State
- ber 1 Liberty has a dark side. Many of the Yazidi women freed from Isis enslavement in Baghouz
- ison, where hundreds of Isis prisoners and Yazidi women had been held. It was to Badush that
- or wives, many to Mosul. The fate of these Yazidi women, sold among Isis commanders according to
- was later killed, and a number of captured Yazidi women. U.S. officials corroborated the
- 490 . The murder of the victims of 9/11 and the young women abducted in Nigeria elicit the same
- d that story before. They have enrolled the young woman, Aida Sarina -- and scores of others

who

- 492 to violence against females or males- than young women, and that addressing such attitudes is
- 493 to Syria to become jihadist brides. Eleven young women are known to have left Britain to
- marry
- about the fate of this apparently troubled young woman, but I am thankful that she left her
- 495 was a violent terrorist who allegedly kept young women from Iraq's Yazidi minority as sex
- 496 e assassination list," he said.) Nearby, a young woman in a bridal salon with wedding dresses
- ral lens, it is difficult to comprehend why young women who have been raised in the west and
- omen to come and marry fighters. One of the young women who appears to have followed his call

at the school, the eyewitness said, the youngest women again were parted from older ones er your Rome, break your crosses and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the

# Girls\* concordances

499

and

500

and

former

debris

she

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

ere slaughtered by Boko Haram? Or the 10-year-old girl who was fitted with a suicide bomb ishing ratio of 123 boys aged 16-17 for every 100 girls, compared with 117 in China. The that keep them constantly on edge. An 11-year-old girl was taken into the yard of the school Nyo, the chief minister of Magway. An 11-year-old girl, Thwal Zin Nyein, was killed when her daughter. What do you say to the 13-year-old girl who describes the warehouses where orced to flee war-ravaged areas was a 14-year-old girl in the east-central African nation of Islamic State-controlled territory. A 15-year-old girl from Kansas was repatriated from Syria, ish police are trying to track down a 15-year-old girl from Bristol who they believe traveled to Islamic State-controlled territory. A 15-year-old girl from Kansas was repatriated from Syria, edroom in Birmingham, a well-educated 15-year-old girl logs on to her computer and leaves Birmingham, Eng-land, a well-educated 15-year-old girl logs on to her computer and leaves Syria before deciding to come home. A 15-year-old girl named Zoé, who is from a secularized emerged this week that police took a 15-year-old girl off a plane taxiing at Heathrow airport fortnight, he had received news of a 15-year-old girl stopped by her family from travelling to er arrested in Austria. Last month, a 15-year-old girl -the daughter of a German convert to 16; Shamima Begum, 15; and an unnamed 15-year-old girl --was "deeply concerning," and he ng, have joined jihadists in Syria. A 15-year-old girl, who had said she was going to join the lamic caliphate in Syria; and where a 15-year-old girl who'd been raped was found guilty of le, such as knives and crude bombs. A 16-year-old girl was among four people arrested in the tairs in Room 218 was Rahma Idriss, a 16-year-old girl who had just lost both of her legs. It orted that she shared the meal with a 16-year-old girl who calls herself Um Ayoub, who wrote: tairs in Room 218 was Rahma Idriss, a 16-year-old girl who had just lost both of her legs. It Times team, posing first as Aisha, a 17-year-old girl from east London, were inundated with y believe traveled to Istanbul with a 17-year-old girl from London with the intention of ldren's activities. The arrest of two 17-year-old girls, one from West Yorkshire and the other ihad". Fourteen people, including two 17-year-old girls, were arrested in the first three weeks

27 police appeal could be fruitful. Two 17-year-old girls were arrested at Heathrow in January en icide to escape sexual enslavement. A 19-year-old girl hanged herself after being captured 28 with cases. They included details of how a 20-year-old girl was burnt alive because she refused to 29 30 a boarding school. (They would kidnap nearly 300 girls four weeks after Linder left Africa.) Omar MostefaÃ. He was the father of a 5-year-old girl and was repeatedly arrested in 31 connection 32 e Islamic State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe who have either 33 e Islamic State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe who have attempted ple, including a police officer and an 8-year-old girl. The bomber's remains were found at the 34 35 ion, including a police officer and an 8-year-old girl. The bomber's remains were found at the ian one: One of her two children— a boy, 5, and a girl, 3—was believed to be seriously ill. 36 But 37 an one: One of her two children-- a boy, 5, and a girl, 3 -- was believed to be seriously ill. " she said. "He loves it here. My older son had a girlfriend and didn't wanna come." Jones led 38 39 ile allegations that he arranged employment for a girlfriend are investigated. Dutton said the 40 g those evacuated. Those children, two boys and a girl, are aged between six and 12. They are peers are getting drunk, obsessed with finding a girlfriend, as opposed to doing something in 41 42 as from in Scotland, said he had left a job and a girlfriend behind to come and fight for the 43 sired children to local women, in Cotton's case a girl believed to be about two years old. 44 conspirator. So why does the situation of such a girl change after five or six years? The 45 de an announcement that they were going to take a girl from every house and marry them to 46 e soldiers have been beheaded." This morning, "a girl had tweeted a picture of Adolf Hitler 47 e soldiers have been beheaded." This morning, "a girl had tweeted a picture of Adolf Hitler knew because before I joined myself, when I saw a girl I knew had started working with ISIS, 48 knew because before I joined myself, when I saw a girl I knew had started working with Isis, I 49 50 from last year he posed with what appears to be a girlfriend in the street. Abdullah's close journalist is here', he would joke: 'She's not a girl, it's a boy.' If you see the pictures, I 51 d sent back to her parents. However, since such a girl now is considered a formed adult, 52 53 ng "a huge amount" of children. One of them was a girl of about seven with second-degree burns g is very quick," says Smith. "I was talking to a girl on Ask.fm and asked her whether there 54 was 55 g is very quick," says Smith. "I was talking to a girl on Ask.fm and asked her whether there was yria are providing arms and inspiration Graphic A girl stands near a Russian soldier in 56 57 ruins. On Sunday, two tiny children, a boy and a girl, were recovered from the rubble in

s he fell to the ground police rushed to rescue a girl who had been standing next to him and coming a hardline Wahabi Muslim. "You went from a girl who was friends with everyone to a wahabi honest, when my friend came and said there was a girl who was interested in marriage, I teragency team charged with locating the abducted girls. The team included representatives of errorists could not have expected was that Abed's girlfriend, Soraya, was determined to stop go across," says Smith. "Hundreds. I come across girls every day who say, I'm so desperate to go across," says Smith. "Hundreds. I come across girls every day who say, 'I'm so desperate to s of jihadist brutality, among them an adolescent girl who had been raped repeatedly by Islamic his battle. Recalling how he gave a little Afghan girl a Pop-Tart only to watch her feed it to two from Kent who had been a guitarist in an all- girl punk band before she married Junaid ds of deaths and horrific crimes against boys and girls, a new Save the Children report says. on Society. As a key recruiter of young women and girls and a regular user of social media to royed ancient religious sites, enslaved women and girls and brutally executed many of the ty. Gerges reminds us that 3,144 Yazidi women and girls are still being held and that the price eir lives for the cause. Not all of the women and girls are satisfied with this, says Smith. ly established an outlet where enslaved women and girls are fitted with price tags and sold to so operates the brothels where enslaved women and girls are raped by -jihadists. Researchers re is firm consensus that "unbelieving" women and girls are legal chattel. The fatuous stumes. Yazidis have reported that 3500 women and girls are being held captive by caliphate s. Open slave markets selling dozens of women and girls are frequented by jihadists who view teens. According to a CNN report, these women and girls are lured to Isis-controlled territory killed. Treated as chattel, many Yazidi women and girls are locked in homes to perform household killing civilians at random, abducting women and girls at will, and forcing tens of thousands ered accounts of rape from more than 50 women and girls, but that others had yet to speak out ered accounts of rape from more than 50 women and girls, but that others had yet to speak out for those fighters that enslaved Yazidi women and girls." Classification Language: ENGLISH bilising to protect this country and our boys and girls," Dr Rifi said. "The government needs hundreds of civilians- including Yazidi women and girls forced into sexual slavery after Islamic lly made sex slaves out of thousands of women and girls from the Yazidi minority in Iraq, on women between the ages of 11 and 46. Women and girls from minority ethnic and religious

58

59

60 wasn't

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

very 71

was

88 illed or taken by Daesh like many other women and girls, had we stayed in Sinjar," said Haifa, 89 erous, godless combination." Attacks on women and girls have been a hideous hallmark of radical he progressive politics and left-leaning guys and girls". He and Ramelow took part in rallies 90 91 lovers and revolutionaries and left-wing guys and girls." He and Ramelow, who converted to Islam 92 ged. "It's difficult to secretly be boyfriend and girlfriend in this country, so in the end we 93 ernational that cited testimony by four women and girls in northern Iraq that they had been held 94 the Islamic State's practice of selling women and girls into marriage or sexual slavery, 95 emic who has given evidence in cases of women and girls involved in terrorism cases, told the 96 also heard accounts of how some Yazidi women and girls killed themselves to escape the cruelty. 97 to circulate photos of captured Yazidi women and girls. One woman told investigators she had 98 n troops burning villages, raping local women and girls, rounding up innocent young men as 99 port from last month states. "Four women and girls said they had been held in the homes of 100 014, killing and enslaving thousands of women and girls. Since then, many Yazidis have worked 101 reed to convert to Islam. " Younger women and girls, some as young as 12, were separated 102 ional leader in advancing the rights of women and girls, strengthening governance and democratic 103 in a house against her will with other women and girls. "The people around you and the entire 104 s burgeoning speciality: the torture of women and girls. The UN recently disclosed survivor 105 in a house against her will with other women and girls. "The people around you and the entire 106 It has imposed punitive restrictions on women and girls. The majority of its fighters are 107 uspects they experimented with alcohol, drugs and girls. "They were not angels," he admits. Amer 108 r leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to lure women and girls to the cause. And that too little is 109 d a sex slavery trade, selling captured women and girls to Islamic State sympathisers and 110 ruit others, including young Australian women and girls, to travel to Syria and Iraq to join the 111 tion of young Australians, particularly women and girls, was a priority. "It seems that Da'ish 112 Amnesty International reports that four women and girls were imprisoned by two Australians of 113 g from the West, Ms. Nagra said. Yazidi women and girls were abducted and sold or given into 114 r occasion, they tried to rescue Yazidi women and girls who he believed were being kept as 115 a jihadi utopia. Foreign fighters, and women and girls who joined the terrorist group from the 116 crime against women. Especially against women and girls who want to assert their independence g. There is a tendency to label foreign women and girls who travelled to Syria and Iraq as 117

mere

118	attended sermons in the mosque and that women and girls wore the veil." Saudi Arabia's
119 120 121 met	rt on the Gold Coast, Mrs Ali went to an Anglican girls' school, but later became an rt on the Gold Coast, Mrs Ali went to an Anglican girls' school, but later became an tian women in Syria. When news broke that another girl -19-year-old "Aicha", a Catholic -had
122	tian women in Syria. When news broke that another girl -19-year-old Aicha, a Catholic -had
met 123	e men choose from hundreds of headshots." Another girl Smith spoke to told her: "A lot of the
124	e men choose from hundreds of headshots." Another girl Smith spoke to told her: "A lot of the
125	ot of the converts going to the Islamic State are girls, girls with problems, girls who have
126	ists pose with severed heads while others film as girls are drained of blood. It is unspeakable.
127	1 already have died, and a 12-year-old Australian girl died in Baghdad after a bomb blast near
128	ine: Ben Doherty Body A three-year-old Australian girl held in al-Hawl camp in Syria will
likely 129	mity to each other. One three-year-old Australian girl held in the camp contracted severe
130	mbing in Afghanistan and a 12-year-old Australian girl was among dozens killed in twin
131	ummer when al-Hisbah killed a teenage Azerbaijani girl. Then a pregnant Indonesian woman
was 132 133 134	at that hard expression, and I cannot see my baby girl." tell them she had given birth to a beautiful baby girl they named Fatima. Rufaila grew face sagging. "You know, we had lost another baby girl two years ago, she was the same age, a
135	d under the capsized hull. His other son and baby girl will never be found. After the disaster,
136 137 138	a in April. In October reports surfaced that both girls wanted out. Shortly afterwards, a in April. In October reports surfaced that both girls wanted out. Shortly afterwards, o years after the start of the war in Syria, both girls were wearing full niqab. Their school
139	crossings THE ease with which Hayat Boumedienne, girlfriend of the Paris kosher
superma 140	Bihar. Now they say Kashmir is open, we can bring girls from there." Amid these vulgar
141	lfe, said there were indications that the Bristol girl might have been "radicalized." There
142	men were searching door-to-door for three British girls aged about 16 and checkpoints had
been 143	men were searching door-to-door for three British girls aged about 16 and that checkpoints
had 144	on-Muslims. In the past week alone, three British girls are believed to have traveled to Syria
145	n passports, including those of the three British girls, as well as other foreign passports and
146	ne night Asma and her crew received three British girls, dressed in western clothes but with
147	is year, Asma and her crew received three British girls, dressed in Western clothes but with
148	, or bored, or angry, or frustrated young British girls. I puzzled over why the flow of young
149	secretary Sajid Javid did in the case of British girl Shamima Begum: "The death of any
British 150	0), some of whom were travelling with the British girls. The man, said to be a dentist from

151 152	Iraq.) In late February, when three young British girlstwo of whom were only 15 at it was looking into reports that three British girls were being hunted by Isis in the Mosul		
153	id it was looking into reports that three British girls were being hunted by Isis loyalists in		
154	a schoolgirl and said: "The angel-faced British girl who last night became World's Most		
155	be the biggest case of enslavement this century. Girls as young as 12 and their mothers have		
156	less time in the classroom. He'd started to chase girls, close himself in his room. A typical		
157	ent of men in Australia and the US. The children, girls aged -between 8 and 10, were forced		
into 158	Chaudhry successfully defended a young Christian girl from charges of blasphemy after a		
Muslim 159	ic juice stand at a local mall. Four blond Danish girls eye him warily. He is well known here, a		
160	cy- for the European values I learned as a Danish girl". The Danish security and intelligence		
161	tan. Huda missed out because he was caught dating girls. He became disillusioned with Darul		
162 163	ander for Kirkuk. Others missing include the dead girls' mother Zara and two sons, ecular vice. Parties with Danish teens. Drinking. Girls. "That's my past," he said. "Not my		
164	ide upbringing, teenage years involving drinking, girls and petty trouble with the law to a		
165 bills	ike Lynda Day from Press Gang. The Little Drummer Girl screened in the US in three double-		
166	killed 22 people, the youngest an eight-year-old girl, and injured dozens more. Fourteen		
people 167	is one with two young children. An eight-year-old girl survived after her family, believed to be		
168	message on her Facebook page: "Greetings to every girl celebrating Eid in her pyjamas!" It		
was 169 wall	I was 14 years old. And Hugh Jackman, which every girl's got to have." Mostly, however, the		
170	a Rosa, presented Fehmi Lassoued and his Filipino girlfriend, Anabel Salipada, at a news		
171 killed as	ashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province. Five girls, seven boys and two women were		
172	ld to count the number of whippings." School for girls ends at age 9, when they are considered		
173 consider	old to count the number of whippings." School for girls ends at age 9, when they are		
174	a. Turkey also helped build roads and schools for girls in Afghanistan after the United States		
175	a. Turkey also helped build roads and schools for girls in Afghanistan after the United States		
176 to	saulted foreign women in Libya, they didn't force girls and single or widowed women in Sirte		
177 exchang	s in their Libyan stronghold of Derna are forcing girls as young as 12 into marriage in		
178 Morocca	another case, the brother of a 15-year-old French girl, Nora el-Bathy, the daughter of		
179 Morocca	another case, the brother of a 15-year-old French girl, Nora el-Bathy, the daughter of		
blankets, anything you wanted. You could even get girls." Soon the detainees were puzzled			
181	he converts going to the Islamic State are girls, girls with problems, girls who have been		

go through the changes on Monday morning." "Good girl. Off you go then." Anna wanted to e's western hostages? Where are the Bethnal Green girls? Crossing the river border into northern st chance to find out if any of the Bethnal Green girls have survived and made it to al-Hawl. Baghouz battle, in case any of the Bethnal Green girls have arrived there. I drive on to ttle away. I leave the names of the Bethnal Green girls on his desk, where a portrait of s: "I'm a sister from London. I'm a Bethnal Green girl." Shamima Begum, 19 years old and heavily ng. They are conservative Muslim, they don't have girlfriends, they don't talk to girls." The ut the real number is believed to be much higher. Girls sold for \$25, News, pages 8-9 Load-Date: felt the answer was obvious. He split up with his girlfriend, abandoned his plans to buy a house , said as he rose to leave the courtroom with his girlfriend and daughter. "What a waste." The "Within days, he had stopped drinking; left his girlfriend; and joined Hizb ut-Tahrir, quickly up his studies and his job and broke up with his girlfriend. In September 2014, Mr. Roy told up his studies and his job and broke up with his girlfriend. In September 2014, Mr. Roy told e Iraq invasion. That same day, Ibrahim asked his girlfriend to be his wife. She said yes, but t, like the thrill of his first protest, when his girlfriend whispered in his ear her excitement state: "Our Dhakarji used to say we will bring in girls from Bihar. Now they say Kashmir is y both sides. These included the rape of an Iraqi girl and the killing of her and her family by of the Devil's Generation (Thatcher), a failed It girl and cabinet wannabe, an anti-Semite, a lass, he threatened to break the neck of a Jewish girl -resulting in his expulsion and an order ck on the 400-bed hospital in Kabul, he kidnapped girls and beheaded elders in front of their l keep you inside forever. Mukdad and his Kurdish girlfriend, Berivan Ahmad, 24, lived among f the truth. She was fearless... A little Kurdish girl from Kobani faced a brutal militia and arity and fear that accompanied them; the Kurdish girls with guns opposing the jihadists. There y." As the terrorist group has gained more land, girls and women -they need to be under 26, y." As the terrorist group has gained more land, girls and women -they need to be under 26, t exist for these people. They were raping little girls and selling them at markets. It was ients. "Most often, it is the feeling of a little girl angry at her mother." Set up in January ents. "Most often, it is the feeling of a little girl angry at her mother." Set up in January epsis. In short, IHMS recommended that the little girl be urgently medically evacuated, to a epsis. In short, IHMS recommended that the little girl be urgently medically evacuated, to a Z18 was born in Nauru on 5 June 2016. This little girl became ill in June 2018 and her illness

182

tell

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213	Z18 was born in Nauru on 5 June 2016. This little girl became ill in June 2018 and her illness
214	, saying, "You can just forget about this little girl, because she is never coming back." The
215	ond to her medical needs. The case of this little girl demonstrates that decisions about medical
216	ond to her medical needs. The case of this little girl demonstrates that decisions about medical
217	over to Iraqi intelligence officers. "The little girl had burns to her legs and hands," Major
218	Raqqa. The lessons have taken a hold. The little girl has even approached strangers to ask if
219 220	long strands of black hair, that it was a little girl, smashed against the wall by the her first-world country; however, the sick little girl was treated at the hospital in Papua New
221	her first-world country; however, the sick little girl was treated at the hospital in Papua New
222	-3C in that part of Syria. We have seen a little girl who will likely lose her fingers because
223	ia Torches flickered outside the church. Little girls wore their sparkly Easter best. Children
224	itizenship. Ms Begum was one of three east London girls who went to Syria in 2015. The
court 225	peal said that Ms Begum, one of three east London girls who went to Syria in 2015, could
only 226 227	y. "I was naughty," he said. "I did it to meet girls." Fares learned English before the oints out that many Muslim women- wives, mothers, girlfriends and aunts -have played a
pivotal 228	2015, he secretly married a burqa-wearing Muslim girl, 15, whom he had met on a website. A
229	he real drama occurs- like the 17-year-old Muslim girl in Melbourne whose claims to be
230	ion. Related: 'It's up to us to stop these Muslim girls making the worst mistake of their lives'
231	s in Somalia with suicide bombs and buried Muslim girls up to their necks in sand and stoned
232	s in Somalia with suicide bombs and buried Muslim girls up to their necks in sand and stoned
233 234	er or her older sister, 19-year-old Ayan. Neither girl will ever come back. Instead, they llage has been given its own cadet college, a new girls' high school, a market and poultry and
235	llage has been given its own cadet college, a new girls' high school, a market and poultry and
236 envision	n hidden, veiled and homebound, and nine-year-old girls can get married. The manifesto
237	and wearing a white T-shirt with the words "Obama Girl" emblazoned in black. "We are all
going 238	with AK-47s and BMWs. "Photographs like these, of girls and women engaging in weapons
training 239	o sexual slavery hundreds, possibly thousands, of girls and women in the past five months,
The 240	e Yazidi minority lived, carrying off hundreds of girls as sex slaves and forcing the remaining
241	e a case of one escapee who was one of a group of girls bought and raped by two Australian
242	nd their friends will move over. We have a lot of girls in the database who have been to school
243	igeria by Boko Haram to the continual shooting of girls in schools by the Taliban in Pakistan.

245	e feared the militants. "We heard many stories of girls kidnapped off the streets by the foreign
246	ound like many, I say. "There must be hundreds of girls wanting to go across," says Smith.
247	ound like many, I say. "There must be hundreds of girls wanting to go across," says Smith.
248	e said, 'Just bring your kids.' The proportion of girls who eventually make the transition from
249	said, 'Just bring your kids.' "The proportion of girls who eventually make the transition from
250	, with instructions encouraging sexual assault on girls who've not yet reached puberty."
251	e with instructions encouraging sexual assault on girls who've not yet reached puberty."
252	take your daughter as a bride for our men." One girl of 15 told how she was "married" and
253	ith her husband, but her children, a one-year-old girl and a three-month-old boy, had both
since 254	bed her as "an average, British, young, ordinary girl" who suffered, he said, from a lack of
255	hanged herself after being captured with 20 other girls, as young as 10, and instructed by
256	mist structure imposed by groups like Isis. Other girls have tried and failed to travel to Syria
257	r to travel and marry a fighter, and warned other girls not to consider travelling out alone to
258	garland their tweets with emojis, encourage other girls to come out to Syria and chastise men
259	ms intent on using her position to persuade other girls to join her. She tells her followers
260	garland their tweets with emojis, encourage other girls to come out to Syria and chastise men
261	rism police to find Begum, then 15, and two other girls, who slipped out of their homes in east
262	ndon. "If I spoke about the opposition, the other girls would be scared and give me weird
looks. 263	ans. They are all terrorists. And they say to our girls, 'I will have you in my bed and your
264	ans. They are all terrorists. And they say to our girls, 'I will have you in my bed and your
265	e last Isis bastion in the Old City said the pale girl with light auburn hair was an enemy
266	exibility and local input. Some Taliban permitted girls' education, even distributing class
267	d sudden violence of an air strike- with one poor girl literally vaporised before our eyes -he
268	um has said she had not wanted to become a poster girl for the group: "I didn't want to be on
269 circumst 270	e" and how to punish them. Sex with pre-pubescent girls is allowed under certain ances. tion for sexual slavery and abuse of prepubescent girls. Ms Bishop told parliament some
women 271	Muslim men are given licence to rape prepubescent girls -captured in war. The institute also
has 272	rock group Nirvana and dated one of the prettiest girls in his school before converting to Islam

nd their friends will move over. We have a lot of girls in the database who have been to school

Southern Baptist, who dated one of the prettiest girls in his class. But in March he posted a

274 Southern Baptist, who dated one of the prettiest girls in his class. But in March he posted a 275 e Islamic State. "I said: 'Are there some pretty girls? Maybe I will go there and settle down,' nd social services officials. "She was a problem girl," said a longtime neighbor, who spoke on 276 277 the Islamic State are girls, girls with problems, girls who have been prostitutes, girls with 278 s with problems, girls who have been prostitutes, girls with psychological and behavioral 279 ibed his mother as a "typical Southern Protestant girl". Friends from his home town of Daphne, 280 ribed his mother as a typical Southern Protestant girl". Friends from his home town of Daphne, around the corner, and opposite the Whalley Range girls school that was once attended by the 281 282 ose between conversion to Islam and death, raping girls as young as nine, selling women at slave 283 rity to settle petty quarrels or exact revenge." Girls who were fighting would go to the 284 ority to settle petty quarrels or exact revenge." Girls who were fighting would go to the 285 ; John Simpson Body The families of three runaway girls had their hopes dashed yesterday after 286 : The "Women of the Islamic State" manifesto says girls can be married at age 9. The Islamic 287 handling of the case of three east London school girls who joined Isis earlier this year, the 288 sed the Turkish border, the former private school girl told her parents that she wanted to 289 n have no idea what is happening to them. "We see girls who are bleeding heavily from their 290 lah he was a childhood friend of Abaaoud, sharing girls, drugs and prison before becoming a 291 journey. "May God protect you," a young shepherd girl offered on the slopes of a valley worn 292 or four terrifying hours, wounding a six-year-old girl and a older woman. The village was 293 come across the truncated body of a six-year-old girl, her brother dead nearby, her parents 294 tred of women in a tweet offering a Yazidi "slave girl" at a price of \$2500 with the execrable 295 the maximum is \$3000," said Abu Nasir. "The slave girls can be sold between fighters, but only nts list the number of wives, children and "slave girls" each had. A photo is also included. It 296 297 tter. "Anyone interested got 1 of 7 yehzidi slave girls for sale," Elomar wrote. "\$2500 each â€ 298 g held and that the price for an adolescent slave girl is about \$124. About five million people 299 all your needs- even the money to purchase slave girls." Jamal defected during his first year. 300 d nearly 300 teenage girls in Nigeria. While some girls escaped the initial abduction, none have 301 intelligent and passionate. "Ruqia was a special girl. She was sensitive and felt the pain of 302 n in Pakistan. These attacks are intended to stop girls acquiring the tools, such as education, 303 ly afterwards the families of the three surviving girls lost all contact with them, which had

of the judges tells her. "You are really a sweet girl." That was the Betsy her parents knew. by then emigrated with his wife. He met a Syrian girlfriend; they married and had three staged a fight with toy guns. When a young Syrian girl walked past them, they pounced on hows you the picture on his cellphone of a Syrian girl who was just taken across the river to the hands of alleged thieves and stoning teenage girls accused of adultery. They also exacted s. As well as the young men, at least two teenage girls are also understood to have travelled failed to travel to Syria- including two teenage girls from West Yorkshire and Surrey who on and Political Violence has traced four teenage girls from Portsmouth, London and Surrey on in Europe has focused on three missing teenage girls from London who were believed to be is Portsmouth. At least eight men and two teenage girls have travelled from the naval port to thought to be as many as a dozen British teenage girls in the Islamist-held regions of northern n last April when it kidnapped nearly 300 teenage girls in Nigeria. While some girls escaped thought to be as many as a dozen British teenage girls in the Islamist-held regions of northern me ways it's not so shocking: a sheltered teenage girl's infatuation with a famous bad boy. She me ways it's not so shocking: a sheltered teenage girl's infatuation with a famous bad boy. She online sex groomers as they try to entice teenage girls into lives of sexual and domestic y an undercover team posing online as two teenage girls. Officers from the Metropolitan shed into calling their parents infidels, teenage girls sold into marriage. One woman arrived shed into calling their parents infidels, teenage girls sold into marriage. One woman arrived rhood, which was especially important for teenage girls, the report says. "Much has been posed the grooming and funding of British teenage girls to move to Syria to become jihadist her, who was a government prosecutor. The teenage girl was engaged to the son of the amily, including two pregnant women and a teenage girl, were shot during a night raid by n London said they were looking for three teenage girls who are suspected of traveling to e to face it: in the space of 23 days the teenage girl who came to me in the hope of help has ideo footage has emerged of three British teenage girls who are believed to have entered Syria jee, who represents the families of three teenage girls who recently absconded to Syria. "They s is allowed under certain circumstances. Teenage girls who escaped Isis were interviewed by , the alternative is clear. On Ask.fm one teenage girl writes: "I have literally no money to mage of Islamic State is the face of a terrorised girl. The weeping Yazidi child enslaved by

304

305

306

her, 307

308

309

310

were

who 312

313

314

315

the 316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

325

326

327

329

330

331

The

332

333

Syria 328

made of 324

police

overed from the rubble in separate locations. The girl, a Russian speaker about four years old, ur and a half where she described the fate of the girls after they arrived in Syria. Though the to be a daughter. Sources who know Cotton put the girl's age at about two to three. At one king up arms against the Assad regime. One of the girls -aged 17 -has spoken in blog posts of dova said in the village of Delichoban, where the girls, ages 6 and 7, now live. Novruzova's ing)!" Kassab wrote in an internet post after the girl -approached patients at a medical clinic. transfer of \$5000 to Islamic State. Atai and the girl are in jail after having been refused he families. Before they would hide but after the girls are married to the jihadist commanders ys the profile of Isis recruits has changed. "The girls are getting younger," she says as his sisters were enthralled. From then on the girls' behaviour quickly changed. By 2013, im, as Scotland Yard originally characterised the girls. But the case will pose a dilemma for adicalized." There would be no penalties for the girls, but for adults, Ms. May said, it is ten years in jail if they return to Britain. The girls' families could not be reached last \$700 in combat pay, Naeem's world collapsed. The girl's family, he was told, had given up ested in Guildford Park yesterday morning and the girl's family were crying and screaming as ening circle, she says, "by association: 'Oh, the girl five years above me made it to Syria.' ening circle, she says, "by association: 'Oh, the girl five years above me made it to Syria.' slim cleric accused her of burning the Koran. The girl fled to Canada with her parents in s have said that they were now confident that the girls fleeing Isis were not their daughters. A milies have said they were now confident that the girls fleeing Isis were not their daughters. A s desperate search for his daughters as about the girls' flight. Sadiq is a glorious figure. He nathan Ames; Richard Ford Body Shamima Begum, the girl from London who became an Islamic State el to Syria are also incredibly young- as are the girls from Tower Hamlets. To suggest that, as re information after it had become clear that the girls had flown to Turkey and caught a bus to at Gatwick Airport, near London, showed that the girls had boarded a flight to Istanbul, stood police were alerted by a family member. The girls have been released without charge. A s a man of action and strong moral character. The girl is drawn by his fervour, his notoriety, eir daughter, few parents can say no, even if the girl is underage. The events of Saturday 5 s a man of action and strong moral character. The girl is drawn by his fervour, his notoriety, eir daughter, few parents can say no, even if the girl is underage. The events of Saturday could grandchildren, who are in the al-Hawl camp. "The girl is supposed to be studying," she said.

334

335

336 stage 337

338

339

340

341

342

343 two 344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

March.

Thursday. The ITV News channel also said that the girl, Kadiza Sultana, 17, had become r example, one teacher observed that although the girl knew a string of languages it seemed apital, calling for government action to free the girls. Meanwhile, Nigeria's military said it and energy of the organisation. Also in 2010 the girls' mother employed a young, dynamic ected that the woman-- Hayat Boumeddiene, 26, the girlfriend of Amedy Coulibaly, believed . He said that the next thing he knew, he saw the girl on television -- and that he had never tly responsible if authorities failed to find the girls. One European diplomat in Ankara said nsom was paid, and the Swedish government and the girl's parents have declined to provide the school, she said everyone was hoping for the girls' safe return but her thoughts were also er away. On one of her social media profiles, the girl said she had stopped talking to many of for 600 pupils, but it is faring better than the girls' school, which has yet to recruit even cky Morgan, the education secretary, wrote to the girls' school Bethnal Green Academy to for 600 pupils, but it is faring better than the girls' school, which has yet to recruit even esperate ventures into Syria to try to rescue the girls. Seierstad builds the story layer upon in February 2015 shocked the country. One of the girls, Shamima Begum, 19, was tracked another room, in London, a woman is watching the girl. She's on her own computer, on the another room, in London, a woman is watching the girl. She's on her own computer, on the he act of lifting her niqab, a mystery ended. The girl sitting before me, alone in a teeming ing more than 550 women. The disappearance of the girls, straight-A students who had kept daughter was trapped under a collapsed wall. The girl survived and is with her mother in the nts say they were unaware of any link between the girls. This newspaper understands that both estigation exposed a plot to provide cash for the girls to travel to Syria. A white Muslim they stepped outside the departures area for the girls to play, shortly before the explosion. they stepped outside the departures area for the girls to play, shortly before the explosion. 25 years old," she said. She was the first of the girls to marry, to the Dutchman from Arnhem, city of Erbil said he had been approached by the girl's uncle, who he said worked for Unicef, stant Boko Haram attacks," Leahy said. Since the girls were taken, Boko Haram has killed at at focused worldwide attention on Boko Haram, the girls were thought to have been brought happened I just dont talk to anyone anymore." The girl, who was not on a police radar until were both arrested a week ago. Police allege the girl, who cannot be named, was used by

365

366

she

367

368

369

to be 370

371

372

any 373

374

375

376

offer 377

378

379

380

381

382

383

385

386

387

388

389

390

391

392

there.

now, 394

Merhi

secret 384

down by

eft the group in its death throes and saluted the girls who stayed. Life in Raqqa, married to a y'll get a male foreign fighter in a room and the girls will all walk up and down covered and y'll get a male foreign fighter in a room and the girls will all walk up and down covered and nce joked that I was tempted to call my book "The Girl With the Hammer and Sickle Tattoo", sation in 2015 when it gave an assurance that the girls would be treated as victims as long as sation in 2015 when it gave an assurance that the girls would be treated as victims as long as tern Union from Isis sources to London, where the girls would use it to buy tickets to travel to suspect colleagues of stealing their money, their girlfriends and their power. By the end, the raped. "They see it as a way of protecting their girls from something worse." She added: "As tries are full of moderate Muslims who want their girls to have an education, they want the at parents she had spoken to were terrified their girls would be raped. "They see it as a way of rming" number of children in Africa- most of them girls -had been used as suicide bombers by from flying only through the actions of his then girlfriend, who duped him into believing that There is nothing particularly special about these girls, apart from the public reaction that has lex issue, highlighted by Begum's situation. This girl was 15 when she went off to join the or six years? The inconsistency is obvious. This girl succumbed to fanaticism and the siren and threatening to sell them into slavery. Those girls are still missing, and Boko Haram has egally children, and, in the case of one of those girls, the government and the police have "But it was O.K. for them, contacting all those girls to bring them in," Aws recalled later, ld. "But it was OK for them, contacting all those girls to bring them in," Aws recalls, rolling ed up adolescent brides and stoned to death those girls who refused. Until the advent of the unday Times, also showed her five children: three girls and two boys. She did not explain why ranean coast, was quoted as saying that the three girls, and eight other foreign nationals who

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

best 405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

It's now believed that the three girls from Tower Hamlets have crossed the ur heartfelt wishes to the relatives of the three girls in Mosul. It cannot be easy for the ur heartfelt wishes to the relatives of the three girls in Mosul. It cannot be easy for the said, referring to the disappearance of the three girls. "We all have a role to play in ice have appealed for information about the three girls, who flew to Turkey last week without ethnal Green Academy, which was attended by three girls who ran away to Syria, the senior thes, young men and boys wore suits and bow ties, girls wore dresses with frills. Shahla went lamic State (Isis) is offering cash incentives to girls as young as 17 to marry fighters in , they don't have girlfriends, they don't talk to girls." The Press Association reported that om island to island, going to parties, talking to girls. Three months later, he ran out of

428	ed to marry a fighter, and there was the Tunisian girl next door who burst into tears every time
429	ed to marry a fighter, and there was the Tunisian girl next door who burst into tears every time
430	the marriage. "We now hope to invite the Turkish girl to Kabul to marry him again," Zamani
431	were supporters of Islamic State and included two girls, aged just nine and 12. A total of 14
432	also cited the rape by extremist fighters of two girls, ages 6 and 9. A pregnant married
woman, 433	tor. "Both were dead, and I thought of my own two girls and started crying, even though death
434	had died in the war. Ms Begum said the other two girls were present in the pocket of Isis
435	een so many fight jihad in Syria and at least two girls, Zahra and Salma Halane, dubbed the
436	be to go back. The story concerns a two-year-old girl known as DIZ18. Her parents fled Iran
to 437	be to go back. The story concerns a two-year-old girl known as DIZ18. Her parents fled Iran
to 438	ies and communities have been uncovered, underage girls among their thousands of victims.
Last 439	means of repression, terror and control. In war, girls were far more likely to be raped, forced
440	content of these messages to jihadis from Western girls: "I'd say 90 per cent of the Ask.fm
441	t of these messages to jihadis from young western girls: "I'd say 90 per cent of the Ask.fm
442	i, Christian as well as Turkmen and Shabak women, girls and boys, and reports of savage
rapes, 443	e barricades in Finally leaving KandaharA working girl at Glastonbury 12 The death toll from
444	ans: "A child dead on a hospital table, a wounded girl in her father's arms, a mother screaming,
445	e." A smuggler who specialised in slipping Yazidi girls across the border took her to Turkey;
446	d allow them to enter the US. Around 5,000 Yazidi girls and women like Haifa were enslaved
by 447 448	its operations, such as selling adolescent Yazidi girls into slavery. In the Syrian city of h foreign fighter who has repeatedly raped Yazidi girls manages to go back to his country
449	the Yazidis and why is Isis hunting them? Yazidi girls over the age of eight and under the age
450	ly to go to the US," Dakhil said. "But the Yazidi girl who was raped repeatedly by the same
451	o], the emirs would take [ethnic minority] Yazidi girls without getting married to them."
452 453	r and a bright student, but in his teenage years" girlfriends and parties" changed his 1947, and to Britain in 1958 when she was a young girl. After an arranged marriage in
Pakistan 454	elieved to be married to fighters, and says young girls are travelling out unaccompanied to the
455	as Foreign Minister Julie Bishop warned of young girls being radical-ised in Australia to act
456	to leave. It's the rest of your life." The young girls in their bedrooms in Birmingham -don't
457	to leave. It's the rest of your life." The young girls in their bedrooms in Birmingham -don't
458	ilot is burned alive for being the enemy; a young girl is incinerated for refusing deprayed acts

459 extremely concerned for the safety of these young girls," Richard Waldon, the commander of a 460 i Faisal. Then he realised the victim was a young girl. Roni didn't hesitate. He scooped her up xt to the main bed was a picture drawn by a young girl that shows a house and stick figures 461 with 462 n in a burka, thought to be his wife, and a young girl thought to be his daughter. MPs have 463 we believe." Remonstrating with the unnamed young girl's uncle sitting nearby, Abu Saif said: 464 y inclined. There are questions about how a young girl was exposed to extremist ideology some 8 in Greenwich, southeast London, she was a young girl when her parents divorced and just 465 ten 466 n officers immediately moved in to rescue a young girl who was standing nearby (2). The man, who 467 the prime suspect in a plot to provide the young girls with cash and offer them intensive critically. Many victims were teenagers and young girls, with parents in tow, who idolized Ms. 468 469 ly to resurface in the Isis-held territory. Young girls with no apparent access to money have 470 critically. Many victims were teenagers and young girls, with parents in tow, who idolized

## **Texts used in CDA**

#### Text 1

### The Guardian, 2014

Police battling to prevent young Muslims heading to Syria to fight in the country's bitter civil war will today gamble that they can persuade women in the community to inform on family members determined to head to the war zone.

Counter-terrorism officers, fearful that some of those fighting in Syria will return to Britain radicalised with the ability to carry out violent acts on British soil, hope that female family members will curb the numbers of people intent on taking up arms against the Assad regime.

Deputy assistant commissioner Helen Ball, senior national coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said: "We want to ensure that people, particularly women, who are concerned about their loved ones are given enough information about what they can do to prevent this from happening. We want to increase their confidence in the police and partners to encourage them to come forward so that we can intervene and help. This is not about criminalising people. It is about preventing tragedies."

However, critics of the scheme - which is due to be unveiled formally today - said there was no evidence that women were always aware of what young people were doing. Nor was it the case that Muslim women were able or willing to inform on friends or family members.

Sajda Mughal of the Jan Trust, which aims to empower disadvantaged women and is supporting the nationwide police campaign, said: "Women are agents of change, particularly mums in the home. They are the ones who can nurture and safeguard their children."

She said concerned women unable to talk to their relatives or partners could call the police, which might lead to interventions from youth workers, not necessarily from police officers, amid concerns that turning to the authorities could lead to more British Muslims being criminalised.

Estimates put the number of Britons who have travelled to Syria at up to 400, with as many as 20 estimated to have been killed. Police say so far this year the number of "Syria-related arrests" has increased substantially, to 40 between January and March, compared with 25 people in the whole of 2013.

Last week it emerged that 18-year-old Abdullah Deghayes, from Brighton, had died during fighting in Kassab. Abdul Waheed Majeed, 41, from Crawley, died in February when taking part in a suicide bombing mission in Aleppo.

The police campaign will operate on a national basis with regional counter-terrorism units also trying to encourage women in Muslim communities to share any concerns.

Keith Vaz, chair of the Commons home affairs committee, whose report into counter-terrorism is out in a fortnight, said the strategy might struggle. "There is no evidence that families know. Young people are just leaving without telling families and their families are the last to know," he said. "The evidence we received is that the police don't know how to stop this."

Part of the concern in British Muslim communities stems from a mistrust of the UK authorities. Police have warned that anyone travelling to Syria should expect to be scrutinised, while the UK government has condemned the Assad regime, which is accused of atrocities.

In some parts of the Muslim community, confidence in the police is low. Martin Innes, professor of police science at Cardiff University, said older Muslim women had less trust in the police than the rest of the population. Innes, who co-authored research for the Association of Chief Police Officers in 2011 on the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation strategies, said: "People are unlikely to have proof someone is going to Syria, but have a sense of unease."

The challenge facing the UK is complex, and is not just confined to young men hoping to take up arms against forces still loyal to Assad. A handful of young women have also travelled to Syria, apparently to marry English-speaking foreign fighters. The King's College London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence has traced four teenage girls from Portsmouth, London and Surrey who are in Syria, believed to be married to fighters, and says young girls are travelling out unaccompanied to the area, something not seen before.

In some cases information from family members has prevented people travelling to Syria, suggesting that the police appeal could be fruitful. Two 17-year-old girls were arrested at Heathrow in January en route to Istanbul, and police suspect to Syria. It is understood police were alerted by a family member. The girls have been released without charge.

A Syria-related terrorism trial opens next month at Kingston crown court involving Mashudur Choudhury. The 30-year-old is charged with the preparation of terrorist acts under section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Choudhury was arrested last year at Gatwick after arriving back in the country. He denies the charge.

The campaign will also urge people appalled by the humanitarian disaster in Syria not to travel there but instead to donate to charities working in the area.

Michelle Russell of the Charity Commission said: "We want everyone to make informed choices about which charities to support and how to support them so that they can feel confident that their contribution really will make a difference to the humanitarian effort."

Atif Iqbal, of the United Birmingham campaign, who travelled to Syria to deliver food, said clarity was needed about how people could provide humanitarian help within the law. "What is the legal framework - that is what we need some clarity on. It's very ambiguous," he said.

Asim Qureshi of the civil liberties group CAGE, said: "In light of the increasing hostile environment for British Muslims expressing sympathy for the plight of the Syrian people, CAGE is concerned that the police campaign has the potential to result in a McCarthyite witch hunt."

### Text 2 The Australian, 2014

Why would an educated Western woman go to Syria to marry a man she has never met and live under sharia law?

IN a bedroom in Birmingham, Eng-land, a well-educated 15-year-old girl logs on to her computer and leaves another hopeful message for Omar Yilmaz: "You have beautiful eyes," this one reads. "I just want to be with you." Compared with the boys she knows at home, Yilmaz - a soldier in the Dutch army not long ago, now living in Syria - is a man of action and strong moral character. The girl is drawn by his fervour, his notoriety, his good looks and the pictures he often posts on the internet of stray kittens nestled in the crook of his machinegun. She has read - and disregarded - the reports of mass rapes and sex slavery perpetrated by jihadis against Christian women in Syria.

When news broke that another girl - 19-year-old Aicha, a Catholic - had met Yilmaz online, converted, then run off to Syria to marry him, she felt, frankly, jealous. In some ways it's not so shocking: a sheltered teenage girl's infatuation with a famous bad boy. She comes from a strict family. Her parents are convinced she will go to medical school and become a doctor. All she thinks about is running away to become a jihadi bride.

In another room, in London, a woman is watching the girl. She's on her own computer, on the website Ask.fm where Yilmaz and other Islamic State fighters can often be found updating the world on their jihadist thoughts and activities. Today Yilmaz has about 2000 messages; so many that when she downloads them, Melanie Smith's laptop crashes. It never fails to stun, amuse or trouble her - the overriding content of these messages to jihadis from Western girls: "I'd say 90 per cent of the Ask.fm messages to these jihadi men are marriage proposals. It's: 'You're so attractive. Will you marry me if I come to Syria?' "Smith is 22, the same age as Khadijah Dare, a London woman who arranged to marry an Islamic State fighter via Facebook, moved to Syria in 2012 to wed him and now posts photographs of her four-year-old son holding an AK47 rifle. She is two years older than Aqsa Mahmood, the radiography degree dropout from Glasgow who was reported missing by her parents a year ago, then surfaced in February, also in Syria, having married an Islamic State fighter and become one of the group's most hardline internet activists under a new name, Umm Layth. She is six years older than Salma and Zahra Halane, the twins from Manchester who left home in the middle of the night in July for Syria, via a flight to Turkey. Smith's job is to track them.

We arrange to meet off the Strand, in London, in a cafe around the corner from King's College International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, the think tank Smith joined in January fresh from a master's in geopolitics, territory and security. In June Islamic State fighters first declared a new "Islamic caliphate" in the region that straddles Syria and Iraq. It is thought that 1000 men from Britain joined their ranks.

"I think," says Smith, "that's why so many women took up the call over the summer. Because the declaration said: 'We need doctors, lawyers, the pillars of foundation for a new state, but above all, women. No women with skills. Just men with skills. And women - separately." As the terrorist group has gained more land, girls and women - they need to be under 26, unmarried and pretty, their potential husbands will emphasise when quizzed on such matters on the internet - have become a key element of Islamic State building.

Their online activism is prolific, ardent, bloodthirsty and confusing: why would an educated Western woman want to travel to Syria, marry a man she has never met and live under sharia law in a mongrel state where healthcare is rudimentary and where women are sub-ordinated to and controlled by men? The dream of every jihadi-wife wannabe, as articulated in her secret Facebook account, is: "I can't wait to have my own jihadi baby." "When I started we had a database of about 515 male foreign fighters which we researched through social media," explains Smith. "We're now hoping to create the same thing, but for women - women that we know of who have gone to live in the Islamic State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe who have attempted to go to Syria or who have made it there; 11 of them are British. "Seven operate and live together and are all married to husbands who fight together." They swap recipes online (food for bulking up their war-torn husbands), garland their tweets with emojis, encourage other girls to come out to Syria and chastise men who haven't done so as un-Islamic "kuffar cowards".

Umm Layth runs a blog 600 pages long and posts messages up to 200 times a day. She has become the goto jihadi bride for advice on what you'll need to bring if you go there: warm clothes and a lifetime's supply of Dairy Milk. (Hair straighteners and deodorant are available.) Like many of her British "sisters" she has a fanatic's zeal that makes her an outstanding enforcer of the moral standards of other women in the fledgling state she is attempting to help create.

Umm Layth is one of several British women who are thought to form a police force in Raqqa, making sure the wrists of other women are covered at all times they appear in public, as she does in her own selfies, covered in a niqab that obscures even her eyes. She dislikes Twitter as a social medium because of the "free mixing".

She posts her favourite hadiths in capitals: "THE BEST OF WOMEN ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT SEE THE MEN AND WHO ARE NOT SEEN BY MEN." But Smith detects in her messaging a change of tone: "The Twitter account that she used to have just didn't match up with her blog. She was very much making contact with other women out there and posting photos of them together and saying, 'I'm going to make you this for dinner, isn't it going to be great?' And yet the blog is very formal and devout - she seemed a lot older. And you have to wonder: how much control does someone have?" It's always possible that behind any woman blogging on behalf of Islamic State is a man with a gun.

Much as we'd like to regard them as victims, however, Smith says there are indications that British women are involved in running brothels for Islamic State fighters, a not unbelievable notion when you look at the comment that another British female jihadi, Umm Farriss, wrote recently on social media complaining that a sex slave had dared to look her in the eye.

"I wish I did it," is how another young woman responded when she was asked on social media about the beheading by Islamic State men of Israeli-American journalist Steven Sotloff. "Boom Boom Day" is how a friend of hers refers to September 11.

A tweet on the suspended Twitter account of an unidentified female friend and associate of Layth's reads: "Drove passed the body of the man who was crucified in manbij for raping a 70 year old. Perks of living under the shade of Shariah." Eleven British jihadi brides doesn't sound like many, I say. "There must be hundreds of girls wanting to go across," says Smith. "Hundreds. I come across girls every day who say, 'I'm so desperate to go over there but it's just so hard for me.' I saw someone say this morning, 'I want to come but I'm a full-time mum.' And someone said, 'Just bring your kids.' "The proportion of girls who eventually make the transition from wanting to go to physically going is tiny. But there are so many people that want to go. And it's fairly overwhelming." Tighter border controls mean the journey to becoming a jihadi bride is trickier now than it was during the northern summer, but the principle is the same: get to Turkey, by flying there direct or flying first to Amsterdam or Spain and then flying to Turkey, and get a bus to the border, where your fixer will pick you up, hide you in his truck and drive the dangerous route through contested territory to Raqqa.

Finding a fixer is difficult but getting married is a cinch: "The pairing is very quick," says Smith. "I was talking to a girl on Ask.fm and asked her whether there was a jihadi Tinder. She told me there is a thing called Jihad Matchmaker that works on Twitter: you follow it, it follows you back, you send a picture of yourself with your veil and the men choose from hundreds of headshots." Another girl Smith spoke to told her: "A lot of the time they'll do a parade. They'll get a male foreign fighter in a room and the girls will all walk up and down covered and the fighter will then get the opportunity to look at their face and he will choose one." Prospective wives are advised by female jihadis to "bring something nice to wear because there aren't any shops left that sell wedding outfits".

In the press these women are often referred to as "female fighters", but that is a misnomer, Smith says. "It's very much a domestic housewife role" at best. "It's not much of a life. You also have to wonder - in a few years' time, these women who are being impregnated: what about their kids and the kids they bring with them? And the children of the Yazidi women being used as sex slaves. Is the idea that these women and their daughters are going to be living in a permanent special-purpose ghetto? Are there going to be women that are going to be abused in the same way for generations?" Many women are lured to jihad for humanitarian reasons, but it's notable, says Smith, how much more hardline than the men they can become once they leave for Syria. "On Monday, the women were writing messages like 'Thank God those soldiers have been beheaded.' "This morning, "a girl had tweeted a picture of Adolf Hitler with the words, 'I could have extinguished every Jew in Europe but I left them so you would be able to do it for me.' This was a British woman." Islamic State is a religious quest, supposedly, but it's sometimes easier to understand the women who want to join it if you think of it simply as an extreme, authoritarian, "revolutionary" cult or sect populated by a good many stragglers, petty criminals, dropouts and fugitives from unhappy or constricted childhoods and ruled over with an iron fist by a charismatic, brutal man. Think of the Manson Family or Jonestown.

The recruits of Islamic State are often dropouts or ex-criminals. Often they are just malleable or lost or looking for a cause. For women, Smith says, the lure is independence. "They say they have more freedom in Islamic State: they see eight women living in a house in Raqqa who all get on famously and they tweet each other all the time. That's something they haven't had, the sense of community and independence. A lot of them could be pissed off with their parents for whatever reason: 'I'm going to run away and go on an amazing adventure.' "What is the amazing adventure likely to look like once they get to Syria? "We can only speculate," says Smith, "but obviously the -reality is not that great." About 100 Islamic State men, originally from Britain, have returned from Syria citing injuries, but returning home will not be an option for women.

Take Sabina Selimovic, 15, and Samra Kesinovic, 17, who left Austria for Syria in April. In October reports surfaced that both girls wanted out. Shortly afterwards, Selimovic gave an interview dismissing the claims. Austrian authorities believe she was ordered to do so. In another case, the brother of a 15-year-old French girl, Nora el-Bathy, the daughter of Moroccan immigrants, travelled to Syria to bring her home but was blocked by her fixer. The brother said her face looked yellow and that she was being held in a house against her will with other women and girls. "The people around you and the entire state in which you live would probably kill you if you said you wanted to go home openly," says Smith. "Once you're there you're not supposed to leave. It's the rest of your life." The young girls in their bedrooms in Birmingham - don't they

worry about what will happen to them if they leave for Syria? "They want to go so badly and they believe with complete conviction that's the path. ISIS (Islamic State) thinks there is no such thing as rape, so I think these women accept it as their due." There are just two so-called "reverts" - converts to Islam - among the jihadi brides Smith is monitoring. Does she think there will be more in the future? "If someone's staying in their bedroom, hates their life, hates their parents and wants to do something drastic, that is one option now that never used to exist." She adds: "In your very Muslim community, in whichever UK city, it's considered desirable and your obligation to Islam: someone breaks out of the group and moves to Syria and tells their friends what a great time they're having and their friends will move over. We have a lot of girls in the database who have been to school together but have gone at different times." It's an ever-widening circle, she says, "by association: 'Oh, the girl five years above me made it to Syria.'

#### Text 3

#### The Sydney Morning Herald, 2015

Up to 40 Australian women have either joined terror groups abroad or are supporting them from home, the Abbott government has said as it prepares to expand the nation's contribution to the fight against the Islamic State.

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop told federal Parliament on Wednesday that more young people and women were travelling to Syria and Iraq to join groups such as the Islamic State.

"Yet more women are either joining their foreign fighter husbands or are apparently seeking to find partners ??? the so called jihadi brides ??? or are otherwise providing support for terrorist organisations," she said. As Fairfax Media reported on Saturday, the Abbott government is poised to announce it will send between 200 and 300 Australian Defence Force troops to train the Iraqis on bases in conjunction with New Zealand forces.

The national security committee of Cabinet met on Tuesday night and is understood to have discussed the deployment. Prime Minister Tony Abbott said on Wednesday he would have more to say on the issue soon. The Chief of the Defence Force Mark Binskin confirmed to a Senate estimates hearing on Wednesday he had worked with his New Zealand counterpart on a further training mission to Iraq but said "no final decision" had been made by the Abbott government.

Fairfax Media understands that the new training force will remain "behind the wire" on bases. Senior sources have told Fairfax Media that the new training forces are expected to start work in the war-torn country by the middle of this year.

But the 200 commandos currently on the ground are expected to start drawing down over the second half of 2015, meaning that by the end of the year, the total number of Australians on the ground will only be slightly higher than it is now.

Ms Bishop said it "defies logic" that women would join groups like the Islamic State.

"We know the attitude of Daesh towards women," she said, using the Arabic acronym for the group. "If the killings and executions aren't enough, Daesh has published instructions on the treatment of sexual slaves which includes raping and beating women. Even children are not immune with instructions encouraging sexual assault on girls who've not yet reached puberty."

Secretary of the Defence Department Dennis Richardson warned in the Senate hearing that Islamic State was a formidable fighting force commanded by experienced leaders, and said it would likely be three years before the Iraqi security forces were able to provide stability in the country.

"It is not a rabble of immature foreign fighters that is running around on the back of utes," he said.

"It is led by experienced former Iraqi generals and others with substantial military experience. As brutal and as nasty and terrible as ... they are, as an enemy, you shouldn't underestimate their capability."

#### Text 4

#### The Australian, 2018

Anti-jihad legislation should be enforced as a deterrent

On Friday we reported the first case of an Australian "jihadi" wife and child returning after a lengthy stay in the badlands of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The woman's terrorist husband, a hardcore fighter, was killed in battle and her return to Sydney was negotiated with Australian authorities. There will be other such returns, and they have troubling implications. More than 200 Australian nationals travelled to Syria to wage jihad (perhaps half are still alive) and as many as 70 Australian children were caught up in the conflict. This first returnee has been judged not to be a threat and has reportedly engaged with deradicalisation activities,

but as a group, former foreign fighters and their Islamist families pose potentially very high risks to our national security and civil society. They will prove a significant extra burden for counter-terrorism agencies, which already have large caseloads of local extremists to monitor and neutralise. The task will be less difficult if authorities can enlist the good sense and co-operation of mainstream Muslims, whose own communities are at risk of destabilisation by returning jihadists. Like the growing numbers of Islamists in prison, former foreign fighters represent a dangerous source of radicalisation.

To discourage the export of Australian jihadis, the federal government made it a crime in 2014 to travel to Raqqa and Mosul, two key cities then under the control of Islamic State. The first returnee left Australia in 2015 and lived in Mosul. Despite this, she has not been charged under the foreign fighters legislation. We are not aware of the full particulars of her case but if she is not a perfect candidate for prosecution under that legislation, who will be? Unless the legislation is seen to be enforced, how can it function as a deterrent when the next Islamist front opens up overseas - possibly on our doorstep in Southeast Asia?One factor that may weigh in the minds of authorities is whether or not a returning (and co-operative) ex-jihadist has information about extremist networks valuable for counter-terrorism. This is a pragmatic consideration, the ultimate aim being the protection of Australian life and liberty. We trust that border control authorities are taking the utmost pains to detect and deny entry to would-be migrants or asylum-seekers wedded to Islamist extremism. It's bad enough that the nation finds itself accepting the return of "Australian" jihadists whose actions and ideology reject everything our open, pluralist nation stands for.

## Text 5 The New York Times, 2019

The young woman said she thought she was going on vacation in Turkey, but instead found herself in Syria, tricked, she said, by her husband, who joined the Islamic State. She herself, she said, never subscribed to ISIS teaching.

But back in Kazakhstan, government psychologists are taking no chances. They have heard that story before. They have enrolled the young woman, Aida Sarina -- and scores of others who were once residents of the Islamic State -- in a program to treat Islamist extremism.

"They want to know if we are dangerous," said Ms. Sarina, who is 25 and has a young son.

Unlike virtually every Western country and most of the rest of the world, Kazakhstan is welcoming home women like Ms. Sarina -- albeit warily and despite the lack of proof that deradicalization programs work - rather than arresting them if they dare show up.

So like a scene from a prosecutor's daydream, a small hotel in the desert of western Kazakhstan is packed with these women, whom many governments view as terrorist suspects.

Men are allowed back, too, in Kazakhstan, though they face immediate arrest and the prospect of a 10-year prison term. Only a few have taken up the offer.

At the treatment site, the Rehabilitation Center of Good Intentions, the women are provided nannies to look after their children, fed hot meals and treated by doctors and psychologists, testing the soft-touch approach to people affiliated with a terrorist group.

For Ms. Sarina, it is a far cry from her previous life in a fetid refugee camp in Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria, a human refuse heap of thousands of former Islamic State residents despised by most of the world.

Having somebody now ask how she felt was amazing, she said. "It was like your mother forgot to pick you up from kindergarten, but then remembered and came back for you," she said.

Rather than treating the women as criminals, the professionals at the rehabilitation center encourage the women to talk about their experiences.

"We teach them to listen to the negative feelings inside," Lyazzat Nadirshina, one psychologist, said of the method. "Why is that negative feeling bubbling up?" she said she asks her patients. "Most often, it is the feeling of a little girl angry at her mother."

Set up in January to quickly process scores of women whose radical ideas might only ossify if they were thrown in prison for long spells, the center's services are not so much for the benefit of the women as the society they will soon rejoin, organizers say.

The Islamic State recruited more than 40,000 foreign fighters and their families from 80 countries over its quick arc from expansion to collapse, from 2014 until this year. American-backed Kurdish militias in Syria still hold at least 13,000 foreign ISIS followers in overflowing camps, including at least 13 Americans.

American diplomats have been pressuring countries to repatriate their citizens, though with not much

"Governments are not big fans of experimenting with this group because the risks are too high," said Liesbeth van der Heide, an expert on Islamic radicalization at the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague.

What's more, she said, studies of deradicalization programs going back decades have failed to show clear benefits.

Governments have tried it on neo-Nazis, members of the Red Brigades and IRA militants, among others, with mixed results. "Does it really matter if you go through a rehab program?" she said. "We don't know."

Yekaterina Sokirianskaya, the director of the Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center, said deradicalization programs offer no guarantees but are an alternative to indefinite incarceration or capital punishment.

Western governments show little sympathy. Female suicide bombers are hardly a rarity. Britain and Australia have revoked the citizenship of nationals who joined the Islamic State. France allows its citizens be tried in Iraqi courts, where hundreds of people have been sentenced to death in trials that last just a few minutes.

Kazakhstan has sought a larger role in international diplomacy with a variety of initiatives to solve global problems, including once offering to dispose of other countries' nuclear waste on its territory. And to date, it is the only country with a large contingent of citizens in Syria to agree to repatriate all of them -- a total of 548, so far.

The program lasts about a month. The women meet individually and in small groups with psychologists. They undergo art therapy and watch plays put on by local actors that teach morality lessons on the pitfalls of radicalization.

"It's a success when they accept guilt, when they promise to relate to nonbelievers with respect and when they promise to continue studying," said Alim Shaumetov, the director of a nongovernmental group that helped design the curriculum.

"We don't offer 100 percent guarantees," he added. "If we manage to achieve 80 percent success, that is still success."

The everyday horror of life in the Islamic State soured some women on radicalism, Ms. Nadirshina, the psychologist, said. The very insecurity of their lives in recent years and months can be put to use in the deradicalization process, she said, by offering the women a safe and secure environment.

Conversely, she said, any threat from the government during this delicate period, like stern interrogations by police, would work at cross-purposes. The male soldiers on guard, for example, are under strict orders not to intimidate the women.

Still, most analysts of radicalism reject the view of ISIS brides as merely browbeaten young women under the thumb of terrorist husbands. Some fought, while others at the least nurtured their zealot spouses. Handling the women has become a puzzle as they lie on a scale someplace between victims and perpetrators.

Ms. Sarina said she was cured. She said that soon after they arrived in Syria, her husband died and she vanished into a so-called house of widows in Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State. Fighters regularly stopped by to pick out new brides, she said, but Ms. Sarina did not remarry.

