This paper argues for a new approach to building Byzantine fault tolerant replication systems. We observe that although recently developed BFT state machine replication protocols are quite fast, they don't tolerate Byzantine faults very well: a single faulty client or server is capable of rendering PBFT, Q/U, HQ, and Zyzzyva virtually unusable. In this paper, we (1) demonstrate that existing protocols are dangerously fragile, (2) define a set of principles for constructing BFT services that remain useful even when Byzantine faults occur, and (3) apply these principles to construct a new protocol, Aardvark. Aardvark can achieve peak performance within 40% of that of the best existing protocol in our tests and provide a significant fraction of that performance when up to f servers and any number of clients are faulty. We observe useful throughputs between 11706 and 38667 requests per second for a broad range of injected faults.

Making Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine Faults / Clement, Allen; Wong, Edmund; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Dahlin, Mike; Marchetti, Mirco. - (2009). (Intervento presentato al convegno The 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation tenutosi a Boston, MA, USA nel April 22 - 24, 2009).

Making Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine Faults

MARCHETTI, Mirco
2009

Abstract

This paper argues for a new approach to building Byzantine fault tolerant replication systems. We observe that although recently developed BFT state machine replication protocols are quite fast, they don't tolerate Byzantine faults very well: a single faulty client or server is capable of rendering PBFT, Q/U, HQ, and Zyzzyva virtually unusable. In this paper, we (1) demonstrate that existing protocols are dangerously fragile, (2) define a set of principles for constructing BFT services that remain useful even when Byzantine faults occur, and (3) apply these principles to construct a new protocol, Aardvark. Aardvark can achieve peak performance within 40% of that of the best existing protocol in our tests and provide a significant fraction of that performance when up to f servers and any number of clients are faulty. We observe useful throughputs between 11706 and 38667 requests per second for a broad range of injected faults.
2009
apr-2009
The 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Boston, MA, USA
April 22 - 24, 2009
Clement, Allen; Wong, Edmund; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Dahlin, Mike; Marchetti, Mirco
Making Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine Faults / Clement, Allen; Wong, Edmund; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Dahlin, Mike; Marchetti, Mirco. - (2009). (Intervento presentato al convegno The 6th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation tenutosi a Boston, MA, USA nel April 22 - 24, 2009).
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Licenza Creative Commons
I metadati presenti in IRIS UNIMORE sono rilasciati con licenza Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal, mentre i file delle pubblicazioni sono rilasciati con licenza Attribuzione 4.0 Internazionale (CC BY 4.0), salvo diversa indicazione.
In caso di violazione di copyright, contattare Supporto Iris

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11380/1135267
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 291
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact