In this paper, I respond to criticisms raised to my version of hinge epistemology in three contributions to the present volume. Namely, Luca Zanetti’s paper on “Inescapable hinges. Steps towards a transcendental hinge epistemology”, Natalie Ashton’s on “Extended rationality and epistemic relativism”, and Sebastiano Moruzzi’s on “Hinge epistemology and alethic pluralism”.
Hinges, radical skepticism and alethic pluralism / Coliva, A.. - (2019), pp. 1-20.
Hinges, radical skepticism and alethic pluralism
A. Coliva
2019
Abstract
In this paper, I respond to criticisms raised to my version of hinge epistemology in three contributions to the present volume. Namely, Luca Zanetti’s paper on “Inescapable hinges. Steps towards a transcendental hinge epistemology”, Natalie Ashton’s on “Extended rationality and epistemic relativism”, and Sebastiano Moruzzi’s on “Hinge epistemology and alethic pluralism”.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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Notes for Pedersen-Non evidential epistemology-Final.docx
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