As the fighting intensified, the ISIS official in charge of evacuating widows instead abandoned them in the desert, she said. They survived by eating grass. Some children froze to death on cold nights.

Now, Ms. Sarina said she was a mentor for other returning women in Kazakhstan, telling them ISIS failed to protect them so they should now trust the government. "I want the world to know it's wholly realistic to rehabilitate us," she said.

Still, Kenshilik Tyshkhan, a professor of religion who tries to persuade women in the program to adopt a moderate form of Islam, said in an interview that some women "express these ideas that a nonbeliever can be killed." And many show little remorse, he said.

"Everybody has a right to make a mistake," Gulpari Farziyeva, 31, said of her journey to Syria, and marriages over six years to a succession of Islamic State militants. Even three weeks into treatment, she seemed remarkably untroubled by the militant group's ways.

One day in Syria, she recalled, she was host at a dinner party at her apartment. While cooking dumplings and baking a cake, she dashed out to the market for a tablecloth she had forgotten to buy on an earlier trip.

At the market she saw a ghoulish scene, "five or six headless bodies," on the ground along with "a lot of blood." A public execution had taken place between her two trips. She averted her eyes, she said.

Nonetheless, she said, she bought the tablecloth and said the dinner party went swimmingly, with all the guests having a good time.

At another point, Ms. Farziyeva said, a militant living across the street was presented with an enslaved Yazidi concubine as a gift. "I was sorry for her," she said. "She was a woman, too." But as a non-Muslim, she said, the woman could not be taken in as a wife, with such rights as that entailed.

In the end though, Ms. Farziyeva expressed repentance. "I haven't met any sister with some ideology left inside her," she said. "We understand we were wrong."

## Text 6 The Times, 2014

In a bedroom in Birmingham, a well-educated 15-year-old girl logs on to her computer and leaves another hopeful message for Omar Yilmaz: "You have beautiful eyes," this one reads. "I just want to be with you." "Compared with the boys she knows at home, Yilmaz - a soldier in the Dutch army not long ago, now living in Syria - is a man of action and strong moral character. The girl is drawn by his fervour, his notoriety, his astonishing good looks and the pictures he often posts on the internet of stray kittens nestled in the crook of his machine gun. She has read - and disregarded - the reports of mass rapes and sex slavery perpetrated by jihadis against Christian women in Syria.

When news broke that another girl - 19-year-old "Aicha", a Catholic - had met Yilmaz online, converted, then run off to Syria to marry him, she felt, frankly, jealous. In some ways it's not so shocking: a sheltered teenage girl's infatuation with a famous bad boy. She comes from a strict family. Her parents are convinced she will go to medical school and become a doctor. All she thinks about is running away from England to become a jihadi bride.

In another room, in London, a woman is watching the girl. She's on her own computer, on the website Ask.fm where Yilmaz and other Islamic State (Isis) fighters can often be found updating the world on their jihadist thoughts and activities. Today Yilmaz has about 2,000 messages; so many that when she downloads them, Melanie Smith's laptop crashes. It never fails to stun, amuse or trouble her - the overriding content of these messages to jihadis from young western girls: "I'd say 90 per cent of the Ask.fm messages to these jihadi men are marriage proposals. It's: 'You're so attractive. Will you marry me if I come to Syria?' " Melanie Smith is 22, the same age as Khadijah Dare, a London woman who arranged to marry an Isis fighter via Facebook, moved to Syria in 2012 to wed him and now posts photographs of her four-year-old son holding an AK-47 rifle. She is two years older than Aqsa Mahmood, the radiography degree drop-out from Glasgow who was reported missing by her parents a year ago, then surfaced in February, also in Syria, having married an Isis fighter and become one of the group's most hardline internet activists under a new name, Umm Layth. She is six years older than Salma and Zahra Halane, the twins from Manchester - 28 GCSEs between them - who left their family home in the middle of the night in July for Syria, via a flight to Turkey. Smith's job is to track them.

We arrange to meet off the Strand, in London, in a café around the corner from King's College International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, the think-tank Smith joined in January fresh from a master's in geopolitics, territory and security. In June this year Isis fighters first declared a new "Islamic caliphate" in the region that straddles Syria and Iraq. It is thought that 1,000 men from Britain joined their ranks. "I think," says Smith, "that's why so many women took up the call over the summer. Because the declaration said: 'We need doctors, lawyers, the pillars of foundation for a new state, but above all, women with skills. Just men with skills. And women - separately.' " As the terrorist group has gained more land, girls and women - they need to be under 26, unmarried and pretty, their potential husbands will emphasise when quizzed on such matters on the internet - have become a key element of Islamic State building. Their online activism is prolific, ardent, bloodthirsty and confusing: why would an educated western woman want to travel to Syria, marry a man she has never met and live under Sharia in a mongrel state where healthcare is rudimentary and where women are subordinated to and controlled by men? The dream of every jihadi-wife wannabe, as articulated in her secret Facebook account, is: "I can't wait to have my own jihadi baby."

"When I started we had a database of about 515 male foreign fighters which we researched through social media," explains Smith. "We're now hoping to create the same thing, but for women - women that we know of who have gone to live in the Islamic State." She's in direct contact with 53 girls and women from Europe

who have either attempted to go to Syria or who have made it there; 11 of them are British. "Seven operate and live together and are all married to husbands who fight together." They swap recipes online (food for bulking up their wartorn husbands), garland their tweets with emojis, encourage other girls to come out to Syria and chastise men who haven't done so as unislamic "kuffar cowards".

Umm Layth runs a blog that's 600 pages long and posts messages up to 200 times a day. She's become the go-to jihadi bride for advice on what you'll need to bring if you go out there - warm clothes and a lifetime's supply of Dairy Milk (hair straighteners and deodorant are available). Like many of her British "sisters" she has a fanatic's zeal that makes her an outstanding enforcer of the moral standards of other women in the fledgeling state she is attempting to help create.

Umm Layth is one of several British women who are thought to now form a police force in Raqqa, making sure that the wrists of other women are covered at all times that they appear in public, as she does in her own selfies, covered in a niqab that obscures even her eyes. She dislikes Twitter as a social medium because of the "free mixing".

She posts her favourite hadiths in capitals: "THE BEST OF WOMEN ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT SEE THE MEN AND WHO ARE NOT SEEN BY MEN."

But Smith detects in her messaging a change of tone: "The Twitter account that she used to have just didn't match up with her blog. She was very much making contact with other women out there and posting photos of them together and saying, 'I'm going to make you this for dinner, isn't it going to be great?' And yet the blog is very formal and devout - she seemed a lot older. And you have to wonder: how much control does someone have?" It's always possible that behind any woman blogging on behalf of Isis is a man with a gun. Much as we'd like to regard them as victims, however, Smith tells me that there are indications that British women are involved in running brothels for Isis fighters, a not unbelievable notion when you look at the comment that another British female jihadi, Umm Farriss, wrote recently on social media complaining that a sex slave had dared to look her in the eye. "I wish I did it," is how another young woman responded when she was asked on social media about the beheading by Isis men of the Israeli-American journalist Steven Sotloff. "Boom Boom Day" is how a friend of hers refers to September 11. A tweet on the suspended Twitter account of an unidentified female friend and associate of Layth's reads: "Drove passed the body of the man who was crucified in manbij for raping a 70 year old. Perks of living under the shade of Shariah."

Eleven British jihadi brides doesn't sound like many, I say. "There must be hundreds of girls wanting to go across," says Smith. "Hundreds. I come across girls every day who say, 'I'm so desperate to go over there but it's just so hard for me.' I saw someone say this morning, 'I want to come but I'm a full-time mum.' And someone said, 'Just bring your kids.' The proportion of girls who eventually make the transition from wanting to go to physically going is tiny. But there are so many people that want to go. And it's fairly overwhelming."

Tighter border controls mean that the journey to becoming a jihadi bride is trickier now than it was over the summer, but the principle is the same: get to Turkey, either by flying there direct or fly first to Amsterdam or Spain then fly to Turkey, and get a bus to the border where your fixer will pick you up, hide you in his truck and drive the narrow and very dangerous route through contested territory to Raqqa.

Finding a fixer is difficult but getting married is a cinch: "The pairing is very quick," says Smith. "I was talking to a girl on Ask.fm and asked her whether there was a jihadi Tinder. She told me there is a thing called Jihad Matchmaker that works on Twitter: you follow it, it follows you back, you send a picture of yourself with your veil and the men choose from hundreds of headshots." Another girl Smith spoke to told her: "A lot of the time they'll do a parade. They'll get a male foreign fighter in a room and the girls will all walk up and down covered and the fighter will then get the opportunity to look at their face and he will choose one." Prospective wives are advised by female jihadis to "bring something nice to wear because there aren't any shops left that sell wedding outfits".

In the press these women are often referred to as "female fighters", but that is a misnomer, Smith says. "It's very much a domestic housewife role," at best. "It's not much of a life. You also have to wonder - in a few years' time, these women who are being impregnated: what about their kids and the kids they bring with them? And the children of the Yazidi women being used as sex slaves. Is the idea that these women and their daughters are going to be living in a permanent special-purpose ghetto? Are there going to be women that are going to be abused in the same way for generations?" Many women are lured to jihad for humanitarian reasons, but it's notable, says Smith, how much more hardline than the men they can become once they leave for Syria. "On Monday, the women were writing messages like 'Thank God those soldiers have been beheaded.' " This morning, "a girl had tweeted a picture of Adolf Hitler with the words, 'I could

have extinguished every Jew in Europe but I left them so you would be able to do it for me.' This was a British woman."

Islamic State is a religious quest, supposedly, but it's sometimes easier to understand the women who want to join it if you think of it - simply - as an extreme, authoritarian, "revolutionary" cult or sect populated by a good many stragglers, petty criminals, drop-outs and fugitives from unhappy or constricted childhoods and ruled over with an iron fist by a charismatic, brutal man. Think of the Manson Family or Jonestown.

The recruits of Isis are often dropouts or ex-criminals. Often they are just malleable or lost or looking for a cause. For women, Smith says, the lure is independence. "There may be pressure from parents: you should study for your A levels so you can go to university so you can be a doctor or a lawyer or an engineer. 'No. Don't want to do it.' That's classic. I remember as a teenager myself: 'No, I don't want to do any work. I'm too cool for that.' There's a lot of that kind of mentality. It's laziness, really.

"And they're bored with their life here. They say they have more freedom in IS: they see eight women living in a house in Raqqa who all get on famously and they tweet each other all the time. That's something they haven't had, the sense of community and independence. A lot of them could be pissed off with their parents for whatever reason: 'I'm going to run away and go on an amazing adventure.' " What is the amazing adventure likely to look like once they get to Syria? "We can only speculate," says Smith, "but obviously the reality is not that great." Around 100 Isis men, originally from the UK, have returned from Syria citing injuries but unless you're Aicha, who last week was rescued by her mother after Yilmaz married another woman and Aicha found herself in what appeared to be frightening circumstances, returning home will not be an option for women.

"Men will say: 'Everything was great but it didn't work out.' It's a sense of bravado that the women don't have," says Smith. Take Sabina Selimovic, 15, and Samra Kesinovic, 17, who left Austria for Syria in April. In October reports surfaced that both girls wanted out. Shortly afterwards, Selimovic gave a Paris Match interview dismissing the claims. Austrian authorities believe she was ordered to do so. In another case, the brother of a 15-year-old French girl, Nora el-Bathy, the daughter of Moroccan immigrants, travelled to Syria to bring her home but was blocked by her fixer. The brother said her face looked yellow and that she was being held in a house against her will with other women and girls. "The people around you and the entire state in which you live would probably kill you if you said you wanted to go home openly," says Smith. "Once you're there you're not supposed to leave. It's the rest of your life."

The young girls in their bedrooms in Birmingham - don't they worry about what will happen to them if they leave for Syria? "They want to go so badly and they believe with complete conviction that's the path. Isis thinks there is no such thing as rape, so I think these women accept it as their due."

There are just two so-called "reverts" - converts to Islam - among the jihadi brides that Smith is monitoring. Does she think there will be more in the future? "If someone's staying in their bedroom, hates their life, hates their parents and wants to do something drastic that is one option now that never used to exist." She adds that: "In your very Muslim community, in whichever UK city, it's considered desirable and your obligation to Islam: someone breaks out of the group and moves to Syria and tells their friends what a great time they're having and their friends will move over. We have a lot of girls in the database who have been to school together but have gone at different times."

It's an ever-widening circle, she says, "by association: 'Oh, the girl five years above me made it to Syria.' "One said: 'I'm a fulltime mum.' The reply: 'Just bring your kids'
Once there you aren't supposed to leave. It's the rest of your life

## Text 7 The Sydney Morning Herald, 2014

On Saturday a Brisbane mother of four was arrested as she allegedly tried to board a flight in Sydney carrying cash and equipment for her husband fighting in Syria. She has been charged with supporting incursions into a foreign state with the intention of engaging in hostile activities.

Last month Attorney-General George Brandis told a think-tank in Washington the grim news that "per capita, Australia is one of the largest sources of foreign war fighters to the Syrian conflict from countries outside the region".

The numbers participating in the conflict were higher than previous conflicts, he said, "with assessments of between 120 and 150 Australians travelling to the greater Syria region to participate".

There are large migrant populations here from Lebanon and Turkey, which border Syria, and it is clear from Brandis' statement that the problem is not being checked. Instead, it is becoming a bigger threat to national security as battle-hardened local jihadis return after having joined Islamic extremist factions while fighting abroad, perhaps seeking to attack their homeland or export the al-Qaeda ideology of global jihad against the West.

Our Foreign Incursions and Recruitment Act allows Australians to join the armed forces of a recognised foreign government, but not insurgencies. Australia has also imposed sanctions on Syria that apply to both sides, and proscribed several jihadist groups under counterterrorism legislation.

We have used tough powers to prevent our citizens making the journey to fight in Syria by depriving them of their passports, mounting criminal charges and imposing bank account restrictions. There have been public communications through the government's Resilient Communities website, and members of the Muslim community in Sydney and Melbourne have met federal and state law enforcement officials to discuss the local impacts of the Syrian conflict.

What is now required is for the Abbott government to take two steps. First, there's no one place for people to learn of Australia's approach - the applicable laws; the government's reasons for being concerned about Australian involvement in the conflict; the government's strategy, and what people can do if they have concerns.

While Australians have fought in foreign conflicts going back to the Spanish civil war in the 1930s, the government should state its position on Syrian foreign fighters. There have now been 10 reported Australian deaths in the conflict.

Second, to get the message through we should have a national awareness campaign about the dangers of citizens travelling to Syria. The campaign would need to be sensitive to the concerns of those who support humanitarian efforts. It should be led by the police, working with relevant community organisations to disseminate appropriate messages to would-be jihadists that such activity is futile - they will be preyed upon by terrorist groups.

Any campaign would need to engage parents to stop their children from going, and include a system for parents suspicious that a family member might join the conflict, to tip off authorities. Some daughters want to help brothers fighting there, so women will have an important role.

The Syrian civil war is being broadcast live over social media, from where young Muslims can get information. Any campaign should thus include a strong online effort to counter extremist recruiters.

This should be put in the context of promoting an inclusive Australian identity that works towards a cohesive society. An awareness campaign on the risks of Australians going to Syria will develop a national policy that pre-empts the next conflict zone where our citizens might want to join the fight.

## Text 8 The Washington Post, 2019

Turkey said Monday that it has deported an American citizen and a Danish national suspected of belonging to the Islamic State militant group, as the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan began following through on a pledge to repatriate foreign-born extremists detained in Turkey.

An Interior Ministry spokesman, Ismail Catakli, did not identify the American or say where the person had been sent. Irish, German and French nationals detained by Turkey will be deported in the coming days, he added.

Thousands of foreigners flocked to the Islamic State as it began seizing territory in Iraq and Syria five years ago. The fate of many foreign militants who were detained after the Islamic State was driven from its last stronghold this year remains unresolved because many European states, citing the threat of attacks at home, have refused to repatriate them.

European states have insisted that the suspected Islamic State members face trial where they were captured or have sought to transfer them to Iraq for prosecution there. Some countries, including Britain, have stripped suspected militants of their citizenship to ensure they do not return home.

Last week, Turkey's interior minister said the foreign detainees would be sent back to their countries, even in cases in which they had lost their citizenship. 'We are not a hotel for anyone's Daesh members,' Suleyman Soylu told reporters, using an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State, which is also known as ISIS. 'What am I supposed to do with your terrorist?'

A State Department spokeswoman said Monday that the United States was 'aware of reports of the detainment of a U.S. citizen by Turkish authorities. Due to privacy considerations, we have no further comment.' Turkish media reported that a U.S. citizen had been deported to Greece and that Greek authorities had refused to receive him.

A spokesman for Germany's Foreign Ministry said Turkish authorities had notified Germany 'about a total of 10 German citizens who are about to be deported in the course of this week.' German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer said citizens could 'rest assured' that each case would be 'carefully examined' by German authorities.

'We will do everything possible to prevent returnees with connections to IS from becoming a danger in Germany,' he said in a statement.

The problem of what to do with foreign-born Islamic State members gained urgency after Turkey launched a military offensive in northern Syria last month, targeting a Kurdish-led militia alliance holding thousands of suspected Islamic State militants. Ankara views the Kurdish fighters in Syria as terrorists because of their links to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, which has waged a decades-long insurgency in Turkey.

The alliance, known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, holds about 10,000 suspected Islamic State members in Syria in about two dozen facilities " including about 2,000 fighters from around 60 countries, not including Syria and Iraq, according to Col. Myles B. Caggins III, a U.S. military spokesman.

Ankara's offensive immediately raised fears that security at those facilities would be compromised. More than 100 people with alleged links to the Islamic State escaped from prisons and detention camps after the start of the Turkish operation, U.S. officials said.

Turkey has since faced growing international pressure to demonstrate that it is taking decisive action against the Islamic State. The pressure intensified last month when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the group's leader, was killed during a U.S. operation in Syria's northern Idlib province " a few miles from the Turkish border, in a province ringed by Turkish military observation posts.

Over the past few weeks, Turkish authorities have announced the capture of hundreds of militants. More than 1,100 suspected Islamic State members are being detained in Turkey, Erdogan said last week, including members of Baghdadi's family.

Turkish officials have begun insisting that Western states take back their nationals, forcing an overdue reckoning on the issue of the Islamic State detainees, according to human rights groups.

In a landmark ruling on Monday, a Dutch court decided that the Netherlands government had an obligation to repatriate 56 Dutch children held in camps in Syria, according to Andre Seebregts, a lawyer who represents dozens of Dutch children and mothers held in the camps.

The court found that 23 mothers who had appealed to return to the Netherlands did not have a right to come home unless their return was deemed necessary for the repatriation of the children, Seebregts said. Kurdish forces guarding the camps had indicated that they would not send the children without their mothers, he added.

It was likely that the women would be arrested as soon as they arrived in the Netherlands, he said. 'It seems it's safer for the Netherlands for these women to come back in a controlled environment than under the radar,' Seebregts said, adding that there appeared to be no alternative but to try them at home because the legal system in Iraq was 'not up to standard.'

# Text 9 The New York Times, 2015

Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain said Saturday that the country's authorities would do everything they could to help three British schoolgirls who were believed to be traveling to Syria to join the Islamic State militant group.

European officials say they are increasingly concerned by reports about Western Muslims who have shown an interest in joining radical Islamic groups in Syria and Iraq, including young women who want to either fight for groups like Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, or become the wives of jihadists.

Estimates from Europe's counterterrorism coordinator suggest that more than 3,000 Europeans may have traveled to Syria and Iraq since early 2014, and could now represent roughly one-quarter of the foreign fighters in the region.

Mr. Cameron said that the latest case, which involves three teenagers from London -- Kadiza Sultana, 16; Shamima Begum, 15; and an unnamed 15-year-old girl -- was "deeply concerning," and he called on community and religious groups to do more to stop the radicalization of young British Muslims.

"It does make a broader point, which is the fight against Islamist extremist terror is not just one that we can wage by the police and border control," Mr. Cameron said, referring to the disappearance of the three girls. "We all have a role to play in stopping people from having their minds poisoned by this appalling death cult."

The British police have appealed for information about the three girls, who flew to Turkey last week without informing their families and are thought to be traveling to Syria to join the terrorist group.

The teenagers told their families on Feb. 17 that they would be out for the day, but security camera footage at Gatwick Airport, near London, showed that the girls had boarded a flight to Istanbul, according to British police.

"We are extremely concerned for the safety of these young girls," Richard Waldon, the commander of a British special operations police counterterrorism unit, said in a statement. "The choice of returning home from Syria is often taken away from those under the control of Islamic State, leaving their families in the U.K. devastated and with very few options to secure their safe return."

The family of one of the teenagers, Ms. Begum, also released a statement on Saturday, calling on her to return to Britain.

"We understand that you have strong feelings and want to help those you believe are suffering in Syria," Ms. Begum's family said in the statement. "You can help from home, you don't have to put yourself in danger."

### Text 10 The Times, 2015

British jihadist brides in Syria are working as "recruiting sergeants" for Islamic State and showing their commitment to the cause by getting pregnant, a report has found.

Western women joining Isis are increasingly bloodthirsty and supportive of battlefield brutality while calling on others to join them or to commit attacks in their home countries, according to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, an independent think-tank.

Its report, compiled over months monitoring the online activities of jihadist brides, found that they play a crucial role in efforts to consolidate Isis's state-building efforts through the promotion of Islamic State ideology and child-bearing, although they are prohibited from fighting.

"Perhaps the most important risk is that these female migrants [to Islamic State] can inspire others, both men and women, to carry out attacks on western countries or to travel to Syria and Iraq," the report said.

"Not only do [the women] celebrate violence; they also indicate a desire to inflict violence themselves. However ... the very women who describe their desire to fight also emphasise the importance of their domestic role.

"It is clear that women's current role in Isis is not to fight but to support their husbands and raise their children to be the next generation of Mujahideen."

Erin Saltman, one of the authors of the report, said more than 50 British women, who tend to be among the most eager to take up arms, have joined the jihad in Syria and Iraq. They, along with at least 70 French women, formed "by far and away the largest contingent" of the 200 to 300 European women who have travelled to the conflicts.

The report came as evidence emerged that Isis internet strategists have set up networks of tens of thousands of automated Twitter accounts to spread jihadist propaganda. More than 45,000 pro-Isis accounts were created in the autumn, according to a report released to the US Congress.

A separate report by the Brookings Institution found that the majority of these accounts were automated "bots" with only a few hundred followers, Until recently Isis operated a small number of popular accounts,

some with as many as 80,000 followers. Having a large number of accounts with only a few hundred followers makes it far harder for security agencies to find them and for Twitter to shut them down.

While recognising the power of online propaganda and grooming for recruitment, Dr Saltman warned that blaming the internet for radicalisation was like "blaming the pen for Mein Kampf". She added: "If you look at Europe and where the largest numbers of per capita foreign fighters come from, it is those countries such as Britain, France and Belgium with longestablished Islamist extremist networks that can promote Islamic State. These are very much localised networks." Dr Saltman emphasised that radicalisation had moved beyond mosques and into prisons and university campuses.

Her report also warned of a potential violent backlash from jihadist brides whose husbands are killed in coalition airstrikes, raising the prospect of Isis women becoming "black widows" like the wives of Chechen rebels.

#### Text 11

#### The Washington Post, 2015

The white vans come out at dinnertime, bringing hot meals to unmarried Islamic State fighters in the city of Hit in western Iraq.

A team of foreign women, who moved from Europe and throughout the Arab world to join the Islamic State, work in communal kitchens to cook the fighters' dinners, which are delivered to homes confiscated from people who fled or were killed, the city's former mayor said.

The Islamic State has drawn tens of thousands of people from around the world by promising paradise in the Muslim homeland it has established on conquered territory in Syria and Iraq.

But in reality, the militants have created a brutal, two-tiered society, where daily life is starkly different for the occupiers and the occupied, according to interviews with more than three dozen people who are now living in, or have recently fled, the Islamic State.

Foreign fighters and their families are provided free housing, medical care, religious education and even a sort of militant meals-on-wheels service, according to those interviewed. The militants are paid salaries raised largely from taxes and fees levied on the millions of people they control in an arc of land as big as the United Kingdom.

Those whose cities and towns are held by the Islamic State said they face not only the casual savagery of militants who behead their enemies and make sex slaves out of some minority women but also severe shortages of the basics of daily life.

Many residents have electricity for only an hour or two a day, and some homes go days without running water. Jobs are scarce, so many people can't afford food prices that have tripled or more. Medical care is poor, most schools are closed, and bans on most travel outside the Islamic State are enforced at gunpoint.

Over the past two years, the militants have produced a torrent of startlingly sophisticated online propaganda that has helped persuade at least 20,000 foreign fighters, many with families, to come from as far away as Australia. The campaign, largely distributed on YouTube and social media, depicts a place filled with Ferris wheels and cotton candy, where local families cheerfully mingle with heavily armed foreigners.

But local people interviewed said their daily lives are filled with fear and deprivation in the Islamic State "caliphate," governed by the militants' extreme version of Islamic sharia law.

"We went back to the Stone Age," said Mohammad Ahmed, 43, a former Arab League worker from Deir al-Zour, a town near Raqqa, the militants' self-proclaimed capital in northern Syria.

"We used to have a beautiful house with marble and ceramic floors," said Ahmed, who fled his home in June and now lives alongside 20,000 other Syrians in Jordan's Azraq refugee camp. "All our lives, we had everything we needed. Then, when they came, we were cooking over a fire outside and washing our clothes in a bucket."

Several of those interviewed said the Islamic State was actually less corrupt and provided more efficient government services, such as road construction and trash collection, than the previous Syrian and Iraqi governments. In Iraq, some said, the Sunni Islamic State militants treated them better than the Shittedominated central government in Baghdad. But none of those interviewed said they supported the militants, and all said efficient government did not excuse the group's brutal and fanatical behavior.

"We hate them," said Hikmat al-Gaoud, 41, the former mayor of Hit, who fled in April and now divides his time between Baghdad and Amman, Jordan.

The Islamic State came to power in the wake of years of fighting in Syria and Iraq that already had shattered many public institutions. But people interviewed said the Islamic State had made the damage worse, in ways that could be felt for decades to come - reversing gains in public education, ruining the medical infrastructure, establishing a justice system based on terror, and exposing a generation of children to gruesome and psychologically devastating violence.

For women, living in the Islamic State homeland often means being subjected to a virtual assembly-line system for providing brides to fighters, or sometimes being abducted and forced into unwanted marriages. Many who were interviewed gave only their first name or declined to be identified at all, for their own safety and the security of their family members still living under Islamic State control. They were interviewed via Skype or telephone calls from Syria and Iraq, or in person in Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.

Those who spoke from inside areas controlled by the Islamic State did so at great peril, saying the militants closely monitor Internet access. They agreed to speak so that they could tell their story of life inside the Islamic State caliphate.

Nearly everyone interviewed said they had witnessed a beheading or another savage punishment. It is virtually impossible to independently verify these accounts, just as it is impossible to verify the claims in much of the propaganda material put out by the Islamic State. The militants almost never allow journalists or other observers inside their territory, and they have posted video of the beheadings of several they have captured.

The interviews, conducted over several months, were arranged largely at random or through long-established contacts in the region. Although several activists were among those interviewed, The Washington Post did not rely on activist groups to provide interview subjects. At the Azraq camp, Post reporters reviewed records of arrivals and sought out those who recently came from militant-controlled areas. Many of the interviews lasted two hours or longer.

The militants control small farming communities and large urban areas, including Mosul, an Iraqi city with a population of more than 1 million people. The Islamic State's policies differ somewhat in each area, so there is no single, uniform way of life; but in the interviews, consistent themes emerged about women, health, education, justice and the economy in the Islamic State.

Women must be fully veiled and can be whipped for leaving the house without a male-relative escort. Many simply stay at home for fear of being picked up on the street and forced to marry a foreign fighter.

Hospitals are usually reserved for foreign fighters and are staffed by doctors who have come from as far as Britain and Malaysia. Local people are forced to seek care in ill-equipped clinics, which have expired medications and poorly trained staff.

In some places, the Islamic State has shut down cellphone service and Internet access. Where it still exists, the militants try to control it closely. They have set up Internet cafes that have become centers for propaganda, where recruiters encourage young people around the world to leave their homes and come to the Islamic State. They have persuaded about 200 Americans - some still in their teens - in Chicago, Denver, Minneapolis and other U.S. cities to try to come to Syria. Most were arrested before reaching their destination, according to U.S. law enforcement officials.

Except for religious schools for the children of foreign fighters, schools are generally closed. Militants have confiscated college diplomas and burned them publicly.

"Life under Daesh is a nightmare each day," said a female math teacher who lives in Mosul, using an Arabic name for the Islamic State.

"We have an unknown future," she said, asking that her name not be used. "Maybe Daesh will kill us or maybe we will die in the war, or maybe after. What we are going through right now is a slow death."

The militants have established checkpoints to prevent people from fleeing. But those interviewed said a growing network of smugglers is helping people flee, and they are entering Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and non-militant-controlled areas of Iraq in increasing numbers. U.N. officials said that 60 percent of refugees who have crossed the Syria-Jordan border recently were escaping areas controlled by the militants.

The Islamic State's propaganda portrays the militants as liberators; one recent video showed armed fighters delivering sweets to a home for the elderly. But according to those interviewed, the majority of residents view the militants as a merciless occupying force, and they stay away from them as much as possible.

"Even if we see them in the streets or in the shops, there is no mingling," said an activist who calls himself Abu Ibrahim al-Raqqawi, a native of Raqqa who runs a social media site called Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently.

People in Raqqa, he said, "feel like strangers in their own city."

Why people join and stay

The Islamic State has had some success recruiting local people. Those interviewed said many of their friends and neighbors in Syria and Iraq have chosen to join the Islamic State, becoming fighters, teachers or workers in their government offices.

Some do so because they believe in the militants' goal of uniting the world under their extreme interpretation of Islamic law.

But most of the people who work for the Islamic State do so out of economic desperation, according to those interviewed. In places where the cost of food has skyrocketed and where many people are living on little more than bread and rice, some men have concluded that becoming an Islamic State warrior is the only way to provide for their family.

"There is no work, so you have to join them in order to live," said Yassin al-Jassem, 52, who fled his home near Raqqa in June. "So many local people have joined them. They were pushed into Daesh by hunger."

Peter Neumann, director of the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence at King's College in London, said that although foreign fighters have given the Islamic State a boost, "in the long term, they will turn out to be a burden." He said that local tribes rose up against al-Qaeda in Iraq in the mid-2000s partly because that group was perceived as a foreign organization. He said people now under Islamic State control could do the same - especially in Iraq.

But those interviewed who had lived under the Islamic State said it has gone to great lengths to suppress any potential uprisings, killing anyone suspected of disloyalty.

Faten Humayda, 70, a grandmother who fled her town near Raqqa in May and now lives in the Azraq camp, said the violence increases local anger at the militants, but it also creates suspicion among local people. It is harder for any kind of resistance movement to form when people think their friends and neighbors might be informants for the militants.

"They have turned us against each other," she said.

Ahmed, who fled his town near Raqqa in June, said some of the Arab fighters would try to mix with the local population, but the Europeans and other non-Arabs never did. He said that although the Islamic State militants claimed they were there to create a better life for Muslims, they seemed mainly focused on battles with other rebel groups and government forces.

"They were always very aggressive, and they seemed angry," he said. "They are there to fight, not to govern."

Interviewed in his baking-hot metal hut in the Azraq camp, Jassem recalled that while he was living under Islamic State control, his 2-year-old grandson developed a brain tumor. Doctors wanted \$800 to remove it. Jassem, a farm hand, hadn't worked since Islamic State militants took over his home town. He was desperate, so in late May he went to the militants to beg for his grandson's life, and they offered him a choice.

"They said to me, 'If you give us your son to fight with us, we will pay for your grandson's treatment,' " he said

The idea of one of his sons becoming an Islamic State fighter turned his stomach, and the thought of losing his grandson broke his heart. So Jassem took his family and escaped in the back of a smuggler's truck. He said his son is now asking Jordanian authorities for medical help for the little boy.

"I am never going back to Syria," Jassem said, looking out from his 12-by-18-foot hut at the bleak expanse of empty Jordan desert. "It's not my Syria anymore."

Sullivan reported from Washington, London and Jordan. Souad Mekhennet in Morocco and Berlin, Loveday Morris, Erin Cunningham and Mustafa Salim in Iraq, Karla Adam in London, and Taylor Luck in Jordan contributed to this report.

Confronting the 'Caliphate'

This project is part of an occasional series about the militant group Islamic State and its violent collision with the United States and others intent on halting its rapid rise.

Text 12 The Guardian, 2014 A young woman cheerfully tweets two British friends, "I'm making pancakes, and there's Nutella, come up in a bit". Her friends tease each other in response: "come b4 I finish dem mwhaha :p"; "oi . . . you have my back dont snake it". Punctuated with emojis and slang, it's hardly a sinister exchange, until it becomes clear that all three have joined the Islamic State (Isis) - and are using their social media accounts to encourage other women to join them in Syria.

As alarm mounts about British men who have joined the militants, including the man thought to have murdered the journalists Steven Sotloff and James Foley, experts say much less attention is being paid to an explicit recruitment drive by Islamic State members at the behest of their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to lure women and girls to the cause. And that too little is being done to challenge online accounts such as the one above on the frontline of this propaganda war.

Melanie Smith from King's College International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation has been tracking through their social media accounts 21 British women who have joined Isis. They include 16-year-old Manchester twins Zahra and Salma Halane, and 20-year-old former radiography student, Aqsa Mahmood, from Glasgow, who exhorted Muslims to carry out terrorist attacks in the west. "Follow the examples of your brothers from Woolwich, Texas and Boston," she tweeted. "'If you cannot make it to the battlefield, then bring the battlefield to yourself."

Smith says no one knows exactly how many of the 500 Britons thought to have travelled to Syria to join Isis are women, but believes there are around 200 western women in the country. However, this total has risen since the insurgents' territory (swathes of land totalling an estimated 35,000 square miles in Syria and Iraq) was declared a caliphate. "There is a stronger pull now Baghdadi has called for all women to come," Smith points out. She says the attraction lies in the chance to help found a new society, based around the fanatical interpretation of Islam that Islamic State promotes. "You can see the state-building process happen," she adds.

Trawling through the online lives of the women who have joined the extremist group can feel like reading a web version of the satirical film, Four Lions - in which home-grown suicide bombers bungle various terrorism missions. They are a jumble of religious quotations, glorifications of murder, banal chat and internet memes - complete with Instagram-posted pictures of sunsets and ubiquitous photos of cats.

One woman even posts a selfie with two friends, all three unrecognisable under niqabs so full that even their eyes can't be seen, one of the three holding up a black-gloved finger in an Isis salute. Another complains British humour is misunderstood ("no one else gets our banter"), before justifying the beheading of Foley. "So the US want to bombarded us with airstrikes in iraq and not give a damn whos killed" she tweets, "but want cry when a dusty journalist is killed? (sic)"

Yet this incongruous, peer-led approach has allowed Isis to reach beyond its usual channels. Prospective recruits can identify with the chatty, young, female jihadists, many of whom post messages saying how happy they are to be living in an Islamic land. Longer blogs, and the Ask.fm sites of foreign fighters, give practical and motivational tips.

Mahmood's Tumblr page, for instance, offers advice to women thinking of making the journey. This week her parents said they could not believe their "sweet, intelligent and peaceful" daughter had travelled to Syria and married a jihadist. Now she has joined a tight-knit community of foreign fighters and their wives in the city of Raqqa, and seems intent on using her position to persuade other girls to join her.

She tells her followers everything from what to pack ("For the winter you will most need a good pair of boots"), to how to prepare ("get all the shots and vaccinations that you require") and highlights the pragmatic reasons for becoming "jihadi brides" - "The reality is that to stay without a man here is really difficult".

Smith says the profile of Isis recruits has changed. "The girls are getting younger," she says - typically 19 or 20. Nor do they seem to be particularly fanatical in their piety. The first recruits to Islamic State had practised an extreme interpretation of Islam all their lives. The women responding now, she says, "are going for adventure, just like the young men". Yet it is obvious from the comments posted online that many are also attracted to the idea of marrying a foreign fighter, seen as a heroic figure willing to sacrifice himself for a cause.

Clusters of women from mainland Europe have travelled to Syria after attending Islamic classes in mosques - from France a group of Chechen women emigrated together - but British women have tended to go alone. "The profile is very mixed across Europe. In the UK, many come from second-generation families from south Asia, because that's the biggest Muslim community here. They are school leavers and a couple of university students, says Smith."

Sasha Havlicek, from the Institute of Strategic Dialogue, says UK women play an important role in Isis's "brilliant" online communications strategy - bolstering the group's claim to be fighting a "decadent and morally corrupt" western society, which has no respect for women. For this "video game generation" of young women, Havlicek says, the juxtaposition of hardcore brutality with "cuddly and fuzzy" propaganda (such as pictures of kittens playing on Kalashnikovs) is crucial.

"Al-Qaida tried to mainstream their appeal as they moved on to mainstream social media platforms. They did quite a bit of 'brand cleansing'," she points out. "The language was softened . . . and they sought to capture a moral high ground.

"Then Isis came along and promoted its own brutality, the massacres and beheadings. Al-Qaida expressly distanced itself, likely assuming it would undermine the jihadi cause. But the amazing thing is that it hasn't." For the moment, however, it's clear that women are only cheerleaders of such murders. Female members may tweet about practising shooting or post photos of their guns, but experts say there is no evidence they are allowed to fight. Instead, they are expected to marry, keep house and bring up a new generation - and strengthen the narrative that this is not a terrorist group, but a state all Muslims must join.

On arrival, women are either given a home - if they are married - or put in a house with other women, if they are single. Their day, says Mahmood, "revolves around the same duties as a normal housewife", cooking, cleaning, and, Smith says, some also mention attending classes on religion. Much of their time is spent indoors, and when they venture out it is with a man, to shop at the local stores or markets, or Instagram pictures of themselves having the occasional milkshake.

Leaving their home country (without parental knowledge or approval), choosing a husband, and joining a tight "sisterhood" to live an "Islamic" life, is repackaged as the ultimate example of female agency, says Havlicek. Men and women, Isis says, have an equal duty to help create an Islamic caliphate and both gain status by being "martyred" in the process - or by inspiring their loved ones to give up their lives for the cause

Not all of the women and girls are satisfied with this, says Smith. "The younger ones are very wrapped up in the idea of fighting, but they know they can't go over the heads of the authorities." On her blog, Mahmood, acknowledges this frustration, and that it's one of the most common questions she has "been receiving from sisters": "I will be straight up . . . there is absolutely nothing for sisters to participate in Qitaal (fighting) . . . No amalia istishihadiya (martyrdom operations) or a secret sisters katiba (battalions). These are all rumours."

Instead she stresses raising your children "for the sake of Allah".

Katherine Brown from King's College defence studies department, points out that there is a long history of women planning and executing terrorist attacks, from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka. Organisations initially opposed on religious grounds (such as Hezbollah) have later allowed women to become suicide bombers or to fight.

"There is an assumption that radicalisation is something men and boys go through," she says. "Statistics show that between 1981 and 2007 women constituted approximately 26% of all suicide attacks, and that there has been a marked rise in participation since 2005."

Smith says there is a huge variation in the ideology of western Isis members, and that it's a mistake to think all are calling for terrorist attacks in the west. She says no woman she has spoken to is considering coming home. "They see it as emigrating to a better life. They say they feel free."

To date, British government policy has focused on women exclusively as tools to prevent men become radicalised. Sara Khan, from the human rights and counter-terrorism organisation Inspire, says women should receive more attention, particularly as many feel the UK is increasingly hostile to Muslims. With Muslim women more likely to be the victims of Islamophobic attacks than men, and facing barriers such as lower levels of employment and qualifications than the population as a whole, this can add to existing feelings of disenfranchisement.

"These young people are the 9/11 generation - and they are constantly told that it is Muslims in this country who are the problem," she says. Media discussions of issues to do with Muslim women have not helped, "In the last year, the debates have all been about gender segregation, the niqab, hysteria about halal meat, the charity commission focusing on Islamic charities. That is really is going to alienate them. And they will look to something that offers them belonging."

The older generation is more likely to rely on a culturally influenced interpretation of Islam, passed down through community norms and oral tradition, says Khan. Younger women may rebel against this, using religion to challenge their parents' strictures on everything from arranged marriages to education. This can

be problematic, says Khan, if they choose ultra-conservative sources as their guide. Such ideas have gained ground recently, she believes, while mainstream interpretations have been drowned out. "There is a feeling that the more hardline your interpretation, the more authentic it is, and that's not the case at all - it's just not true of Islamic law."

Joining extremist groups can be seen as cool as well, while the lack of a sense of belonging has led to a renewed interest and identification with the Ummah, the worldwide community of Muslims.

The horrors of the Syrian conflict are cited as the motivating factor by many women who have travelled to Syria, says Smith. Khan agrees that anger about foreign policy plays a part in young people being drawn to extremism - something Baroness Warsi acknowledged when she said the British lack of response over the crises in Gaza was a "basis for radicalisation that could have consequences for years to come".

Intense identification with Muslim sufferings abroad, coupled with anger about British foreign policy, can be used to suggest the Ummah is under attack, and needs defending. Mahmood's parents, for instance, said she was desperate to help those suffering in Syria, and Smith says the anger about Israeli actions in Gaza could also help extremist groups recruit new members.

