The paper argues for a new interpretation of Moore's paradox, which hinges on the idea of beliefs as commitments vs as mere dispostions. It also presents a criticism of previous accounts of Moore's paradox and defends the proposed solution from several possible objections.
How to commit Moore's paradox / Coliva, Annalisa. - In: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. - ISSN 0022-362X. - STAMPA. - 112:4(2015), pp. 169-192. [10.5840/jphil2015112411]
How to commit Moore's paradox
COLIVA, Annalisa
2015
Abstract
The paper argues for a new interpretation of Moore's paradox, which hinges on the idea of beliefs as commitments vs as mere dispostions. It also presents a criticism of previous accounts of Moore's paradox and defends the proposed solution from several possible objections.
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