It is a problem Muslim groups are tackling, but experts say more resources are needed. Sajda Mughal from the Jan Trust, a charity that has run schemes helping marginalised women counter extremism, says too few parents are aware of their children's anger about foreign policy, or need advice on how to channel it into mainstream political engagement.

Government policies such as Prevent made British Muslim communities feel that they were under surveillance and could not trust the police, says Brown. "Policing should be to serve the community, so they can then be trusted with intelligence," she says.

Shaista Gohir, from the Muslim Women's Network, stopped engaging with Prevent for this reason. Four years ago she was contacted by a woman who had left an extremist group - and told the Home Office, hoping they could learn from the woman more about the radicalisation process.

"You don't often find women who break from these groups and who are ready to speak to you," she says. Instead, the security services tried to recruit the woman as a spy. "They had no regard for her safety," Gohir says. "If someone is brave enough to come forward, you should not try to exploit their vulnerability like the extremists do."

Smith says social media accounts need to be closed more quickly to disrupt real-time updates from the battlefield. Havlicek wants funding to be discreetly channelled into supporting credible dissenting voices online. But above all, young Muslim women need to be helped to re-engage with politics, says Brown. "If you think no one in the political system looks after your interest, why would you listen to them?"

For some, the alternative is clear. On Ask.fm one teenage girl writes: "I have literally no money to come (to Syria), and I can't take out loans . . . because I'm too young is there any way you can help?" The reply from the self-styled jihadists is swift: "Message us privately."

## Cross-cultural perspective

#### Collocates

Australia

Austrana			Omteu			Cilita States		
			Kingdom			of America		
word	ranking	frequency	word	ranking	frequency	word	ranking	frequency
Syria	8	185	Syria	7	175	Syria	8	215
returning	9	124	Isis	19	90	Islamic	16	107
Iraq	19	98	flow	25	69	flow	17	105
Islamic	23	78	number	28	57	State	22	83

United States

United

State	25	73	many	29	54	Iraq	23	76
Australian	26	62	more	30	53	number	29	72
Australian	20	02	Iraq	35	48	more	30	72
			Iraq	33	70	some	38	51
						many	39	49
flow	27	62	returning	39	44	thousands	41	49
return	30	58	most	51	32	narrowed	52	37
threat	37	54	terrorist	52	32	language	54	37
Australia	40	52	Islamic	53	32	terms	55	37
laws	40	50	thousands	54	28	countries	59	36
laws	42	30	some	56	31	group	61	32
legislation	47	42	threat	58	27	western	62	30
number	48	40	return	59	27	threat	66	28
	49	39	families	60	27	militants	67	28
many Australians	54	35	British	62	24		68	29
	58	33	children	63	25	groups	70	27
home	62	31		64	25	Europe Isis	72	25
become	64	29	Turkey	65	25		72	25
	66	29	group	65	25	local Taliban	74	
join tamaniam	66	29		69	23		76	25 24
terrorism			hundreds			join		
security	72	26 25	country	72 75	22	ranks	77	24
government's	74		Europe			across		
problem	75	25	estimated	77	21	Qaeda	79	23
returned	76	25	stop	78	21	border	80	23
through	84	22	state	79	20	hundreds	81	22
countries	85	21	Australian	80	19	officials	82	22
prevent	90	20	joining	83	19	Syrian	87	21
thousands	91	20	returned	84	18	presence	88	21
Turkey	92	19	influx	88	17	country	89	20
government	93	19	citizenship	91	17	influx	92	20
issue	95	19	captured	92	17	Turkey	93	20
<del> </del>			Syrian	96	17	Afghanistan	94	19
back	97	19	countries	97	17	travelled	97	18
travel	99	18	travelled	98	17	captured	101	17
children	100	18	groups	100	16	European	105	17
Western	101	18	training	106	15	recruited	107	17
terrorist	105	17	Western	111	14	weapons	112	16
attacks	107	17	government	112	14	estimated	114	16
citizenship	108	17				returning	115	16
groups	109	17	international	116	14	forces	119	15
against	113	15	home	121	14	Libya	120	15
terrorists	114	15	members	123	13	largest	121	15
country	115	15	body	127	13	money	123	14
joining	116	15	jihadist	130	13	united	124	14
group	119	15	conflict	134	12	families	125	14
families	120	14	Britain	138	12	return	126	14
travelling	125	14	supplies	139	12	attracted	130	14
Indonesia	131	14	European	143	12	war	131	13
foreign	133	14	issue	151	12	joining	133	13
			recruitment	154	11	government	134	13
source	138	13	Australia	157	11	extremists	135	13
joined	140	13	foreign	158	11	recruit	138	13
intelligence	145	13	fight	165	11	conflict	139	13
terror	146	13	growing	168	11	extremist	140	13

### Text 1

#### The Australian, 2016

The potential return of -dozens of Australian children from Islamic State-controlled Syria and Iraq has prompted state and federal authorities to workshop how they will reintegrate a generation of battle-scarred children back into community life.

With Western governments -increasingly confident they have -Islamic State in retreat, Australian authorities have begun war--gaming how to handle a potential influx of hardened jihadists driven out of Syria and northern Iraq.

About 110 Australians are thought to be fighting in Syria and Iraq. While the threat that returning foreign fighters pose to communities has long been known, a new challenge emerging is how to deal with children who have been exposed to the violence of the -Syrian war, perhaps for years on end. Security authorities believe that since the war began in 2011, dozens of Australian children have become embroiled in the conflict through the actions of their -Australian parents.

Some, like the children of Sydney terrorist Khaled Sharrouf, were taken into the war zone by their parents; others were born there, either to Australian women who travelled to the Middle East as jihadist brides or to Australian men who have impregnated local women, some by raping them.

Sexual violence against women is commonplace in Islamic State-controlled territory. In December 2014, another Sydney terrorist, Mohamed Elomar, attempted to "sell" captured women from Iraq's Yazidi community via Twitter. "Anyone interested got 1 of 7 yehzidi slave girls for sale," Elomar wrote. "\$2500 each â€| don't worry brothers she won't dissapoint (sic) you." According to witnesses who -escaped from Elomar's Raqqa home, which he shared with his friend Sharrouf, Elomar was suspected of raping or threatening to rape enslaved Yazidi women.

Elomar was killed last year in a drone attack in Raqqa. He had -fathered a child to Sharrouf's eldest daughter. While some of these children have never set foot in Australia and are not citizens, they could lay claim to an Australian passport if it could be demonstrated their -parents were Australian. Under such circumstances, it is likely Australia would take the children, even if they were without parents.

That would give rise to secondary questions about guardianship, particularly if the children were -removed from their parents, which in some cases at least would seem likely.

Despite strengthened laws, not all returning foreign fighters will face prosecution. The challenges of collecting admissible evidence in places such as Syria and Iraq mean authorities will have to rely on other means, such as control orders, to manage returnees in the community.

Under legislation introduced into the Senate, the Australian Federal Police would be allowed to tender sensitive intelligence to -obtain control orders, effectively making them easier to use.

Should the children of returning jihadis come home en masse, integrating them into Australian life would pose unprecedented challenges for schools, child--welfare authorities and the communities in which they settled.

The Australian has been told that several weeks ago, NSW authorities began workshopping the problem. Officials from the -departments of education and health, as well as police and family and community services, were among those present.

Among the questions asked were: What risk, if any, would the children of returnees pose to the community? How would authorities manage any backlash from parents? And how would they handle the intense focus the children would -inevitably generate?

Some children might return to Australia but without their -parents. In the case of the -Sharrouf children, their mother, Tara -Nettleton, died in hospital while Sharrouf remains un-accounted for.

In the unlikely event Sharrouf did return with his children, he would almost certainly face criminal charges and prison, such were his crimes in Syria.

With the conflict in Syria -entering a new and bloody phase, others are likely to find themselves in similar positions.

Attorney-General George Brandis confirmed that state and federal authorities would collaborate to manage the return of children from the fighting.

"Should the children of foreign fighters return to Australia, the government would work closely with relevant state or territory governments to manage their return on a case-by-case basis and with appropriate safeguards," Senator Brandis told The Australian.

The Australian understands officials also looked at what special services the children might require. Some are likely to be physically or emotionally affected by the war, perhaps requiring psychological counselling. Islamic State has not been reticent in exposing children to the cruelties of its regime. The so-called "cubs of the Caliphate" routinely feature in Islamic State's propaganda films, in some cases executing prisoners. The plight of children caught behind the lines in Syria was most gruesomely illustrated in 2014 when The Australian published pictures of Sharrouf's oldest son holding aloft the severed head of a Syrian man killed by Islamic State. The picture prompted -revulsion across the world, with US Secretary of State John Kerry describing the picture as -"stomach-turning".

"This image, perhaps even an iconic photograph ... is really one of the most disturbing, stomach-turning, grotesque photographs ever displayed," Mr Kerry said at the time. About 200 Australians have travelled to Syria since the war began. Between 61 and 67 are thought to have been killed in the fighting, while an estimated 110 are still in the conflict zone. Most are fighting for Islamic State. About 40 have returned, - although most did so during the early phases of the conflict.

### Text 2

### The Guardian, 2015

It's been a long, hard parliamentary week in the fast lane. Let's step into the slow lane and take the time to think about five interesting developments.

1. Penetrating glimpses of the obvious: citizenship

Malcolm Turnbull, the communications minister, has been saying for a fortnight or so that it's a sound idea to make sure that laws enacted by the parliament conform with the requirements of the Australian constitution.

The shadow attorney general, Mark Dreyfus, said on Thursday that people who commit crimes under Australian law should return to face punishment under the law. Both statements, to borrow a Turnbullism from the week, are penetrating glimpses of the obvious. Yet both statements were characterised in various febrile quarters as vaguely treasonous: wild talk by wild men.

Tony Abbott, by contrast, produced some of his characteristic aggressive simplicity: he didn't want those jihadis back in Australia. This was a short, sharp, simple, declarative statement, designed to pass the front bar "nod" test. "I don't want them back." (Keep the bad guys off our soil, Tony? You bet you are. You bet I am.) Except if you think about it for five seconds. The prime minister's first problem with "never darken our door" is that sole citizens can continue to come back. At this stage, the government is only proposing citizenship revocations for dual nationals.

The second curiosity about the statement is this: can the prime minister really be sanguine about jihadis remaining at large as long as they don't make landfall on the island continent of Australia?

On the face of it, this is pretty unorthodox reasoning from a political leader. Let's apply that same logic to other mass murders. Are we comfortable with the only sanction against other types of mass murderers being they aren't allowed to set foot in Australia any more?

I suspect we're not really comfortable with that. It's more conventional to want to see criminals put behind bars, which is precisely why the government told us only a few months ago that we needed new powers to prosecute returning foreign fighters, and the parliament duly obliged. Under the revised foreign fighters regime, the government was going to be stopping the bad guys at airports and dispatching them promptly to the jail house. Now we no longer aim to prosecute them, apparently. We don't want them back. As they say in the classics, go figure.

2. June and July are the cruellest months

April is the cruellest month, the great poet TS Eliot told us in The Wasteland, but for Bill Shorten, June and July are looking truly character-forming. The Labor leader has to deal with the high-rating grotesque that is The Killing Season; he has to deal with Abbott's clear and present ambition to belt him out of studious neutrality on national security; and, perhaps happiest of all, he has to deal with the comrades -past comrades at the royal commission into trade unions, and present comrades at the party's national conference in July. Shorten's got to face all these challenges knowing that Labor's poll success is not built on him cutting through successfully as opposition leader, but on persistent dislike of the other guy. Shorten is also surrounded by parliamentary colleagues who wanted him to be the federal leader not out of love or loyalty, or because they absolutely believed him to be the right man for the times, but because they wanted and needed the Shorten cycle of ambition to run its natural course.

Given Shorten had spent years styling himself as "the next most likely", he'd either deliver in the leadership, and Labor would prosper, or he wouldn't, and that would be that, the end of the Big Bill Run. Let's be clear

about this. It's absolutely not Shorten's fault - the decision by colleagues to take part in an ABC documentary in which they willingly re-enact (in some cases literally) their own mad leadership coup culture, the manifest betrayal of their base and voters and supporters - but unfortunately he has to deal with the obvious framing question thrown up by this last political week. Is Shorten the man to lead Labor past the intrigues and manifest failures of the Rudd/Gillard period? Is he the man to atone and reconnect? Or is he in fact part of Labor's problem?

3. We are paying people smugglers? You really can't be serious

The idea of spooks floating about on the seas to our north paying people smugglers to make sure asylum seekers don't end up anywhere near Australia underscores just how unhinged the domestic debate about asylum seekers has become.

If this actually happened - and of course we don't know if it did or didn't because there are no straight answers to questions - this goes well beyond the boundaries of strategic disruption activity by law enforcement. We are now taking part in, and providing perverse incentives to, a trade that has always been characterised quite correctly as unlawful and absolutely immoral.

So how have we come to this sorry pass? Having manufactured a "crisis" around a normal human activity, the idea that people come in boats to seek Australia's protection, Australian major party politics is now completely hostage to a negative perception that it manufactured and stoked for it own cynical ends. If the boats carrying asylum seekers do come, then politics has not stopped "the boats crisis", which was never actually a crisis in the first place.

Given such high stakes, given a complete non-issue has been hyped into a "test of resolve", you can see how such a trajectory builds in risk - the risk that governments will make very poor judgments and insist that officials implement their very poor judgments. Nobody is really thinking about the long-term consequences of these decisions, only on winning the next 24 hours and the 24 hours after that. And the human cost is already high and escalating. This really is crazy. Something has to give.

4. Trade. It's tricky, and might get trickier

It's strange that signing a landmark free trade deal with China can fly mostly below the radar but this was a crowded week in Canberra.

The text of the bilateral deal hammered out between Beijing and Canberra finally hit the public domain and it's clear that management challenges lie ahead for both the major parties. Let me explain.

Labor is finding it harder to sell trade liberalisation to its base, because both the progressive grassroots left and the industrial left are inclined in contemporary times to see the costs of liberalisation more starkly than the benefits. It's too soon to say what the end result will be on the China FTA but my feeling now is the labour provisions and the investor-state dispute settlement clause will be a hard sell in the ALP caucus.

The government also has jitters within its ranks. The agriculture minister, Barnaby Joyce, doesn't want state-owned enterprises buying the Aussie farm. He's made this abundantly clear. Joyce is the boundary rider here. His view isn't the government's official policy position but the Nationals view of the world has already influenced government positioning on foreign investment. The main parties are being pulled incrementally off an orthodoxy that once seemed unshakable in Australia: trade is good. The next big cab off the rank is the trans-Pacific partnership. If that deal does manage to take off from the runway in Washington, it's safe to predict that it will face a hard landing in Canberra. Watch this space.

5. A victory for intuitive reasoning

I did cover this contribution in the live blog this week but it warrants a mention here as we close out our five topics of interest for the weekend.

This week we heard the usual level of nonsense that comes during any given parliamentary week. Surround-sound nonsense is a given. But we also heard a lone voice in the Senate take us through how decent people can get to the heart of very profound things if they take the time to think and empathise.

The crossbench senator Ricky Muir spoke in a chamber debate late on Thursday about legalising same-sex marriage. He took fellow senators on a journey about how he'd come to this position. He'd listened to people. He'd been alarmed by the statistics on depression and suicide. He'd known people in his community who felt marginalised.

Muir had some interests and pastimes that might not win universal acclaim, but life wasn't about getting hung up on that. Life was about living. In Muir's view, it was time to make a gesture to good people who had suffered and faced discrimination, well... for no good reason.

Muir summarised his view on ending state-sanctioned discrimination in this way: "We are not all the same, and all people have the right to live their lives without judgment. I like to live my own life without judgment, and I like to return the favour." More power to your arm, Ricky.

#### Text 3

#### The Times, 2016

Sir, At a time when European challenges of security, migration and humanitarian crises are increasing, there is one key player that can help Europe in controlling the flow of migrants: Turkey. It is the crossing point of choice for radicalised EU citizens who join the war zones in Syria and Iraq. It is also through Turkey that foreign fighters go when returning to Europe to consider or commit terrorist attacks. Better cooperation with Turkey to strengthen border controls and to exchange information is therefore crucial.

As regards migration, no concrete action has been taken on the European commitment of November 29 to pay \$3 billion to Turkey to host migrants on its territory. Equally urgent is to make real progress on readmission agreements for people to return to their own country. Without these two prerequisites, migration pressure towards Greece will explode.

At today's EU-Turkey summit unerring political determination will be needed to secure clear Turkish commitments. The first step is the establishment of a clear and honest dialogue with Turkey, Russia, Syria, Iraq and regional powerhouses. And whatever we think of Bashar al Assad, he is in the same position as Milosevic before him. Peace, as the current truce shows, also relies on him. This does not mean that he will not be accountable for his actions.

In this unprecedented, inhuman and degrading crisis for both the EU and Turkey, the world is watching us. We cannot wait for another terror attack on our soil for co-operation on fighting radicalisation. Nor can we wait for increases in xenophobia to find a migration policy worthy of our values. rachida dati Member of the European Parliament and former French minister of justice Sir, The deployment of Nato warships to the Mediterranean and General Breedlove's comments on the refugee and migrant crisis show the paucity of the western political response to this destabilising and dangerous situation.

Greece and Italy are members of the EU. Turkey, Greece and Italy are all members of Nato, and form part of Nato's southern flank. Nato has rapid reaction troops which have carried out joint training exercises on that flank.

It seems astonishing that the European members of Nato have not deployed these troops to assist border forces to set up and run refugee camps in order to hold those people crossing the borders in safety, relative comfort and quarantine; and to allow identification of those who are genuine refugees and those who are economic migrants or who might pose a threat to the countries they are entering. The use of troops in this way would have reassured both Greece and Italy of their importance to the rest of the EU and of the willingness of the EU to support them. It would also have encouraged Turkey into the sphere of EU influence and made Nato's concerns clear to that nation. It would also have sent a clear and necessary signal to Russia and Syria.

This failure to activate a landbased, border-focused Nato response to the refugee crisis shows a lack of moral and political leadership on the part of our elected governments. peter louth Truro, Cornwall

## Text 4 The Australian, 2015

Many Australians favour the UK model of taking away citizenship

"If you take the oath and live by it," Victorian Liberal senator Scott Ryan assures new citizens when he attends swearing-in ceremonies, "it doesn't matter where you come from, who you are, what else you believe, you are absolutely a first-class Australian." Tony Abbott was so taken by these words of inclusion, the Prime Minister quoted them as he confirmed the government would introduce legislation within weeks to overhaul the Citizenship Act to empower the Immigration Minister with the discretion to strip dual nationals caught in the barbaric web of terrorism of their Australian citizenship.

As the Coalition embarks on national security measures to penalise those who "betray" their allegiance to the country - those involved in modern-day treason - political leaders are conscious of the delicate balancing act of ensuring efforts to protect against radicalisation don't tear at Australia's social cohesion.

Where do the scales fall when it comes to safeguarding a nation, weighed against the individual right to natural justice?

With cabinet ministers split on just how far to go, two-thirds of the Coalition backbench in the lower house have warned their frontbench colleagues not to get out of step with the community.

They argue there is support across the country for tougher laws to combat the rise of homegrown jihadists, including stripping Australian-born citizens of their citizenship if they can avail themselves of citizenship elsewhere.

For British Prime Minister David Cameron, there is no quandary: "Successive governments have come to the view - and I agree with the view - that when you're facing an existential challenge and a challenge as great as the one we face with Islamist -extremists, you need additional powers as well as simply the criminal law." Cameron was speaking as he stood next to Abbott six months ago, sharing the podium in the Australian Prime Minister's parliamentary courtyard.

Then, as now, Britain is taking the lead on immigration measures to combat the rise of homegrown jihadists. For almost a decade, in the aftermath of the London bombings, Britain's home secretary has had the power to deprive dual nationals of their British citizenship if it is "conducive to the public good".

The House of Commons -library reports 27 deprivations have occurred on these grounds since 2006. Britain's armoury was further enhanced last year, after months of political wrangling, when legislation was passed allowing the government to revoke the citizenship of terrorism suspects even if it renders them stateless where there are "reasonable grounds to believe that they could acquire another nationality".

The Australian government has drawn the line against changes that leave anyone stateless.

Instead, the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 will be updated to empower Immigration Minister Peter Dutton to revoke citizenship in the national interest where a dual national "betrays" Australia by participating in serious terrorist-related activities.

Those taking up arms or supporting murderous groups such as Islamic State overseas or at home, and lone wolves, will be captured, as the government modernises the provisions, dating back to 1948, whereby citizenship could be revoked for serving in the "armed forces of a country at war with Australia".

Under the proposed changes, the minister's decision to revoke a dual national's citizenship, informed by advice from intelligence agencies, will be subject to judicial review, and the government insists the laws will remain consistent with Australia's international obligations.

"If people are involved in terrorist activities in the Middle East, if they're fighting in the name of Islamic State, if they are doing harm to our national interests in the Middle East or if they are doing harm to our Australian people here at home, if they are fighting in the name of terrorism, there is a price to pay for that terrorism," Dutton says.

His starting point is that to be an Australian citizen is a great privilege, regardless of how citizenship was gained.

Dutton has been studying Britain's response to the threat of radicalisation, and this has included briefings from security agencies.

"We've had conversations with the (British) minister's department and I intend to meet with the minister in July in London and talk through what their next wave of reform might be, because the United Kingdom, as I understand it, is looking at what else they might do to bolster their existing laws," Dutton tells The Australian.

"The United Kingdom is a fair way ahead of where Australia is, but they recognise the imminent danger like we do." About 100 Australians are fighting overseas with Islamic State and other terrorist groups. At least 150 Australians here are supporting them.

A proposal to examine whether second-generation Australians involved in terrorism could have their citizenship revoked or suspended, forcing them to take out citizenship in the country of their parents' birth, raised hackles in cabinet last week, with former lawyers, including Julie Bishop, George Brandis and Malcolm Turnbull, raising objections.

The debate mirrors the one that occurred in Britain - would another country seriously provide citizenship to an Australian, even if it was a birthright they had not yet taken up, if they were stripped of their citizenship because of terrorism? Surely, no one would want to accept a jihadist or a supporter of terrorism, and they would be rendered stateless.

But those arguing Australia should inch further down the British path believe every weapon in the government's arsenal needs to be deployed as authorities warn more domestic terror attacks are being planned, warning times are becoming shorter, and the perpetrators are younger.

It is a debate that shows no signs of waning, with West Australian Liberal MP Luke Simpkins leading a push for tougher action and backing Abbott for being "in tune now with the nation".

Simpkins, who petitioned four months ago to have Abbott dumped, has written to the Prime Minister urging him to adopt the British stance and take action against Australian-born citizens for terrorism-related offences.

Signed by 37 lower-house Coalition MPs, the letter says: "We believe that there is a significant risk that limiting the revocation powers to those who currently hold dual citizenship will fail to capture many already serving sentences in Australia for terrorism offences or those currently participating in terrorism-related activities or conflicts." The letter adds that by restricting the powers to dual nationals "it will allow others

to renounce another citizenship and remain an Australian citizen despite clearly no longer having an allegiance to our country, our democratic beliefs, our values and freedoms. This will put our fellow Australians at greater risk." Since Australia's terror alert level was raised from medium to high last September, there have been two terrorist-inspired events in Sydney and Melbourne, and six attacks have been averted.

The divisive issue of second-generation Australians involved in terrorism will now form part of the government's "national conversation" on the value of citizenship, put out for consultation to test just how far the community is prepared to go.

As for the government's proposed changes to strip dual nationals of their Australian citizenship, Labor's immigration spokesman Richard Marles has indicated the ALP is unlikely to raise significant opposition.

While Labor is yet to briefed, Marles told Sky News: "If you do take arms against Australia right now in a traditional state-on-state context your citizenship is stripped automatically. We accept that principle and if you can imagine that in a context like a phenomenon like IS, well, then I do think it is appropriate that the law be updated to take into account that." Labor's legal affairs spokesman Mark Dreyfus QC is cautious. He told the ABC television's Insiders program that the proposal to give the Immigration Minister discretion to revoke Australian citizenship "raises tremendous concerns" and there are issues about what the standard of proof would be.

George Williams, a professor of public law at the University of NSW, gives voice to many in the legal fraternity in speaking out against the proposal to crack down on dual-national terror suspects.

Williams says he is concerned about the plans to use deprivation of citizenship as a form of punishment in Australia, pointing to the widespread condemnation of the British regime.

"The UK laws have been widely criticised for good reason, and I don't think, given criticisms and concerns, we should be following that path," he says.

"We live at a time when it's desperately hard to deal with the problem, particularly of foreign fighters, and so parliament and governments are turning to almost any measure they can, but there are real questions about whether they are effective, whether they are needed and whether they are appropriate." Williams cautions that "when you are actually removing someone's citizenship so they can't enter the country it can be pretty difficult to test these things, and also in these cases you'd imagine these decisions would be made on secret information" and therefore, even though there is the safeguard of judicial review, it may be impossible for a suspect to gain information used against them.

The broader sweep of counterterrorism measures, including the proposed citizenship changes, he says, "may actually cause some harm in that if they further the problem of alienation and continue to fray social cohesion in Australia, then that can actually make the job of recruiters easier".

The Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia's chairman Joe Caputo highlights the difficulties the government will face in explaining the change to large swaths of the community, including those who have adopted the nation as their home.

"I would personally caution the government to think very seriously about this issue," he says, "because it is not an easy one to come to grips with, and we are treading on dangerous ground when we strip someone of their citizenship.

"If people have broken the law, they should be given natural justice in Australia and tried according to the rule of law. But to strip someone of their citizenship without giving them natural justice is a very serious issue."

AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP PLEDGE From this time forward, under God, I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people, whose democratic beliefs I share, whose rights and liberties I respect, and whose laws I will uphold and obey.

## Text 5 The New York Times 2016

ABOARD A JOINT STARS SURVEILLANCE PLANE, Over Northern Iraq — Flying at 30,000 feet, the powerful radar aboard this Air Force jet peered deep into Syrian territory, hunting for targets on the ground to strike in the looming offensive to seize Raqqa, the Islamic State's capital.

It was on a mission like this several weeks ago that analysts discovered a hiding place in the central Syrian desert where the Islamic State was stashing scores of oil tanker trucks that provide the terrorist group with a crucial financial lifeline. Acting on that tip and other intelligence, two dozen American warplanes

destroyed 188 of the trucks in the biggest airstrike of the year, eliminating an estimated \$2 million in oil revenue for the Islamic State, also known as or ISIL.

Even as the American-led air campaign conducts bombing missions to support Iraqi troops fighting the Islamic State in Mosul, American commanders said the air war would probably play an even greater role in over the coming weeks in the battle to retake Raqqa.

Newly recruited Syrian Arab militia fighters, allied with experienced Kurdish fighters, are encircling Raqqa. But they need allied bombing to weaken and dislodge enemy forces dug in there, and to cut off the ability for the Islamic State to rearm, refuel and reinforce its fighters.

But with few spies in the city, American officials say assessing the enemy is difficult.

"We've spent a lot of time trying to understand the situation on the ground in Raqqa," Lt. Gen. Jeffrey L. Harrigian, the air war commander, said in an interview from his headquarters in Qatar. "It's improving. It's still not at the level we'd like it to be."

The air operation is a pivotal component of a military campaign that has cost \$12.5 million a day in Iraq and Syria. The effort has destroyed hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, military vehicles, command centers and fighting positions, and killed more than 50,000 fighters, according to American estimates. Since the air war began in late summer 2014, American and allied aircraft have conducted about 17,000 strikes in both countries

The Islamic State has lost about half of the territory it seized in Iraq and Syria in 2014. But as ISIS loses ground in its physical caliphate, or religious state, the threat of hundreds of foreign fighters returning home and of the expansion of its virtual caliphate through social media is certain to accelerate, American and European officials say. That raises fears of more terrorist attacks in cities outside the Middle East.

For instance, the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for last week's truck attack on a Christmas market in Berlin even though the links between the group and the main suspect, Anis Amri, a 24-year-old Tunisian, are not completely clear. After Mr. Amri's death, the Islamic State released a video of him pledging allegiance to the group.

President Obama has vowed to deal the Islamic State crippling blows in Mosul and Raqqa before he leaves office. This month, he ordered 200 more American Special Operations forces to Syria to help local fighters advancing on Raqqa, . Commanders are uncertain, however, about the level of support President-elect Donald J. Trump will maintain for rebel groups in Syria combating the Islamic State.

The military march on Raqqa is complicated by the predominant role played by Kurdish militia members, who make up a majority of the 45,000 fighters bearing down on the city. They are the most effective American partner against the Islamic State in Syria, providing logistics, command and control, and fierce fighting prowess. But the — a pivotal American ally — as a terrorist threat.

These lingering diplomatic and military questions leave some congressional leaders voicing skepticism about a swift, decisive attack on the Islamic State capital. "It's hard to see anything is imminent," said Representative Adam Schiff of California, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee.

With a prewar population of about 220,000, Raqqa is about one-tenth the size of Mosul, but commanders still face the same challenges of waging an air war while minimizing risks to civilians in a congested city. There are other reasons to go slow. Some Islamic State headquarters buildings have been spared attack for now so the Americans can monitor their communications and movements of their personnel in and out to learn more about the enemy operations, General Harrigian said.

Still, allied airstrikes have picked up as the Arab and Kurdish fighters have moved closer to the capital, and as commanders seek to pressure Mosul and Raqqa simultaneously. About 30 percent of the 1,300 strikes in and around Raqqa since the war began in 2014 have been conducted in the past three months.

"The pressure in Raqqa is bearing fruit as ISIL leaders come out of hiding, which allows us to kill them," Brett H. McGurk, Mr. Obama's envoy to the international coalition fighting the Islamic State, said this month.

Tracking the enemy's ground movements falls largely to the crew of the Joint Stars plane, a 1960s-era, reconfigured Boeing 707 jetliner packed with sensitive electronics that is part of an eclectic and unsung mix of odd-shaped surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with names like Compass Call and Rivet Joint. These planes suck up some enemy communications, jam others and help paint a picture of the Islamic State on the ground for American fighters and bombers to attack.

Bulging from the belly of the Joint Stars is a canoe-shaped, cloud-piercing radar that can see ground targets — and even some low-flying planes and helicopters — as far as 250 miles away on either side of the nearly windowless fuselage.

Aboard the plane, the crew of 19 Air Force and Army personnel — an unusual mix of active-duty and Georgia National Guard specialists — track clusters of dots on their screens that could represent groups of

hostile fighters and their vehicles, friendly forces or just routine commercial traffic. Much depends on where they are and what time of day it is.

From its high-flying, wide-area perch, the radar can track moving vehicles; low, slow-flying aircraft; and smaller potential targets such as people, said Lt. Col. William B. Hartman, 39, of Irvine, Calif., the Joint Stars squadron commander. The operators on board can change the filters on their systems to show different-size targets or their direction of travel in different colors, all of which is relayed back to operations centers in Baghdad and Erbil, in northern Iraq, he said.

Flying from a base in the Persian Gulf, a typical Joint Stars mission over Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan can last about 11 or 12 hours. Crews pack snacks in their flight bags but also fire up the plane's oven to prepare an in-flight order of chicken wings.

The Joint Stars is not equipped with cameras to identify specific images on the ground. When the crew members see something suspicious, they direct a Predator or Reaper to zoom in for a closer look. The Joint Stars is also valuable because a rotation of aircraft and surveillance crews can monitor a particular area for days, weeks or months, watching Islamic State activity to understand what the military calls the enemy's "pattern of life."

Islamic State fighters know from experience that they are being watched and often try to deceive the surveillance planes, hiding in schools or mosques or using camouflage. At one point, analysts said, ISIS even appeared to be trying to smuggle weapons strapped to the bellies of herds of sheep.

"They're extremely smart," Master Sgt. Caylon Kimball, 31, an airborne intelligence technician from Anadarko, Okla., said of the militants.

Several weeks ago, as the air campaign intensified against the Islamic State's oil-production and distribution network, analysts noticed an intriguing development in the central Syrian desert, about 35 miles north of Palmyra.

Comparing months-old radar data from Joint Stars and other surveillance imagery with newer versions, analysts discovered that the Islamic State was moving much of its oil tanker truck fleet to an obscure area of sandy gullies, about 20 miles by 20 miles in size.

"They were trying to hide from us," General Harrigian said. "They were adapting to what we were doing. They were going into the desert and just parking."

For several more weeks, analysts watched the clandestine desert truck stop grow, wanting to ensure it was the Islamic State trucking fleet. Confident in that assessment, General Harrigian ordered an attack plan, code-named Olympus. In two waves of strikes — on Dec. 8 and 9 — about two dozen Air Force and Navy warplanes destroyed 188 of the trucks. Empty truck cabs were struck first to scare off drivers sleeping in their rigs, and General Harrigian said it appeared there were no civilian casualties.

Besides wiping out a sizable portion of the Islamic State's tanker truck fleet and depriving the group of over \$2 million in oil sales, commanders said the strike was also meant to cripple the enemy's morale.

"There would be a larger strategic message we sent to them: Nice try. We found you," General Harrigian said. "Keep trying to hide, we will hunt you down again."

PHOTO: A Joint Stars surveillance plane refueling in 2004. Such planes help paint a picture of the Islamic State for American forces.

#### Text 6

#### The New York Times, 2016

You could be forgiven, after five years of Syria's war dominating front pages, for feeling lost.

It is easy to track the war's toll: It has killed 400,000 people, displaced millions, opened space for the Islamic State, and sucked in foreign powers, including the United States. It is harder to keep track of the how and why. The basics can seem even more confusing than the day-to-day details.

But those basics are crucial to understanding Syria's war -- and they are far more complex than they might initially seem. As last week's truce appears shaky after American planes bombed Syrian troops, here are straightforward answers to some of the fundamental questions about the conflict: an attempt to explain its origins, the broader context and how it relates to the refugee crisis and the rise of the Islamic State.

1. What is the Syrian civil war?

The war makes more sense if you think of it as four overlapping conflicts.

The core conflict is between forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and the rebels who oppose him. Over time, both sides fractured into multiple militias, including local and foreign fighters, but their fundamental disagreement is over whether Mr. Assad's government should stay in power.

This opened a second conflict: Syria's ethnic Kurdish minority took up arms amid the chaos. The Kurds carved out a de facto ministate and have gradually taken territory they see as Kurdish -- sometimes with

backing from the United States, which sees the Kurds as an ally against jihadist groups. While Mr. Assad has not focused on fighting the Kurdish groups, they are opposed by neighboring Turkey, which is in conflict with its own Kurdish minority.

The third conflict involves the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, which emerged out of infighting among jihadist groups. In 2014, the Islamic State seized large parts of Syria and Iraq, and it declared that territory its caliphate. The group has no allies and is at war with all other actors in the conflict.

The fourth, and most complex, dynamic may be the crisscrossing foreign interventions, which have grown steadily. Mr. Assad receives vital support from Iran and Russia, as well as the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. The rebels are backed by the United States and oil-rich Arab states like Saudi Arabia. These foreign powers have different agendas, but all pursue them by ramping up Syria's violence, helping to perpetuate the war.

### 2. How did the war happen?

On the surface, the conflict began in 2011 with the Arab Spring. Syrians, like other peoples across the region, rose up peacefully against their authoritarian government. Mr. Assad cracked down violently. Communities took up arms to defend themselves, then fought back in what became a civil war. Some soldiers joined the rebels, but not enough to win.

But that alone does not explain Syria's disintegration. It is now clear that the state was weak in ways that made it inherently unstable and prone to violence.

The government was dominated by a minority group. Over decades, Syria's religious and ethnic divides had taken on greater political importance, making the ruling minority fearful and reactive. Mr. Assad had strong support among the military and security services, but not the broader population, making violence more tempting. The instability was deepened by the fact that rural Syrians had moved to cities in large numbers in recent years, driven in part by droughts linked to climate change.

Fighting, once it began, was worsened by several external factors. A decade of war in neighboring Iraq had produced battle-hardened extremist groups that now flowed into Syria. Iraq's political troubles in 2011 and 2012 helped open space for the Islamic State. During this time, Syria was sucked into the regional power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

#### 3. Which countries are involved and why?

Five countries are playing a major role in Syria, each with different agendas. Their interventions have locked the war into an ever-worsening stalemate.

Iran was first, sending supplies and soldiers to prop up Mr. Assad. Iran sees Syria as crucial to its regional strategy: It provides access to Lebanon and therefore Hezbollah, a group Tehran uses for regional influence and as a counterweight to Israel, whose nuclear weapons it fears.

Saudi Arabia supported Syria's rebels in the hopes of replacing Mr. Assad with a friendlier government and of countering Iran's influence. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been rivals for decades, fighting something like a cold war for regional dominance. (Other Arab states like Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also backed the rebels.)

Their struggle has escalated for several reasons: Iran's growing power; the regional power vacuum that opened with the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 in Iraq; more political vacuums opened by the Arab Spring; a hawkish new king in Saudi Arabia; and Saudi fears that the United States is becoming less hostile toward Iran.

The United States funnels weapons to Syria's rebels. It did so initially out of opposition to Mr. Assad, a longtime enemy, and later to encourage those groups to fight the Islamic State. The United States has also armed Kurdish groups against the Islamic State.

Turkey sheltered Syrian rebels and ushered in foreign recruits, seeking to undermine and perhaps topple Mr. Assad. Later, the country also acted to counter Syrian Kurdish groups, fearing that they could strengthen Kurdish insurgents in Turkey.

Russia has backed Mr. Assad from the beginning, selling him arms and providing diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Syria is one of Russia's last remaining allies, and it is where Moscow maintains its only military bases outside the former Soviet Union. Russian forces intervened in 2015, at a time when Mr. Assad appeared to be losing ground.

## 4. Why is the war so bloody?

There have been atrocities on all sides, but forces loyal to Mr. Assad have committed by far the most. Because his government is so weak -- its support base is small and its military has suffered heavy defections -- Mr. Assad seems to believe he can regain control only by violently coercing Syrians into submission. That has included using chemical weapons, barrel bombs and starvation.

Because neither Mr. Assad nor the rebels are strong enough to win, the battle lines push back and forth, rolling across communities in waves of destruction that kill thousands but accomplish little else.

Foreign interventions have made those shifting front lines even bloodier and have deepened the stalemate. As a result, the overall violence kills more Syrians without altering the conflict's underlying dynamics.

The years of chaos have destroyed basic order in Syria. As often happens in lengthy civil wars, militias have filled the vacuum. Their leaders often behave more as warlords, forcibly extracting resources from local communities. This practice has been carried out by rebel militias and some that support the government.

The rise of the Islamic State has worsened all of these trends. The jihadist group has provided another set of shifting battle lines, introduced more warlords, compelled more foreign interventions and, most of all, put communities under its tyrannical, fanatical rule.

5. How did the war become divided by religion?

There is nothing innately religious about Syria's war, but its broader political forces have played out along religious lines. To understand why, it helps to start about 100 years ago.

After World War I, France took control of the territory of the defeated Ottoman Empire that is now Syria. France ruled through minority groups that would be too small to hold power without outside support. That included Alawites, followers of a branch of Shiite Islam, who joined the military in large numbers. The last French troops left in 1946, and a long period of turmoil followed. Syria's military consolidated power in a 1970 coup led by Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite general and the father of Bashar al-Assad.

Syria's authoritarian government favored Alawites and other minorities, widening social and political divides along sectarian lines. A sectarian civil war next door in Lebanon and the rise of Sunni religious politics widened them further, and Alawites continued to cluster in positions of power. The country's Sunni Arab majority came to feel, at times, that they were underserved.

Minority governments like Syria's tend to be unstable. They sometimes fear discrimination or worse should they lose power, and can see the majority group as a potential threat rather than a base of support. This can make them more willing to use violence to hold on to power -- as Mr. Assad did when his forces opened fire on peaceful protesters in 2011.

As the war has worsened, many Syrians have based their allegiance on sectarian identity. But this is not because they are motived primarily by religious or ethnic concerns. Rather, it is defensive. They fear that the other side will target them for their background, so they feel safe only with their own people. This contributes to atrocities: If Alawites are seen as innately pro-Assad, then Sunni militias could conclude that all Alawite civilians are a threat and treat them accordingly, which prompts more defensive sorting.

At the same time, the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy war is also playing out along sectarian lines, with the Saudis backing Sunnis and Iran backing Shiites across the region. For both countries, sectarianism is a tool by which they can cultivate proxy forces and stir up fear of the other side.

6. Where did the Islamic State come from?

The group has its roots in two earlier wars and the foreign occupations that followed: the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the first, Sunni Arab volunteers fought alongside Afghan rebels, later forming the global jihadist movement, including Al Qaeda. In the second, Al Qaeda and other Sunni groups flooded to Iraq to fight both the Americans and Iraq's Shiite majority.

A key name is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian extremist who fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s and Iraq in the 2000s. Mr. Zarqawi's views and methods were even more extreme and theatrical than Al Qaeda's. He flourished in Iraq's war, using tactics now associated with the Islamic State: videotaped beheadings, mass killings of fellow Muslims deemed nonbelievers and attacks meant to incite a Sunni-Shiite war.

Al Qaeda invited Mr. Zarqawi to rebrand his group as Al Qaeda in Iraq, but the two factions argued over strategy and ideology, setting them up for conflict a decade later in Syria.

Mr. Zarqawi was killed in 2006, and his group declined as Sunni Iraqis turned against it. Later, Iraq's Shiite-dominated government grew increasingly authoritarian and sectarian, alienating the minority Sunni. It also purged many experienced military and security officers, replacing them with political loyalists.

The successor to Mr. Zarqawi's group, then calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq, exploited these conditions in 2011 and 2012 to reconstitute itself, for example by breaking extremists out of Iraqi prisons. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, combined Mr. Zarqawi's views with an apocalypticism taking hold amid the region's upheaval.

Mr. Baghdadi sent a top officer into Syria's war to set up a new Al Qaeda franchise: the Nusra Front, now known as the Levant Conquest Front. In 2013, Mr. Baghdadi declared himself commander of all Al Qaeda

forces in Iraq and Syria. After years of tense partnership with Al Qaeda, the groups finally split. Mr. Baghdadi -- his force now rebranded as the Islamic State -- invaded Syria to fight his former Qaeda allies.

The Islamic State carved out a ministate in Syria's chaos, then used it as a base to invade Iraq in 2014. It repeated Mr. Zarqawi's worst tactics on a far larger scale, committing acts of genocide and mass murder in the Middle East and abroad, and attracting foreign recruits from rich and poor countries alike.

7. Why is the refugee crisis so severe?

The war in Syria has produced nearly five million refugees. The exodus has created three sets of problems, all dire: a humanitarian crisis for the refugees themselves, a potential crisis for the countries that host them and a political crisis in Europe over what to do.

Syrian refugees face disease and malnutrition. Host countries often bar them from working, meaning that families cannot provide for themselves. Many Syrian children are deprived of education, a problem that could hinder them for life.

Most Syrian refugees are in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, neighboring countries that lack the necessary resources to help them. The influx could be destabilizing, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon where Syrian refugees now make up a large share of the population.

Many refugees, unable to tolerate life in the camps, have braved the dangerous journey to Europe. But European voters have largely rejected them, supporting extreme measures to keep out Syrians and other migrants.

European leaders at one point suspended search-and-rescue missions in the Mediterranean, partly in response to complaints that saving refugees' lives might encourage more to make the journey. Leaders of the campaign to get Britain to leave the European Union based their argument partly on opposition to accepting Syrian refugees.

Europe's attitude appears driven by a combination of economic downturn; hostility toward the European Union, which allows unlimited migration among member states; and demographic anxiety rooted in longer-term trends that have made populations more diverse.

As a result, many refugees are stuck in camps in Italy and Greece. Many others die trying to reach Europe. European countries, along with the United States and Canada, have absorbed thousands of refugees, but not nearly enough to alter the underlying crisis.

### Text 7

#### The Australian, 2014

The West's post-9/11 strategy has failed. We have to do better

THE events of 2014 - Islamic State in Iraq, the Syrian civil war and its spillover into Lebanon, the collapse of Libya, what looks increasingly like a Taliban comeback in Afghanistan, the string of Boko Haram atrocities in Nigeria, terrorist attacks in Mali and Somalia, the unprecedented flow of Westerners to terrorist groups, and attacks in Ottawa and Melbourne - represent nothing less than the collapse of Western counterterrorism strategy as we've known it since 2001.

After 13 years, thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, we're worse off today than before 9/11, with a stronger, more motivated, more dangerous enemy than ever.

Whatever the reason - and there's more than enough blame to go around, in many countries and on all sides of politics - the -result is that governments are suffering "task saturation". So much is happening, simultaneously, in so many places that leaders are struggling to decide what to do, in what order. The danger is that we will engage in panicked, knee-jerk -responses rather than taking time to consider what an effective strategy looks like.

The first step, of course, is to admit that this really is, every bit, the strategic failure it seems. US president George W. Bush's large-footprint approach, invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, then rebuilding those countries from scratch at vast cost in time, troops, money and blood - what Maajid Nawaz, the former Islamist radical who now heads the London-based Quilliam Foundation, describes as "spreading democracy at the barrel of a gun" - bogged down the US and its allies in a decade-long counter--insurgency fight that demanded immense sacrifices from our troops, cost us our strategic freedom of act-ion and eroded the legitimacy of a cause that, at the outset, enjoyed huge global support.

President Barack Obama's strategy of precipitate withdrawal then pulled the rug out from underneath whatever progress had been made in stabilising Iraq and Afghanistan, neutralising those sacrifices and making a bad situation even worse. His passivity in the face of crises in Egypt and Libya, failure to support democracy movements in Syria and Iran, and reliance on unilateral drone strikes, raids and targeted killings - again, in Nawaz's formulation, "getting rid of the democracy but keeping the gun" - telegraphed weakness

to adversaries such as Iran and Russia, enabled the rebirth of Islamic State from the ashes of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, allowed a humanitarian tragedy in Syria and ultimately failed just as badly.

America's allies - Australia, Canada, Britain and the rest of NATO - went along out of solidarity, while corrupt, non-inclusive governments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have been as responsible as anyone for the dire outcomes in their countries. Nobody's in the clear: this is a bipartisan, multinational, equalopportunity screw-up.

The second step is to realise that this truly is, as many have argued, a long war. There's no magic bullet, no instant solution, let alone some carefully calibrated combination of firepower, diplomacy and technology that can quickly put the genie back in the bottle. Many Islamic State fighters are sons of Iraqis imprisoned by occupation forces a decade ago; many al-Shabab fighters in Somalia and Boko Haram militants in Nigeria are teenagers. Today's Taliban members are younger, more radical, more battle-hardened and better trained than those we fought in 2001 - they have plenty of energy, and all the time in the world.

There are more than 30,000 fighters in Islamic State and about as many in the Taliban and other extremist movements. The rise of Islamic State, the stimulating effect of its rivalry with al-Qa'ida, the Taliban resurgence and, above all, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's declaration of the caliphate are breathing new life into a global movement that seemed to be declining - proving that the ideology, like the movements defined by it, is tough and resilient. This conflict will not be over quickly or cleanly. On the contrary: it is, and will be, a multi-generational struggle against an implacable enemy, and the violence we're dealing with in the Middle East and Africa is not some unfortunate aberration - it's the new normal.

Nor can we pull up the drawbridge, disengage from the world and somehow avoid the fight. For one thing, there is no drawbridge: we live in connected societies whose prosperity and success rely on trade, travel and free intercourse with the world. Particularly for Australians, as citizens of a multicultural nation, plugged into the global economy, a key player in regional and world events, opting out just isn't feasible. For another, if we fail to face the threat where it is today - primarily overseas - we'll suffer the consequences at home. This isn't to rehash some Cold War domino theory in which we "fight them there or we'll fight them here". It's just to recognise the reality that a purely isolationist, defensive, policing strategy - protecting ourselves at home rather than seeking to defeat terrorism abroad - ultimately means the end of society as we know it. Mass surveillance, secret police, a national-security state, guards on every gate, a garrison society: that's what a "defensive" strategy actually entails.

While ever there's an entity - Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, the Taliban - that can attract and motivate disaffected young people in our societies, preying on their idealism and alienation, drawing them into what the late, great Time magazine Baghdad correspondent Jim Frederick called a "hyperviolent, nihilistic band of exterminators", the threat will remain. We can lock down our societies, destroying them in the process, or we can seek to remove that entity.

In short, what we've been doing has failed: we need a complete rethink. That rethink, I would suggest, needs to start with a threat analysis. What exactly is the threat we're facing and how can we address it in ways that are cheap enough, effective enough and non-intrusive enough to be sustainable across the long term, without undermining the openness, democracy and prosperity that make our societies worth defending in the first place?

IN my view there are four distinct (but related) threats to consider. In order of priority these are domestic radicalisation, foreign fighters, the effect of Islamic State on regional and global jihadist groups, and the destabilising effect of conflict in the Middle East. Let's consider each issue in turn.

Domestic radicalisation - the mobilising effect of overseas terrorist groups on people in our own societies - is the most immediate threat. Last week's attack in Ottawa, attacks on police and members of the public in Australia, last year's Boston Marathon bombing, and the horrendous attack in which two Muslim converts ran down off-duty soldier Lee Rigby with a car, then beheaded him in a London street in broad daylight, are examples of "self-radicalisation" or "remote radicalisation".

The randomness, unpredictability and copycat nature of these attacks, which require little preparation, give few warning signs, and are difficult to prevent, is what makes them so terrifying.

Attackers are often disenfranchised, alienated, marginalised young people, frequently converts: society's losers, who see radical Salafi-jihadist ideology as a way to be part of something big, historic and successful. They're not really self-radicalised. Rather, they often access online terrorist materials (increasingly in English) for inspir-ation, instruction and training, or link up online with radicals who groom them for action. Defeating this threat is partly a matter of community policing to identify and engage at-risk individuals, and partly a matter of detecting and monitoring access to online forums, radicalisation networks, social media and online training materials.

Despite the fear these attacks create, police and intelligence agencies have a pretty good handle on this type of threat, but in the long term this brings a potential cost to civil liberties and community cohesion. This is because, more broadly, domestic radicalisation occurs amid alienation, authoritarianism and conservatism -within some majority-Muslim communities, and hence suspicion of those communities from the rest of society. Ironically, it's the ultra-conservatism and lack of freedom for young people in these communities that make radicalism so attractive and exciting.

Western governments have been their own worst enemies here: the tendency to treat Muslim communities as a special case, to think that "mainstream" society can deal with "the Muslim community" (whatever that is) only through self-appointed, often conservative, authoritarian elders and notables, is to deny people the individual freedoms that belong to them, by right, as members of our society while absolving them from the responsibilities that go with those freedoms.

It's to set up an unelected, often illiberal intermediary between our wider society and the idealistic, motivated young people who deserve - and from whom society has a right to expect - the same rights and responsibilities as anyone else. So the right strategy for dealing with domestic radicalisation is more freedom, not less - but with it must come more individual accountability.

The second threat is that of foreign fighters, people who travel from our societies to join terrorist groups overseas. The pace and scale of foreign fighter flows into Syria, and now Islamic State, have been unprecedented, 10 to 12 times the size of anything we saw during the Iraq war. And many of these people are "cleanskins", people with Western passports, Western faces and no known previous connection with violent radicalism.

The threat that such fighters, blooded in Iraq or Syria, may return to target their home countries is real and serious, though in practice many become disillusioned, are killed overseas or fail to return. Still, it would take only a small proportion of the dozens of Australians fighting with Islamic State in Syria to return home to pose a serious threat. Combined with self-radicalised individuals in their home communities, these people could form the nucleus of a serious domestic terrorist threat.

The appropriate strategy here seems to be a combination of pol-icing and community engagement at home, and intelligence gathering overseas. Much as for domestic radicalisation, foreign fighters belong to communities and have families who care about them, and want them home and safe - for many, reintegration and monitoring may be the right approach. For others who commit atrocities overseas, participate in direct combat against their countrymen, or seek to bring their lethal skills back to target their home societies - well, the battlefield is a dangerous place, they take their chances, and many may not come back.

For those who seek to return, robust monitoring, border security and the ability to revoke or suspend travel documents may be all that's required. Experience has shown, though, that it's unproductive to treat all returning foreign fighters as a threat - debriefing, deradicalisation and reintegration programs can work, though results have been patchy.

These first two threats, then - domestic radicalisation and foreign fighters - are best dealt with through a strategy that combines policing, community engagement, intelligence work and border security. Australians, by global standards, are well served by institutions that are effective and generally bound by the rule of law and respect for civil liberties. But the ratcheting effect of these kinds of security measures - think of airline security since 9/11 - is such that if this is all we do, we'll eventually find ourselves living in a garrison state, with para-militarised police and intelligence services that are more effective at stifling freedoms in the name of safety than in providing security.

Dealing with the last two threats - the regional effect of groups such as Islamic State and the destabilising effect on the Middle East - requires overseas -engagement because only by removing that overseas threat and its magnetic effect on marginalised individuals at home can we ultimately dial back the securitisation of our society and thus preserve individual liberty.

The emergence of Islamic State has reinvigorated a global movement that seemed to be flagging after the death of Osama bin Laden and in the wake of the Arab Spring. Salafi-jihadist groups in North Africa, South Asia, Indonesia, The Philippines and even Latin America have been re-energised by the movement's success in Iraq and Syria, and by the declaration of the caliphate.

It's worth noting that Bagh-dadi, unlike bin Laden, claims an actual religious qualification - a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence - and claims to be a Qureishi, from the tribe of the prophet Mohammed. When a man such as that gives a public sermon in the main mosque in Iraq's second city, Mosul, a city occupied by Americans only a few years ago, then declares a caliphate, announces his intent to expand that caliphate by conquest and calls on all true Muslims to join him and build a new, triumphant Islamic state, this has a huge effect on Salafi believers worldwide - at least some of whom may feel a sense of obligation to support him, while many others feel a stirring of excitement and historical purpose.

The regional strategy to deal with such a challenge is one area where Australia, at least, has had a good track record since 9/11 - one of close co-operation with, support for, and assistance to partners such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and The Philippines.

Australian co-operation with Indonesia, for example, though it has had its ups and downs, has generally had an extremely favourable impact on the capability of Indonesia's police and legal ser-vices, on information sharing and on regional security, with support for jihadist groups dropping steadily across time. Australia's diplomatic leadership, peer-to-peer co-operation among police and law enforcement, and carefully tailored foreign assistance and intelligence partnerships have made Australians and our regional partners safer, and at a modest cost.

Continuing and deepening this co-operation at the regional level is a key component, then, of our overall strategy - as well as extending it to other parts of the world such as Africa, parts of Eur-ope and Latin America.

Finally, the threat that has received most public attention in the past few months, that of destabilisation and conflict in the Middle East, clearly demands the strongest military response we can muster. Islamic State is a state-building enterprise, with a government, territory, an economy, a population under its control and an aggressive agenda of expansionism and sectarian violence. If we are ultim-ately to remove the other threats, Islamic State has to be destroyed.

Today's strategy - of airstrikes, limited ground engagement in Iraq and training and logistical support to Syrian nationalist rebels - is fine as far as it goes, but there are some serious problems in its execution, and one fundamental flaw: the lack of a clearly defined regional end-state. Ultimately, the tough choice will be whether to tolerate the continued misrule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria or to seek a transition - most likely through a negotiated process - to a new regime.

This will be difficult, but it's essential if the strategy is to have any chance of succeeding. At present, air attacks on Islamic State are simply creating room for the Assad regime to expand its control. This is why the Turkish government has been reluctant to commit to an effort that favours separatist Kurds and the Baathist government of Syria at the expense of regional stability, and it's why so few Syrian nationalist rebels - so-called "moderates" - have come forward for training.

Until Western powers commit to the ultimate replacement of the Assad regime with a transitional unity or ultimately a secular democratic government - something the original democracy protesters called for in 2011, right at the beginning of the war - it's hard to imagine any Syrian volunteering to fight with us against -Islamic State. In any case, it will be months or more before Iraqi and Syrian forces are sufficiently trained to take the fight forward effectively.

Australia has a role in this, and an important one, both in the air and on the ground. But we should remember that of the four threats posed by Islamic State, this is last on the list for the simple reason that it's a huge and complex challenge that is beyond Australia's ability to address alone.

OUR goal seems to be - as it should be - to contribute where we can, participate as a valued and capable member of the coalition, and help develop a longer-term strategy as part of that coalition. At the same time, we shouldn't make the mistake of meekly going along with a strategy with no clear or -viable outcome in sight: Australia's contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq have earned us the respect, and the right, to have a say in the strategy, and we should exercise that right vigorously.

The bottom line is that 2014 has exposed the weakness of a strategic approach that for too long focused just on neutralising terrorist plots and killing or capturing senior terrorist leaders. This approach looked, and often felt, as if it were proactive - taking the fight to the enemy. But in reality, as this year has shown, it was too narrowly -focused to succeed.

The silver lining in this year's crisis is that it forces us to a rethink. Australia should use that opportunity to broaden the strategy, building an integrated and sustainable approach that focuses on the four areas in priority order while exercising the right, earned across more than a decade in the war against terrorism and more than 70 years as a leading US ally, to have a say as to how that campaign develops.

And as we do these things, we should remember our fundamental strategic purpose: to preserve a free society, connected and integrated with the world and within itself, free from external terror and internal oppression.

This is truly an enormous challenge, but meeting it is essential if we are to rise from this year's crisis to a counter-terrorism strategy that can be maintained for the duration of this long conflict.

Australian David Kilcullen is a US-based counter-insurgency and intelligence analyst and a former adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq. He will deliver the 2014 John Bonython Lecture in Sydney on November 12 for the Centre for Independent Studies, What are We Fighting For? Islamism and the Threat to Liberal Ideas.

#### Text 8

#### The Australian, 2015

Jail term awaits returning jihadists

Australian jihadists disillusioned with life in Syria can -expect arrest, prosecution and jail if they return to Australia, not a warm welcome, Tony Abbott has said.

The Prime Minister said foreign fighters posed a unique threat to Australia and any -attempt on their behalf to return to the communities they have abandoned must be treated -warily.

Mr Abbott was -responding to revelations in The Australian yesterdaythat at least three suspected Australian -jihadis were in secret talks with the government about returning home.

He rejected suggestions that such men could play a valuable role in debunking the Islamist propaganda pumped out by the Islamic State.

The men, understood to have fought with either the Islamic State or al-Qa'ida's official Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, have been talking with Australian Federal Police, in at least one case through Melbourne lawyer Rob Stary.

The Prime Minister made it clear yesterday that any Australian known to have fought with a terror group abroad could expect only one fate - jail.

"If you go abroad to kill innocent people in the name of misguided fundamentalism and extremism, if you go abroad to become an Islamist killer, well, we're hardly going to welcome you back into this country," he said.

His comments were echoed by Immigration Minister Peter -Dutton, who said Australia's counter-terror laws were quite "specific" when it came to foreign fighters. "The Australian people expect their country to be safe, and -someone who has been a terrorist abroad could very easily become a terrorist here in Australia," Mr Dutton said.

"If they go off to fight in a proscribed area, for example, that is an offence against Australian law. When they return, they can expect to face Australian law - and that's how it operates." Mr Stary said foreign fighters who returned home, jaded and battle-weary, had a unique role to play in the government deradicalisation programs that authorities hoped would steer vulnerable young Muslims away from Islamist violence.

"They don't pose a prospective risk on their return," Mr Stary said. "More importantly, as I said, the counter narrative can be used to discourage other people from going to those hot spots." Mr Stary's views found some support from the Australian -Strategic Policy Institute's Clare Murphy and Anthony Bergin, who argued that not all of the 104 -Australians believed to be -participating in the Syrian jihad could be lumped in the same -category.

Some may be conducting -humanitarian work, or may have been "misinformed" about what to expect.

Writing in The Australian today, they call for a "triage" -system to individually assess the situation of every returning -jihadist.

"(Some) could be an effective and powerful tool in discouraging other young Australians joining the world of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq," they write.

In recent weeks, counter-terrorism officials have expressed alarm about the increasingly young age of would-be jihadis.

Islamic State is believed to have moved from what might be -described as a "mass market" -approach to a more targeted -recruitment process.

Young Australian Muslims are being "groomed" by senior Islamic State figures such as former -Melbourne man Neil Prakash, who make contact with them via open source social media platforms, such as Twitter, before taking the communications offline, often through encrypted mess-aging -applications.

They are then radicalised and encouraged to conduct domestic terror attacks.

#### Text 9 The Times, 2017

Britons fighting for Islamic State should be prosecuted in the countries in which they are caught rather than be returned to this country, Theresa May told the G7 summit yesterday.

The prime minister urged other world leaders to give more help to countries around Syria and Iraq to prevent foreign fighters returning undetected, by bolstering their capability to identify and catch fighters through data-sharing and helping to build the legal capacity to prosecute them.

Mrs May said: "It is vital we do more to co-operate with our partners in the region to step up returns and prosecutions of foreign fighters. This means improving intelligence-sharing, evidence gathering and bolstering countries' police and legal processes." Successive British governments have worried about the threat posed by returning foreign fighters, with about 350 thought to be in the UK.

Senior legal figures said yesterday that the UK's capacity to prosecute Britons suspected of fighting in Iraq and Syria was limited, and that high-profile trials in British courts risked political controversy.

The case of Aine Davis, a Londonborn jihadist who was jailed in Turkey, was an example of the cooperation Mrs May wanted, Whitehall sources said.

Davis was suspected of having been part of a four-strong Islamist terrorist cell with Mohammed Emwazi, the killer known as Jihadi John. Davis, 33, was this month convicted of being a member of a terrorist organisation and jailed for seven and a half years. He had been tracked by Turkish police and intelligence officials days after being smuggled out of Syria by Isis.

Critics could see the initiative as part of efforts to "outsource" the problem to countries with poor human rights records. Iraq has the death penalty and President Erdogan of Turkey wants to reinstate capital punishment.

A government source said: "A successful prosecution was brought in Turkey. We now plan to work with other countries to ensure the right legal structures and processes are in place for prosecutions to happen. They include Lebanon, Jordan and governed Iraq."